LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF 


ELOQUENCE 


OF 


THE  UNITED  STATES 


COMPILED 

BY  E.  B.  WILLISTON. 


IN  FIVE  VOLUMES, 
VOL.  I. 


MIDDLETOWN,  CONN, 
PRINTED    AND    PUBLISHED    BY    F..    &    H.    CLARK 

1827. 
LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFOR3MIA 
DAVIS 


\ 


DISTRICT  OF  CONNECTICUT,  SS. 

BE  IT  REMEMBERED,  That  on  the  seventeenth  day  of 
July,  in  the  fifty-se  ond  year  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  E.  B.  WILLISTOK,  of  the  said 
District,  hath  deposited  in  this  Office,  the  title  of  a  Book,  the  right  whereof 
he  claims  as  Author  and  Proprietor,  in  the  words  following — to  wit: 

"  Eloquence  of  the  United  States :  compiled  by  E.  B.   Willision,   in  Jive 
volumes." 

In  conformity  to  the  Act  of  Congress  of  the  United  States,  entitled,  "  An  Act 
for  the  encouragement  of  learning,  by  securing  the  copies  of  Maps,  Charts  and 
Books,  to  the  authors  and  proprietors  of  such  copies,  during  the  times  therein 
mentioned." — And  also  to  the  Act,  entitled, "  An  Act  supplementary  to  an  Act, 
entitled  4  An  Act  for  the  encouragement  of  learning,  by  securing  the  copies  of 
Maps,  Charts  and  Books,  to  the  authors  and  proprietors  of  such  copies  during 
the  times  therein  mentioned,'  and  extending  the  benefits  thereof  to  the  arts  of 
designing,  engraving  and  etching  historical  and  other  prints." 

CHA'S  A.  INGERSOLL, 

Clerk  of  the  District  of  Connecticut. 
A  true  copy  of  Record,  examined  and  sealed  by  me, 

CHA'S  A.  INGERSOLL, 

Clerk  of  the  District  of  Connecticut. 


PREFACE. 


THE  Compiler  of  these  volumes  was  induced  to 
engage  in  the  undertaking,  from  the  conviction  that  a 
collection  of  the  kind  would  be  of  great  public  utili 
ty  and  meet  with  liberal  encouragement.  He  now 
offers  them  to  the  public  with  much  diffidence,  aris 
ing  from  an  apprehension  that  he  may  have  been  in 
judicious  in  his  choice  of  materials,  and  that  the  ex 
pectations  of  his  patrons  will  be  disappointed. 

The  work  consists  of  selections  from  the  Delibe 
rative,  Forensic  and  Miscellaneous  Eloquence  of  the 
United  States. 

A  copious  selection  has  been  made  from  the  de 
bates  in  the  several  State  Conventions  on  the  expe 
diency  of  adopting  the  Federal  Constitution,  which,  it 
is  believed,  will  be  found  highly  interesting  at  the  pre 
sent  time,  when  so  much  difference  of  opinion  exists 
relative  to  the  true  meaning  and  intent  of  some  parts 
of  that  instrument. 

The  Congressional  Eloquence  of  the  most  inter 
esting  period  of  our  history,  (during  the  Revolution,) 
is  irrevocably  lost;  and  such  was  the  condition  of  the 


PREFACE. 


art  of  reporting  for  several  years  subsequent,  that 
sketches  only  of  the  debates  were  preserved  by  the 
reporters. 

In  the  selection  of  the  Speeches  -in  Congress,  two 
objects  have  directed  the  Compiler  in  his  choice  —  the 
eloquence  of  the  productions,  and  the  importance 
of  the  subjects  of  discussion  ;  and  as  far  as  practica 
ble,  he  has  given  preference  to  those  which  unite 
both  these  qualities.  He  has  endeavored,  without 
regard  to  the  political  parties  which  have  existed,  to 
make  the  selection  in  such  manner  as  to  furnish  a 
view  of  the  most  important  subjects  which  have 
engaged  the  deliberations  of  Congress.  Several 
speeches,  originally  reported  in  the  third  person, 
have  been  changed  to  the  first  with  as  little  altera 
tion  in  the  phraseology  as  possible. 

In  Forensic  Eloquence,  great  excellence  has  been 
attained  in  this  country;  but  most  of  the  efforts  in 
this  department  have  passed  away  with  the  occasions 
which  gave  them  birth,  or  exist  only  in  the  recollec 
tions  of  those  who  heard  them. 

In  the  prosecution  of  his  undertaking,  the  Compi 
ler  has  applied  to  every  source  from  which  he  could 
expect  to  derive  aid  ;  and  takes  this  opportunity  to 
acknowledge  his  great  obligations  to  numerous  gen 
tlemen,  from  whom  he  has  received  valuable  assist 
ance.  He  still  is  sensible  that,  notwithstanding  his 
exertions  to  render  the  collection  as  perfect  as  possi- 


PREFACE. 


ble,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  *  sin  of  omission' 
may  be  justly  laid  to  his  charge. 

But  when  it  is  considered  how  various  and  exten 
sive  are  the  materials  from  which  the  compilation 
has  been  made,  he  feels  confident  that  due  allowance 
will  be  made  for  any  errors  of  this  kind  into  which 
he  may  have  fallen. 

MlDDLETOWN,    CONNECTICUT,  ) 

Nov.  13,  1827.  S 


I 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  FIRST. 


Mr.  WILSON'S  Speech  on  the  expediency  of  adopting 
the  Federal  Constitution,  in  the  Convention  of 
Pennsylvania,  November  26,  1787, 1 

Mr.  HAMILTON'S  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the 

Convention  of  New  York,  June  20,  1788,     ...       22 

Mr.  HAMILTON'S  second  Speech  on  the  same  subject, 

in  the  Convention  of  New  York,  June  24,  1788,     .       45 

Mr.  HAMILTON'S   third  Speech  on   the  same  subject, 

in  the  Convention  of  New  York,  June  27,  1788,     .       61 

Mr.  HENRY'S  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the  Con 
vention  of  Virginia,  June  4,  1788, 73 

Mr.  RANDOLPH'S   Speech  on  the  same  subject,   in  the  /^ 

Convention  of  Virginia,  June  6,  1788,       ....     102 

Mr.  MADISON'S  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the  Con 
vention  of  Virginia,  June,  1788, 128 

Mr.  HENRY'S  second  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the 

Convention  of  Virginia,  June  7,  1788,      ....     178 

Mr.  MARSHALL'S   Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the 

Convention  of  Virginia,  June  20,  1788,     ....     226 

Mr.  HENRY'S  third  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the 

(            Convention  of  Virginia,  June,  24,  1788,     ....     240 
President  WASHINGTON'S  Inaugural  Address,  April  30, 
1789,         252 
Mr.  SMITH'S  Speech  on  Mr.  Madison's  Resolutions,  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States, 

January  13,  1794, 257 

Mr.  NICHOLAS'  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States, 

January  16,  1794, 286 

Mr.  AMES'  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  the  United  States,  January  27, 

1794,         29S 

Mr.  MADISON'S  Speech  on  the  British  Treaty,  in  the 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States, 

April  15,  1796,  332 

Mr.  GILES'  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  the  United  States,  April  18, 
1796,  352 

Mr.  GALLATIN'S  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States, 
April  26,  1796, 396 

Mr.  AMES'  Speech  on  the  same  subject,  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  of  the  United  States,  April  28, 
1796,  425 

President  J.  ADAMS'  Inaugural  Address,  March  4,  1797,       464 

Mr.  HARPER'S  Speech  on  the  necessity  of  resisting  the 
Aggressions  and  Encroachments  of  France  ;  in  the 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States, 
May  29,-  1797, 471 


SPEECH  OF  JAMES  WILSON. 

ON  THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  ADOPTING  THE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 

DELIVERED    IN   THE   CONVENTION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 
NOVEMBER  26lh,  1787.* 


THE  system  proposed,  by  the  late  convention,  for 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  is  now  before 
you.  Of  that  convention  I  had  the  honor  to  be  a 
member.  As  I  am  the  only  member  of  that  body,  who 
has  the  honor  to  be  also  a  member  of  this,  it  may  be 

*  Soon  after  the  termination  of  the  war  of  the  revolution,  it  be 
came  apparent  that  the  powers  vested  in  the  General  Government* 
by  the  articles  of  Confederation,  were  inadequate,  and  that  the  unity 
which  had  existed  among  the  states  during  the  war,  had  resulted 
rather  from  the  pressure  of  circumstances,  than  from  any  authority 
of  the  General  Government. 

So  universal  was  the  conviction  that  the  public  welfare  required 
a  Government  of  more  extensive  powers,  that  in  May,  1787,  a  con 
vention,  composed  of  delegates  from  all  the  states  in  the  union,  with 
the  exception  of  Rhode  Island,  assembled  at  Philadelphia,  to  take 
the  subject  into  consideration.  It  continued  its  deliberations  with 
closed  doors  until  the  17th  of  the  following  September,  when  thf 
Federal  Constitution  was  promulgated.  The  convention  resolved. 
"  That  the  constitution  be  laid  before  the  United  States,  in  Con 
gress  assembled,  and  that  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  convention  that 
it  should  afterwards  be  submitted  to  a  convention  of  delegates,  cho 
sen  in  each  state  by  the  people  thereof,  for  their  assent  and  ratifica 
tion." 

In  conformity  to  the  recommendation  of  the  convention,  Con 
gress,  on  the  28th  of  the  same  month,  passed  a  resolution  directing 
that  the  constitution  be  submitted  to  conventions  to  be  assembled 
in  the  several  states. 

In  the  conventions  subsequently  assembled,  the  expediency  of  adopt 
ing  the  constitution  was  discussed  wfth  great  ability  and  eloquence. 
The  wisdom,  genius  and  patriotism  of  the  nation,  were  here  called  into 
action,  and  their  concentrated  rays  threw  over  the  subject  a  flood  of 
light  which  left  none  of  its  intricacies  unrevealed. — COMPILED. 
VOL.  T.  I 


2  MR.  WILSON'S  SPEECH  ON" 

expected  that  I  should  prepare  the  way  for  the  delibe 
rations  of  this  assembly,  by  unfolding  the  difficulties 
which  the  late  convention  were  obliged  to  encounter ; 
by  pointing  out  the  end  which  they  proposed  to  ac 
complish  ;  and  by  tracing  the  general  principles  which 
they  have  adopted  for  the  accomplishment  of  that  end. 

To  form  a  good  system  of  government  for  a  single 
city  or  state,  however  limited  as  to  territory,  or  incon 
siderable  as  to  numbers,  has  been  thought  to  require 
the  strongest  efforts  of  human  genius.  With  what 
conscious  diffidence,  then,  must  the  members  of  the 
convention  have  revolved  in  their  minds  the  immense 
undertaking  which  was  before  them.  Their  views 
could  not  be  confined  to  a  small  or  a  single  community, 
but  were  expanded  to  a  great  number  of  states  ;  seve 
ral  of  which  contain  an  extent  of  territory,  and  re 
sources  of  population,  equal  to  those  of  some  of  the 
most  respectable  kingdoms  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic.  Nor  were  even  these  the  only  objects  to 
be  comprehended  within  their  deliberations.  Numer 
ous  states  yet  unformed,  myriads  of  the  human  race, 
who  will  inhabit  regions  hitherto  uncultivated,  were 
to  be  affected  by  the  result  of  their  proceedings.  It 
Avas  necessary,  therefore,  to  form  their  calculations  on 
a  scale  commensurate  to  a  large  portion  of  the  globe. 

For  my  own  part,  I  have  been  often  lost  in  astonish 
ment  at  the  vastness  of  the  prospect  before  us.  To 
open  the  navigation  of  a  single  river  was  lately  thought, 
in  Europe,  an  enterprise  adequate  to  imperial  glory. 
But  could  the  commercial  scenes  of  the  Scheldt  be 
compared  with  those  that,  under  a  good  government, 
will  be  exhibited  on  the  Hudson,  the  Delaware,  the 
Potomac,  and  the  numerous  other  rivers,  that  water 
and  are  intended  to  enrich  the  dominions  of  the  United 
States? 

The  difficulty  of  the  business  was  equal  to  its  mag 
nitude.  No  small  share  of  wisdom  and  address  is  re 
quisite  to  combine  and  reconcile  the  jarring  interests, 
that  prevail,  or  seem  to  prevail,  in  a  single  community. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  ;{ 

The  United  States  contain  already  thirteen  govern 
ments  mutually  independent.  Those  governments 
present  to  the  Atlantic  a  front  of  fifteen  hundred  miles 
in  extent.  Their  soil,  their  climates,  their  produc 
tions,  their  dimensions,  their  numbers,  are  different. 
In  many  instances,  a  difference  and  even  an  opposi 
tion  subsists  among  their  interests  ;  and  a  difference 
and  even  an  opposition  is  imagined  to  subsist  in  many 
more.  An  apparent  interest  produces  the  same  attach 
ment  as  a  real  one ;  and  is  often  pursued  with  no  less 
perseverance  and  vigor.  When  all  these  circumstances 
are  seen  and  attentively  considered,  will  any  mem 
ber  of  this  honorable  body  be  surprised,  that  such  a 
diversity  of  things  produced  a  proportioned  diversity 
of  sentiment  ?  Will  he  be  surprised  that  such  a  diversi 
ty  of  sentiment  rendered  a  spirit  of  mutual  forbearance 
and  conciliation  indispensably  necessary  to  the  success 
of  the  great  work  ?  And  will  he  be  surprised  that  mu 
tual  concessions  and  sacrifices  were  the  consequences 
of  mutual  forbearance  and  conciliation  ?  When  the 
springs  of  opposition  were  so  numerous  and  strong, 
and  poured  forth  their  waters  in  courses  so  varying, 
need  we  be  surprised  that  the  stream  formed  by  then- 
conjunction  was  impelled  in  a  direction  somewhat 
different  from  that,  which  each  of  them  would  have 
taken  separately  ? 

I  have  reason  to  think  that  a  difficulty  arose  in  the 
minds  of  some  members  of  the  convention  from  another 
consideration — their  ideas  of  the  temper  and  disposi 
tion  of  the  people,  for  whom  the  constitution  is  propos 
ed.  The  citizens  of  the  United  States,  however  differ^ 
ent  in  some  other  respects,  are  well  known  to  agree  in 
one  strongly  marked  feature  of  their  character — a 
warm  and  keen  sense  of  freedom  and  independence. 
This  sense  has  been  heightened  by  the  glorious  result 
of  their  late  struggle  against  all  the  efforts  of  one  of 
the  most  powerful  nations  of  Europe.  It  was  appre 
hended,  I  believe,  by  some,  that  a  people  so  high  spirit 
ed  would  ill  brook  the  restraints  of  an  efficient  govern- 


i  MR.  WILSON'S  SPEECH  ON 

rnent.  I  confess  that  this  consideration  did  not  influ 
ence  my  conduct.  I  knew  my  constituents  to  be  high 
spirited;  but  I  knew  them  also  to  possess  sound 
sense.  I  knew  that,  in  the  event,  they  would  be  best 
pleased  with  that  system  of  government,  which  would 
best  promote  their  freedom  and  happiness.  I  have 
often  revolved  this  subject  in  my  mind.  I  have  sup 
posed  one  of  my  constituents  to  ask  me,  why  I  gave 
such  a  vote  on  a  particular  question  ?  I  have  always 
thought  it  would  be  a  satisfactory  answer  to  say — 
because  I  judged,  upon  the  best  consideration  I  could 
give,  that  such  a  vote  was  right.  I  have  thought  that 
it  would  be  but  a  very  poor  compliment  to  my  con 
stituents  to  say,  that  in  my  opinion,  such  a  vote  would 
have  been  proper,  but  that  I  supposed  a  contrary  one 
would  be  more  agreeable  to  those  who  sent  me  to  the 
convention.  I  could  not,  even  in  idea,  expose  myself 
to  such  a  retort  as,  upon  the  last  answer,  might  have 
been  justly  made  to  me.  Pray,  sir,  what  reasons  have 
you  for  supposing  that  a  right  vote  would  displease 
your  constituents  ?  Is  this  the  proper  return  for  the 
high  confidence  they  have  placed  in  you?  If  they  have 
given  cause  for  such  a  surmise,  it  was  by  choosing  a 
representative,  who  could  entertain  such  an  opinion  of 
them.  I  was  under  no  apprehension,  that  the  good 
people  of  this  state  would  behold  with  displeasure  the 
brightness  of  the  rays  of  delegated  power,  when  it  only 
proved  the  superior  splendor  of  the  luminary,  of 
which  those  rays  were  only  the  reflection. 

A  very  important  difficulty  arose  from  comparing 
the  extent  of  the  country  to  be  governed,  with  the  kind 
of  government  which  it  would  be  proper  to  establish 
in  it.  It  has  been  an  opinion,  countenanced  by  high 
authority,  "  that  the  natural  property  of  small  states  is 
to  be  governed  as  a  republic ;  of  middling  ones,  to  be 
subject  to  a  monarch;  and  of  large  empires,  to  be 
swayed  by  a  despotic  prince;  and  that  the  conse 
quence  is,  that,  in  order  to  preserve  the  principles  of 
the  established  government,  the  state  must  be  support- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  0 

ed  in  the  extent  it  has  acquired ;  and  that  the  spirit  of 
the  state  will  alter  in  proportion  as  it  extends  ^or  con 
tracts  its  limits."*  This  opinion  seems  to  be  support 
ed,  rather  than  contradicted,  by  the  history  of  the  gov 
ernments  in  the  old  world.  Here  then  the  difficulty 
appeared  in  full  view.  On  one  hand,  the  United  States 
contain  an  immense  extent  of  territory,  and,  according 
to  the  foregoing  opinion,  a  despotic  government  is  best 
adapted  to  that  extent.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
well  known,  that,  however  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  might,  with  pleasure,  submit  to  the  legitimate 
restraints  of  a  republican  constitution,  they  would 
reject,  with  indignation,  the  fetters  of  despotism. 
What  then  was  to  be  done  ?  The  idea  of  a  confede 
rate  republic  presented  itself.  This  kind  of  constitu 
tion  has  been  thought  to  have  "  all  the  internal  ad 
vantages  of  a  republican,  together  with  the  external 
force  of  a  monarchical  government."!  Its  description 
is, "  a  convention,  by  which  several  states  agree  to  be 
come  members  of  a  larger  one,  which  they  intend  to 
establish.  It  is  a  kind  of  assemblage  of  societies,  that 
constitute  a  new  one,  capable  of  increasing  by  means 
of  farther  association."!  The  expanding  quality  of  I 
such  a  government  is  peculiarly  fitted  for  the  United 
States,  the  greatest  part  of  whose  territory  is  yet  un-  f 
cultivated. 

But  while  this  form  of  government  enabled  us  to 
surmount  the  difficulty  last  mentioned,  it  conducted 
us  to  another,  of  which  I  am  now  to  take  notice.  It 
left  us  almost  without  precedent  or  guide ;  and,  con 
sequently,  without  the  benefit  of  that  instruction, 
which,  in  many  cases,  may  be  derived  from  the  con 
stitution,  and  history,  and  experience  of  other  nations. 
Several  associations  have  frequently  been  called  by 
the  name  of  confederate  states,  which  have  not,  in 


*  Mont.  Sp.  L.  b.  8.  c.  20. 

t  Id.  b.  9.  c.  1.     1  Paley,  199—202. 

1  Mont.  Sp.  L.  b.  9.  c.  1. 


()  MR.  WILSON'S  SPEECH  ON 

propriety  of  language,  deserved  it.  The  Swiss  Can 
tons  are  connected  only  by  alliances.  The  United 
Netherlands  are  indeed  an  assemblage  of  societies  • 
but  this  assemblage  constitutes  no  new  one ;  and,  there 
fore,  it  does  not  correspond  with  the  full  definition  of 
a  confederate  republic.  The  Germanic  body  is  com 
posed  of  such  disproportioned  and  discordant  mate 
rials,  and  its  structure  is  so  intricate  and  complex, 
that  little  useful  knowledge  can  be  drawn  from  it. 
Ancient  history  discloses,  and  barely  discloses  to  our 
view,  some  confederate  republics — the  Achgean  league, 
the  Lycian  confederacy,  and  the  Amphictyonic  coun 
cil.  But  the  facts  recorded  concerning  their  consti 
tutions  are  so  few  and  general,  and  their  histories  are 
so  unmarked  and  defective,  that  no  satisfactory  infor 
mation  can  be  collected  from  them  concerning  many 
particular  circumstances,  from  an  accurate  discern 
ment  and  comparison  of  which  alone,  legitimate  and 
practical  inferences  can  be  made  from  one  constitu 
tion  to  another.  Besides,  the  situation  and  dimensions 
of  those  confederacies,  and  the  state  of  society,  man 
ners,  and  habits  in  them,  were  so  different  from  those 
of  the  United  States,  that  the  most  correct  descrip 
tions  could  have  supplied  but  a  very  small  fund  of  ap 
plicable  remark.  Thus,  in  forming  this  system,  we 
were  deprived  of  many  advantages,  which  the  history 
and  experience  of  other  ages  and  other  countries 
would,  in  other  cases,  have  afforded  us. 

Permit  me  to  add,  in  this  place,  that  the  science 
even  of  government  itself,  seems  yet  to  be  almost  in 
its  state  of  infancy.  Governments,  in  general,  have 
been  the  result  of  force,  of  fraud,  and  of  accident. 
After  a  period  of  six  thousand  years  has  elapsed  since 
the  creation,  the  United  States  exhibit  to  the  world 
the  first  instance,  as  far  as  we  can  learn,  of  a  nation, 
unattacked  by  external  force,  unconvulsed  by  domes 
tic  insurrections,  assembling  voluntarily,  deliberating 
fully,  and  deciding  calmly,  concerning  that  system  of 
government  under  which  they  would  wish  that  they 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  7 

and  their  posterity  should  live.  The  ancients,  so  en 
lightened  on  other  subjects,  were  very  uninformed  with 
regard  to  this.  They  seem  scarcely  to  have  had  any 
idea  of  any  other  kinds  of  government,  than  the  three 
simple  forms  designated  by  the  epithets,  monarchical, 
aristocratical,  and  democratical.  I  know  that  much 
and  pleasing  ingenuity  has  been  exerted,  in  modem 
times,  in  drawing  entertaining  parallels  between  some 
of  the  ancient  constitutions,  and  some  of  the  mixed 
governments  that  have  since  existed  in  Europe.  But  I 
much  suspect  that,  on  strict  examination,  the  instances 
of  resemblance  will  be  found  to  be  few  and  weak ;  to 
be  suggested  by  the  improvements,  which,  in  subse 
quent  ages,  have  been  made  in  government,  and  not 
to  be  drawn  immediately  from  the  ancient  constitu 
tions  themselves,  as  they  were  intended  and  under 
stood  by  those  who  framed  them.  To  illustrate  this, 
a  similar  observation  may  be  made  on  another  subject. 
Admiring  critics  have  fancied,  that  they  have  discover 
ed  in  their  favorite  Homer  the  seeds  of  all  the  improve 
ments  in  philosophy,  and  in  the  sciences,  made  since 
his  time.  What  induces  me  to  be  of  this  opinion,  is, 
that  Tacitus,  the  profound  politician  Tacitus,  who 
lived  towards  the  latter  end  of  those  ages  which  are 
now  denominated  ancient,  who  undoubtedly  had  stu 
died  the  constitutions  of  all  the  states  and  kingdoms 
known  before  and  in  his  time,  and  who  certainly  was 
qualified,  in  an  uncommon  degree,  for  understanding 
the  full  force  and  operation  of  each  of  them,  considers, 
after  all  he  had  known  and  read,  a  mixed  government, 
composed  of  the  three  simple  forms,  as  a  thing  rather 
to  be  wished  than  expected :  and  he  thinks,  that  if 
such  a  government  could  even  be  instituted,  its  dura 
tion  could  not  be  long.  One  thing  is  very  certain,  that, 
the  doctrine  of  representation  in  government  was  al 
together  unknown  to  the  ancients.  Now  the  know 
ledge  and  practice  of  this  doctrine  is,  in  my  opinion, 
essential  to  every  system,  that  can  possess  the  quali 
ties  of  freedom,  wisdom,  and  energy. 


tf  MR.  WILSON'S  SPEECH  ON 

It  is  worthy  of  remark,  and  the  remark  may,  perhaps, 
excite  some  surprise,  that  representation  of  the  people 
is  not,  even  at  this  day,  the  sole  principle  of  any  gov 
ernment  in  Europe.  Great  Britain  boasts,  and  she 
may  well  boast,  of  the  improvement  she  has  made  in 
politics,  by  the  admission  of  representation:  for  the 
improvement  is  important  as  far  as  it  goes ;  but  it  by 
no  means  goes  far  enough.  Is  the  executive  power  of 
Great  Britain  founded  on  representation?  This  is 
not  pretended.  Before  the  revolution,  many  of  the 
kings  claimed  to  reign  by  divine  right,  and  others  by 
hereditary  right ;  and  even  at  the  revolution,  nothing 
farther  was  effected  or  attempted,  than  the  recogni 
tion  of  certain  parts  of  an  original  contract,*  supposed 
at  some  remote  period  to  have  been  made  between 
the  king  and  the  people.  A  contract  seems  to  ex 
clude,  rather  than  to  imply,  delegated  power.  The 
judges  of  Great  Britain  are  appointed  by  the  crown. 
The  judicial  authority,  therefore,  does  not  depend  upon 
representation,  even  in  its  most  remote  degree.  Does 
representation  prevail  in  the  legislative  department  of 
the  British  government  ?  Even  here  it  does  not  pre 
dominate  ;  though  it  may  serve  as  a  check.  The  le 
gislature  consists  of  three  branches,  the  king,  the 
lords,  and  the  commons.  Of  these,  only  the  latter  are 
supposed  by  the  constitution  to  represent  the  authority 
of  the  people.  This  short  analysis  clearly  shows,  to 
what  a  narrow  corner  of  the  British  constitution  the 
principle  of  representation  is  confined.  I  believe  it 
does  not  extend  farther,  if  so  far,  in  any  other  govern 
ment  in  Europe.  For  the  American  States  were  re 
served  the  glory  and  the  happiness  of  diffusing  this 
vital  principle  through  all  the  constituent  parts  of  gov 
ernment.  Representation  is  the  chain  of  communi 
cation  between  the  people,  and  those  to  whom  they 
have  committed  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  govern 
ment.  This  chain  may  consist  of  one  or  more  links ; 

*  I  Bl.  Com.  233. 


THE   FEDERAL    CONSTITUTION.  9 

but  in  all  cases  it  should  be  sufficiently  strong  and 
discernible. 

To  be  left  without  guide  or  precedent  was  not  the 
only  difficulty,  in  which  the  convention  were  involved, 
by  proposing  to  their  constituents  a  plan  of  a  confede 
rate  republic.  They  found  themselves  embarrassed 
with  another  of  peculiar  delicacy  and  importance ;  I 
mean  that  of  drawing  a  proper  line  between  the  nation 
al  government  and  the  governments  of  the  several 
states.  It  was  easy  to  discover  a  proper  and  satisfac 
tory  principle  on  the  subject.  Whatever  object  of  gov 
ernment  is  confined  in  its  operation  and  effects  within 
the  bounds  of  a  particular  state,  should  be  con 
sidered  as  belonging  to  the  government  of  that 
state ;  whatever  object  of  government  extends  in  its 
operation  or  effects  beyond  the  bounds  of  a  particular 
state,  should  be  considered  as  belonging  to  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States.  But  though  this  principle 
be  sound  and  satisfactory,  its  application  to  particular 
cases  would  be  accompanied  with  much  difficulty; 
because,  in  its  application,  room  must  be  allowed  for 
great  discretionary  latitude  of  construction  of  the 
principle.  In  order  to  lessen  or  remove  the  difficulty 
arising  from  discretionary  construction  on  this  subject, 
an  enumeration  of  particular  instances,  in  which  the 
application  of  the  principle  ought  to  take  place,  has 
been  attempted  with  much  industry  and  care.  It  is 
only  in  mathematical  science,  that  aline  can  be  describ 
ed  with  mathematical  precision.  But  I  flatter  myself 
that,  upon  the  strictest  investigation,  the  enumeration 
will  be  found  to  be  safe  and  unexceptionable ;  and  ac 
curate  too,  in  as  great  a  degree  as  accuracy  can  be 
expected  in  a  subject  of  this  nature.  Particulars 
under  this  head  will  be  more  properly  explained,  when 
we  descend  to  the  minute  view  of  the  enumeration 
which  is  made  in  the  proposed  constitution. 

After  all,  it  will  be  necessary,  that,  on  a  subject  so 
peculiarly  delicate  as  this,  much  prudence,  much  can 
dor,  much  moderation,  and  much  liberality  should  be 


10  MR.  WILSON'S   SPEECH  O>s 

exercised  and  displayed,  both  by  the  federal  govern 
ment  and  by  the  governments  of  the  several  states. 
It  is  to  be  hoped,  that  those  virtues  in  government  will 
be  exercised  and  displayed,  when  we  consider,  that  the 
powers  of  the  federal  government,  and  those  of  the 
state  governments,  are  drawn  from  sources  equally 
pure.  If  a  difference  can  be  discovered  between  them, 
it  is  in  favor  of  the  federal  government;  because  that 
government  is  founded  on  a  representation  of  the  whole 
union ;  whereas  the  government  of  any  particular  state 
is  founded  only  on  the  representation  of  a  part,  incon 
siderable  when  compared  with  the  whole.  It  is  not 
more  reasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  counsels  of  the 
whole  will  embrace  the  interest  of  every  part,  than  that 
the  counsels  of  any  part  will  embrace  the  interests  of 
the  whole. 

I  intend  not,  sir,  by  this  description  of  the  difficulties 
with  which  the  convention  were  surrounded,  to  magnify 
their  skill  or  their  merit  in  surmounting  them,  or  to 
insinuate  that  any  predicament,  in  which  the  conven 
tion  stood,  should  prevent  the  closest  and  most  cautious 
scrutiny  into  the  performance,  which  they  have  exhibit 
ed  to  their  constituents  and  to  the  world.  My  inten 
tion  is  of  far  other  and  higher  aim — to  evince  by  the 
conflicts  and  difficulties  which  must  arise  from  the 
many  and  powerful  causes  which  I  have  enumerated, 
that  it  is  hopeless  and  impracticable  to  form  a  constitu 
tion,  which  will,  in  every  part,  be  acceptable  to  every 
citizen,  or  even  to  every  government  in  the  United 
States ;  and  that  all  which  can  be  expected  is,  to  form 
such  a  constitution  as,  upon  the  whole,  is  the  best  that 
can  possibly  be  obtained.  Man  and  perfection ! — a 
state  and  perfection  ! — -an  assemblage  of  states  and 
perfection !  Can  we  reasonably  expect,  however 
ardently  we  may  wish,  to  behold  the  glorious  union  ? 

I  can  well  recollect,  though  I  believe  I  cannot  convey 
to  others,  the  impression,  which,  on  many  occasions, 
was  made  by  the  difficulties  which  surrounded  and 
pressed  the  convention.  The  great  undertaking,  at 


THE   FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  H 

some  times,  seemed  to  be  at  a  stand ;  at  other  times, 
its  motions  seemed  to  be  retrograde.  At  the  conclu 
sion,  however,  of  our  work,  many  of  the  members  ex 
pressed  their  astonishment  at  the  success  with  which 
it  terminated. 

Having  enumerated  some  of  the  difficulties  which 
the  convention  were  obliged  to  encounter  in  the  course 
of  their  proceedings,  I  shall  next  point  out  the  end 
which  they  proposed  to  accomplish.  Our  wants,  our 
talents,  our  affections,  our  passions,  all  tell  us  that  we 
were  made  for  a  state  of  society.  But  a  state  of  so 
ciety  could  not  be  supported  long  or  happily  without 
some  civil  restraint.  It  is  true  that,  in  a  state  of  na 
ture,  any  one  individual  may  act  uncontrolled  by  others; 
but  it  is  equally  true,  that,  in  such  a  state,  every  other 
individual  may  act  uncontrolled  by  him.  Amidst  this 
universal  independence,  the  dissensions  and  animosi 
ties  between  interfering  members  of  the  society  would 
be  numerous  and  ungovernable.  The  consequence 
would  be,  that  each  member,  in  such  a  natural  state, 
would  enjoy  less  liberty,  and  suffer  more  interruption, 
than  he  would  in  a  regulated  society.  Hence  the  uni 
versal  introduction  of  governments  of  some  kind  or 
other  into  the  social  state.  The  liberty  of  every 
member  is  increased  by  this  introduction ;  for  each 
gains  more  by  the  limitation  of  the  freedom  of  every 
other  member,  than  he  loses  by  the  limitation  of  his 
own.  The  result  is,  that  civil  government  is  ne 
cessary  to  the  perfection  and  happiness  of  man.  In 
forming  this  government,  and  carrying  it  into  execution, 
it  is  essential  that  the  interest  and  authority  of  the 
whole  community  should  be  binding  on  every  part  of  it. 

The  foregoing  principles  and  conclusions  are  gene 
rally  admitted  to  be  just  and  sound  with  regard  to  the 
nature  and  formation  of  single  governments,  and  the 
duty  of  submission  to  them.  In  some  cases  they  will 
apply,  with  much  propriety  and  force,  to  states  already 
formed.  The  advantages  and  necessity  of  civil  gov 
ernment  among  individuals  in  society  are  not  greater 


jo  ;MJ{.  WILSON'S  SPEECH  o\ 

or  stronger  than,  in  some  situations  and  circumstances, 
are  the  advantages  and  necessity  of  a  federal 
government  among  states.  A  natural  and  a  very 
important  question  now  presents  itself.  Is  such  the 
situation — are  such  the  circumstances  of  the  United 
States  ?  A  proper  answer  to  this  question  will  unfold 
some  very  interesting  truths. 

The  United  States  may  adopt  any  one  of  four  differ 
ent  systems.  They  may  become  consolidated  into 
one  government,  in  which  the  separate  existence  of 
the  states  shall  be  entirely  absorbed.  They  may  re 
ject  any  plan  of  union  or  association,  and  act  as 
separate  and  unconnected  states.  They  may  form 
two  or  more  confederacies.  They  may  unite  in  one 
federal  republic.  Which  of  these  systems  ought  to 
have  been  proposed  by  the  convention  ?  To  support 
with  vigor,  a  single  government  over  the  whole  ex 
tent  of  the  United  States,  would  demand  a  system  of 
the  most  unqualified  and  the  most  unremitted  despot 
ism.  Such  a  number  of  separate  states,  contiguous  in 
situation,  unconnected  and  disunited  in  government, 
would  be,  at  one  time,  the  prey  of  foreign  force,  foreign 
influence,  and  foreign  intrigue ;  at  another,  the  victim 
of  mutual  rage,  rancor,  and  revenge.  Neither  of 
these  systems  found  advocates  in  the  late  convention : 
I  presume  they  will  not  find  advocates  in  this.  Would 
it  be  proper  to  divide  the  United  States  into  two  or 
more  confederacies  ?  It  will  not  be  unadvisable  to 
take  a  more  minute  survey  of  this  subject.  Some 
aspects,  under  which  it  may  be  viewed,  are  far  from 
being,  at  first  sight,  uninviting.  Two  or  more  confede 
racies  would  be  each  more  compact  and  more 
manageable,  than  a  single  one  extending  over  the 
same  territory.  By  dividing  the  United  States  into 
two  or  more  confederacies,  ithe  great  collision  of  in 
terests,  apparently  or  really  different  and  contrary,  in 
the  whole  extent  of  their  dominion,  would  be  broken, 
and  in  a  great  measure  disappear  in  the  several  parts. 
But  these  advantages,  which  are  discovered  from 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  13 

certain  points  of  view,  are  greatly  overbalanced  by 
inconveniences  that  will  appear  on  a  more  accurate 
examination.  Animosities,  and  perhaps  wars,  would 
arise  from  assigning  the  extent,  the  limits,  and  the 
rights  of  the  different  confederacies.  The  expenses 
of  governing  would  be  multiplied  by  the  number  of 
federal  governments.  The  danger  resulting  from  for 
eign  influence  and  mutual  dissensions  would  not,  per 
haps,  be  less  great  and  alarming  in  the  instance  of 
different  confederacies,  than  in  .the  instance  of  dif 
ferent,  though  more  numerous  unassociated  states. 
These  observations,  and  many  others  that  might  be 
made  on  the  subject,  will  be  sufficient  to  evince,  that 
a  division  of  the  United  States  into  a  number  of  sepa 
rate  confederacies,  would  probably  be  an  unsatis 
factory  and  an  unsuccessful  experiment.  The  re 
maining  system,  which  the  American  States  may 
adopt,  is  a  union  of  them  under  one  confederate 
republic.  It  will  not  be  necessary  to  employ  much 
time  or  many  arguments  to  show,  that  this  is  the 
most  eligible  system  that  can  be  proposed.  By 
adopting  this  system,  the  vigor  and  decision  of  a 
wide  spreading  monarchy  may  be  joined  to  the  free 
dom  and  beneficence  of  a  contracted  republic.  The 
extent  of  territory,  the  diversity  of  climate  and  soil,  the 
number,  and  greatness,  and  connexion  of  lakes  and 
rivers,  with  which  the  United  States  are  intersected 
and  almost  surrounded,  all  indicate  an  enlarged  gov 
ernment  to  be  fit  and  advantageous  for  them.  The 
principles  and  dispositions  of  their  citizens  indicate, 
that. in  this  government  liberty  shall  reign  triumphant. 
Such  indeed  have  been  the  general  opinions  and  wishes 
entertained  since  the  era  of  our  independence.  If 
those  opinions  and  wishes  are  as  well  founded  as  they 
have  been  general,  the  late  convention  were  justified 
in  proposing  to  their  constituents  one  confederate  re 
public,  as  the  best  system  of  a  national  government  for 
the  United  States. 

In  forming  this  system,  it  was  proper  to  give  minute 


14  MR.  WILSON'S  SPEECH  O\ 

attention  to  the  interests  of  all  the  parts ;  but  there 
was  a  duty  of  still  higher  import — to  feel  and  to  show 
a  predominating  regard  to  the  superior  interests  of 
the  whole.  If  this  great  principle  had  not  prevailed, 
the  plan  before  us  would  never  have  made  its  ap 
pearance.  The  same  principle  that  was  so  necessary 
in  forming  it,  is  equally  necessary  in  our  deliberations, 
whether  we  should  reject  or  ratify  it. 

I  make  these  observations  with  a  design  to  prove 
and  illustrate  this  gr.eat  and  important  truth — that  in 
our  decisions  on  the  work  of  the  late  convention,  we 
should  not  limit  our  views  and  regards  to  the  state  of 
Pennsylvania.  The  aim  of  the  convention  was,  to 
form  a  system  of  good  and  efficient  government  on  the 
more  extensive  scale  of  the  United  States.  In  this,  as 
in  every  other  instance,  the  work  should  be  judged 
with  the  same  spirit  with  which  it  was  performed. 
A  principle  of  duty  as  well  as  of  candor  demands 
this. 

We  have  remarked,  that  civil  government  is  neces 
sary  to  the  perfection  of  society  :  we  now  remark,  that 
civil  liberty  is  necessary  to  the  perfection  of  civil  gov 
ernment.  Civil  liberty  is  natural  liberty  itself,  divest 
ed  only  of  that  part,  which,  placed  in  the  government, 
produces  more  good  and  happiness  to  the  community, 
than  if  it  had  remained  in  the  individual.  Hence  it 
follows,  that  civil  liberty,  while  it  resigns  a  part  of 
natural  liberty,  retains  the  free  and  generous  exercise 
of  all  the  human  faculties,  so  far  as  it  is  compatible 
with  the  public  welfare. 

In  considering  and  .  developing  the  nature  and  end 
of  the  system  before  us,  it  is  necessary  to  mention 
another  kind  of  liberty,  which  has  not  yet,  as  far  as  I 
know,  received  a  name.  I  shall  distinguish  it  by  the 
appellation  of  federal  liberty.  When  a  single  govern 
ment  is  instituted,  the  individuals,  of  which  it  is  com 
posed,  surrender  to  it  a  part  of  their  natural  independ 
ence,  which  they  before  enjoyed  as  men.  When  a 
confederate  republic  is  instituted,  the  communities,  of 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  15 

which  it  is  composed,  surrender  to  it  a  part  of  their 
political  independence,  which  they  before  enjoyed  as 
states.  The  principles  which  directed,  in  the  former 
case,  what  part  of  the  natural  liberty  of  the  man  ought 
to  be  given  up,  and  what  part  ought  to  be  retained, 
will  give  similar  directions  in  the  latter  case.  The 
states  should  resign  to  the  national  government  that 
part,  and  that  part  only,  of  their  political  liberty,  which, 
placed  in  that  government,  will  produce  more  good  to 
the  whole,  than  if  it  had  remained  in  the  several  states. 
While  they  resign  this  part  of  their  political  liberty, 
they  retain  the  free  and  generous  exercise  of  all  their 
other  faculties  as  states,  so  far  as  it  is  compatible 
with  the  welfare  of  the  general  and  superintending 
confederacy. 

Since  states  as  well  as  citizens  are  represented  in 
the  constitution  before  us,  and  form  the  objects  on 
which  that  constitution  is  proposed  to  operate,  it  was 
necessary  to  notice  and  define  federal  as  well  as  civil 
liberty. 

These  general  reflections  have  been  made  in  order 
to  introduce?  with  more  propriety  and  advantage,  a 
practical  illustration  of  the  end  proposed  to  be  accom 
plished  by  the  late  convention. 

It  has  been  too  well  known — it  has  been  too  severely 
felt — that  the  present  confederation  is  inadequate  to 
the  government  and  to  the  exigencies  of  the  United 
States.  The  great  struggle  for  liberty  in  this  country, 
should  it  be  unsuccessful,  will  probably  be  the  last  one 
which  she  will  have  for  her  existence  and  prosperity, 
in  any  part  of  the  globe.  And  it  must  be  confessed, 
that  this  struggle  has,  in  some  of  the  stages  of  its  pro 
gress,  been  attended  with  symptoms  that  foreboded 
no  fortunate  issue.  To  the  iron  hand  of  tyranny, 
which  was  lifted  up  against  her,  she  manifested,  indeed, 
an  intrepid  superiority.  She  broke  in  pieces  the  fet 
ters  which  were  forged  for  her,  and  showed  that  she 
was  unassailable  by  force.  But  she  was  environed  by 
dangers  of  another  kind,  and  springing  from  a  very 


16  MR.  WILSON'S  SPEECH  ON 

different  source.  While  she  kept  her  eye  steadily 
fixed  on  the  efforts  of  oppression,  licentiousness  was 
secretly  undermining  the  rock  on  which  she  stood. 

Need  I  call  to  your  remembrance  the  contrasted 
scenes,  of  which  we  have  been  witnesses  ?  On  the 
glorious  conclusion  of  our  conflict  with  Britain,  what 
high  expectations  were  formed  concerning  us  by 
others !  What  high  expectations  did  we  form  con 
cerning  ourselves!  Have  those  expectations  been 
realized  ?  No.  What  has  been  the  cause?  Did  our 
citizens  lose  their  perseverance  and  magnanimity  ? 
No.  Did  they  become  insensible  of  resentment  and 
indignation  at  any  high  handed  attempt,  that  might 
have  been  made  to  injure  or  enslave  them?  No. 
What  then  has  been  the  cause  ?  The  truth  is,  we 
dreaded  danger  only  on  one  side :  this  we  manfully 
repelled.  But  on  another  side,  danger,  not  less  formi 
dable,  but  more  insidious,  stole  in  upon  us ;  and  our 
unsuspicious  tempers  were  not  sufficiently  attentive, 
either  to  its  approach  or  to  its  operations.  Those, 
whom  foreign  strength  could  not  overpower,  have 
well  nigh  become  the  victims  of  internal  anarchy. 

If  we  become  a  little  more  particular,  we  shall  find 
that  the  foregoing  representation  is  by  no  means  exag 
gerated.  When  we  had  baffled  all  the  menaces  of 
foreign  power,  we  neglected  to  establish  among  our 
selves  a  government,  that  would  ensure  domestic  vigor 
and  stability.  What  was  the  consequence?  The 
commencement  of  peace  was  the  commencement  of 
every  disgrace  and  distress,  that  could  befall  a  people 
in  a  peaceful  state.  Devoid  of  national  power,  we 
could  not  prohibit  the  extravagance  of  our  importa 
tions,  nor  could  we  derive  a  revenue  from  their  excess. 
Devoid  of  national  importance,  we  could  not  procure 
for  our  exports  a  tolerable  sale  at  foreign  markets. 
Devoid  of  national  credit,  we  saw  our  public  securities 
melt  in  the  hands  of  the  holders,  like  snow  before  the 
sun.  Devoid  of  national  dignity,  we  could  not,  in 
some  instances,  perform  our  treaties  on  our  part : 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  17 

<•> 

and,  in  other  instances,  we  could  neither  obtain  nor 
compel  the  performance  of  them  on  the  part  of  others. 
Devoid  of  national  energy,  we  could  not  carry  into 
execution  our  own  resolutions,  decisions,  or  laws. 

Shall  I  become  more  particular  still  ?  The  tedious 
detail  would  disgust  me:  nor  is  it  now  necessary. 
The  years  of  languor  are  past.  We  have  felt  the  dis 
honor,  with  which  we  have  been  covered :  we  have 
seen  the  destruction  with  which  we  have  been  threat 
ened.  We  have  penetrated  to  the  causes  of  both,  and 
when  we  have  once  discovered  them,  we  have  begun 
to  search  for  the  means  of  removing  them.  For  the 
confirmation  of  these  remarks,  I  need  not  appeal  to  an 
enumeration  of  facts.  The  proceedings  of  Congress, 
and  of  the  several  states,  are  replete  with  them.  They 
all  point  out  the  weakness  and  insufficiency  of  the 
present  confederation  as  the  cause,  and  an  efficient 
general  government  as  the  only  cure  of  our  political 
distempers. 

Under  these  impressions,  and  with  these  views,  was 
the  late  convention  appointed;  and  under  these  im 
pressions,  and  with  these  views,  the  late  convention 
met. 

We  now  see  the  great  end  which  they  proposed  to 
accomplish.  It  was  to  frame,  for  the  consideration  of 
their  constituents,  one  federal  and  national  constitu 
tion — a  constitution  that  would  produce  the  advan 
tages  of  good,  and  prevent  the  inconveniences  of  bad 
government — a  constitution,  whose  beneficence  and 
energy  would  pervade  the  whole  union,  and  bind  and 
embrace  the  interests  of  every  part — a  constitution 
that  would  ensure  peace,  freedom,  and  happiness,  to 
the  states  and  people  of  America. 

We  are  now  naturally  led  to  examine  the  means,  by 
which  they  proposed  to  accomplish  this  end.  This 
opens  more  particularly  to  our  view  the  important  dis 
cussion  before  us.  But  previously  to  our  entering  upon 
it,  it  will  not  be  improper  to  state  some  general  and 
leading  principles  of  government,  which  will  receive 

VOL.  i.  3 


18  MR.   WILSON'S   SPEECH  ON 

particular  applications  in  the  course  of  our  investi 
gations. 

There  necessarily  exists  in  every  government  a 
power,  from  which  there  is  no  appeal;  and  which,  for 
that  reason,  may  be  termed  supreme,  absolute,  and 
uncontrollable.  Where  does  this  power  reside  ?  To 
this  question,  writers  on  different  governments  will 
give  different  answers.  Sir  William  Blackstone  will 
tell  you,  that  in  Britain,  the  power  is  lodged  in  the 
British  parliament ;  that  the  parliament  may  alter  the 
form  of  the  government ;  and  that  its  power  is  abso 
lute  and  without  control.  The  idea  of  a  constitution, 
limiting  and  superintending  the  operations  of  legisla 
tive  authority,  seems  not  to  have  been  accurately  un 
derstood  in  Britain.  There  are,  at  least,  no  traces  of 
practice,  conformable  to  such  a  principle.  The  British 
constitution  is  just  what  the  British  parliament  pleases. 
When  the  parliament  transferred  legislative  authority 
to  Henry  the  eighth,  the  act  transferring  it  could  not, 
in  the  strict  acceptation  of  the  term,  be  called  uncon 
stitutional. 

To  control  the  power  and  conduct  of  the  legisla 
ture  by  an  overruling  constitution,  was  an  improve 
ment  in  the  science  and  practice  of  government  re 
served  to  the  American  States. 

Perhaps  some  politician,  who  has  not  considered, 
with  sufficient  accuracy,  our  political  systems,  would 
answer,  that,  in  our  governments,  the  supreme  power 
is  vested  in  the  constitutions.  This  opinion  ap 
proaches  a  step  nearer  to  the  truth,  but  doe  snot  reach 
it.  The  truth  is,  that,  in  our  governments,  the  su 
preme,  absolute,  and  uncontrollable  power  remains 
in  the  people.  As  our  constitutions  are  superior  to 
our  legislatures;  so  the  people  are  superior  to  our 
constitutions.  Indeed,  the  superiority,  in  this  last  in 
stance,  is  much  greater ;  for  the  people  possess,  over 
our  constitutions,  control  in  act,  as  well  as  in  right. 

The  consequence  is,  that  the  people  may  change 
the  constitutions,  whenever  and  however  they  please- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  19 

This  is  a  right,  of  which  no  positive  institution  can 
ever  deprive  them. 

These  important  truths,  sir,  are  far  from  being 
merely  speculative :  we,  at  this  moment,  speak  and 
deliberate  under  their  immediate  and  benign  influence. 
To  the  operation  of  these  truths,  we  are  to  ascribe 
the  scene,  hitherto  unparalleled,  which  America  now 
exhibits  to  the  world — a  gentle,  a  peaceful,  a  volunta 
ry,  and  a  deliberate  transition  from  one  constitution  of 
government  to  another.  In  other  parts  of  the  world, 
the  idea  of  revolutions  in  government  is,  by  a  mourn 
ful  and  indissoluble  association,  connected  with  the 
idea  of  wars,  and  all  the  calamities  attendant  on  wars. 
But  happy  experience  teaches  us  to  view  such  revolu 
tions  in  a  very  different  light — to  consider  them  only 
as  progressive  steps  in  improving  the  knowledge  of 
government,  and  increasing  the  happiness  of  society 
and  mankind. 

Oft  have  I  viewed  with  silent  pleasure  and  admira 
tion,  the  force  and  prevalence,  through  the  United 
States,  of  this  principle — that  the  supreme  power  re 
sides  in  the  people ;  and  that  they  never  part  with  it. 
It  may  be  called  the  panacea  in  politics.  There  can 
be  no  disorder  in  the  community  but  may  here  receive 
a  radical  cure.  If  the  error  be  in  the  legislature,  it 
may  be  corrected  by  the  constitution ;  if  in  the  con 
stitution,  it  may  be  corrected  by  the  people.  There 
is  a  remedy,  therefore,  for  every  distemper  in  govern 
ment,  if  the  people  are  not  wanting  to  themselves. 
For  a  people  wanting  to  themselves,  there  is  no  reme 
dy  :  from  their  power,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  no  ap 
peal:  to  their  error,  there  is  no  superior  principle  of 
correction. 

There  are  three  simple  species  of  government — 
monarchy,  where  the  supreme  power  is  in  a  single 
person — aristocracy,  where  the  supreme  power  is  in  a 
select  assembly,  the  members  of  which  either  fill  up, 
by  election,  the  vacancies  in  their  own  body,  or  suc 
ceed  to  their  places  in  it  by  inheritance,  property,  or  in 


20  MR.  WILSON'S  SPEECH  ON 

respect  of  some  personal  right  or  qualification — a  re 
public  or  democracy,  where  the  people  at  large  retain 
the  supreme  power,  and  act  either  collectively  or  by 
representation.  Each  of  these  species  of  government 
has  its  advantages  and  disadvantages. 

The  advantages  of  a  monarchy  are,  strength,  des 
patch,  secrecy,  unity  of  counsel.  Its  disadvantages 
are,  tyranny,  expense,  ignorance  of  the  situation  and 
wants  of  the  people,  insecurity,  unnecessary  wars,  evils 
attending  elections  or  successions. 

The  advantage  of  aristocracy  is,  wisdom,  arising 
from  experience  and  education.  Its  disadvantages  are, 
dissensions  among  themselves,  oppression  to  the  lower 
orders. 

The  advantages  of  democracy  are,  liberty,  equal,  cau 
tious  and  salutary  laws,  public  spirit,  frugality,  peace, 
opportunities  of  exciting  and  producing  the  abilities 
of  the  best  citizens.  Its  disadvantages  are,  dissensions, 
the  delay  and  disclosure  of  public  counsels,  the  imbe 
cility  of  public  measures  retarded  by  the  necessity  of  a 
numerous  consent. 

A  government  may  be  composed  of  two  or  more  of 
the  simple  forms  above  mentioned.  Such  is  the  British 
government.  It  would  be  an  improper  government  for 
the  United  States;  because  it  is  inadequate  to  such  an 
extent  of  territory ;  and  because  it  is  suited  to  an  es 
tablishment  of  different  orders  of  men.  A  more  mi 
nute  comparison  between  some  parts  of  the  British 
constitution,  and  some  parts  of  the  plan  before  us,  may, 
perhaps,  find  a  proper  place  in  a  subsequent  period  of 
our  business. 

What  is  the  nature  and  kind  of  that  government, 
which  has  been  proposed  for  the  United  States,  by 
the  late  convention  ?  In  its  principle,  it  is  purely  de- 
mocratical :  but  that  principle  is  applied  in  different 
forms,  in  order  to  obtain  the  advantages,  and  exclude 
the  inconveniences  of  the  simple  modes  of  government. 
If  we  take  an  extended  and  accurate  view  of  it,  we 
shall  find  the  streams  of  power  running  in  different 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  21 

directions,  in  different  dimensions,  and  at  different 
heights,  watering,  adorning,  and  fertilizing  the  fields 
and  meadows,  through  which  their  courses  are  led; 
but  if  we  trace  them,  we  shall  discover,  that  they  all 
originally  flow  from  one  abundant  fountain.  In  this 
constitution,  all  authority  is  derived  from  THE  PEOPLE. 
Fit  occasions  will  hereafter  offer  for  particular  re 
marks  on  the  different  parts  of  the  plan.  I  have  now 
to  ask  pardon  of  the  house  for  detaining  them  so  long. 


SPEECH  OF  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON, 

ON    THE    EXPEDIENCY     OF    ADOPTING    THE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 
DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,  JUNE  20, 1788. 


The  second  section  of  the  first  article  of  the  constitution  having 
heen  read,  the  following  amendment  was  proposed  : 

"  Resolved,  That  it  is  proper  that  the  number  of  representatives  be 
fixed  at  the  rate  of  one  for  every  twenty  thousand  inhabitants,  to 
be  ascertained  on  the  principles  mentioned  in  the  second  section 
of  the  first  article  of  the  constitution,  until  they  amount  to  three 
hundred ;  after  which,  they  shall  be  apportioned  among  the 
states,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  inhabitants  of  the  states  re 
spectively  :  and  that  before  the  first  enumeration  shall  be  made, 
the  several  states  shall  be  entitled  to  choose  double  the  number  of 
representatives  for  that  purpose,  mentioned  in  the  constitution  ;" 
when  Mr.  Hamilton  addressed  the  convention  as  follows. — 


MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

THE  honorable  member,  who  spoke  yesterday, 
went  into  an  explanation  of  a  variety  of  circumstances 
to  prove  the  expediency  of  a  change  in  our  national 
government,  and  the  necessity  of  a  firm  union :  at  the 
same  time,  he  described  the  great  advantages  which 
this  state,  in  particular,  receives  frem  the  confederacy, 
and  its  peculiar  weaknesses  when  abstracted  from  the 
union.  In  doing  this,  he  advanced  a  variety  of  argu 
ments,  which  deserve  serious  consideration.  Gentle 
men  have  this  day  come  forward  to  answer  him.  He 


MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH,  &c.  23 

has  been  treated  as  having  wandered  in  the  flowery 
fields  of  fancy ;  and  attempts  have  been  made,  to  take 
off  from  the  minds  of  the  committee,  that  sober  im 
pression,  which  might  be  expected  from  his  arguments. 
I  trust,  sir,  that  observations  of  this  kind  are  not  thrown 
out  to  cast  a  light  air  on  this  important  subject;  or  to 
give  any  personal  bias,  on  the  great  question  before 
us.  I  will  not  agree  with  gentlemen,  who  trifle  with 
the  weaknesses  of  our  country ;  and  suppose,  that  they 
are  enumerated  to  answer  a  party  purpose,  and  to 
terrify  with  ideal  dangers.  No ;  I  believe  these  weak 
nesses  to  be  real,  and  pregnant  with  destruction. 
Yet,  however  weak  our  country  may  be,  I  hope  we 
shall  never  sacrifice  our  liberties.  If,  therefore,  on  a 
full  and  candid  discussion,  the  proposed  system  shall 
appear  to  have  that  tendency,  for  God's  sake,  let  us 
reject  it.  But,  let  us  not  mistake  words  for  things, 
nor  accept  doubtful  surmises  as  the  evidence  of  truth. 
Let  us  consider  the  constitution  calmly  and  dispas 
sionately,  and  attend  to  those  things  only  which  merit 
consideration. 

No  arguments  drawn  from  embarrassment  or  incon 
venience  ought  to  prevail  upon  us  to  adopt  a  system 
of  government  radically  bad;  yet  it  is  proper  that 
these  arguments,  among  others,  should  be  brought 
into  view.  In  doing  this,  yesterday,  it  was  necessary 
to  reflect  upon  our  situation ;  to  dwell  upon  the  imbe 
cility  of  our  union ;  and  to  consider  whether  we,  as  a 
state,  could  stand  alone.  Although  I  am  persuaded 
this  convention  will  be  resolved  to  adopt  nothing  that 
is  bad;  yet  I  think  every  prudent  man  will  consider 
the  merits  of  the  plan  in  connexion  with  the  circum 
stances  of  our  country ;  and  that  a  rejection  of  the 
constitution  may  involve  most  fatal  consequences.  I 
make  these  remarks  to  show,  that  though  we  ought 
not  to  be  actuated  by  unreasonable  fear,  yet  we  ought 
to  be  prudent. 

This  day,  sir,  one  gentleman  has  attempted  to  an 
swer  the  arguments  advanced  by  my  honorable  friend ; 


24  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

another  has  treated  him  as  having  wandered  from  the 
subject :  this  being  the  case,  I  trust  I  shall  be  equally 
indulged  in  reviewing  the  remarks  which  have  been 
made. 

Sir,  it  appears  to  me  extraordinary,  that  while  gen 
tlemen  in  one  breath  acknowledge,  that  the  old  con 
federation  requires  many  material  amendments,  they 
should  in  the  next  deny,  that  its  defects  have  been  the 
cause  of  our  political  weakness,  and  the  consequent 
calamities  of  our  country.  I  cannot  but  infer  from  this, 
that  there  is  still  some  lurking,  favorite  imagination, 
that  this  system,  with  corrections,  might  become  a 
safe  and  permanent  one.  It  is  proper  that  we  should 
examine  this  matter.  We  contend  that  the  radical 
vice  in  the  old  confederation  is,  that  the  laws  of  the 
union  apply  only  to  states  in  their  corporate  capacity. 
Has  not  every  man,  who  has  been  in  our  legislature, 
experienced  the  truth  of  this  position  ?  It  is  insepara 
ble  from  the  disposition  of  bodies,  who  have  a  constitu 
tional  power  of  resistance,  to  examine  the  merits  of  a 
law.  This  has  ever  been  the  case  with  the  federal  re 
quisitions.  In  this  examination,  not  being  furnished 
with  those  lights,  which  directed  the  deliberations  of 
the  general  government,  and  incapable  of  embracing 
the  general  interests  of  the  union,  the  states  have  al 
most  uniformly  weighed  the  requisitions  by  their  own 
local  interests,  and  have  only  executed  them  so  far  as 
answered  their  particular  convenience  or  advantage. 
Hence  there  have  ever  been  thirteen  different  bodies 
to  judge  of  the  measures  of  Congress — and  the  opera 
tions  of  government  have  been  distracted  by  their 
taking  different  courses :  those,  which  were  to  be 
benefitted,  have  complied  with  the  requisitions ;  others 
have  totally  disregarded  them.  Have  not  all  of  us 
been  witnesses  to  the  unhappy  embarrassments  which 
resulted  from  these  proceedings?  Even  during  the 
late  war,  while  the  pressure  of  common  danger  con 
nected  strongly  the  bond  of  our  union,  and  incited  to 
vigorous  exertions,  we  have  felt  many  distressing  ef- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  25 

fects  of  the  impotent  system.  How  have  we  seen  this 
state,  though  most  exposed  to  the  calamities  of  the  war, 
complying,  in  an  unexampled  manner,  with  the  federal 
requisitions,  and  compelled  by  the  delinquency  of 
others,  to  bear  most  unusual  burdens.  Of  this  truth, 
we  have  the  most  solemn  proof  on  our  records.  In 
1779  and  1780,  when  the  state,  from  the  ravages  of 
war,  and  from  her  great  exertions  to  resist  them,  be 
came  weak,  distressed,  and  forlorn,  every  man  avowed 
the  principle  which  we  now  contend  for ;  that  our  mis 
fortunes,  in  a  great  degree,  proceeded  from  the  want 
of  vigor  in  the  continental  government.  These  were 
our  sentiments  when  we  did  not  speculate,  but  feel 
We  saw  our  weakness,  and  found  ourselves  its  victims. 
Let  us  reflect  that  this  may  again,  in  all  probability, 
be  our  situation.  This  is  a  weak  state ;  and  its  rela 
tive  station  is  dangerous.  Your  capital  is  accessible 
by  land,  and  by  sea  is  exposed  to  every  daring  invader; 
and  on  the  north-west,  you  are  open  to  the  inroads  of  a 
powerful  foreign  nation.  Indeed,  this  state,  from  its 
situation,  will,  in  time  of  war,  probably  be  the  theatre 
of  its  operations. 

Gentlemen  have  said  that  the  non-compliance  of 
the  states  has  been  occasioned  by  their  sufferings. 
This  may  in  part  be  true.  But  has  this  state  been 
delinquent  ?  Amidst  all  our  distresses,  we  have  fully 
complied.  If  New  York  could  comply  wholly  with  the 
requisitions,  is  it  not  to  be  supposed,  that  the  other 
states  could  in  part  comply  ?  Certainly  every  state  in 
the  union  might  have  executed  them  in  some  degree. 
But  New  Hampshire,  who  has  not  suffered  at  all,  is 
totally  delinquent:  North  Carolina  is  totally  delin 
quent  :  many  others  have  contributed  in  a  very  small 
proportion ;  and  Pennsylvania  and  New  York  are  the 
only  states,  which  have  perfectly  discharged  their 
federal  duty. 

From  the  delinquency  of  those  states  who  have  suf 
fered  little  by  the  war,  we  naturally  conclude,  that  they 
have  made  no  efforts;  and  a  knowledge  of  human 

VOL.  i.  4 


2$  MR.  HAMILTON'S   SPEECH  ON 

nature  will  teach  us,  that  their  ease  and  security  have 
been  a  principal  cause  of  their  want  of  exertion. 
While  danger  is  distant,  its  impression  is  weak,  and 
while  it  affects  only  our  neighbors,  we  have  few  mo 
tives  to  provide  against  it.  Sir,  if  we  have  national 
objects  to  pursue,  we  must  have  national  revenues. 
If  you  make  requisitions  arid  they  are  not  complied 
with,  what  is  to  be  done  ?  It  has  been  well  observed, 
that  to  coerce  the  states  is  one  of  the  maddest  pro 
jects  that  was  ever  devised.  A  failure  of  compliance 
will  never  be  confined  to  a  single  state :  this  being  the 
case,  can  we  suppose  it  wise  to  hazard  a  civil  war  ? 
Suppose  Massachusetts,  or  any  large  state,  should  re 
fuse,  and  Congress  should  attempt  to  compel  them; 
would  they  not  have  influence  to  procure  assistance, 
especially  from  those  states  who  are  in  the  same 
situation  as  themselves  ?  What  picture  does  this  idea 
present  to  our  view  ?  A  complying  state  at  war  with 
a  non-complying  state :  Congress  marching  the  troops 
of  one  state  into  the  bosom  of  another  :  this  state  col 
lecting  auxiliaries  and  forming  perhaps  a  majority 
against  its  federal  head.  Here  is  a  nation  at  war 
with  itself.  Can  any  reasonable  man  be  well  disposed 
towards  a  government  which  makes  war  and  carnage 
the  only  means  of  supporting  itself — a  government 
that  can  exist  only  by  the  sword  ?  Every  such  war 
must  involve  the  innocent  with  the  guilty.  This  single 
consideration  should  be  sufficient  to  dispose  every 
peaceable  citizen  against  such  a  government. 

But  can  we  believe  that  one  state  will  ever  suffer 
itself  to  be  used  as  an  instrument  of  coercion  ?  The 
thing  is  a  dream — it  is  impossible — then  we  are 
brought  to  this  dilemma:  either  a  federal  standing 
army  is  to  enforce  the  requisitions,  or  the  federal  trea 
sury  is  left  without  supplies,  and  the  government  with 
out  support.  What,  sir,  is  the  cure  for  this  great  evil  ? 
Nothing,  but  to  enable  the  national  laws  to  operate  on 
individuals,  in  the  same  manner  as  those  of  the  states 
do»  This  is  the  true  reasoning  upon  the  subject,  sir. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  27 

The  gentlemen  appear  to  acknowledge  its  force ;  and 
yet  while  they  yield  to  the  principle,  they  seem  to  fear 
its  application  to  the  government. 

What  then  shall  we  do  ?  Shall  we  take  the  old  con 
federation,  as  the  basis  of  a  new  system  ?  Can  this 
be  the  object  of  the  gentlemen  ?  Certainly  not.  Will 
any  man  who  entertains  a  wish  for  the  safety  of  his 
country,  trust  the  sword  and  the  purse  with  a  single 
assembly  organized  on  principles  so  defective — so 
rotten  ?  Though  we  might  give  to  such  a  government 
certain  powers,  with  safety,  yet  to  give  them  the  full 
and  unlimited  powers  of  taxation  and  the  national 
forces,  would  be  to  establish  a  despotism ;  the  defini 
tion  of  which  is,  a  government  in  which  all  power 
is  concentred  in  a  single  body.  To  take  the  old 
confederation,  and  fashion  it  upon  these  principles, 
would  be  establishing  a  power  which  would  destroy 
the  liberties  of  the  people.  These  considerations 
show  clearly,  that  a  government  totally  different  must 
be  instituted.  They  had  weight  in  the  convention 
which  formed  the  new  system.  It  was  seen,  that  the  ne 
cessary  powers  were  too  great  to  be  trusted  to  a  single 
body :  they  therefore  formed  two  branches,  and  divided 
the  powers,  that  each  might  be  a  check  upon  the  other. 
This  was  the  result  of  their  wisdom ;  and  I  presume 
that  every  reasonable  man  will  agree  to  it.  The  more 
this  subject  is  explained,  the  more  clear  and  convinc 
ing  it  will  appear  to  every  member  of  this  body.  The 
fundamental  principle  of  the  old  confederation  is  de 
fective — we  must  totally  eradicate  and  discard  this 
principle  before  we  can  expect  an  efficient  go vernment. 
The  gentlemen  who  have  spoken  to-day,  have  taken 
up  the  subject  of  the  ancient  confederacies :  but  their 
view  of  them  has  been  extremely  partial  and  erroneous. 
The  fact  is,  the  same  false  and  impracticable  principle 
ran  through  most  of  the  ancient  governments.  The 
first  of  these  governments  that  we  read  of,  was  the 
Amphictyonic  confederacy.  The  council  which 
managed  the  affairs  of  this  league,  possessed  powers 


28  MR-  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

of  a  similar  complexion  to  those  of  our  present  Con 
gress.  The  same  feeble  mode  of  legislation  in  the 
head,  and  the  same  power  of  resistance  in  the  mem 
bers,  prevailed.  When  a  requisition  was  made,  it 
rarely  met  a  compliance ;  and  a  civil  war  was  the  con 
sequence.  Those  which  were  attacked,  called  in 
foreign  aid  to  protect  them ;  and  the  ambitious  Philip, 
under  the  mask  of  an  ally  to  one,  invaded  the  liberties 
of  each,  and  finally  subverted  the  whole. 

The  operation  of  this  principle  appears  in  the  same 
light  in  the  Dutch  Republics.  They  have  been  oblig 
ed  to  levy  taxes  by  an  armed  force.  In  this  confedera 
cy,  one  large  province,  by  its  superior  wealth  and  in 
fluence,  is  commonly  a  match  for  all  the  rest ;  and 
when  they  do  not  comply,  the  province  of  Holland  is 
obliged  to  compel  them.  It  is  observed,  that  the 
United  Provinces  have  existed  a  long  time ;  but  they 
have  been  constantly  the  sport  of  their  neighbors,  and 
have  been  supported  only  by  the  external  pressure  of 
the  surrounding  powers.  The  policy  of  Europe,  not 
the  policy  of  their  government,  has  saved  them  from 
dissolution.  Besides,  the  powers  of  the  Stadtholder 
have  served  to  give  an  energy  to  the  operations  of 
this  government,  which  is  not  to  be  found  in  ours. 
This  prince  has  a  vast  personal  influence :  he  has 
independent  revenues :  he  commands  an  army  of  forty 
thousand  men. 

The  German  confederacy  has  also  been  a  perpetual 
source  of  wars.  They  have  a  diet,  like  our  Congress, 
who  have  authority  to  call  for  supplies :  these  calls  are 
never  obeyed;  and  in  time  of  war,  the  imperial  army 
never  takes  the  field  till  the  enemy  are  returning  from 
it.  The  emperor's  Austrian  dominions,  in  which  he  is 
an  absolute  prince,  alone  enable  him  to  make  head 
against  the  common  foe.  The  members  of  this  con 
federacy  are  ever  divided  and  opposed  to  each  other. 
The  king  of  Prussia  is  a  member ;  yet  he  has  been 
constantly  in  opposition  to  the  emperor.  Is  this  a  de 
sirable  government  ? 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  29 

i  might  go  more  particularly  into  the  discussion  of 
examples  and  show,  that  wherever  this  fatal  principle 
has  prevailed,  even  as  far  back  as  the  Lycian  and 
Achaean  leagues,  as  well  as  the  Amphictyonic  con 
federacy;  it  has  proved  the  destruction  of  the  govern 
ment.  But  I  think  observations  of  this  kind  might 
have  been  spared.  Had  they  not  been  entered  into 
by  others,  I  should  not  have  taken  up  so  much  of  the 
time  of  the  committee.  No  inference  can  be  drawn 
from  these  examples,  that  republics  cannot  exist :  we 
only  contend  that  they  have  hitherto  been  founded  on 
false  principles.  We  have  shown  how  they  have  been 
conducted,  and  how  they  have  been  destroyed. 
Weakness  in  the  head  has  produced  resistance  in  the 
members :  this  has  been  the  immediate  parent  of  civil 
war:  auxiliary  force  has  been  invited;  and  a  foreign 
power  has  annihilated  their  liberties  and  their  name. 
Thus  Philip  subverted  the  Amphictyonic,  and  Rome 
the  Achaean  Republic. 

We  shall  do  well,  sir,  not  to  deceive  ourselves  with 
the  favorable  events  of  the  late  war.  Common  danger 
prevented  the  operation  of  the  ruinous  principle,  in  its 
full  extent :  but,  since  the  peace,  we  have  experienced 
the  evils ;  we  have  felt  the  poison  of  the  system  in  its 
unmingled  purity. 

Without  dwelling  any  longer  on  this  subject,  I  shall 
proceed  to  the  question  immediately  before  the  com 
mittee. 

In  order  that  the  committee  may  understand  clearly 
the  principles  on  which  the  general  convention  acted, 
I  think  it  necessary  to  explain  some  preliminary  cir 
cumstances. 

Sir,  the  natural  situation  of  this  country  seems  to 
divide  its  interests  into  different  classes.  There  are 
navigating  and  non-navigating  states — the  northern 
are  properly  the  navigating  states :  the  southern  ap 
pear  to  possess  neither  the  means  nor  the  spirit  of  na 
vigation.  This  difference  of  situation  naturally  pro 
duces  a  dissimilarity  of  interests  and  views  respecting 


30  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

foreign  commerce.  It  was  the  interest  of  the  northern 
states,  that  there  should  be  no  restraints  on  their 
navigation,  and  that  they  should  have  full  power,  by  a 
majority  in  Congress,  to  make  commercial  regulations 
in  favor  of  their  own,  and  in  restraint  of  the  navigation 
of  foreigners.  The  southern  states  wished  to  impose 
a  restraint  on  the  northern,  by  requiring  that  two-thirds 
in  Congress,  should  be  requisite  to  pass  an  act  in  re 
gulation  of  commerce :  they  were  apprehensive  that 
the  restraints  of  a  navigation  law  would  discourage 
foreigners,  and  by  obliging  them  to  employ  the  ship 
ping  of  the  northern  states,  would  probably  enhance 
their  freight.  This  being  the  case,  they  insisted 
strenuously  on  having  this  provision  engrafted  in  the 
constitution ;  and  the  northern  states  were  as  anxious 
in  opposing  it.  On  the  other  hand,  the  small  states 
seeing  themselves  embraced  by  the  confederation  upon 
equal  terms,  wished  to  retain  the  advantages  which 
they  already  possessed :  the  large  states,  on  the  con 
trary,  thought  it  improper  that  Rhode  Island  and  De 
laware  should  enjoy  an  equal  suffrage  with  themselves: 
from  these  sources  a  delicate  and  difficult  contest 
arose.  It  became  necessary,  therefore,  to  compro 
mise  ;  or  the  convention  must  have  dissolved  without 
effecting  any  thing.  Would  it  have  been  wise  and 
prudent  in  that  body,  in  this  critical  situation,  to  have 
deserted  their  country  ?  No.  Every  man  who  hears 
me — every  wise  man  in  the  United  States,  would  have 
condemned  them.  The  convention  were  obliged  to 
appoint  a  committee  for  accommodation.  In  this 
committee  the  arrangement  was  formed  as  it  now 
stands ;  and  their  report  was  accepted.  It  was  a  deli 
cate  point;  and  it  was  necessary  that  all  parties 
should  be  indulged.  Gentlemen  will  see,  that  if  there 
had  not  been  unanimity,  nothing  could  have  been 
done :  for  the  convention  had  no  power  to  establish, 
but  only  to  recommend  a  government.  Any  other  sys 
tem  would  have  been  impracticable.  Let  a  convention 
be  called  to-morrow — let  them  meet  twenty  times; 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  31 

nay,  twenty  thousand  times ;  they  will  have  the  same 
difficulties  to  encounter ;  the  same  clashing  interests 
to  reconcile. 

But,  dismissing  these  reflections,  let  us  consider  how 
far  the  arrangement  is  in  itself  entitled  to  the  approba 
tion  of  this  body.  We  will  examine  it  upon  its  own 
merits. 

The  first  thing  objected  to,  is  that  clause  which  al 
lows  a  representation  for  three-fifths  of  the  negroes. 
Much  has  been  said  of  the  impropriety  of  represent 
ing  men,  who  have  no  will  of  their  own.  Whether 
this  be  reasoning  or  declamation,  I  will  not  presume 
to  say.  It  is  the  unfortunate  situation  of  the  southern 
states,  to  have  a  great  part  of  their  population,  as  well 
as  property,  in  blacks.  The  regulation  complained  of, 
was  one  result  of  the  spirit  of  accommodation,  which 
governed  the  convention ;  and  without  this  indulgence, 
no  union  could  possibly  have  been  formed.  But,  sir, 
considering  some  peculiar  advantages  which  we  de 
rive  from  them,  it  is  entirely  just  that  they  should  be 
gratified.  The  southern  states  possess  certain  staples, 
tobacco,  rice,  indigo,  &c.  which  must  be  capital  ob 
jects  in  treaties  of  commerce  with  foreign  nations ; 
and  the  advantage  which  they  necessarily  procure  in 
these  treaties,  will  be  felt  throughout  all  the  states. 
But  the  justice  of  this  plan  will  appear  in  another 
view.  The  best  writers  on  government  have  held, 
that  representation  should  be  compounded  of  persons 
and  property.  This  rule  has  been  adopted,  as  far  as 
it  could  be,  in  the  constitution  of  New  York.  It  will, 
however,  by  no  means  be  admitted,  that  the  slaves 
are  considered  altogether  as  property.  They  are 
men,  though  degraded  to  the  condition  of  slavery. 
They  are  persons  known  to  the  municipal  laws  of  the 
states  which  they  inhabit,  as  well  as  to  the  laws  of 
nature.  But  representation  and  taxation  go  together 
— and  one  uniform  rule  ought  to  apply  to  both. 
Would  it  be  just  to  compute  these  slaves  in  the  as 
sessment  of  taxes*  and  discard  them  from  the  estimate 


32  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

in  the  apportionment  of  representatives  ?  Would  it  be 
just  to  impose  a  singular  burden,  without  conferring 
some  adequate  advantage  ? 

Another  circumstance  ought  to  be  considered. 
The  rule  we  have  been  speaking  of,  is  a  general  rule, 
and  applies  to  all  the  states.  Now,  you  have  a  great 
number  of  people  in  your  state,  which  are  not  repre 
sented  at  all ;  and  have  no  voice  in  your  government : 
these  will  be  included  in  the  enumeration — not  two- 
fifths — nor  three-fifths,  but  the  whole.  This  proves 
that  the  advantages  of  the  plan  are  not  confined  to 
the  southern  states,  but  extend  to  other  parts  of  the 
Union. 

I  now  proceed  to  consider  the  objection  with  regard 
to  the  number  of  representatives,  as  it  now  stands ;  I 
am  persuaded  the  system,  in  this  respect,  stands  on  a 
better  footing  than  the  gentlemen  imagine. 

It  has  been  asserted,  that  it  will  be  in  the  power  of 
Congress  to  reduce  the  number.  I  acknowledge,  that 
there  are  no  direct  words  of  prohibition.  But  I  con 
tend,  that  the  true  and  genuine  construction  of  the 
clause,  gives  Congress  no  power  whatever  to  reduce 
the  representation  below  the  number,  as  it  now  stands. 
Although  they  may  limit,  they  can  never  diminish  the 
number.  One  representative  for  every  thirty  thousand 
inhabitants  is  fixed  as  the  standard  of  increase ;  till, 
by  the  natural  course  of  population,  it  shall  become 
necessary  to  limit  the  ratio.  Probably,  at  present, 
were  this  standard  to  be  immediately  applied,  the  rep 
resentation  would  considerably  exceed  sixty-five.  In 
three  years  it  would  exceed  one  hundred.  If  I  under 
stand  the  gentlemen,  they  contend  that  the  number 
may  be  enlarged  or  may  not.  I  admit  that  this  is  in 
the  discretion  of  Congress ;  and  I  submit  to  the  com 
mittee,  whether  it  be  not  necessary  and  proper. 
Still,  I  insist,  that  an  immediate  limitation  is  not  proba 
ble,  nor  was  it  in  the  contemplation  of  the  convention. 
But,  sir,  who  will  presume  to  say,  to  what  precise  point 
the  representation  ought  to  be  increased  ?  This  is  a 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  33 

matter  of  opinion;  and  opinions  are  vastly  different 
upon  the  subject.  A  proof  of  this  is  drawn  from  the 
representations  in  the  state  legislatures.  In  Massa 
chusetts,  the  assembly  consists  of  about  three  hundred 
— in  South  Carolina,  of  nearly  one  hundred — in  New 
York  there  are  sixty-five.  It  is  observed  generally, 
that  the  number  ought  to  be  large ;  let  the  gentlemen 
produce  their  criterion.  I  confess  it  is  difficult  for  me 
to  say  what  number  may  be  said  to  be  sufficiently 
large.  On  one  hand,  it  ought  to  be  considered,  that 
a  small  number  will  act  with  more  facility,  system  and 
decision :  on  the  other,  that  a  large  one  may  enhance 
the  difficulty  of  corruption.  The  Congress  is  to  con 
sist,  at  first,  of  ninety-one  members.  This,  to  a  rea 
sonable  man,  may  appear  to  be  as  near  the  proper 
medium  as  any  number  whatever ;  at  least,  for  the 
present.  There  is  one  source  of  increase,  also,  which 
does  not  depend  upon  any  constructions  of  the  consti 
tution;  it  is  the  creation  of  new  states.  Vermont, 
Kentucky  and  Franklin,  will  probably  become  inde 
pendent  ;  new  members  of  the  union  will  also  be  form 
ed  from  the  unsettled  tracts  of  western  territory. 
These  must  be  represented,  and  will  all  contribute  to 
swell  the  federal  legislature.  If  the  whole  number  in 
the  United  States  be,  at  present,  three  millions,  as  is 
commonly  supposed,  according  to  the  ratio  of  one  for 
thirty  thousand,  we  shall  have  on  the  first  census,  a 
hundred  representatives.  In  ten  years,  thirty  more 
will  be  added ;  and  in  twenty-five  years,  the  number 
will  double :  then,  sir,  we  shall  have  two  hundred,  if 
the  increase  goes  on  in  the  same  proportion.  The 
convention  of  Massachusetts,  who  made  the  same 
objection,  have  fixed  upon  this  number  as  the  point  at 
which  they  chose  to  limit  the  representation.  But  can 
we  pronounce  with  certainty,  that  it  will  not  be  expe 
dient  to  go  beyond  this  number  ?  We  cannot.  Ex 
perience  alone  must  determine.  This  matter  may, 
with  more  safety,  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  le 
gislature,  as  it  will  be  the  interest  of  the  large  and  in- 
VOL.  i.  5 


34  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

creasing  states,  of  Massachusetts,  New  York,  Pennsyl 
vania,  &c.  to  augment  the  representation.  Only  Con 
necticut,  Rhode  Island,  Delaware,  and  Maryland,  can 
be  interested  in  limiting  it.  We  may,  therefore,  safely 
calculate  upon  a  growing  representation,  according  to 
the  advance  of  population,  and  the  circumstances  of 
the  country. 

The  state  governments  possess  inherent  advantages, 
which  will  ever  give  them  an  influence  and  ascendency 
over  the  national  government ;  and  will  for  ever  pre 
clude  the  possibility  of  federal  encroachments.  That 
their  liberties  indeed  can  be  subverted  by  the  federal 
head,  is  repugnant  to  every  rule  of  political  calcula 
tion.  Is  not  this  arrangement  then,  sir,  a  most  wise 
and  prudent  one  ?  Is  not  the  present  representation 
fully  adequate  to  our  present  exigencies;  and  suf 
ficient  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of  the  union  ?  I 
am  persuaded  that  an  examination  of  the  objects  of 
the  federal  government  will  afford  a  conclusive 
answer. 

Many  other  observations  might  be  made  on  this 
subject,  but  I  cannot  now  pursue  them ;  for  I  feel  my 
self  not  a  little  exhausted :  I  beg  leave,  therefore,  to 
waive  for  the  present  the  further  discussion  of  the 
question. 

On  the  21st,  Mr.  Hamilton  continued  his  remarks  as  follows  : 

When  I  had  the  honor  to  address  the  committee 
yesterday,  I  gave  a  history  of  the  circumstances 
which  attended  the  convention,  when  forming  the 
plan  before  you.  I  endeavored  to  point  out  to  you 
the  principles  of  accommodation,  on  which  this  ar 
rangement  was  made,  and  to  show  that  the  contend 
ing  interests  of  the  states  led  them  to  establish  the 
representation  as  it  now  stands.  In  the  second  place, 
I  attempted  to  prove,  that,  in  point  of  number,  the 
representation  would  be  perfectly  secure.  Sir,  no 
man  agrees  more  perfectly  than  myself  to  the  main 
principle  for  which  the  gentlemen  contend.  I  agree 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  35 

that  there  should  be  a  broad  democratic  branch  in  the 
national  legislature.  But  this  matter,  sir,  depends  on 
circumstances.  It  is  impossible,  in  the  first  instance, 
to  be  precise  and  exact  with  regard  to  the  number; 
and  it  is  equally  impossible  to  determine  to  what 
point  it  may  be  proper  in  future  to  increase  it.  On 
this  ground  I  am  disposed  to  acquiesce.  In  my  rea 
sonings  on  the  subject  of  government,  I  rely  more  on 
the  interests  and  opinions  of  men,  than  on  any  specu 
lative  parchment  provisions  whatever.  I  have  found, 
that  constitutions  are  more  or  less  excellent,  as  they 
are  more  or  less  agreeable  to  the  natural  operation 
of  things.  I  am  therefore  disposed  not  to  dwell  long 
on  curious  speculations,  or  pay  much  attention  to 
modes  and  forms ;  but  to  adopt  a  system,  whose  prin 
ciples  have  been  sanctioned  by  experience,  adapt  it 
to  the  real  state  of  our  country,  and  depend  on  pro 
bable  reasonings  for  its  operation  and  result.  I  con 
tend  that  sixty-five  and  twenty-six  in  two  bodies,  af 
ford  perfect  security,  in  the  present  state  of  things; 
and  that  the  regular  progressive  enlargement,  which 
was  in  the  contemplation  of  the  general  convention, 
will  not  leave  an  apprehension  of  danger  in  the  most 
timid  and  suspicious  mind.  It  will  be  the  interest  of 
the  large  states  to  increase  the  representation.  This 
will  be  the  standing  instruction  to  their  delegates. 
But,  say  the  gentlemen,  the  members  of  Congress 
will  be  interested  not  to  increase  the  number,  as  it  will 
diminish  their  relative  influence.  In  all  their  reason 
ing  upon  the  subject,  there  seems  to  be  this  fallacy : 
they  suppose  that  the  representative  will  have  no 
motive  of  action,  on  the  one  side,  but  a  sense  of  duty ; 
or  on  the  other,  but  corruption.  They  do  not  reflect, 
that  he  is  to  return  to  the  community ;  that  he  is  de 
pendent  on  the  will  of  the  people,  and  that  it  cannot  be 
his  interest  to  oppose  their  wishes.  Sir,  the  general 
sense  of  the  people  will  regulate  the  conduct  of  their  re 
presentatives.  I  admit  that  there  are  exceptions  to  this 
rule — there  are  certain  conjunctures,  when  it  may  be 


36  MR-  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

necessary  and  proper  to  disregard  the  opinions  which 
the  majority  of  the  people  have  formed.  But  in  the 
general  course  of  things,  the  popular  views,  and  even 
prejudices,  will  direct  the  actions  of  the  rulers. 

All  governments,  even  the  most  despotic,  depend, 
in  a  great  degree,  on  opinion.  In  free  republics,  it 
is  most  peculiarly  the  case.  In  these,  the  will  of  the 
people  makes  the  essential  principle  of  the  govern 
ment;  and  the  laws  which  control  the  community,  re 
ceive  their  tone  and  spirit  from  the  public  wishes.  It 
is  the  fortunate  situation  of  our  country,  that  the  minds 
of  the  people  are  exceedingly  enlightened  and  refined. 
Here  then  we  may  expect  the  laws  to  be  propor- 
tionably  agreeable  to  the  standard  of  perfect  policy; 
and  the  wisdom  of  public  measures  to  consist  with  the 
most  intimate  conformity  between  the  views  of  the  re 
presentative  and  his  constituent.  If  the  general  voice 
of  the  people  be  for  an  increase,  it  undoubtedly  must 
take  place.  They  have  it  in  their  power  to  instruct 
their  representatives  ;  and  the  state  legislatures,  which 
appoint  the  senators,  may  enjoin  it  also  upon  them. 
Sir,  if  I  believed  that  the  number  would  remain  at  sixty- 
five,  I  confess  I  should  give  my  vote  for  an  amend 
ment;  though  in  a  different  form  from  the  one 
proposed. 

The  amendment  proposes  a  ratio  of  one  for  twen 
ty  thousand.  I  would  ask,  by  what  rule  or  reasoning 
it  is  determined,  that  one  man  is  a  better  representa 
tive  for  twenty  than  thirty  thousand  ?  At  present  we 
have  three  millions  of  people ;  in  twenty-five  years, 
we  shall  have  six  millions;  and  in  forty  years,  nine 
millions :  and  this  is  a  short  period,  as  it  relates  to 
the  existence  of  states.  Here  then,  according  to  the 
ratio  of  one  for  thirty  thousand,  we  shall  have,  in 
forty  years,  three  hundred  representatives.  If  this  be 
true,  and  if  this  be  a  safe  representation,  why  be  dis 
satisfied?  Why  embarrass  the  constitution  with 
amendments,  that  are  merely  speculative  and  useless  ? 
I  affree  with  the  gentleman,  that  a  very  small  number 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  37 

might  give  some  color  for  suspicion :  I  acknowledge, 
that  ten  would  be  unsafe  ;  on  the  other  hand,  a  thou 
sand  would  be  too  numerous.  But  I  ask  him,  why  will 
not  ninety-one  be  an  adequate  and  safe  representation? 
This  at  present  appears  to  be  the  proper  medium. 
Besides,  the  president  of  the  United  States  will  be  him 
self  the  representative  of  the  people.  From  the  com 
petition  that  ever  subsists  between  the  branches  of  gov 
ernment,  the  President  will  be  induced  to  protect 
their  rights,  whenever  they  are  invaded  by  either 
branch.  On  whatever  side  we  view  this  subject,  we 
discover  various  and  powerful  checks  to  the  encroach 
ments  of  Congress.  The  true  and  permanent  inter 
ests  of  the  members  are  opposed  to  corruption: 
their  number  is  vastly  too  large  for  easy  combina 
tion  :  the  rivalship  between  the  houses  will  for  ever 
prove  an  insuperable  obstacle :  the  people  have  an 
obvious  and  powerful  protection  in  their  state  govern 
ments.  Should  any  thing  dangerous  be  attempted, 
these  bodies  of  perpetual  observation,  will  be  capable 
of  forming  and  conducting  plans  of  regular  opposition. 
Can  we  suppose  the  people's  love  of  liberty  will  not, 
under  the  incitement  of  their  legislative  leaders,  be 
roused  into  resistance,  and  the  madness  of  tyranny 
be  extinguished  at  a  blow  ?  Sir,  the  danger  is  too  dis 
tant  ;  it  is  beyond  all  rational  calculation. 

It  has  been  observed  by  an  honorable  gentleman, 
that  a  pure  democracy,  if  it  were  practicable,  would 
be  the  most  perfect  government.  Experience  has 
proved,  that  no  position  in  politics  is  more  false  than 
this.  The  ancient  democracies,  in  which  the  people 
themselves  deliberated,  never  possessed  one  feature  of 
good  government.  Their  very  character  was  tyran 
ny;  their  figure  deformity.  When  they  assembled, 
the  field  of  debate  presented  an  ungovernable  mob, 
not  only  incapable  of  deliberation,  but  prepared  for 
every  enormity.  In  these  assemblies,  the  enemies  of 
the  people  brought  forward  their  plans  of  ambition  sys 
tematically.  They  were  opposed  by  their  enemies,  of 


38  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

another  party ;  and  it  became  a  matter  of  contingency, 
whether  the  people  subjected  themselves  to  be  led 
blindly  by  one  tyrant  or  by  another. 

It  was  remarked  yesterday,  that  a  numerous  repre 
sentation  was  necessary  to  obtain  the  confidence  of 
the  people.  This  is  not  generally  true.  The  confi 
dence  of  the  people  will  easily  be  gained  by  a  good  ad 
ministration.  This  is  the  true  touchstone.  I  could 
illustrate  the  position,  by  a  variety  of  historical  exam 
ples,  both  ancient  and  modern.  In  Sparta,  the  Ephori 
were  a  body  of  magistrates,  instituted  as  a  check 
upon  the  senate,  and  representing  the  people.  They 
consisted  of  only  five  men ;  but  they  were  able  to  pro 
tect  their  rights,  and  therefore  enjoyed  their  confidence 
and  attachment.  In  Rome,  the  people  were  repre 
sented  by  three  Tribunes,  who  were  afterwards  in 
creased  to  ten.  Every  one  acquainted  with  the  histo 
ry  of  that  republic,  will  recollect  how  powerful  a  check 
to  the  senatorial  encroachments,  this  small  body  prov 
ed  ;  how  unlimited  a  confidence  was  placed  in  them  by 
the  people  whose  guardians  they  were ;  and  to  what  a 
conspicuous  station  in  the  government  their  influence 
at  length  elevated  the  plebeians.  Massachusetts  has 
three  hundred  representatives ;  New  York  has  sixty- 
five.  Have  the  people  in  this  state  less  confidence  in 
their  representation  than  the  people  of  that  ?  Dela 
ware  has  twenty-one  :  do  the  inhabitants  of  New  York 
feel  a  higher  confidence  than  those  of  Delaware  ?  I 
have  stated  these  examples,  to  prove  that  the  gentle 
man's  principle  is  not  just.  The  popular  confidence 
depends  on  circumstances  very  distinct  from  conside 
rations  of  number.  Probably  the  public  attachment 
is  more  strongly  secured  by  a  train  of  prosperous 
events,  which  are  the  result  of  wise  deliberation  and 
vigorous  execution,  and  to  which  large  bodies  are 
much  less  competent  than  small  ones.  If  the  repre 
sentative  conducts  with  propriety,  he  will  necessarily 
enjoy  the  good  will  of  the  constituent.  It  appears 
then,  if  my  reasoning  be  just,  that  the  clause  is  perfect- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  39 

ly  proper,  upon  the  principles  of  the  gentleman  who 
contends  for  the  amendment ;  as  there  is  in  it  the  great 
est  degree  of  present  security,  and  a  moral  certainty 
of  an  increase  equal  to  our  utmost  wishes. 

It  has  been  further,  by  the  gentlemen  in  opposition, 
observed,  that  a  large  representation  is  necessary  to 
understand  the  interests  of  the  people.  This  princi 
ple  is  by  no  means  true,  in  the  extent  to  which  the 
gentlemen  seem  to  carry  it.  I  would  ask,  why  may 
not  a  man  understand  the  interests  of  thirty  as  well  as 
of  twenty  ?  The  position  appears  to  be  made  upon 
the  unfounded  presumption,  that  all  the  interests  of  all 
parts  of  the  community  must  be  represented.  No 
idea  is  more  erroneous  than  this.  Only  such  interests 
are  proper  to  be  represented,  as'  are  involved  in  the 
powers  of  the  general  government.  These  interests 
come  completely  under  the  observation  of  one,  or  a 
few  men ;  and  the  requisite  information  is  by  no  means 
augmented  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of  number. 
What  are  the  objects  of  the  government  ?  Commerce, 
taxation,  &c.  In  order  to  comprehend  the  interests  of 
commerce,  is  it  necessary  to  know  how  wheat  is  rais 
ed,  and  in  what  proportion  it  is  produced  in  one  dis 
trict  and  in  another  ?  By  no  means.  Neither  is  this 
species  of  knowledge  necessary  in  general  calculations 
upon  the  subject  of  taxation.  The  information  neces 
sary  for  these  purposes,  is  that  which  is  open  to  every 
intelligent  inquirer ;  and  of  which,  five  men  may  be  as 
perfectly  possessed  as  fifty.  In  royal  governments, 
there  are  usually  particular  men  to  whom  the  business 
of  taxation  is  committed.  These  men  have  the  form 
ing  of  systems  of  finance ;  and  the  regulation  of  the 
revenue.  I  do  not  mean  to  commend  this  practice. 
It  proves,  however,  this  point;  that  a  few  individuals 
may  be  competent  to  these  objects ;  arid  that  large 
numbers  are  not  necessary  to  perfection  in  the  science 
of  taxation.  But  granting  for  a  moment,  that  this 
minute  and  local  knowledge,  the  gentlemen  contend 
for,  is  necessary,  let  us  see,  if  under  the  new  constitu- 


40  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

tion,  it  will  not  probably  be  found  in  the  representa 
tion.  The  natural  and  proper  mode  of  holding  elec 
tions,  will  be  to  divide  the  state  into  districts,  in  pro 
portion  to  the  number  to  be  elected.  This  state  will 
consequently  be  divided,  at  first,  into  six.  One  man 
from  each  district  will  probably  possess  all  the  know 
ledge  gentlemen  can  desire.  Are  the  senators  of  this 
state  more  ignorant  of  the  interests  of  the  people,  than 
the  assembly  ?  Have  they  not  ever  enjoyed  their  con 
fidence  as  much  ?  Yet,  instead  of  six  districts,  they 
are  elected  in  four ;  and  the  chance  of  their  being  col 
lected  from  the  smaller  divisions  of  the  state  conse 
quently  diminished.  Their  number  is  but  twenty-four ; 
and  their  powers  are  co-extensive  with  those  of  the 
assembly,  and  reach  objects,  which  are  most  dear  to 
the  people — life,  liberty  and  property. 

Sir,  we  hear  constantly  a  great  deal,  which  is  rather 
calculated  to  awake  our  passions,  and  create  preju 
dices,  than  to  conduct  us  to  the  truth,  and  teach  us 
our  real  interests.  I  do  not  suppose  this  to  be  the 
design  of  the  gentlemen.  Why  then  are  we  told  so 
often  of  an  aristocracy  ?  For  my  part,  I  hardly  know 
the  meaning  of  this  word  as  it  is  applied.  If  all  we 
hear  be  true,  this  government  is  really  a  very  bad  one. 
But  who  are  the  aristocracy  among  us  ?  Where  do 
we  find  men,  elevated  to  a  perpetual  rank  above  their 
fellow-citizens ;  and  possessing  powers  entirely  inde 
pendent  of  them  ?  The  arguments  of  the  gentlemen 
only  go  to  prove  that  there  are  men  who  are  rich,  men 
who  are  poor ;  some  who  are  wise,  and  others  who  are 
not.  That  indeed  every  distinguished  man  is  an  aris 
tocrat.  This  reminds  me  of  a  description  of  the  aris 
tocrats,  I  have  seen  in  a  late  publication,  styled  the 
Federal  Farmer.  The  author  reckons  in  the  aris 
tocracy,  all  governors  of  states,  members  of  con 
gress,  chief  magistrates,  and  all  officers  of  the  mili 
tia.  This  description,  I  presume  to  say,  is  ridicu 
lous.  The  image  is  a  phantom.  Does  the  new  gov 
ernment  render  a  rich  man  more  eligible  than  a  poor 


THE  FEDERAL   CONSTITUTION.  4! 

one  ?  No.  It  requires  no  such  qualification.  It  is 
bottomed  on  the  broad  and  equal  principle  of  your 
state  constitution. 

Sir,  if  the  people  have  it  in  their  option,  to  elect 
their  most  meritorious  men,  is  this  to  be  considered  as 
an  objection  ?  Shall  the  constitution  oppose  their 
wishes,  and  abridge  their  most  invaluable  privilege  ? 
While  property  continues  to  be  pretty  equally  divided, 
and  a  considerable  share  of  information  pervades  the 
community,  the  tendency  of  the  people's  suffrages,  will 
be  to  elevate  merit  even  from  obscurity.  As  riches 
increase  and  accumulate  in  few  hands;  as  luxury 
prevails  in  society,  virtue  will  be  in  a  greater  degree 
considered  as  only  a  graceful  appendage  of  wealth, 
and  the  tendency  of  things  will  be  to  depart  from  the 
republican  standard.  This  is  the  real  disposition  of 
human  nature  :  it  is  what  neither  the  honorable  mem 
ber  nor  myself  can  correct ;  it  is  a  common  misfortune, 
that  awaits  our  state  constitution,  as  well  as  all 
others. 

There  is  an  advantage  incident  to  large  districts  of 
election,  which  perhaps  the  gentlemen,  amidst  all 
their  apprehensions  of  influence  and  bribery,  have  not 
adverted  to.  In  large  districts,  the  corruption  of  the 
electors  is  much  more  difficult.  Combinations  for  the 
purposes  of  intrigue  are  less  easily  formed :  factions 
and  cabals  are  little  known.  In  a  small  district, 
wealth  will  have  a  more  complete  influence ;  because 
the  people  in  the  vicinity  of  a  great  man,  are  more  im 
mediately  his  dependants,  and  because  this  influence 
has  fewer  objects  to  act  upon.  It  has  been  remarked, 
that  it  would  be  disagreeable  to  the  middle  class  of 
men  to  go  to  the  seat  of  the  new  government.  If  this 
be  so,  the  difficulty  will  be  enhanced  by  the  gentle 
man's  proposal.  If  his  argument  be  true,  it  proves, 
that  the  larger  the  representation  is,  the  less  will  ba 
your  choice  of  having  it  filled.  But,  it  appears  to  me 
frivolous  to  bring  forward  such  arguments  as  these. 
It  has  answered  no  other  purpose,  than  to  induce  me, 

VOT,.  f.  f> 


42  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

by  way  of  reply,  to  enter  into  discussions,  which  I  con 
sider  as  useless,  and  not  applicable  to  our  subject. 

It  is  a  harsh  doctrine,  that  men  grow  wicked  in 
proportion  as  they  improve  and  enlighten  their  minds. 
Experience  has  by  no  means  justified  us  in  the  suppo 
sition,  that  there  is  more  virtue  in  one  class  of  men 
than  in  another.  Look  through  the  rich  and  the  poor 
of  the  community ;  the  learned  and  the  ignorant. 
Where  does  virtue  predominate  ?  The  difference  in 
deed  consists,  not  in  the  quantity  but  kind  of  vices, 
which  are  incident  to  various  classes ;  and  here  the 
advantage  of  character  belongs  to  the  wealthy. 
Their  vices  are  probably  more  favorable  to  the  pros 
perity  of  the  state,  than  those  of  the  indigent,  and 
partake  less  of  moral  depravity, 

After  all,  sir,  we  must  submit  to  this  idea,  that  the 
true  principle  of  a  republic  is,  that  the  people  should 
choose  whom  they  please  to  govern  them.     Represen 
tation  is  imperfect,  in  proportion  as  the  current  of  po 
pular  favor  is  checked.     This   great  source  of  free 
government,  popular  election,  should  be  perfectly  pure, 
and  the  most  unbounded  liberty  allowed.     Where  this 
principle  is  adhered  to ;  where,  in  the  organization  of 
the  government,  the  legislative,  executive  and  judicial 
branches  are  rendered  distinct ;  where  again  the  le 
gislative  is  divided  into  separate  houses,  and  the  ope 
rations  of  each  are  controlled  by  various  checks  and 
balances,  and  above  all,  by  the  vigilance  and  weight  of 
the  state  governments ;  to  talk  of  tyranny,  and  the  sub 
version  of  our  liberties,  is  to  speak  the  language  of 
enthusiasm.     This  balance  between  the  national  and 
state  governments  ought  to  be  dwelt  on  with  peculiar 
attention,  as  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance.     It  forms 
a  double  security  to  the  people.     If  one  encroaches  on 
their  rights,  they  will  find  a  powerful  protection  in  the 
other.     Indeed,  they  will  both  be  prevented  from  over 
passing  their  constitutional  limits,  by  a  certain  rival- 
ship,  which  will  ever  subsist  between  them.     I  am  per 
suaded,  that  a  firm  union  is  as  necessary  to  perpetuate 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  43 

our  liberties,  as  it  is  to  make  us  respectable  ;  and  ex 
perience  will  probably  prove,  that  the  national  govern 
ment  will  be  as  natural  a  guardian  of  our  freedom,  as 
the  state  legislatures  themselves. 

Suggestions,  sir,  of  an  extraordinary  nature,  have 
been  frequently  thrown  out  in  the  course  of  the  present 
political  controversy.  It  gives  me  pain  to  dwell  ou 
topics  of  this  kind;  and  I  wish  they  might  be  dismiss 
ed.  We  have  been  told,  that  the  old  confederation 
has  proved  inefficacious,  only  because  intriguing  and 
powerful  men,  aiming  at  a  revolution,  have  been  for 
ever  instigating  the  people,  and  rendering  them  disaf 
fected  with  it.  This,  sir,  is  a  false  insinuation.  The 
thing  is  impossible.  I  will  venture  to  assert,  that  no 
combination  of  designing  men  under  Heaven,  will  be 
capable  of  making  a  government  unpopular,  which  is 
in  its  principles  a  wise  arid  good  one,  and  vigorous  in 
its  operations. 

The  confederation  was  framed  amidst  the  agitation 
and  tumult  of  society.  It  was  composed  of  unsound 
materials  put  together  in  haste.  Men  of  intelligence 
discovered  the  feebleness  of  the  structure,  in  the  first 
stages  of  its  existence;  but  the  great  body  of  the  peo 
ple,  too  much  engrossed  with  their  distresses,  to  con 
template  any  but  the  immediate  causes  of  them,  were 
ignorant  of  the  defects  of  their  constitution.  But  when 
the  dangers  of  war  were  removed,  they  saw  clearly 
what  they  had  suffered,  and  what  they  had  yet  to  suf 
fer,  from  a  feeble  form  of  government.  There  was  no 
need  of  discerning  men  to  convince  the  people  of  their 
unhappy  situation;  the  complaint  was  co-extensive 
with  the  evil,  and  both  were  common  to  all  classes  of 
the  community.  We  have  been  told,  that  the  spirit  of 
patriotism,  and  love  of  liberty,  are  almost  extinguished 
among  the  people;  and  that  it  has  become  a  prevail 
ing  doctrine,  that  republican  principles  ought  to  be 
hooted  out  of  the  world.  Sir,  I  am  confident  that  such 
remarks  as  these  are  rather  occasioned  by  the  heat  of 
argument,  than  by  a  cool  conviction  of  their  truth  and 


44  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH,  &c. 

justice.  As  far  as  my  experience  has  extended,  I  have 
heard  no  such  doctrine,  nor  have  I  discovered  any  di 
minution  of  regard  for  those  rights  arid  liberties,  in  de 
fence  of  which,  the  people  have  fought  and  suffered. 
There  have  been,  undoubtedly,  some  men  who  have 
had  speculative  doubts  on  the  subject  of  government ; 
but  the  principles  of  republicanism  are  founded  on  too 
firm  a  basis  to  be  shaken  by  a  few  speculative  and 
sceptical  reasoners.  Our  error  has  been  of  a  very  dif 
ferent  kind.  We  have  erred  through  excess  of  caution, 
and  a  zeal  false  and  impracticable.  Our  counsels 
have  been  destitute  of  consistency  and  stability.  I 
am  flattered  with  a  hope,  sir,  that  we  have  now  found 
a  cure  for  the  evils  under  which  we  have  so  long  labor 
ed.  I  trust,  that  the  proposed  constitution  affords  a 
genuine  specimen  of  representative  and  republican 
government,  and  that  it  will  answer,  in  an  eminent  de 
gree,  all  the  beneficial  purposes  of  society. 


SPEECH  OF  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON, 

ON  THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  ADOPTING  TBE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 
DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,  JUNE  24th,  1788, 


The  following  speech  was  made  in  opposition  to  a  resolution  brought 
forward  by  Mr.  G.  Livingston,  as  an  amendment  to  the  constitution, 
which  proposed  ;  That  no  person  should  be  eligible  as  a  senator  for 
more  than  six  years,  in  any  term  of  twelve  years,  and  that  the  le 
gislatures  of  the  several  states  should  have  power  to  recall  their 
senators,  or  either  of  them,  and  to  elect  others  in  their  stead,  to 
serve  for  the  remainder  of  the  time  for  which  such  senator,  or 
senators,  so  recalled,  were  appointed. 

I  AM  persuaded,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  I  in  my  turn 
shall  be  indulged,  in  addressing  the  committee.  We 
all,  in  equal  sincerity,  profess  to  be  anxious  for  the 
establishment  of  a  republican  government,  on  a  safe 
and  solid  basis.  It  is  the  object  of  the  wishes  of  every 
honest  man  in  the  United  States,  and  I  presume  I 
shall  not  be  disbelieved,  when  I  declare,  that  it  is  an 
object  of  all  others,  the  nearest  and  most  dear  to  my 
own  heart.  The  means  of  accomplishing  this  great 
purpose,  become  the  most  important  study  which  can 
interest  mankind.  It  is  our  duty  to  examine  all  those 
means  with  peculiar  attention,  and  to  choose  the  best 
and  most  effectual.  It  is  our  duty  to  draw  from 


46  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECtf  ON 

nature,  from  reason,  from  examples,  the  best  princi 
ples  of  policy,  and  to  pursue  arid  apply  them  in  the 
formation  of  our  government.  We  should  contem 
plate  and  compare  the  systems,  which,  in  this  examina 
tion,  come  under  our  view ;  distinguish,  with  a  careful 
eye,  the  defects  and  excellencies  of  each,  and  discard 
ing  the  former,  incorporate  the  latter,  as  far  as  circum 
stances  will  admit,  into  our  constitution.  If  we  pursue 
a  different  course  and  neglect  this  duty,  we  shall  pro 
bably  disappoint  the  expectations  of  our  country  and 
of  the  world. 

In  the  commencement  of  a  revolution,  which  receiv 
ed  its  birth  from  the  usurpations  of  tyranny,  nothing 
was  more  natural,  than  that  the  public  mind  should 
be  influenced  by  an  extreme  spirit  of  jealousy.  To 
resist  these  encroachments,  and  to  nourish  this  spirit, 
was  the  great  object  of  all  our  public  and  private 
institutions.  The  zeal  for  liberty  became  predominant 
and  excessive.  In  forming  our  confederation,  this 
passion  alone  seemed  to  actuate  us,  and  we  appear  to 
have  had  no  other  view  than  to  secure  ourselves  from 
despotism.  The  object  certainly  was  a  valuable  one, 
and  deserved  our  utmost  attention.  But,  sir,  there  is 
another  object,  equally  important,  and  which  our 
enthusiasm  rendered  us  little  capable  of  regarding :  I 
mean  a  principle  of  strength  and  stability  in  the  or 
ganization  of  our  government,  and  vigor  in  its  opera 
tions.  This  purpose  can  never  be  accomplished 
but  by  the  establishment  of  some  select  body,  formed 
peculiarly  upon  this  principle.  There  are  few  posi 
tions  more  demonstrable  than  that  there  should  be  in 
every  republic,  some  permanent  body  to  correct  the  pre 
judices,  check  the  intemperate  passions,  and  regulate 
the  fluctuations  of  a  popular  assembly.  It  is  evident, 
that  a  body  instituted  for  these  purposes,  must  be  so 
formed  as  to  exclude  as  much  as  possible  from  its  own 
character,  those  infirmities,  and  that  mutability  which 
it  is  designed  to  remedy.  It  is  therefore  necessary 
that  it  should  be  small,  that  it  should  hold  its  autho- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  47 

rity  during  a  considerable  period,  and  that  it  should 
have  such  an  independence  in  the  exercise  of  its  pow 
ers,  as  will  divest  it  as  much  as  possible  of  local  preju 
dices.  It  should  be  so  formed  as  to  be  the  centre  of 
political  knowledge,  to  pursue  always  a  steady  line  of 
conduct,  and  to  reduce  every  irregular  propensity  to 
system.  Without  this  establishment,  we  may  make  ex 
periments  without  end,  but  shall  never  have  an  efficient 
government. 

It  is  an  unquestionable  truth,  that  the  body  of  the 
people  in  every  country  desire  sincerely  its  prosperity : 
but  it  is  equally  unquestionable,  that  they  do  not  pos 
sess  the  discernment  and  stability  necessary  for  sys 
tematic  government.  To  deny  that  they  are  frequently 
led  into  the  grossest- errors  by  misinformation  and 
passion,  would  be  a  flattery  which  their  own  good 
sense  must  despise.  That  branch  of  administration 
especially,  which  involves  our  political  relations  with 
foreign  states,  a  community  will  ever  be  incompetent 
to.  These  truths  are  not  often  held  up  in  public 
assemblies ;  but  they  cannot  be  unknown  to  any  who 
hear  me.  From  these  principles  it  follows,  that  there 
ought  to  be  two  distinct  bodies  in  our  government;  one, 
which  shall  be  immediately  constituted  by  and  pecu 
liarly  represent  the  people,  and  possess  all  the  popular 
features ;  another,  formed  upon  the  principle,  and  for 
the  purposes  before  explained.  Such  considerations 
as  these  induced  the.  convention  who  formed  your 
state  constitution,  to  institute  a  senate  upon  the  pre 
sent  plan.  The  history  of  ancient  and  modern  repub 
lics  had  taught  them,  that  many  of  the  evils  which 
these  republics  suffered,  arose  from  the  want  of  a  cer 
tain  balance  and  mutual  control  indispensable  to  a 
wise  administration ;  they  were  convinced  that  popu 
lar  assemblies  are  frequently  misguided  by  ignorance, 
by  sudden  impulses  and  the  intrigues  of  ambitious 
men ;  and  that  some  firm  barrier  against  these  opera 
tions  was  necessary  :  they,  therefore,  instituted  your 


48  MR.  HAMILTON'S   SPEECH  ON 

senate,  and  the  benefits  we  have  experienced,  have 
fully  justified  their  conceptions. 

Now,  sir,  what  is  the  tendency   of  the  proposed 
amendment  ?     To  take  away  the  stability  of  govern 
ment  by  depriving  the  senate  of  its  permanency ;  to 
make  this  body  subject  to  the  same  weakness  and  pre 
judices,  which  are  incident  to  popular  assemblies,  and 
which  it  was  instituted  to  correct ;  and  by  thus  assimi 
lating  the  complexion  of  the  two  branches,  destroy  the 
balance  between  them.     The  amendment  will  render 
the  senator  a  slave  to  all  the  capricious  humors  among 
the  people.     It  will  probably  be  here  suggested,  that 
the  legislatures,  not  the  people,  are  to  have  the  power 
of  recall.     Without  attempting  to  prove  that  the  le 
gislatures  must  be,  in  a  great  degree,  the  image  of  the 
multitude,  in  respect  to  federal  affairs,  and  that  the 
same  prejudices  and  factions  will  prevail ;  I  insist,  that 
in  whatever  body  the  power  of  recall  is  vested,  the  se 
nator  will  perpetually  feel  himself  in  such  a  state  of 
vassalage  and  dependence,  that  he  never  can  possess 
that  firmness  which  is  necessary  to  the  discharge  of 
his  great  duty  to  the  union. 

Gentlemen,  in  their  reasoning,  have  placed  the  inter 
ests  of  the  several  states,  and  those  of  the  United 
States  in  contrast ;  this  is  not  a  fair  view  of  the  sub 
ject  ;  they  must  necessarily  be  involved  in  each  other. 
What  we  apprehend  is,  that  some  sinister  prejudice, 
or  some  prevailing  passion,  may  assume  the  form  of  a 
genuine  interest.  The  influence  of  these  is  as  power 
ful  as  the  most  permanent  conviction  of  the  public 
good ;  and  against  this  influence  we  ought  to  provide. 
The  local  interests  of  a  state  ought  in  every  case  to 
give  way  to  the  interests  of  the  union :  for  when  a  sa 
crifice  of  one  or  the  other  is  necessary,  the  former  be 
comes  only  an  apparent,  partial  interest,  and  should 
yield,  on  the  principle  that  the  small  good  ought  never 
to  oppose  the  great  one.  When  you  assemble  from 
your  several  counties  in  the  legislature,  were  every 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  49 

member  to  be  guided  only  by  the  apparent  interest  of 
his  county,  government  would  be  impracticable. 
There  must  be  a  perpetual  accommodation  and  sa 
crifice  of  local  advantage  to  general  expediency ;  but 
the  spirit  of  a  mere  popular  assembly  would  rarely  be 
actuated  by  this  important  principle.  It  is  therefore 
absolutely  necessary  that  the  senate  should  be  so  form 
ed,  as  to  be  unbiassed  by  false  conceptions  of  the  real 
interests,  or  undue  attachment  to  the  apparent  good 
of  their  several  states. 

Gentlemen  indulge  too  many  unreasonable  appre 
hensions  of  danger  to  the  state  governments;  they 
seem  to  suppose,  that  the  moment  you  put  men  into  u 
national  council,  they  become  corrupt  and  tyrannical, 
and  lose  all  their  affection  for  their  fellow-citizens. 
But  can  we  imagine  that  the  senators  will  ever  be  so 
insensible  of  their  own  advantage,  as  to  sacrifice  the 
genuine  interest  of  their  constituents  ?  The  state 
governments  are  essentially  necessary  to  the  form  and 
spirit  of  the  general  system.  As  long,  therefore,  as 
Congress  have  a  full  conviction  of  this  necessity,  they 
must,  even  upon  principles  purely  national,  have  as 
firm  an  attachment  to  the  one  as  to  the  other.  This 
conviction  can  never  leave  them,  unless  they  become 
madmen.  While  the  constitution  continues  to  be 
read,  and  its  principles  known,  the  states  must,  by  eve 
ry  rational  man,  be  considered  as  essential,  component 
parts  of  the  union;  and  therefore  the  idea  of  sacrific 
ing  the  former  to  the  latter  is  wholly  inadmissible. 

The  objectors  do  not  advert  to  the  natural  strength 
and  resources  of  state  governments,  which  will  ever 
give  them  an  important  superiority  over  the  general 
government.  If  we  compare  the  nature  of  their  differ 
ent  powers,  or  the  means  of  popular  influence  which 
each  possesses,  we  shall  find  the  advantage  entirely 
on  the  side  of  the  states.  This  consideration,  impor 
tant  as  it  is,  seems  to  have  been  little  attended  to. 
The  aggregate  number  of  representatives  throughout 
the  states  may  be  two  thousand.  Their  personal  in- 

VOL.  i.  7 


£0  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

fluence  will,  therefore,  be  proportionably  more  exten 
sive  than  that  of  one  or  two  hundred  men  in  Congress. 
The  state  establishments  of  civil  and  military  officers 
of  every  description,  infinitely  surpassing  in  number 
any  possible  correspondent  establishments  in  the  ge 
neral  government,  will  create  such  an  extent  and  com 
plication  of  attachments,  as  will  ever  secure  the  predi 
lection  and  support  of  the  people.  Whenever,  there 
fore,  Congress  shall  meditate  any  infringement  of  the 
state  constitutions,  the  great  body  of  the  people  will 
naturally  take  part  with  their  domestic  representatives. 
Can  the  general  government  withstand  such  an  united 
opposition  ?  Will  the  people  suffer  themselves  to  be 
stripped  of  their  privileges  ?  Will  they  suffer  their 
legislatures^)  be  reduced  to  a  shadow  and  a  name  ? 
The  idea  is  shocking  to  common  sense. 

From  the  circumstances  already  explained,  and 
many  others  which  might  be  mentioned,  results  a 
complicated,  irresistible  check,  which  must  ever  sup 
port  the  existence  and  importance  of  the  state  gov 
ernments.  The  danger,  if  any  exists,  flows  from  an 
opposite  source.  The  probable  evil  is,  that  the  ge 
neral  government  will  be  too  dependent  on  the  state 
legislatures,  too  much  governed  by  their  prejudices, 
and  too  obsequious  to  their  humors ;  that  the  states, 
with  every  power  in  their  hands,  will  make  encroach 
ments  on  the  national  authority,  till  the  union  is  weak 
ened  and  dissolved. 

Every  member  must  have  been  struck  with  an  ob 
servation  of  a  gentleman  from  Albany.  Do  what  you 
will,  says  he,  local  prejudices  and  opinions  will  go 
into  the  government.  What !  shall  we  then  form  a 
constitution  to  cherish  and  strengthen  these  pre 
judices  ?  Shall  we  confirm  the  distemper,  instead  of 
remedying  it  ?  It  is  undeniable  that  there  must  be  a 
control  somewhere.  Either  the  general  interest  is  to 
control  the  particular  interests,  or  the  contrary.  If 
the  former,  then  certainly  the  government '  ought  to 
be  so  framed,  as  to  render  the  power  of  control  effi- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  5] 

cient  to  all  intents  and  purposes ;  if  the  latter,  a  strik 
ing  absurdity  follows :  the  controlling  powers  must  be 
as  numerous  as  the  varying  interests,  and  the  opera 
tions  of  government  must  therefore  cease:  for  the 
moment  you  accommodate  these  different  interests, 
which  is  the  only  way  to  set  the  government  in  mo 
tion,  you  establish  a  general  controlling  power.  Thus, 
whatever  constitutional  provisions  are  made  to  the 
contrary,  every  government  will  be  at  last  driven  to 
the  necessity  of  subjecting  the  partial  to  the  universal 
interest.  The  gentlemen  ought  always,  in  their  rea 
soning,  to  distinguish  between  the  real,  genuine  good 
of  a  state,  and  the  opinions  and  prejudices  which 
may  prevail  respecting  it :  the  latter  may  be  opposed 
to  the  general  good,  and  consequently  ought  to  be 
sacrificed ;  the  former  is  so  involved  in  it,  that  it  ne 
ver  can  be  sacrificed.  Sir,  the  main  design  of  the  con 
vention,  in  forming  the  senate,  was  to  prevent  fluc 
tuations  and  cabals.  With  this  view,  they  made  that 
body  small,  and  to  exist  for  a  considerable  period. 
Have  they  executed  this  design  too  far  ?  The  sena 
tors  are  to  serve  six  years.  This  is  only  two  years 
longer  than  the  senators  of  this  state  hold  their  places. 
One  third  of  the  members  are  to  go  out  every  two 
years ;  and  in  six,  the  whole  body  may  be  changed. 
Prior  to  the  revolution,  the  representatives  in  the  se 
veral  colonies  were  elected  for  different  periods ;  for 
three  years,  for  seven  years,  &c.  Were  those  bodies 
ever  considered  as  incapable  of  representing  the  peo 
ple,  or  as  too  independent  of  them  ?  There  is  one 
circumstance  which  will  have  a  tendency  to  increase 
the  dependence  of  the  senators  on  the  states,  in  pro 
portion  to  the  duration  of  their  appointments.  As 
the  state  legislatures  are  in  continual  fluctuation,  the 
senator  will  have  more  attachments  to  form,  and  con 
sequently  a  greater  difficulty  of  maintaining  his  place, 
than  one  of  shorter  duration.  He  will  therefore  be 
more  cautious  and  industrious  to  suit  his  conduct  to 
the  wishes  of  his  constituents. 


*       p 

.r)2  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

Sir,  when  you  take  a  view  of  all  the  circumstances 
which  have  been  recited,  you  will  certainly  see,  that 
the  senators  will  constantly  look  up  to  the  state  gov 
ernments,  with  an  eye  of  dependence  and  affection/ 
If  they  are  ambitious  to  continue  in  office,  they  will 
make  every  prudent  arrangement  for  this  purpose, 
and,  whatever  may  be  their  private  sentiments  of  po 
litics,  they  will  be  convinced,  that  the  surest  means  of 
obtaining  a  re-election,  will  be  an  uniform  attachment 
to  the  interests  of  their  several  states. 

The  gentlemen,  to  support  their  amendment,  have 
observed,  that  the  power  of  recall,  under  the  old  gov 
ernment,  has  never  been  exercised.  There  is  no  rea 
soning  from  this.  The  experience  of  a  few  years, 
under  peculiar  circumstances,  can  afford  no  probable 
security  that  it  never  will  be  carried  into  execution 
with  unhappy  effects.  A  seat  in  Congress  has  been 
less  an  object  of  ambition ;  and  the  arts  of  intrigue, 
consequently,  have  been  less  practised.  Indeed,  it 
has  been  difficult  to  find  men,  who  were  willing  to 
suffer  the  mortifications,  to  which  so  feeble  a  govern 
ment,  and  so  dependent  a  station,  exposed  them. 

Sir,  if  you  consider  but  a  moment,  the  purposes  for 
which  the  senate  was  instituted,  and  the  nature  of  the 
business  which  they  are  to  transact,  you  will  see  the 
necessity  of  giving  them  duration.  They,  together 
with  the  president,  are  to  manage  all  our  concerns 
with  foreign  nations ;  they  must  understand  all  their 
interests,  and  their  political  systems.  This  knowledge 
is  not  soon  acquired — but  a  very  small  part  is  gained 
in  the  closet.  Is  it  desirable  then  that  new  and  un 
qualified  members  should  be  continually  thrown  into 
that  body  ?  When  public  bodies  are  engaged  in  the 
exercise  of  general  powers,  you  cannot  judge  of  the 
propriety  of  their  conduct,  but  from  the  result  of  their 
systems.  They  may  be  forming  plans,  which  require 
time  and  diligence  to  bring  to  maturity.  It  is  neces 
sary,  therefore,  that  they  should  have  a  considerable 
and  fixed  duration,  that  they  may  make  their  calcula- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  53 

lions  accordingly.  If  they  are  to  be  perpetually  fluc 
tuating,  they  can  never  have  that  responsibility  which 
is  so  important  in  republican  governments.  In  bodies 
subject  to  frequent  changes,  great  political  plans  must 
be  conducted  by  members  in  succession :  a  single  as 
sembly  can  have  but  a  partial  agency  in  them,  and 
consequently  cannot  properly  be  answerable  for  the 
final  event.  Considering  the  senate,  therefore,  with  a 
view  to  responsibility,  duration  is  a  very  interesting 
and  essential  quality.  There  is  another  view,  in  which 
duration  in  the  senate  appears  necessary.  A  gov 
ernment,  changeable  in  its  policy,  must  soon  lose  its 
sense  of  national  character,  and  forfeit  the  respect  of 
foreigners.  Senators  will  not  be  solicitous  for  the 
reputation  of  public  measures,  in  which  they  have  had 
but  a  temporary  concern,  and  will  feel  lightly  the  bur 
den  of  public  disapprobation,  in  proportion  to  the 
number  of  those  who  partake  of  the  censure.  Our 
political  rivals  will  ever  consider  our  mutable  counsels 
as  evidence  of  deficient  wisdom,  and  will  be  little  ap 
prehensive  of  our  arriving  at  any  exalted  station  in  the 
scale  of  power.  Such  are  the  internal  and  external 
disadvantages  which  would  result  from  the  principle 
contended  for.  Were  it  admitted,  I  am  fully  persuad 
ed,  sir,  that  prejudices  would  govern  the  public  delibe 
rations,  and  passions  rage  in  the  counsels  of  the  union. 
If  it  were  necessary,  I  could  illustrate  my  subject  by 
historical  facts :  I  could  travel  through  an  extensive 
field  of  detail,  and  demonstrate,  that  wherever  the  fa 
tal  principle  of — the  head  suffering  the  control  of  the 
members,  has  operated,  it  has  proved  a  fruitful  source 
of  commotions  and  disorder. 

This,  sir,  is  the  first  fair  opportunity  that  has  been 
offered,  of  deliberately  correcting  the  errors  in  gov.- 
ernment.  Instability  has  been  a  prominent  and  very 
defective  feature  in  most  republican  systems.  It  is 
the  first  to  be  seen,  and  the  last  to  be  lamented  by  a 
philosophical  inquirer.  It  has  operated  most  bane- 
fully  in  our  infant  republics.  It  is  necessary  that  we 


,j4  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

apply  an  immediate  remedy,  and  eradicate  the  poi 
sonous  principle  from  our  government.  If  this  be  not 
done,  sir,  we  shall  feel,  and  posterity  will  be  convuls 
ed  by  a  painful  malady. 

On  the  25th,  Mr.  Hamilton  continued  his  remarks  upon  the  same 
subject. 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

In  debates  of  this  kind,  it  is  extremely  easy,  on  either 
side,  to  say  a  great  number  of  plausible  things.  It  is 
to  be  acknowledged,  that  there  is  even  a  certain  degree 
of  truth  in  the  reasonings  on  both  sides.  In  this  situa 
tion,  it  is  the  province  of  judgment  and  good  sense,  to 
determine  their  force  and  application,  and  how  far  the 
arguments  advanced  on  one  side,  are  balanced  by  those 
on  the  other.  The  ingenious  dress  in  which  both  may 
appear,  renders  it  a  difficult  task  to  make  this  decision, 
and  the  mind  is  frequently  unable  to  come  to  a  safe 
and  solid  conclusion.  On  the  present  question,  some 
of  the  principles  on  each  side  are  admitted,  and  the 
conclusions  drawn  from  them  denied,  while  other  prin 
ciples,  with  their  inferences,  are  rejected  altogether. 
It  is  the  business  of  the  committee  to  seek  the  truth  in 
this  labyrinth  of  argument. 

There  are  two  objects  in  forming  systems  of  gov 
ernment — safety  for  the  people,  and  energy  in  the  ad 
ministration.  When  these  objects  are  united,  the  cer 
tain  tendency  of  the  system  will  be  to  the  public  wel 
fare.  If  the  latter  object  be  neglected,  the  people's 
security  will  be  as  certainly  sacrificed,  as  by  disregard 
ing  the  former.  Good  constitutions  are  formed  upon 
a  comparison  of  the  liberty  of  the  individual,  with  the 
strength  of  government :  if  the  tone  of  either  be  too 
high,  the  other  will  be  weakened  too  much.  It  is  the 
happiest  possible  mode  of  conciliating  these  objects, 
to  institute  one  branch  peculiarly  endowed  with  sensi 
bility,  another  with  knowledge  and  firmness.  Through 
the  opposition  and  mutual  control  of  these  bodies,  the 
government  will  reach,  in  its  operations,  the  perfect 


THE   FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  55 

balance  between  liberty  and  power.  The  arguments 
of  the  gentlemen  chiefly  apply  to  the  former  branch — 
the  house  of  representatives.  If  they  will  calmly  con 
sider  the  different  nature  of  the  two  branches,  they 
will  see  that  the  reasoning  which  justly  applies  to  the 
representative  house,  will  go  to  destroy  the  essential 
qualities  of  the  senate.  If  the  former  is  calculated  per 
fectly  upon  the  principles  of  caution,  why  should  you 
impose  the  same  principles  upon  the  latter,  which  is 
designed  fpr  a  different  operation?  Gentlemen,  while 
they  discover  a  laudable  anxiety  for  the  safety  of  the 
people,  do  not  attend  to  the  important  distinction  I 
have  drawn.  We  have  it  constantly  held  up  to  us, 
that,  as  it  is  our  chief  duty  to  guard  against  tyranny,  it 
is  our  policy  to  form  all  the  branches  of  government 
for  this  purpose.  Sir,  it  is  a  truth  sufficiently  illus 
trated  by  experience,  that  when  the  people  act  by  their 
representatives,  they  are  commonly  irresistible.  The 
gentleman  admits  the  position,  that  stability  is  essen 
tial  to  the  government,  and  yet  enforces  principles, 
which,  if  true,  ought  to  banish  stability  from  the  sys 
tem.  The  gentleman  observes,  that  there  is  a  fallacy 
in  my  reasoning,  arid  informs  us,  that  the  legislatures 
of  the  states — not  the  people,  are  to  appoint  the 
senators.  Does  he  reflect,  that  they  are  the  immedi 
ate  agents  of  the  people ;  that  they  are  so  constituted 
as  to.  feel  all  their  prejudices  and  passions,  and  to  be 
governed,  in  a  great  degree,  by  their  misapprehen 
sions?  Experience  must  have  taught  him  the  truth 
of  this.  Look  through  their  history :  what  factions 
have  arisen  from  the  most  trifling  causes — what  in 
trigues  have  been  practised  for  the  most  illiberal  pur 
poses  !  Is  not  the  state  of  Rhode  Island,  at  this  mo 
ment,  struggling  under  difficulties  and  distresses,  for 
having  been  led  blindly  by  the  spirit  of  the  multitude  ? 
What  is  her  legislature  but  the  picture  of  a  mob  ?  In 
this  state  we  have  a  senate,  possessed  of  the  proper 
qualities  of  a  permanent  body :  Virginia,  Maryland, 
and  a  few  other  states,  are  in  the  same  situation :  the 


56  MR.   HAMILTON'S  SPEECH   ON 

rest  are  either  governed  by  a  single  democratic  as 
sembly,  or  have  a  senate  constituted  entirely  upon  de 
mocratic  principles.  These  have  been,  more  or  less, 
embroiled  in  factions,  and  have  generally  been  the 
image  and  echo  of  the  multitude.  It  is  difficult  to 
reason  on  this  point,  without  touching  on  certain  deli 
cate  chords.  I  could  refer  you  to  periods  and  con 
junctures,  when  the  people  have  been  governed  by 
improper  passions,  and  led  by  factious  and  designing 
men.  I  could  show,  that  the  same  passions  have  in 
fected  their  representatives.  Let  us  beware  that  we 
do  not  make  the  state  legislatures  a  vehicle,  hi  which 
the  evi)  humors  may  be  conveyed  into  the  national  sys 
tem.  To  prevent  this,  it  is  necessary  that  the  senate 
should  be  so  formed,  as,  in  some  measure,  to  check  the 
state  governments,  and  preclude  the  communication 
of  the  false  impressions  which  they  receive  from  the 
people.  It  has  been  often  repeated,  that  the  legisla 
tures  of  the  states  can  have  only  a  partial  and  confin 
ed  view  of  national  affairs ;  that  they  can  form  no  pro 
per  estimate  of  great  objects  which  are  not  in  the 
sphere  of  their  interests.  The  observation  of  the  gen 
tleman,  therefore,  cannot  take  off  the  force  of  my  ar 


gument. 


Sir,  the  senators  will  constantly  be  attended  with  a 
reflection,*  that  their  future  existence  is  absolutely  in 
the  power  of  the  states.  Will  not  this  form  a  power 
ful  check  ?  It  is  a  reflection  which  applies  closely  to 
their  feelings  and  interests ;  and  no  candid  man,  who 
thinks  deliberately,  will  deny  that  it  would  be  alone  a 
sufficient  check.  The  legislatures  are  to  provide  the 
mode  of  electing  the  President,  and  must  have  a  great 
influence  over  the  electors.  Indeed,  they  convey  their 
influence  through  a  thousand  channels,  into  the  gene 
ral  government.  Gentlemen  have  endeavored  to 
show  that  there  will  be  no  clashing  of  local  and  gene 
ra1  interests:  they  do  not  seem  to  have  sufficiently 
considered  the  subject.  We  have  in  this  state  a  duty 
of  six  pence  per  pound  on  salt,  and  it  operates  lightly 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  57 

and  with  advantage :  but  such  a  duty  would  be  very 
burdensome  to  some  of  the  states.  If  Congress 
should,  at  any  time,  find  it  convenient  to  impose  a  salt 
tax,  would  it  not  be  opposed  by  the  eastern  states  ? 
Being  themselves  incapable  of  feeling  the  necessity  of 
the  measure,  they  could  only  feel  its  apparent  injus 
tice.  Would  it  be  wise  to  give  the  New  England 
states  a  power  to  defeat  this  measure,  by  recalling 
their  senators  who  may  be  engaged  for  it  ?  I  beg  the 
gentlemen  once  more  to  attend  to  the  distinction  be 
tween  the  real  and  apparent  interests  of  the  states.  I 
admit  that  the  aggregate  of  individuals  constitutes  the 
government ;  yet  every  state  is  not  the  government : 
every  petty  district  is  not  the  government.  Sir,  in  our 
state  legislatures,  a  compromise  is  frequently  necessa 
ry  between  the  interests  of  counties :  the  same  must 
happen  in  the  general  government  between  states.  In 
this,  the  few  must  yield  to  the  many:  or,  in  other 
words,  the  particular  must  be  sacrificed  to  the  general 
interest.  If  the  members  of  Congress  are  too  depend 
ent  on  the  state  legislatures,  they  will  be  eternally 
forming  secret  combinations  from  local  views.  This 
is  reasoning  from  the  plainest  principles.  Their  in 
terest  is  interwoven  with  their  dependence,  and  they 
will  necessarily  yield  to  the  impression  of  their  situa 
tion.  Those  who  have  been  in  Congress,  have  seen 
these  operations.  The  first  question  has  been — how 
will  such  a  measure  affect  my  constituents,  and  conse 
quently,  how  will  the  part  I  take  affect  my  re-election  ? 
This  consideration  may  be,  in  some  degree,  proper; 
but  to  be  dependent  from  day  to  day,  and  to  have  the 
idea  perpetually  present,  would  be  the  source  of  innu 
merable  evils.  Six  years,  sir,  is  a  period  short  enough 
for  a  proper  degree  of  dependence.  Let  us  consider 
the  peculiar  state  of  this  body,  and  see  under  what 
impressions  they  will  act.  One  third  of  them  are  to 
go  out  at  the  end  of  two  years ;  two  thirds  in  four 
years,  and  the  whole  in  six  years.  When  one  year  is 
elapsed,  there  will  be  a  number  who  are  to  hold  their 
VOL.  i.  8 


58  MR-  HAMILTON'S   SPEECH  OK 

places  for  one  year,  others  for  three,  and  others  for 
five  years.  Thus,  there  will  not  only  be  a  constant 
and  frequent  change  of  members,  but  there  will  be 
some  whose  office  is  near  the  point  of  expiration,  and 
who,  from  this  circumstance,  will  have  a  lively  sense 
of  their  dependence.  The  biennial  change  of  mem 
bers  is  an  excellent  invention  for  increasing  the  diffi 
culty  of  combination.  Any  scheme  of  usurpation  will 
lose,  every  two  years,  a  number  of  its  oldest  advo 
cates,  and  their  places  will  be  supplied  by  an  equal 
number  of  new,  unaccommodating  and  virtuous  men. 
When  two  principles  are  equally  important,  we  ought 
if  possible,  to  reconcile  them,  and  sacrifice  neither. 
We  think  that  safety  and  permanency  in  this  govern 
ment  are  completely  reconcileable.  The  state  gov 
ernments  will  have,  from  the  causes  I  have  described, 
a  sufficient  influence  over  the  senate,  without  the 
check  for  which  the  gentlemen  contend. 

It  has  been  remarked,  that  there  is  an  inconsistency 
in  our  admitting,  that  the  equal  votes  in  the  senate 
were  given  to  secure  the  rights  of  the  states ;  and,  at 
the  same  time,  holding  up  the  idea,  that  their  interests 
should  be  sacrificed  to  those  of  the  union.  But  the 
committee  certainly  perceive  the  distinction  between 
the  rights  of  the  state  and  its  interests.  The  rights 
of  a  state  are  defined  by  the  constitution,  and  cannot 
be  invaded  without  a  violation  of  it ;  but  the  interests 
of  a  state  have  no  connexion  with  the  constitution, 
and  may  be  in  a  thousand  instances  constitutionally 
sacrificed.  An  uniform  tax  is  perfectly  constitutional ; 
and  yet  it  may  operate  oppressively  upon  certain 
members  of  the  union.  The  gentlemen  are  afraid  that 
the  state  governments  will  be  abolished.  But,  sir, 
their  existence  does  jiot  depend  upon  the  laws  of  the 
United  States.  Congress  can  no  more  abolish  the 
state  governments,  than  they  can  dissolve  the  union. 
The  whole  constitution  is  repugnant  to  it,  and  yet  the 
gentlemen  would  introduce  an  additional,  useless  pro 
vision  against  it.  It  is  proper  that  the  influence  of  the 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION,  59 

states  should  prevail  to  a  certain  extent.  But  shall 
the  individual  states  be  the  judges  how  far  ?  Shall  an 
unlimited  power  be  left  them  to  determine  in  their 
own  favor  ?  The  gentlemen  go  into  the  extreme  :  in 
stead  of  a  wise  government,  they  would  form  a  fantas 
tical  Utopia.  But,  sir,  while  they  give  it  a  plausible, 
popular  shape,  they  would  render  it  impracticable. 
Much  has  been  said  about  factions.  As  far  as  my  ob 
servation  has  extended,  factions  in  Congress  have 
arisen  from  attachment  to  state  prejudices.  We  are 
attempting  by  this  constitution  to  abolish  factions,  and 
to  unite  all  parties  for  the  general  welfare.  That  a 
man  should  have  the  power  in  private  life,  of  recalling 
his  agent,  is  proper ;  because  in  the  business  in  which 
he  is  engaged,  he  has  no  other  object  but  to  gain  the 
approbation  of  his  principal.  Is  this  the  case  with 
the  senator  ?  Is  he  simply  the  agent  of  the  state  ? 
No — he  is  an  agent  for  the  union,  and  he  is  bound  to 
perform  services  necessary  to  the  good  of  the  whole, 
though  his  state  should  condemn  them. 

Sir,  in  contending  for  a  rotation,  the  gentlemen  car 
ry  their  zeal  beyond  all  reasonable  bounds.  I  am  con 
vinced  that  no  government,  founded  on  this  feeble 
principle,  can  operate  well.  I  believe  also,  that  we 
shall  be  singular  in  this  proposal.  We  have  not  felt 
the  embarrassments  resulting  from  rotation,  that  other 
states  have;  and  we  hardly  know  the  strength  of 
their  objections  to  it.  There  is  no  probability  that 
we  shall  ever  persuade  a  majority  of  the  states  to 
agree  to  this  amendment.  The  gentlemen  deceive 
themselves.  The  amendment  would  defeat  their  own 
design.  When  a  man  knows  he  must  quit  his  station, 
let  his  merit  be  what  it  may,  he  will  turn  his  attention 
chiefly  to  his  own  emolument :  nay,  he  will  feel  temp 
tations,  which  few  other  situations  furnish,  to  perpetu 
ate  his  power  by  unconstitutional  usurpations.  Men 
will  pursue  their  interests.  It  is  as  easy  to  change  hu 
man  nature,  as  to  oppose  the  strong  current  of  the  sel- 


60  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH,  &c. 

fish  passions.     A  wise  legislator  will  gently  divert  the 
channel,  and  direct  it,  if  possible,  to  the  public  good. 

It  has  been  observed,  that  it  is  not  possible  there 
should  be,  in  a  state,  only  two  men  qualified  for  sena 
tors.  But,  sir,  the  question  is  not,  whether  there  may 
be  no  more  than  two  men;  but  whether,  in  certain 
emergencies,  you  could  find  two  equal  to  those  whom 
the  amendment  would  discard.  Important  negotia 
tions,  or  other  business  to  which  they  shall  be  most 
competent,  may  employ  them,  at  the  moment  of  their 
removal.  These  things  often  happen.  The  difficulty 
of  obtaining  men,  capable  of  conducting  the  affairs  of 
a  nation  in  dangerous  times,  is  much  more  serious 
than  the  gentlemen  imagine. 

As  to  corruption,  sir,  admitting  in  the  president  a 
disposition  to  corrupt,  what  are  the  instruments  of 
bribery?  It  is  said,  he  will  have  in  his  disposal  a 
great  number  of  offices.  But  how  many  offices  are 
there,  for  which  a  man  would  relinquish  the  senato 
rial  dignity  ?  There  may  be  some  in  the  judicial,  and 
some  in  other  principal  departments.  But  there  are 
few,  whose  respectability  can  in  any  measure  balance 
that  of  the  office  of  senator.  Men  who  have  been  in 
the  senate  once,  and  who  have  a  reasonable  hope  of 
a  re-election,  will  not  be  easily  bought  by  offices. 
This  reasoning  shows  that  a  rotation  would  be  pro 
ductive  of  many  disadvantages — under  particular  cir 
cumstances,  it  might  be  extremely  inconvenient,  if  not 
fatal  to  the  prosperity  of  our  country. 


SPEECH  OF   ALEXANDER  HAMILTON, 

ON  THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  ADOPTING  THE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 
DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  NEW  YORK,  JUNE  27, 1788. 


A  proposition  to  amend  the  constitution  was  brought  before  the  conven 
tion,  the  object  of  which  was,  to  materially  abridge  the  power  pro 
posed  to  be  conferred  upon  Congress,  relative  to  imposing  excise 
and  laying  direct  taxes,  in  opposition  to  which,  Mr.  Hamilton  de 
livered  the  following  speech. 

THIS  is  one  of  those  subjects,  Mr.  Chairman,  on 
which  objections  very  naturally  arise,  and  assume  the 
most  plausible  shape.  Its  address  is  to  the  passions, 
and  its  first  impressions  create  a  prejudice,  before  cool 
examination  has  an  opportunity  for  exertion.  It  is 
more  easy  for  the  human  mind  to  calculate  the  evils, 
than  the  advantages  of  a  measure ;  and  vastly  more 
natural  to  apprehend  the  danger,  than  to  see  the  ne 
cessity,  of  giving  powers  to  our  rulers.  Hence,  I  may 
justly  expect,  that  those  who  hear  me,  will  place  less 
confidence  in  those  arguments  which  oppose,  than  in 
those  which  favor,  their  prepossessions. 

After  all  our  doubts,  our  suspicions  and  specula 
tions,  on  the  subject  of  government,  we  must  return,  at 
last,  to  this  important  truth — that  when  we  have  form 
ed  a  constitution  upon  free  principles ;  when  we  have 
given  a  proper  balance  to  the  different  branches  of  ad 
ministration,  and  fixed  representation  upon  pure  and 
equal  principles,  we  may,  with  safety,  furnish  it  with 


02  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

all  the  powers  necessary  to  answer,  in  the  most  ample 
manner,  the  purposes  of  government.  The  great  de 
siderata  are  a  free  representation,  and  mutual  checks. 
When  these  are  obtained,  all  our  apprehensions  of  the 
extent  of  powers  are  unjust  and  imaginary.  What 
then  is  the  structure  of  this  constitution  ?  One  branch 
of  the  legislature  is  to  be  elected  by  the  people — by 
the  same  people,  who  choose  your  state  representa 
tives.  Its  members  are  to  hold  their  office  two  years, 
and  then  return  to  their  constituents.  Here,  sir,  the 
people  govern:  here  they  act  by  their  immediate 
representatives.  You  have  also  a  senate,  constituted 
by  your  state  legislatures — by  men,  in  whom  you  place 
the  highest  confidence,  and  forming  another  represen 
tative  branch.  Then,  again,  you  have  an  executive 
magistrate,  created  by  a  form  of  election,  which  me 
rits  universal  admiration.  In  the  form  of  this  govern 
ment,  and  in  the  mode  of  legislation,  you  find  all  the 
checks  which  the  greatest  politicians  and  the  best 
writers,  have  ever  conceived.  What  more  can  rea 
sonable  men  desire?  Is  there  any  one  branch,  in 
which  the  whole  legislative  and  executive  powers  are 
lodged  ?  No.  The  legislative  authority  is  lodged  in 
three  distinct  branches,  properly  balanced :  the  execu 
tive  authority  is  divided  between  two  branches ;  and 
the  judicial  is  still  reserved  for  an  independent  body, 
who  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior.  This 
organization  is  so  complex,  so  skilfully  contrived,  that 
it  is  next  to  impossible  that  an  impolitic  or  wicked 
measure  should  pass  the  great  scrutiny  with  success. 
Now,  what  do  gentlemen  mean,  by  coming  forward 
and  declaiming  against  this  government  ?  Why  do 
they  say  we  ought  to  limit  its  powers,  to  disable  it, 
and  to  destroy  its  capacity  of  blessing  the  people  ? 
Has  philosophy  suggested — has  experience  taught, 
that  such  a  government  ought  not  to  be  trusted  with 
every  thing  necessary  for  the  good  of  society  ?  Sir, 
when  you  have  divided  and  nicely  balanced  the  de 
partments  of  government ;  when  you  have  strongly 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  £3 

connected  the  virtue  of  your  rulers  with  their  interest; 
when,  in  short,  you  have  rendered  your  system  as  per 
fect  as  human  forms  can  be — you  must  place  con 
fidence  ;  you  must  give  power. 

We  have  heard  a  great  deal  of  the  sword  and  the 
purse:  it  is  said,  our  liberties  are  in  danger,  if  both  are 
possessed  by  Congress.  Let  us  see  what  is  the  true 
meaning  of  this  maxim,  which  has  been  so  much  used, 
and  so  little  understood.  It  is,  that  you  shall  not 
place  these  powers  in  either  the  legislative  or  execu 
tive  singly :  neither  one  nor  the  other  shall  have  both ; 
because  this  would  destroy  that  division  of  powers,  on 
which  political  liberty  is  founded ;  and  would  furnish 
one  body  with  all  the  means  of  tyranny.  But,  where 
the  purse  is  lodged  in  one  branch,  and  the  sword  in 
another,  there  can  be  no  danger.  All  governments 
have  possessed  these  powers :  they  would  be  monsters 
without  them,  and  incapable  of  exertion.  What  is 
your  state  government?  Does  not  your  legislature 
command  what  money  it  pleases?  Does  not  your 
executive  execute  the  laws  without  restraint  ?  These 
distinctions  between  the  purse  and  the  sword  have  no 
application  to  the  system,  but  only  to  its  separate 
branches.  Sir,  when  we  reason  about  the  great  in 
terests  of  a  great  people,  it  is  high  time  that  we  dis 
miss  our  prejudices  and  banish  declamation. 

In  order  to  induce  us  to  consider  the  powers,  given 
by  this  constitution,  as  dangerous— in  order  to  render 
plausible  an  attempt  to  take  away  the  life  and  spirit 
of  the  most  important  power  in  government,  the  gen 
tleman  complains  that  we  shall  not  have  a  true  and 
safe  representation*  I  asked  him  what  a  safe  repre 
sentation  was,  and  he  has  given  no  satisfactory  aiv 
swer.  The  assembly  of  New  York  has  been  mention 
ed  as  a  proper  standard ;  but,  if  we  apply  this  stan 
dard  to  the  general  government,  our  Congress  will  be 
come  a  mere  mob,  exposed  to  every  irregular  impulse, 
and  subject  to  every  breeze  of  faction.  Can  such  a 
system  afford  security  ?  Can  you  have  confidence  in 


64  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

such  a  body  ?  The  idea  of  taking  the  ratio  of  repre 
sentation,  in  a  small  society,  for  the  ratio  of  a  great 
one,  is  a  fallacy  which  ought  to  be  exposed.  It  is  im 
possible  to  ascertain  to  what  point  our  representation 
will  increase :  it  may  vary  from  one,  to  two,  three,  or 
four  hundred  ,•  it  depends  upon  the  progress  of  popu 
lation.  Suppose  it  to  rest  at  two  hundred ;  is  not  this 
number  sufficient  to  secure  it  against  corruption  ? 
Human  nature  must  be  a  much  more  weak  and  despi 
cable  thing,  than  I  apprehend  it  to  be,  if  two  hundred 
of  our  fellow-citizens  can  be  corrupted  in  two  years. 
But,  suppose  they  are  corrupted;  can  they,  in  t»vo 
years,  accomplish  their  designs  ?  Can  they  form  a 
combination,  and  even  lay  a  foundation  for  a  system  of 
tyranny,  in  so  short  a  period  ?  It  is  far  from  my  inten 
tion  to  wound  the  feelings  of  any  gentleman ;  but  I 
must,  in  this  most  interesting  discussion,  speak  of 
things  as  they  are ;  and  hold  up  opinions  in  the  light 
in  which  they  ought  to  appear :  and  I  maintain,  that 
all  that  has  been  said  of  corruption,  of  the  purse  and 
the  sword,  and  of  the  danger  of  giving  powers,  is  not 
supported  by  principle  or  fact :  that  it  is  mere  verbiage, 
and  idle  declamation.  The  true  principle  of  govern 
ment  is  this :  make  the  system  complete  in  its  struc 
ture;  give  a  perfect  proportion  and  balance  to  its 
parts ;  and  the  powers  you  give  it  will  never  affect 
your  security.  The  question,  then,  of  the  division  of 
powers  between  the  general  and  state  governments,  is 
a  question  of  convenience :  it  becomes  a  prudential 
inquiry,  what  powers  are  proper  to  be  reserved  to  the 
latter ;  and  this  immediately  involves  another  inquiry 
into  the  proper  objects  of  the  two  governments.  This 
is  the  criterion  by  which  we  shall  determine  the  just 
distribution  of  powers. 

The  great  leading  objects  of  the  federal  government, 
in  which  revenue  is  concerned,  are  to  maintain  domes 
tic  peace,  and  provide  for  the  common  defence.  In 
these  are  comprehended  the  regulation  of  commerce, 
that  is,  the  whole  system  of  foreign  intercourse ;  the 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  (J5 

support  of  armies  and  navies,  and  of  the  civil  adminis-* 
tration.  It  is  useless  to  go  into  detail.  Every  one 
knows  that  the  objects  of  the  general  government  are 
numerous,  extensive  and  important.  Every  one  must 
acknowledge  the  necessity  of  giving  powers,  in  all  re 
spects,  and  in  every  degree,  equal  to  these  objects. 
This  principle  assented  to,  let  us  inquire  what  are  the 
objects  of  the  state  governments.  Have  they  to  pro 
vide  against  foreign  invasion?  Have  they  to  maintain 
fleets  and  armies  ?  Have  they  any  concern  in  the  re 
gulation  of  commerce,  the  procuring  alliances,  or  form 
ing  treaties  of  peace?  No.  Their  objects  are  merely 
civil  and  domestic;  to  support  the  legislative  esta 
blishment,  and  to  provide  for  the  administration  of  the 
laws.  Let  any  one  compare  the  expense  of  support 
ing  the  civil  list  in  a  state,  with  the  expense  of  provid 
ing  for  the  defence  of  the  union.  The  difference  is 
almost  beyond  calculation.  The  experience  of  Great 
Britain  will  throw  some  light  on  this  subject.  In  that 
kingdom,  the  ordinary  expenses  of  peace  to  those  of 
war,  are  as  one  to  fourteen:  but  there  they  have  a 
monarch,  with  his  splendid  court,  and  an  enormous  ci 
vil  establishment,  with  which  we  have  nothing  in  this 
country  to  compare.  If,  in  Great  Britain,  the  expenses 
of  war  and  peace  are  so  disproportioned,  how  wide 
will  be  their  disparity  in  the  United  States  ;  how  infi 
nitely  wider  between  the  general  government  and 
each  individual  state  !  Now,  sir,  where  ought  the  great 
resources  to  be  lodged?  Every  rational  man  will 
give  an  immediate  answer.  To  what  extent  shall 
these  resources  be  possessed  ?  Reason  says,  as  far  as 
possible  exigencies  can  require  ;  that  is,  without  limita 
tion.  A  constitution  cannot  set  bounds  to  a  nation's 
wants  ;  it  ought  not,  therefore,  to  set  bounds  to  its  re 
sources.  Unexpected  invasions,  long  and  ruinous 
wars,  may  demand  all  the  possible  abilities  of  the 
country.  Shall  not  your  government  have  power  to 
call  these  abilities  into  action  ?  The  contingencies  of 
society  are  not  reduceable  to  calculations.  They 


VOL.  r. 


66  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

cannot  be  fixed  or  bounded,  even  in  imagination. 
Will  you  limit  the  means  of  your  defence,  when  you 
cannot  ascertain  the  force  or  extent  of  the  invasion  ? 
Even  in  ordinary  wars,  a  government  is  frequently 
obliged  to  call  for  supplies,  to  the  temporary  oppres 
sion  of  the  people. 

Sir,  if  we  adopt  the  idea  of  exclusive  revenues,  we 
shall  be  obliged  to  fix  some  distinguished  line,  which 
neither  government  shall  overpass.  The  inconven 
iences  of  this  measure  must  appear  evident,  on  the 
slightest  examination.'  The  resources  appropriated  to 
one,  may  diminish  or  fail,  while  those  of  the  other  may 
increase,  beyond  the  wants  of  government.  One  may 
be  destitute  of  revenues,  while  the  other  shall  possess 
an  unnecessary  abundance,  and  the  constitution  will 
be  an  eternal  barrier  to  a  mutual  intercourse  and  re 
lief.  In  this  case,  will  the  individual  states  stand  on 
so  good  a  ground,  as  if  the  objects  of  taxation  were 
left  free  and  open  to  the  embrace  of  both  the  govern 
ments  ?  Possibly,  in  the  advancement  of  commerce, 
the  imposts  may  increase  to  such  a  degree,  as  to  ren 
der  direct  taxes  unnecessary.  These  resources,  then, 
as  the  constitution  stands,  may  be  occasionally  relin 
quished  to  the  states ;  but  on  the  gentleman's  idea  of 
prescribing  exclusive  limits,  and  precluding  all  recip 
rocal  communication,  this  would  be  entirely  improper. 
The  laws  of  the  states  must  not  touch  the  appropriat 
ed  resources  of  the  United  States,  whatever  may  be 
their  wants.  Would  it  not  be  of  more  advantage  to 
the  states,  to  have  a  concurrent  jurisdiction  extending 
to  all  the  sources  of  revenue,  than  to  be  confined  to 
such  a  small  resource,  as,  on  calculation  of  the  objects 
of  the  two  governments,  should  appear  to  be  their 
due  proportion?  Certainly  you  cannot  hesitate  on 
this  question.  The  gentleman's  plan  would  have  a 
further  ill  effect;  it  would  tend  to  dissolve  the  con 
nexion  and  correspondence  of  the  two  governments, 
to  estrange  them  from  each  other,  and  to  destroy  that 
mutual  dependence,  which  forms  the  essence  of  union. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  <J7 

Sir,  a  number  of  arguments  have  been  advanced  by 
an  honorable  member  from  New  York,  which,  to  every 
unclouded  mind,  must  carry  conviction.  He  has  stat 
ed,  that  in  sudden  emergencies,  it  may  be  necessary 
to  borrow;  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  borrow,  unless 
you  have  funds  to  pledge  for  the  payment  of  your  debts. 
Limiting  the  powers  of  government  to  certain  re 
sources,  is  rendering  the  fund  precarious ;  and  oblig 
ing  the  government  to  ask,  instead  of  empowering  it 
to  command,  is  to  destroy  all  confidence  and  credit. 
If  the  power  of  taxing  is  restricted,  the  consequence  is, 
that  on  the  breaking  out  of  a  war,  you  must  divert  the 
funds,  appropriated  to  the  payment  of  debts,  to  an 
swer  immediate  exigencies.  Thus  you  violate  your 
engagements,  at  the  very  time  you  increase  the  bur 
den  of  them.  Besides,  sound  policy  condemns  the 
practice  of  accumulating  debts.  A  government,  to 
act  with  energy,  should  have  the  possession  of  all  its 
revenues  to  answer  present  purposes.  The  principle, 
for  which  I  contend,  is  recognized,  in  all  its  extent,  by 
our  old  constitution.  Congress  is  authorized  to  raise 
troops,  to  call  for  supplies  without  limitation,  and  to 
borrow  money  to  any  amount.  It  is  true,  they  must 
use  the  form  of  recommendations  and  requisitions : 
but  the  states  are  bound  by  the  solemn  ties  of  honor, 
of  justice,  of  religion,  to  comply  without  reserve. 

Mr.  Chairman,  it  has  been  advanced  as  a  principle, 
that  no  government  but  a  despotism,  can  exist  in  a 
very  extensive  country.  This  is  a  melancholy  consi 
deration  indeed.  If  it  were  founded  on  truth,  we 
ought  to  dismiss  the  idea  of  a  republican  government, 
even  for  the  state  of  New  York.  This  idea  has  been 
taken  from  a  celebrated  writer,  who,  by  being  misun 
derstood,  has  been  the  occasion  of  frequent  fallacies 
in  our  reasoning  on  political  subjects.  But  the  posi 
tion  has  been  misapprehended;  and  its  application  is 
entirely  false  and  unwarrantable:  it  relates  only  to 
democracies,  where  the  whole  body  of  the  people 
meet  to  transact  business :  arid  where  representation 


tf8  MR.  HAMILTON'S    SPEECH  ON 

is  unknown.     Such  were  a  number  of  ancient,  and 
some  modern  independent  cities.      Men   who  read 
without  attention,  have  taken  these  maxims  respect 
ing  the  extent  of  country ;  and,,  contrary  to  their  pro 
per  meaning,  have  applied  them  to 'republics  in  gene 
ral.     This  application  is  wrong  in  respect  to  all  rep 
resentative  governments ;  but  especially  in  re]ation  to 
a  confederacy  of  states,  in  which  the  supreme  legis 
lature  has  only  general  powers,  and  the  civil  and  do 
mestic  concerns  of  the  people  are  regulated  by  the 
laws  of  the  several  states.     This  distinction  being  kept 
in  view,  all  the  difficulty  will  vanish,  and  we  may  ea 
sily  conceive,  that  the  people  of  a  large  country  may 
be  represented,  as  truly  as  those  of  a  small  one.     An 
assembly  constituted   for  general  purposes,  may  be 
fully  competent  to  every  federal  regulation,  without  be 
ing  too  numerous  for  deliberate  conduct.     If  the  state 
governments  were  to  be  abolished,  the  question  would 
wear  a  different  face :  but  this  idea  is  inadmissible. 
They  are  absolutely  necessary  to  the  system.     Their 
existence  must  form  a  leading  principle  in  the  most 
perfect  constitution  we  could  form.     I  insist,  that  it 
never  can  be  the  interest  or  desire  of  the  national  le 
gislature,  to  destroy  the  state  governments.     It  can 
derive  no  advantage  from  such  an  event ;  but,  on  the 
contrary,  would  lose  an  indispensable  support,  a  neces 
sary  aid  in  executing  the  laws,  and  conveying  the  in 
fluence  of  government  to  the  doors   of  the   people. 
The  union  is  dependent  on  the  will  of  the  state  gov 
ernments  for  its  chief  magistrate,  and  for  its  senate. 
The  blow  aimed  at  the  members,  must  give  a  fatal 
wound  to  the  head ;  and  the  destruction  of  the  states 
must  be  at  once  a  political  suicide.     Can  the  national 
government  be  guilty  of  this  madness  ?     What  induce 
ments,  what  temptations  can  they  have  ?    Will  they 
attach  new  honors  to  their  station  ;  will  they  increase 
the  national  strength ;  will  they  multiply  the  national 
resources ;  will  they  make  themselves  more  respecta 
ble  in  the  view  of  foreign  nations,  or  of  their  fellow- 


THE  FEDERAL   CONSTITUTION.  (J9 

citizens,  by  robbing  the  states  of  their  constitutional 
privileges  ?  But  imagine,  for  a  moment,  that  a  politi 
cal  frenzy  should  seize  the  government ;  suppose  they 
should  make  the  attempt — certainly,  sir,  it  would  be 
for  ever  impracticable.  This  has  been  sufficiently  de 
monstrated  by  reason  and  experience.  It  has  been 
proved,  that  the  members  of  republics  have  been,  and 
ever  will  be,  stronger  than  the  head.  Let  us  attend  to 
one  general  historical  example.  In  the  ancient  feudal 
governments  of  Europe,  there  were,  in  the  first  place, 
a  monarch ;  subordinate  to  him,  a  body  of  nobles  ;  and 
subject  to  these,  the  vassals,  or  the  whole  body  of  the 
people.  The  authority  of  the  kings  was  limited,  and 
that  of  the  barons  considerably  independent.  A  great 
part  of  the  early  wars  in  Europe  were  contests  between 
the  king  and  his  nobility.  In  these  contests,  the  lat 
ter  possessed  many  advantages  derived  from  their  in 
fluence,  and  the  immediate  command  they  had  over 
the  people ;  and  they  generally  prevailed.  The  histo 
ry  of  the  feudal  wars  exhibits  little  more  than  a  series 
of  successful  encroachments  on  the  prerogatives  of 
monarchy.  Here,  sir,  is  one  great  proof  of  the  supe- . 
riority,  which  the  members  in  limited  governments 
possess  over  their  head.  As  long  as  the  barons  en 
joyed  the  confidence  and  attachment  of  the  people, 
they  had  the  strength  of  the  country  on  their  side,  and 
were  irresistible.  I  may  be  told,  that  in  some  instances 
the  barons  were  overcome  :  but  how  did  this  hap 
pen  ?  Sir,  they  took  advantage  of  the  depression  of 
the  royal  authority,  and  the  establishment  of  their  own 
power,  to  oppress  and  tyrannize  over  their  vassals.  As 
commerce  enlarged,  and  as  wealth  and  civilization  in 
creased,  the  people  began  to  feel  their  own  weight  and 
consequence :  they  grew  tired  of  their  oppressions ; 
united  their  strength  with  that  of  the  prince,  and 
threw  off  the  yoke  of  aristocracy.  These  very  in 
stances  prove  what  I  contend  for.  They  prove,  that  in 
whatever  direction  the  popular  weight  leans,  the  cur 
rent  of  power  will  flow  :  wherever  the  popular  attach- 


70  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH  ON 

ments  lie,  there  will  rest  the  political  superiority.  Sir, 
can  it  be  supposed  that  the  state  governments  will  be 
come  the  oppressors  of  the  people  ?  Will  they  forfeit 
their  affections  ?  Will  they  combine  to  destroy  the 
liberties  and  happiness  of  their  fellow-citizens,  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  involving  themselves  in  ruin?  God 
forbid !  The  idea,  sir,  is  shocking  !  It  outrages  every 
feeling  of  humanity,  and  every  dictate  of  common 


sense ! 


There  are  certain  social  principles  in  human  nature, 
from  which  we  may  draw  the  most  solid  conclusions, 
with  respect  to  the  conduct  of  individuals  and  of  com 
munities.  We  love  our  families  more  than  our  neigh 
bors  :  we  love  our  neighbors  more  than  our  coun 
trymen  in  general.  The  human  affections,  like  the 
solar  heat,  lose  their  intensity,  as  they  depart  from  the 
centre,  and  become  languid,  in  proportion  to  the  ex 
pansion  of  the  circle,  on  which  they  act.  On  these 
principles,  the  attachment  of  the  individual  will  be  first 
and  for  ever  secured  by  the  state  governments :  they 
will  be  a  mutual  protection  and  support.  Another 
,  source  of  influence,  which  has  already  been  pointed 
out,  is  the  various  official  connexions  in  the  states. 
Gentlemen  endeavor  to  evade  the  force  of  this,  by 
saying  that  these  offices  will  be  insignificant.  This  is 
by  no  means  true.  The  state  officers  will  ever  be  im 
portant,  because  they  are  necessary  and  useful. 
Their  powers  are  such  as  are  extremely  interesting  to 
the  people ;  such  as  affect  their  property,  their  liberty 
and  life.  What  is  more  important  than  the  administra 
tion  of  justice,  and  the  execution  of  the  civil  and  cri 
minal  laws  ?  Can  the  state  governments  become  in 
significant,  while  they  have  the  power  of  raising  money 
independently,  and  without  control  ?  If  they  are  real 
ly  useful ;  if  they  are  calculated  to  promote  the  essen 
tial  interests  of  the  people ;  they  must  have  their  con 
fidence  and  support.  The  states  can  never  lose  their 
powers,  till  the  whole  people  of  America  are  robbed 
of  their  liberties.  These  must  go  together ;  they  must 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  7j 

support  each  other,  or  meet  one  common  fate.  On 
the  gentlemen's  principle,  we  may  safely  trust  the  state 
governments,  though  we  have  no  means  of  resisting 
them :  but  we  cannot  confide  in  the  national  govern 
ment,  though  we  have  an  effectual  constitutional  guard 
against  every  encroachment.  This  is  the  essence  of 
their  argument,  and  it  is  false  and  fallacious  beyond 
conception. 

With  regard  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  two  govern 
ments,  I  shall  certainly  admit  that  the  constitution 
ought  to  be  so  formed,  as  not  to  prevent  the  states 
from  providing  for  their  own  existence ;  and  I  main 
tain  that  it  is  so  formed ;  and  that  their  power  of  pro 
viding  for  themselves  is  sufficiently  established.  This 
is  conceded  by  one  gentleman,  and  in  the  next  breath, 
the  concession  is  retracted.  He  says,  Congress  have 
but  one  exclusive  right  in  taxation ;  that  of  duties  on 
imports :  certainly,  then,  their  other  powers  are  only 
concurrent.  But  to  take  off  the  force  of  this  obvious 
conclusion,  he  immediately  says,  that  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  are  supreme ;  and  that  where  there  is 
one  supreme,  there  cannot  be  a  concurrent  authority ; 
and  further,  that  where  the  laws  of  the  union  are  su 
preme,  those  of  the  states  must  be  subordinate ;  be 
cause,  there  cannot  be  two  supremes.  This  is  curi 
ous  sophistry.  That  two  supreme  powers  cannot  act 
together,  is  false.  They  are  inconsistent  only  when 
they  are  aimed  at  each  other,  or  at  one  indivisible  ob 
ject.  The  laws  of  the  United  States  are  supreme,  as 
to  all  their  proper,  constitutional  objects :  the  laws  of 
the  states  are  supreme  in  the  same  way.  These  su 
preme  laws  may  act  on  different  objects,  without  clash 
ing;  or  they  may  operate  on  different  parts  of  the 
same  common  object,  with  perfect  harmony.  Suppose 
both  governments  should  lay  a  tax,  of  a  penny,  on  a 
certain  article :  has  not  each  an  independent  and  un 
controllable  power  to  collect  its  own  tax?  The 
meaning  of  the  maxim,  there  cannot  be  two  supremes^ 
is  simply  this — two  powers  cannot  be  supreme  over 


72  MR.  HAMILTON'S  SPEECH,  to*. 

each  other.  This  meaning  is  entirely  perverted  by 
the  gentlemen.  But,  it  is  said,  disputes  between  col 
lectors  are  to  be  referred  to  the  federal  courts.  This 
is  again  wandering  in  the  field  of  conjecture.  But 
suppose  the  fact  certain :  is  it  not  to  be  presumed,  that 
they  will  express  the  true  meaning  of  the  constitution 
and  the  laws  ?  Will  they  not  be  bound  to  consider  the 
concurrent  jurisdiction ;  to  declare  that  both  the  taxes 
shall  have  equal  operation ;  that  both  the  powers,  in 
that  respect,  are  sovereign  and  co-extensive  ?  If  they 
transgress  their  duty,  we  are  to  hope  that  they  will  be 
punished.  Sir,  we  can  reason  from  probabilities 
alone.  When  we  leave  common  sense,  and  give  our 
selves  up  to  conjecture,  there  can  be  no  certainty,  no 
security  in  our  reasonings. 

I  imagine  I  have  stated  to  the  committee,  abundant 
reasons  to  prove  the  entire  safety  of  the  state  gdvern- 
rnents,  and  of  the  people.  I  would  go  into  a  more  mi 
nute  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  concurrent 
jurisdiction,  and  the  operation  of  the  laws,  in  relation 
to  revenue ;  but  at  present,  I  feel  too  much  indisposed 
to  proceed.  I  shall,  with  the  leave  of  the  committee, 
improve  another  opportunity  of  expressing  to  them 
more  fully  my  ideas  on  this  point.  I  wish  the  com 
mittee  to  remember,  that  the  constitution  under  exa 
mination,  is  framed  upon  truly  republican  principles ; 
and  that,  as  it  is  expressly  designed  to  provide  for  the 
common  protection  and  the  general  welfare  of  the 
United  States,  it  must  be  utterly  repugnant  to  this 
constitution,  to  subvert  the  state  governments,  or  op 
press  the  people. 


SPEECH  OF  PATRICK  HENRY. 

ON  THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  ADOPTING   THE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 
DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  JUNE  4th,  178S. 


The  preamble  and  the  two  first  sections  of  the  first  article  of  the 
constitution  being  under  consideration,  Mr.  Henry  thus  addressed 
the  convention. 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

THE  public  mind,  as  well  as  my  own,  is  extremely 
uneasy  at  the  proposed  change  of  government.  Give 
me  leave  to  form  one  of  the  number  of  those,  who  wish 
to  be  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  reasons  of  this 
perilous  and  uneasy  situation,  and  why  we  are  brought 
hither  to  decide  on  this  great  national  question.  I 
consider  myself  as  the  servant  of  the  people  of  this 
commonwealth,  as  a  centinel  over  their  rights,  liberty 
and  happiness.  I  represent  their  feelings  when  I  say. 
that  they  are  exceedingly  uneasy,  being  brought  from 
that  state  of  full  security,  which  they  enjoy,  to  the  pre 
sent  delusive  appearance  of  things.  Before  the  meet 
ing  of  the  late  federal  convention  at  Philadelphia,  a 
general  peace,  and  an  universal  tranquillity  prevailed  in 
this  country,  and  the  minds  of  our  citizens  were  at 
perfect  repose  ;  but  since  that  period,  they  are  exceed 
ingly  uneasy  and  disquieted.  When  I  wished  for  an 
appointment  to  this  convention;  my  mind  was  extremely 
agitated  for  the  situation  of  public  affairs.  I  conceive 

VOL.  i  10 


74  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  OK 

the  republic  to  be  in  extreme  danger.  If  our  situation 
be  thus  uneasy,  whence  has  arisen  this  fearful  jeopardy  ? 
It  arises  from  this  fatal  system ;  it  arises  from  a  propo 
sal  to  change  our  government — a  proposal  that  goes 
to  the  utter  annihilation  of  the  most  solemn  engage 
ments  of  the  states — a  proposal  of  establishing  nine 
states  into  a  confederacy,  to  the  eventual  exclusion  of 
four  states.  It  goes  to  the  annihilation  of  those  solemn 
treaties  we  have  formed  with  foreign  nations.  The 
present  circumstances  of  France,  the  good  offices  ren 
dered  us  by  that  kingdom,  require  our  most  faithful  and 
most  punctual  adherence  to  our  treaty  with  her.  We 
are  in  alliance  with  the  Spaniards,  the  Dutch,  the 
Prussians :  those  treaties  bound  us  as  thirteen  states, 
confederated  together.  Yet  here  is  a  proposal  to  sever 
that  confederacy.  Is  it  possible  that  we  shall  abandon 
all  our  treaties  and  national  engagements  ?  And  for 
what  ?  I  expected  to  have  heard  the  reasons  of  an 
event  so  unexpected  to  my  mind,  and  many  others. 
Was  our  civil  polity,  or  public  justice,  endangered  or 
sapped  ?  Was  the  real  existence  of  the  country  threat 
ened,  or  was  this  preceded  by  a  mournful  progression 
of  events  ?  This  proposal  of  altering  our  federal  gov 
ernment  is  of  a  most  alarming  nature  :  make  the  best 
of  this  new  government — say  it  is  composed  by  any 
thing  but  inspiration — you  ought  to  be  extremely  cau 
tious,  watchful,  jealous  of  your  liberty ;  for  instead  of 
securing  your  rights,  you  may  lose  them  forever.  If  a 
wrong  step  be  now  made,  the  republic  may  be  lost  for 
ever.  If  this  new  government  will  not  come  up  to  the 
expectation  of  the  people,  and  they  should  be  disap 
pointed,  their  liberty  will  be  lost,  and  tyranny  must  and 
will  arise.  I  repeat  it  again,  and  I  beg  gentlemen  to 
consider,  that  a  wrong  step,  made  now,  will  plunge  us 
into  misery,  and  our  republic  will  be  lost.  It  will  be 
necessary  for  this  convention  to  have  a  faithful  histori 
cal  detail  of  the  facts,  that  preceded  the  session  of  the 
federal  convention,  and  the  reasons  that  actuated  its 
members  in  proposing  an  entire  alteration  of  govern- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  7;, 

inent — and  to  demonstrate  the  dangers  that  awaited 
us.  If  they  were  of  such  awful  magnitude,  as  to  war 
rant  a  proposal  so  extremely  perilous  as  this,  I  must 
assert,  that  this  convention  has  an  absolute  right  to  a 
thorough  discovery  of  every  circumstance  relative 
to  this  great  event.  And  here  I  would  make  this  inqui 
ry  of  those  worthy  characters  who  composed  a  part  of 
the  late  federal  convention.  I  am  sure  they  were  fully 
impressed  with  the  necessity  of  forming  a  great  con 
solidated  government,  instead  of  a  confederation. 
That  this  is  a  consolidated  government  is  demonstra- 
bly  clear;  and  the  danger  of  such  a  government  is,  to 
my  mind,  very  striking.  I  have  the  highest  veneration 
for  those  gentlemen  ;  but,  sir,  give  me  leave  to  demand, 
what  right  had  they  to  say,  "We,  the  People  ?"  My  po 
litical  curiosity,  exclusive  of  my  anxious  solicitude  for  the 
public  welfare,  leads  me  to  ask,  who  authorized  them 
to  speak  the  language  of,  "  We,  the  People,"  instead 
of  We,  the  States?  States  are  the  characteristics,  and 
the  soul  of  a  confederation.  If  the  states  be  not  the 
agents  of  this  compact,  it  must  be  one  great  consoli 
dated  national  government  of  the  people  of  all  the 
states.  I  have  the  highest  respect  for  those  gentle 
men  who  formed  the  convention ;  and  were  some  of 
them  not  here,  I  would  express  some  testimonial  of 
esteem  for  them.  America  had  on  a  former  occasion 
put  the  utmost  confidence  in  them ;  a  confidence  which 
was  well  placed ;  and  I  am  sure,  sir,  I  would  give  up 
any  thing  to  them ;  I  would  cheerfully  confide  in  them 
as  my  representatives.  But,  sir,  on  this  great  occasion, 
I  would  demand  the  cause  of  their  conduct.  Even 
from  that  illustrious  man,  who  saved  us  by  his  valor, 
I  would  have  a  reason  for  his  conduct ;  that  liberty 
which  he  has  given  us  by  his  valor,  tells  me  to  ask  this 
reason,  and  sure  I  am,  were  he  here,  he  would  give  us 
that  reason :  but  there  are  other  gentlemen  here,  who 
can  give  us  this  information.  The  people  gave  them 
no  power  to  use  their  name.  That  they  exceeded  their 
power  is  perfectly  clear.  It  is  not  mere  curiosity  that 


76  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

actuates  me  ;  I  wish  to  hear  the  real,  actual,  existing 
danger,  which  should  lead  us  to  take  those  steps  so 
dangerous  in  my  conception.  Disorders  have  arisen 
in  other  parts  of  America,  but  here,  sir,  no  dangers,  no 
insurrection  or  tumult,  has  happened ;  every  thing  has 
been  calm  and  tranquil.  But  notwithstanding  this, 
we  are  wandering  on  the  great  ocean  of  human  affairs. 
I  see  no  land  mark  to  guide  us.  We  are  running 
we  know  not  whither.  Difference  in  opinion  has 
gone  to  a  degree  of  inflammatory  resentment,  in 
(different  parts  of  the  country,  which  has  been  occa 
sioned  by  this  perilous  innovation.  The  federal  con 
vention  ought  to  have  amended  the  old  system ;  for 
this  purpose,  they  were  solely  delegated:  the  object  of 
their  mission  extended  to  no  other  consideration. 
You  must  therefore  forgive  the  solicitation  of  one  un 
worthy  member,  to  know  what  danger  could  have 
arisen  under  the  present  confederation,  and  what  are 
the  causes  of  this  proposal  to  change  our  government 

Some  of  the  advocates  of  the  proposed  constitution,  having  replied 
to  the  preceding  remarks  of  Mr.  Henry,  on  the  5th,  he  continued 
his  speech  as  follows. 

MR.  CHAIRMAN: 

1  am  much  obliged  to  the  very  worthy  gentleman* 
for  his  encomium.  I  wish  I  were  possessed  of  talents, 
or  possessed  of  any  thing,  that  might  enable  me  to 
elucidate  this  great  subject.  I  am  not  free  from  sus 
picion  :  I  am  apt  to  entertain  doubts :  I  rose  yesterday 
to  ask  a  question,  which  arose  in  my  awn  mind.  When 
I  asked  that  question,  I  thought  the  meaning  of  my  in 
terrogation  was  obvious  :  the  fate  of  this  question  and 
of  America,  may  depend  on  this.  Have  they  said,  we, 
the  states  ?  Have  they  made  a  proposal  of  a  compact 
between  states  ?  If  they  had,  this  would  be  a  con 
federation  :  it  is  otherwise  most  clearly  a  consoli 
dated  government.  The  question  turns,  sir,  on  that 
poor  little  thing — the  expression,  We,  the  people,  in- 

*  Mr.  Lee.  of  Westmoreland, 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  77 

stead  of  the  states  of  America.    I  need  not  take  much 
pains  to  show,  that  the  principles  of  this  system,  are 
extremely  pernicious,  impolitic,   and  dangerous.     Is 
this  a  monarchy,  like  England — a  compact  between 
prince  and  people ;  with  checks  on  the  former  to  se 
cure  the  liberty  of  the  latter  ?  Is  this  a  confederacy, 
like  Holland — an  association  of  a  number  of  inde 
pendent  states,  each  of  which  retains  its  individual 
sovereignty  ?     It   is   not  a   democracy,   wherein  the 
people  retain  all  their  rights   securely.     Had  these 
principles  been  adhered  to,  we  should  not  have  been 
brought  to  this  alarming  transition,  from  a  confederacy 
to  a  consolidated  government.     We  have  no  detail  of 
those  great  considerations  which,  in  my  opinion,  ought 
to  have  abounded  before  we  should  recur  to  a  govern 
ment  of  this  kind.     Here  is  a  revolution  as  radical  as 
that,  which  separated  us  from  Great  Britain.     It  is  as 
radical,  if  in  this  transition,  our  rights  and  privileges 
are  endangered,  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  states  re 
linquished!     And  cannot  we  plainly  see,  that  this  is 
actually  the  case  ?     The  rights  of  conscience,  trial  by 
jury,  liberty  of  the  press,  all  your  immunities  and  fran 
chises,  all  pretensions  to  human  rights  and  privileges, 
are  rendered  insecure,  if  not  lost,  by  this  change  so 
loudly  talked  of  by  some,  and  inconsiderately  by  others. 
Is  this  tarne  relinquishment  of  rights  worthy  of  free 
men  ?  Is  it  worthy  of  that  manly  fortitude  that  ought 
to   characterize  republicans  ?    It  is  said  eight  states 
have  adopted  this  plan.    I  declare  that  if  twelve  states 
and  an  half  had  adopted  it,  I  would,  with  manly  firm 
ness,  and  in  spite  of  an  erring  world,  reject  it.     You  are 
not  to  inquire  how  your  trade  may  be  increased,  nor 
how  you  are  to  become  a  great  and  powerful  people, 
but  how  your  liberties  can  be  secured;    for  liberty 
ought  to  be  the  direct  end  of  your  government.     Hav 
ing  premised  these  things,  I  shall,  with  the  aid  of  my 
judgment  and  information,  which  I  confess  are  not  ex 
tensive,  go  into  the  discussion  of  this  system  more  mi 
nutely.    Is  it  necessary  for  your  liberty,  that  you  should 


78  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  OlNi 

abandon  those  great  rights  by  the  adoption  of  this 
system  ?  Is  the  relinquishment  of  the  trial  by  jury,  and 
the  liberty  of  the  press,  necessary  for  your  liberty  ? 
Will  the  abandonment  of  your  most  sacred  rights,  tend 
to  the  security  of  your  liberty  ?  Liberty,  the  greatest 
of  all  earthly  blessings — give  us  that  precious  jewel, 
and  you  may  take  every  thing  else.  But  I  am  fearful  I 
have  lived  long  enough  to  become  an  old-fashioned 
fellow.  Perhaps  an  invincible  attachment  to  the 
dearest  rights  of  man,  may,  in  these  refined,  enlighten 
ed  days,  be  deemed  old-fashioned :  if  so,  I  am  con 
tented  to  be  so.  I  say,  the  time  has  been  when  every 
pulse  of  my  heart  beat  for  American  liberty,  and  which, 
I  believe,  had  a  counterpart  in  the  breast  of  every  true 
American.  But  suspicions  have  gone  forth — sus 
picions  of  my  integrity.  It  has  been  publicly  re 
ported  that  my  professions  are  not  real.  Twenty 
three  years  ago  was  I  supposed  a  traitor  to  my 
country :  I  was  then  said  to  be  a  bane  of  sedition, 
because  I  supported  the  rights  of  my  country  :  I  may 
be  thought  suspicious,  when  I  say  our  privileges  and 
rights  are  in  danger :  but,  sir,  a  number  of  the  people 
of  this  country  are  weak  enough  to  think  these  things 
are  too  true.  I  am  happy  to  find  that  the  gentlemen 
on  the  other  side,  declare  they  are  groundless :  but, 
sir,  suspicion  is  a  virtue,  as  long  as  its  object  is  the 
preservation  of  the  public  good,  and  as  long  as  it  stays 
within  proper  bounds  :  should  it  fall  on  me,  I  am  con 
tented  :  conscious  rectitude  is  a  powerful  consolation  : 
I  trust  there  are  many  who  think  my  professions  for 
the  public  good  to  be  real.  Let  your  suspicion  look  to 
both  sides :  there  are  many  on  the  other  side,  who, 
possibly  may  have  been  persuaded  of  the  necessity  of 
these  measures,  which  I  conceive  to  be  dangerous  to 
your  liberty.  Guard  with  jealous  attention  the  public 
liberty.  Suspect  every  one  who  approaches  that  jewel. 
Unfortunately,  nothing  will  preserve  it,  but  downright 
force.  Whenever  you  give  up  that  force,  you  are  in 
evitably  ruined.  I  am  answered  by  gentlemen,  that 


1 

THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  79 

Though  I  may  speak  of  terrors,  yet  the  fact  isrthat  we 
fire  surrounded  by  none  of  the  dangers  I  apprehend. 
I  conceive  this  new  government  to  be  one  of  those 
dangers  :  it  has  produced  those  horrors,  which  distress 
many  of  our  best  citizens.  We  are  come  hither  to 
preserve  the  poor  commonwealth  of  Virginia,  if  it 
can  be  possibly  done  :  something  must  be  done  to  pre 
serve  your  liberty  and  mine.  The  confederation,  this 
same  despised  government,  merits,  in  my  opinion,  the 
highest  encomium  :  it  carried  us  through  a  long  and 
dangerous  war :  it  rendered  us  victorious  in  that  bloody 
conflict  with  a  powerful  nation :  it  has  secured  us  a 
territory  greater  than  any  European  monarch  pos 
sesses  :  and  shall  a  government  which  has  been  thus 
strong  and  vigorous,  be  accused  of  imbecility,  and 
abandoned  for  want  of  energy  ?  Consider  what  you 
are  about  to  do,  before  you  part  with  this  government. 
Take  longer  time  in  reckoning  things :  revolutions 
like  this  have  happened  in  almost  every  country  in 
Europe :  similar  examples  are  to  be  found  in  ancient 
Greece  and  ancient  Rome :  instances  of  the  people 
losing  their  liberty  by  their  own  carelessness  and  the 
ambition  of  a  few.  We  are  cautioned  by  the  honora 
ble  gentleman  who  presides,  against  faction  and  turbu 
lence.  I  acknowledge  that  licentiousness  is  danger 
ous,  and  that  it  ought  to  be  provided  against :  I  ac 
knowledge  also  the  new  form  of  government  may 
effectually  prevent  it :  yet,  there  is  another  thing  it 
will  as  effectually  do  :  it  will  oppress  and  ruin  the  peo 
ple.  There  are  sufficient  guards  placed  against  sedi 
tion  and  licentiousness :  for  when  power  is  given  to 
this  government  to  suppress  these,  or,  for  any  other 
purpose,  the  language  it  assumes  is  clear,  express, 
and  unequivocal ;  but  when  this  constitution  speaks  of 
privileges,  there  is  an  ambiguity,  sir,  a  fatal  ambigu 
ity — an  ambiguity  which  is  very  astonishing.  In  the 
clause  under  consideration,  there  is  the  strangest  lan 
guage  that  I  can  conceive.  I  mean,  when  it  says,  that 
there  shall  not  be  more  representatives,  than  one  for 


80  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

every  30,000.  Now,  sir,  how  easy  is  it  to  evade  this 
privilege  ?  "  The  number  shall  not  exceed  one  for  every 
30,000."  This  may  be  satisfied  by  one  representative 
from  each  state.  Let  our  numbers  be  ever  so  great, 
this  immense  continent,  may,  by  this  artful  expression, 
be  reduced  to  have  but  thirteen  representatives.  I  con 
fess  this  construction  is  not  natural ;  but  the  ambiguity  of 
the  expression  lays  a  good  ground  for  a  quarrel.  Why 
was  it  not  clearly  and  unequivocally  expressed,  that 
they  should  be  entitled  to  have  one  for  every  30,000  ? 
This  would  have  obviated  all  disputes;  and  was 
this  difficult  to  be  done  ?  What  is  the  inference  ? 
When  population  increases,  and  a  state  shall  send 
representatives  in  this  proportion,  Congress  may  re 
mand  them,  because  the  right  of  having  one  for  every 
30,000  is  not  clearly  expressed.  This  possibility  of 
reducing  the  number  to  one  for  each  state,  approxi 
mates  to  probability  by  that  other  expression,  "  but 
each  state  shall  at  least  have  one  representative." 
Now  is  it  not  clear  that,  from  the  first  expression,  the 
number  might  be  reduced  so  much,  that  some  states 
should  have  no  representative  at  all,  were  it  not  for 
the  insertion  of  this  last  expression  ?  And  as  this  is 
the  only  restriction  upon  them,  we  may  fairly  conclude 
that  they  may  restrain  the  number  to  one  from  each 
state.  Perhaps  the  same  horrors  may  hang  over  my 
mind  again.  I  shall  be  told  I  am  continually  afraid  : 
but,  sir,  I  have  strong  cause  of  apprehension.  In 
some  parts  of  the  plan  before  you,  the  great  rights  of 
freemen  are  endangered,  in  other  parts  absolutely 
taken  away.  How  does  your  trial  by  jury  stand  ?  In 
civil  cases  gone — not  sufficiently  secured  in  crimi 
nal — this  best  privilege  is  gone.  But  we  are  told,  that 
we  need  not  fear,  because  those  in  power  being  our 
representatives,  will  not  abuse  the  powers  we  put  in 
their  hands.  I  am  not  well  versed  in  history,  but  I  will 
submit  to  your  recollection,  whether  liberty  has  been  de 
stroyed  most  often  by  the  licentiousness  of  the  people, 
or  by  the  tyranny  of  rulers.  I  imagine,  sir,  you  will 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  tfl 

find  the  balance  on  the  side  of  tyranny.  Happy  will 
you  be,  if  you  miss  the  fate  of  those  nations,  who, 
omitting  to  resist  their  oppressors,  or  negligently  suf 
fering  their  liberty  to  be  wrested  from  them,  have 
groaned  under  intolerable  despotism !  Most  of  the 
human  race  are  now  in  this  deplorable  condition. 
And  those  nations  who  have  gone  in  search  of  gran 
deur,  power  and  splendor,  have  also  fallen  a  sacrifice, 
and  been  the  victims  of  their  own  folly.  While  they 
acquired  those  visionary  blessings,  they  lost  their  free 
dom.  My  great  objection  to  this  government  is,  that 
it  does  not  leave  us  the  means  of  defending  our  rights ; 
or,  of  waging  war  against  tyrants.  It  is  urged  by 
some  gentlemen,  that  this  new  plan  will  bring  us  an 
acquisition  of  strength ;  an  army,  and  the  militia  of  the 
states.  This  is  an  idea  extremely  ridiculous  :  gentle 
men  cannot  be  in  earnest.  This  acquisition  will  tram 
ple  on  your  fallen  liberty.  Let  my  beloved  Americans 
guard  against  that  fatal  lethargy  that  has  pervaded  the 
universe.  Have  we  the  means  of  resisting  disciplined 
armies,  when  our  only  defence,  the  militia,  is  put  into 
the  hands  of  Congress  ? 

The  honorable  gentleman  said,  that  great  danger 
would  ensue,  if  the  convention  rose  without  adopting 
this  system.  I  ask,  where  is  that  danger?  I  see 
none.  Other  gentlemen  have  told  us,  within  these 
walls,  that  the  union  is  gone— or,  that  the  union  will 
be  gone.  Is  not  this  trifling  with  the  judgment  of  their 
fellow-citizens  ?  Till  they  tell  us  the  ground  of  their 
fears,  I  will  consider  them  as  imaginary.  I  rose  to 
make  inquiry  where  those  dangers  were ;  they  could 
make  no  answer :  I  believe  I  never  shall  have  that  an 
swer.  Is  there  a  disposition  in  the  people  of  this  coun 
try  to  revolt  against  the  dominion  of  laws?  Has 
there  been  a  single  tumult  in  Virginia  ?  Have  not 
the  people  of  Virginia,  when  laboring  under  the  se 
verest  pressure  of  accumulated  distresses,  manifested 
the  most  cordial  acquiescence  in  the  execution  of  the, 
laws  ?  What  could  be  more  awful,  than  their  unani* 

VOL.  i.  11 


82  MR.   HENRY'S   SPEECH  Oi\ 

mous  acquiescence  under  general  distresses  ?  Is 
there  any  revolution  in  Virginia?  Whither  is  the 
spirit  of  America  gone?  Whither  is  the  genius  of 
America  fled  ?  It  was  but  yesterday,  when  our  ene 
mies  marched  in  triumph  through  our  country.  Yet 
the  people  of  this  country  could  not  be  appalled  by 
their  pompous  armaments :  they  stopped  their  careen 
and  victoriously  captured  them :  where  is  the  peril 
now,  compared  to  that  ? 

Some  minds  are  agitated  by  foreign  alarms.  Hap 
pily  for  us,  there  is  no  real  danger  from  Europe ;  that 
country  is  engaged  in  more  arduous  business ;  from 
that  quarter,  there  is  no  cause  of  fear :  you  may  sleep 
in  safety  forever  for  them.  Where  is  the  danger? 
If,  sir,  there  was  any,  I  would  recur  to  the  American 
spirit  to  defend  us — that  spirit  which  has  enabled  us 
to  surmount  the  greatest  difficulties :  to  that  illustrious 
spirit,  I  address  my  most  fervent  prayer,  to  prevent 
our  adopting  a  system  destructive  to  liberty.  Let  not 
gentlemen  be  told,  that  it  is  not  safe  to  reject  this  gov 
ernment.  Wherefore  is  it  not  safe?  We  are  told 
there  are  dangers  ;  but  those  dangers  are  ideal ;  they 
cannot  be  demonstrated.  To  encourage  us  to  adopt 
it,  they  tell  us,  that  there  is  a  plain,  easy  way  of  getting 
amendments.  When  I  come  to  contemplate  this  part. 
I  suppose  that  I  am  mad,  or,  that  my  countrymen  are 
so.  The  way  to  amendment  is,  in  my  conception, 
shut.  Let  us  consider  this  plain,  easy  way.  "  The 
Congress,  whenever  two  thirds  of  both  houses  shall 
deem  it  necessary,  shall  propose  amendments  to  this 
constitution ;  or,  on  the  application  of  the  legislatures 
of  two  thirds  of  the  several  states,  shall  call  a  conven 
tion  for  proposing  amendments,  which,  in  either  case, 
shall  be  valid  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  part  of 
this  constitution,  when  ratified  by  the  legislatures  of 
three  fourths  of  the  several  states,  or  by  conventions 
in  three  fourths  thereof,  as  the  one,  or  the  other  mode 
of  ratification  may  be  proposed  by  the  Congress. 
Provided,  that  no  amendment  which  may  be  made 


. 

THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  ft,3 

prior  to  the  year  1808,  shall,  in  any  manner,  affect  the 
first  and  fourth  clauses  in  the  ninth  section  of  the  first 
article  ;  and  that  no  state,  without  its  consent,  shall  be 
deprived  of  its  equal  suffrage  in  the  senate."  Hence 
it  appears,  that  three  fourths  of  the  states  must  ulti 
mately  agree  to  any  amendments  that  may  be  neces 
sary.  Let  us  consider  the  consequences  of  this.  How 
ever  uncharitable  it  may  appear,  yet  I  must  express 
my  opinion,  that  the  most  unworthy  characters  may 
get  into  power  and  prevent  the  introduction  of  amend 
ments.  Let  us  suppose,  (for  the  case  is  supposable, 
possible  and  probable,)  that  you  happen  to  deal  these 
powers  to  unworthy  hands ;  will  they  relinquish  pow 
ers  already  in  their  possession,  or  agree  to  amend 
ments  ?  Two  thirds  of  the  Congress,  or  of  the  state 
legislatures,  are  necessary  even  to  propose  amend 
ments.  If  one  third  of  these  be  unworthy  men,  they 
may  prevent  the  application  for  amendments;  but 
a  destructive  and  mischievous  feature  is,  that  three 
fourths  of  the  state  legislatures,  or  of  the  state  conven 
tions,  must  concur  in  the  amendments  when  proposed. 
In  such  numerous  bodies,  there  must  necessarily  be 
some  designing,  bad  men.  To  suppose  that  so  large 
a  number  as  three  fourths  of  the  states  will  concur,  is 
to  suppose  that  they  will  possess  genius,  intelligence 
and  integrity,  approaching  to  miraculous.  It  would, 
indeed,  be  miraculous,  that  they  should  concur  in  the 
same  amendments,  or,  even  in  such  as  would  bear 
some  likeness  to  one  another.  For  four  of  the  small 
est  states,  that  do  not  collectively  contain  one  tenth 
part  of  the  population  of  the  United  States,  may  ob 
struct  the  most  salutary  and  necessary  amendments. 
Nay,  in  these  four  states,  six  tenths  of  the  people  may 
reject  these  amendments ;  and  suppose,  that  amend 
ments  shall  be  opposed  to  amendments,  (which  is 
highly  probable,)  is  it  possible,  that  three  fourths  can 
ever  agree  to  the  same  amendments  ?  A  bare  majo 
rity  in  these  four  small  states,  may  hinder  the  adop 
tion  of  amendments ;  so  that  we  may  fairly  and  justly 


84  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

conclude,  that  one  twentieth  part  of  the  American 
people,  may  prevent  the  removal  of  the  most  grievous 
inconveniences  and  oppression,  by  refusing  to  accede 
to  amendments.  A  trifling  minority  may  reject  the 
most  salutary  amendments.  Is  this'  an  easy  mode  of 
securing  the  public  liberty  ?  It  is,  sir,  a  most  fearful 
situation,  when  the  most  contemptible  minority  can 
prevent  the  alteration  of  the  most  oppressive  govern 
ment  ;  for  it  may,  in  many  respects,  prove  to  be  such. 
Is  this  the  spirit  of  republicanism  ?  What,  sir,  is  the 
genius  of  democracy  ?  Let  me  read  that  clause  of 
the  Bill  of  Rights  of  Virginia  which  relates  to  this : 
3d  clause ;  "  That,  government  is,  or  ought  to  be,  in 
stituted  for  the  common  benefit,  protection  and  secu 
rity  of  the  people,  nation,  or  community.  Of  all  the  va 
rious  modes  and  forms  of  government,  that  is  best, 
which  is  capable  of  producing  the  greatest  degree  of 
happiness  and  safety,  and  is  most  effectually  secured 
against  the  danger  of  mal-administration,  and  that 
whenever  any  government  shall  be  found  inadequate, 
or  contrary  to  these  purposes,  a  majority  of  the  com 
munity  hath  an  indubitable,  unalienable  and  indefeasi 
ble  right  to  reform,  alter,  or  abolish  it,  in  such  manner  as 
shall  be  judged  most  conducive  to  the  public  weal." 
This,  sir,  is  the  language  of  democracy — that  a  ma 
jority  of  the  community  have  a  right  to  alter  their  gov 
ernment  when  found  to  be  oppressive :  but  how  differ 
ent  is  the  genius  of  your  new  constitution  from  this  ! 
How  different  from  the  sentiments  of  freemen,  that  a 
contemptible  minority  can  prevent  the  good  of  the  ma 
jority  !  If  then,  gentlemen,  standing  on  this  ground, 
are  come  to  that  point,  that  they  are  willing  to  bind 
themselves  and  their  posterity  to  be  oppressed,  I  am 
amazed  and  inexpressibly  astonished.  If  this  be  the 
opinion  of  the  majority,  I  must  submit;  but  to  me, 
sir,  it  appears  perilous  and  destructive ;  I  cannot  help 
thinking  so :  perhaps  it  may  be  the  result  of  my  age ; 
these  may  be  feelings  natural  to  a  man  of  my  years, 
when  the  American  spirit  has  left  him,  and  his  mental 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  85 

powers,  like  the  members  of  the  body,  are  decayed. 
If,  sir,  amendments  are  left  to  the  twentieth,  or  to  the 
tenth  part  of  the  people  of  America,  your  liberty  is 
gone  forever.  We  have  heard  that  there  is  a  great 
deal  of  bribery  practised  in  the  house  of  commons  in 
England ;  and  that  many  of  the  members  raise  them 
selves  to  preferments,  by  selling  the  rights  of  the  peo 
ple.  But,  Sir,  the  tenth  part  of  that  body  cannot  con 
tinue  oppressions  on  the  rest  of  the  people.  English 
liberty  is,  in  this  case,  on  a  firmer  foundation  than  Ame 
rican  liberty.  It  will  be  easily  contrived  to  procure 
the  opposition  of  one  tenth  of  the  people  to  any  altera 
tion,  however  judicious. 

The  honorable  gentleman  who  presides,  told  us, 
that  to  prevent  abuses  in  our  government,  we  will  as 
semble  in  convention,  recall  our  delegated  powers, 
and  punish  our  servants  for  abusing  the  trust  reposed 
in  them.  Oh,  sir,  we  should  have  fine  times  indeed, 
if  to  punish  tyrants,  it  were  only  sufficient  to  assemble 
the  people.  Your  arms,  wherewith  you  could  defend 
yourselves,  are  gone ;  and  you  have  no  longer  an  aris- 
tocratical,  no  longer  a  democratical  spirit.  Did  you 
ever  read  of  any  revolution  in  any  nation,  brought 
about  by  the  punishment  of  those  in  power,  inflicted 
by  those  who  had  no  power  at  all  ?  You  read  of  a 
riot  act  in  a  country  which  is  called  one  of  the  freest 
in  the  world,  where  a  few  neighbours  cannot  assem 
ble  without  the  risk  of  being  shot  by  a  hired  soldiery, 
the  engines  of  despotism.  We  may  see  such  an  act 
in  America.  A  standing  army  we  shall  have  also,  to 
execute  the  execrable  commands  of  tyranny :  and  how 
are  you  to  punish  them  ?  Will  you  order  them  to  be 
punished  ?  Who  shall  obey  these  orders  ?  Will  your 
mace-bearer  be  a  match  for  a  disciplined  regiment  ? 
In  what  situation  are  we  to  be  ? 

The  clause  before  you  gives  a  power  of  direct  taxa 
tion,  unbounded  and  unlimited ;  exclusive  power  of  le 
gislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  for  ten  miles  square, 
and  over  all  places  purchased  for  the  erection  of  forts. 


I 

86  MR.  HENRY'S   SPEECH  ON 

magazines,  arsenals,  dock-yards,  &c.  What  resist 
ance  could  be  made  ?  The  attempt  would  be  mad 
ness.  You  will  find  all  the  strength  of  this  country  in 
the  hands  of  your  enemies :  those  garrisons  will  natu 
rally  be  the  strongest  places  in  the  country.  Your 
militia  is  given  up  to  Congress  also,  in  another  part 
of  this  plan :  they  will  therefore  act  as  they  think  pro 
per  :  all  power  will  be  in  their  own  possession :  you 
cannot  force  them  to  receive  their  punishment.  Of 
what  service  would  militia  be  to  you,  when  most 
probably  you  will  not  have  a  single  musket  in  the 
state  ?  For,  as  arms  are  to  be  provided  by  Congress, 
they  may,  or  may  not,  furnish  them. 

Let  us  here  call  your  attention  to  that  part  which 
gives  the  Congress  power  "  To  provide  for  organizing, 
arming  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and  for  governing 
such  part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  reserving  to  the  states  respec 
tively,  the  appointment  of  the  officers,  and  the  authori 
ty  of  training  the  militia,  according  to  the  discipline 
prescribed  by  Congress."  By  this,  sir,  you  see  that 
their  control  over  our  last  and  best  defence,  is  unlimit 
ed.  If  they  neglect  or  refuse  to  discipline  or  arm  our 
militia,  they  will  be  useless :  the  states  can  do  neither, 
this  power  being  exclusively  given  to  Congress.  The 
power  of  appointing  officers  over  men  not  disciplined 
or  armed,  is  ridiculous  :  so  that  this  pretended,  little 
remnant  of  power,  left  to  the  states,  may,  at  the  plea 
sure  of  Congress,  be  rendered  nugatory.  Our  situa 
tion  will  be  deplorable  indeed :  nor  can  we  ever  expect 
to  get  this  government  amended ;  since  I  have  already 
shown,  that  a  very  small  minority  may  prevent  it,  and 
that  small  minority  interested  in  the  continuance  of 
the  oppression.  Will  the  oppressor  let  go  the  oppress 
ed  ?  Was  there  ever  an  instance  ?  Can  the  annals 
of  mankind  exhibit  one  single  example,  where  rulers, 
overcharged  with  power,  willingly  let  go  the  oppress 
ed,  though  solicited  and  requested  most  earnestly? 
The  application  for  amendments  will  therefore  be 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  37 

fruitless.  Sometimes  the  oppressed  have  got  loose  by 
one  of  those  bloody  struggles  that  desolate  a  country. 
But  a  willing  relinquishment  of  power  is  one  of  those 
tilings,  which  human  nature  never  was,  nor  ever  will 
he,  capable  of. 

The  honorable  gentleman's  observations,  respecting 
the  people's  right  of  being  the  agents  in  the  formation 
of  this  government,  arc  not  accurate,  in  my  humble 
conception.  The  distinction  between  a  national  gov 
ernment  and  a  confederacy,  is  not  sufficiently  discern 
ed.  Had  the  delegates,  who  were  sent  to  Philadel 
phia,  a  power  to  propose  a  consolidated  government 
instead  of  a  confederacy  ?  Were  they  not  deputed  by 
states,  and  not  by  the  people?  The  assent  of  the 
people,  in  their  collective  capacity,  is  not  necessary  to 
the  formation  of  a  federal  government.  The  people 
have  no  right  to  enter  into  leagues,  alliances,  or  con 
federations  :  they  are  not  the  proper  agents  for  this 
purpose:  states  and  sovereign  powers  are  the  only 
proper  agents  for  this  kind  of  government.  Show 
me  an  instance  where  the  people  have  exercised  this 
business :  has  it  not  always  gone  through  the  legisla 
tures  ?  I  refer  you  to  the  treaties  with  France,  Hol 
land,  and  other  nations :  how  were  they  made  ? 
Were  they  not  made  by  the  states  ?  Are  the  people, 
therefore,  in  their  aggregate  capacity,  the  proper  per 
sons  to  form  a  confederacy  ?  This,  therefore,  ought 
to  depend  on  the  consent  of  the  legislatures  ;  the  peo 
ple  having  never  sent  delegates  to  make  any  proposi 
tion  of  changing  the  government.  Yet  I  must  say,  at 
the  same  time,  that  it  was  made  on  grounds  the  most 
pure,  and  perhaps  I  might  have  been  brought  to  con 
sent  to  it,  so  far  as  to  the  change  of  government ;  but 
there  is  one  thing  in  it,  which  I  never  would  acquiesce 
in.  I  mean,  the  changing  it  into  a  consolidated  gov 
ernment,  wrhich  is  so  abhorrent  to  my  mind. 

The  honorable  gentleman  then  went  on  to  the  figure 
we  make  with  foreign  nations ;  the  contemptible  one 
we  make  in  France  and  Holland,  which,  according  to 


88  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

the  substance  of  my  notes,  he  attributes  to  the  present 
feeble  government.  An  opinion  has  gone  forth,  we  find, 
that  we  are  a  contemptible  people  :  the  time  has  been 
when  we  were  thought  otherwise.  Under  this  same 
despised  government,  we  commanded  the  respect  of  all 
Europe :  wherefore  are  we  now  reckoned  otherwise  ? 
The  American  spirit  has  fled  from  hence  :  it  has  gone 
to  regions,  where  it  has  never  been  expected :  it  has 
gone  to  the  people  of  France,  in  search  of  a  splendid 
government — a  strong,  energetic  government.  Shall 
we  imitate  the  example  of  those  nations,  who  have 
gone  from  a  simple  to  a  splendid  •government  ?  Are 
those  nations  more  worthy  of  our  imitation  ?  What 
can  make  an  adequate  satisfaction  to  them  for  the  loss 
they  have  suffered  in  attaining  such  a  government — 
for  the  loss  of  their  liberty  ?  If  we  admit  this  consoli 
dated  government,  it  will  be  because  we  like  a  great 
and  splendid  one.  Some  way  or  other  we  must  be  a 
great  and  mighty  empire ;  we  must  have  an  army,  and 
a  navy,  and  a  number  of  things.  When  the  American 
spirit  was  in  its  youth,  the  language  of  America  was 
different:  liberty,  sir,  was  then  the  primary  object. 
We  are  descended  from  a  people  whose  government 
was  founded  on  liberty:  our  glorious  forefathers,  of 
Great  Britain,  made  liberty  the  foundation  of  every 
thing.  That  country  is  become  a  great,  mighty  and 
splendid  nation;  not  because  their  government  is 
strong  and  energetic :  but,  sir,  because  liberty  is  its 
direct  end  and  foundation.  We  drew  the  spirit  of  li 
berty  from  our  British  ancestors ;  by  that  spirit  we 
have  triumphed  over  every  difficulty.  But  now,  sir, 
the  American  spirit,  assisted  by  the  ropes  and  chains 
of  consolidation,  is  about  to  convert  this  country  into 
a  powerful  and  mighty  empire.  If  you  make  the  citi 
zens  of  this  country  agree  to  become  the  subjects  of 
one  great  consolidated  empire  of  America,  your  gov 
ernment  will  not  have  sufficient  energy  to  keep  them 
together :  such  a  government  is  incompatible  with  the 
genius  of  republicanism.  There  will  be  no  checks,  no 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  8$ 

real  balances,  in  this  government.  What  can  avail 
your  specious,  imaginary  balances ;  your  rope-dancing, 
chain-rattling,  ridiculous,  ideal  checks  and  contri 
vances  ?  But,  sir,  we  are  not  feared  by  foreigners  ; 
we  do  not  make  nations  tremble.  Would  this  consti 
tute  happiness,  or  secure  liberty  ?  I  trust,  sir,  our  poli 
tical  hemisphere  will  ever  direct  its  operations  to  the 
security  of  those  objects.  Consider  our  situation,  sir ; 

to  to  the  poor  man,  ask  him  what  he  does  ;  he  will  in- 
>rm  you  that  he  enjoys  the  fruits  of  his  labor,  under  his 
own  fig-tree,  with  his  wife  and  children  around  him,  in 
peace  and  security.  Go  to  every  other  member  of  the 
society,  you  will  find  the  same  tranquil  ease  and  con 
tent  ;  you  will  find  no  alarms  or  disturbances !  Why  then 
tell  us  of  dangers,  to  terrify  us  into  an  adoption  of  this 
new  form  of  government  ?  And  yet  who  knows  the 
dangers  that  this  new  system  may  produce  ?  They 
are  out  of  the  sight  of  the  common  people  :  they  cannot 
foresee  latent  consequences.  I  dread  the  operation  of 
it  on  the  middling  and  lower  classes  of  people :  it 
is  for  them  I  fear  the  adoption  of  this  system.  I  fear  I 
tire  the  patience  of  the  committee,  but  I  beg  to  be  in 
dulged  with  a  few  more  observations. 

When  I  thus  profess  myself  an  advocate  for  the 
liberty  of  the  people,  I  shall  be  told,  I  am  a  designing 
man,  that  I  am  to  be  a  great  man,  that  I  am  to  be  a 
demagogue;  and  many  similar  illiberal  insinuations 
will  be  thrown  out ;  but,  sir,  conscious  rectitude  out 
weighs  these  things  with  me.  I  see  great  jeopardy  in 
this  new  government:  I  see  none  from  our  present 
one.  I  hope  some  gentleman  or  other  will  bring  forth, 
in  full  array,  those  dangers,  if  there  be  any,  that  we 
may  see  and  touch  them  ;  I  have  said  that  I  thought 
this  a  consolidated  government :  I  will  now  prove  it. 
Will  the  great  rights  of  the  people  be  secured  by  this 
government?  Suppose  it  should  prove  oppressive, 
how  can  it  be  altered  ?  Our  bill  of  rights  declares, 
"  That  a  majority  of  the  community  hath  an  indubita 
ble,  unalienable  and  indefeasible  right  to  reform,  alter. 
VOL.  i.  12 


90  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

or  abolish  it,  in  such  manner  as  shall  be  judged  most 
conducive  to  the  public  weal."  I  have  just  proved, 
that  one  tenth,  or  less,  of  the  people  of  America — a 
most  despicable  minority,  may  prevent  this  reform,  or 
alteration.  Suppose  the  people  of  Virginia  should 
wish  to  alter  their  government,  can  a  majority  of  them 
do  it  ?  No,  because  they  are  connected  with  other 
men;  or,  in  other  words,  consolidated  with  other 
states.  When  the  people  of  Virginia,  at  a  future  day, 
shall  wish  to  alter  their  government,  though  they  should 
be  unanimous  in  this  desire,  yet  they  may  be  prevented 
therefrom  by  a  despicable  minority  at  the  extremity  of 
the  United  States.  The  founders  of  your  own  constitu 
tion  made  your  government  changeable :  but  the  power 
of  changing  it  is  gone  from  you  !  Whither  is  it  gone  ?  It 
is  placed  in  the  same  hands  that  hold  the  rights  of 
twelve  other  states ;  and  those,  who  hold  those  rights, 
have  right  and  power  to  keep  them.  It  is  not  the  par 
ticular  government  of  Virginia :  one  of  the  leading 
features  of  that  government  is,  that  a  majority  can 
alter  it,  when  necessary  for  the  public  good.  This 
government  is  not  a  Virginian,  but  an  American  gov 
ernment.  Is  it  not  therefore  a  consolidated  govern 
ment  ?  The  sixth  clause  of  your  bill  of  rights  tells  you, 
"  That  elections  of  members  to  serve  as  representa 
tives  of  the  people  in  assembly,  ought  to  be  free,  and 
that  all  men,  having  sufficient  evidence  of  perma 
nent,  common  interest  with,  and  attachment  to  the  com 
munity,  have  the  right  of  suffrage,  and  cannot  be  taxed  or 
deprived  of  their  property,  for  public  uses,  without  then- 
own  consent,  or  that  of  their  representatives  so  elected, 
nor  bound  by  any  law  to  which  they  have  not  in  like 
manner  assented  for  the  public  good."  But  what  does 
this  constitution  say  ?  The  clause  under  considera 
tion  gives  an  unlimited  and  unbounded  power  of  taxa 
tion.  Suppose  every  delegate  from  Virginia  opposes 
a  law  laying  a  tax,  what  will  it  avail  ?  They  are  op 
posed  by  a  majority ;  'eleven  members  can  destroy  their 
efforts :  those  feeble  ten  cannot  prevent  the  passing  the 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  91 

most  oppressive  tax-law.  So  that  in  direct  opposition  to 
the  spirit  and  express  language  of  your  declaration  of 
rights,  you  are  taxed,  not  by  your  own  consent,  but 
by  people  who  have  no  connexion  with  you. 

The  next  clause  of  the  bill  of  rights  tells  you,  "That 
all  power  of  suspending  law,  or  the  execution  of  laws, 
by  any  authority,  without  the  consent  of  the  representa 
tives  of  the  people,  is  injurious  to  their  rights,  and 
ought  not  to  be  exercised."  This  tells  us  that  there 
can  be  no  suspension  of  government,  or  laws,  without 
our  own  consent ;  yet  this  constitution  can  counteract 
and  suspend  any  of  our  laws,  that  contravene  its  op 
pressive  operation ;  for  they  have  the  power  of  direct 
taxation,  which  suspends  our  bill  of  rights ;  and  it  is 
expressly  provided,  that  they  can  make  all  laws  neces 
sary  for  carrying  their  powers  into  execution ;  and  it  is 
declared  paramount  to  the  laws  and  constitutions  of 
the  states.  Consider  how  the  only  remaining  defence, 
we  have  left,  is  destroyed  in  this  manner.  Besides  the 
expenses  of  maintaining  the  senate  and  other  house  in 
as  much  splendor  as  they  please,  there  is  to  be  a  great 
and  mighty  president,  with  very  extensive  powers — 
the  powers  of  a  king.  He  is  to  be  supported  in  extra 
vagant  magnificence :  so  that  the  whole  of  our  proper 
ty  may  be  taken  by  this  American  government,  by  lay 
ing  what  taxes  they  please,  giving  themselves  what 
salaries  they  please,  and  suspending  our  laws  at  their 
pleasure.  I  might  be  thought  too  inquisitive,  but  I 
believe  I  should  take  up  but  very  little  of  your  time  in 
enumerating  the  little  power  that  is  left  to  the  govern 
ment  of  Virginia;  for  this  power  is  reduced  to  little  or 
nothing.  Their  garrisons,  magazines,  arsenals,  and 
forts,  which  will  be  situated  in  the  strongest  places 
within  the  states — their  ten  miles  square,  with  all  the 
fine  ornaments  of  human  life,  added  to  their  powers, 
and  taken  from  the  states,  will  reduce  the  power  of  the 
latter  to  nothing.  The  voice  of  tradition,  I  trust,  will 
inform  posterity  of  our  struggles  for  freedom.  If  our 
descendants  be  worthy  the  name  of  Americans,  they 


<);>  mi.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

will  preserve,  and  hand  down  to  their  latest  posterity, 
the  transactions  of  the  present  times ;  and  though,  I 
confess,  my  exclamations  are  not  worthy  the  hearing, 
they  will  see  that  I  have  done  my  utmost  to  preserve 
their  liberty :  for  I  never  will  give  up  the  power  of  di 
rect  taxation,  but  for  a  scourge.  I  am.  willing  to  give 
it  conditionally;  that  is,  after  non-compliance  with 
requisitions :  I  will  do  more,  sir,  and  what  I  hope  will 
convince  the  most  sceptical  man,  that  I  am  a  lover  of 
the  American  union ;  that  in  case  Virginia  shall  not 
make  punctual  payment,  the  control  of  our  custom 
houses,  and  the  whole  regulation  of  trade,  shall  be 
given  to  Congress ;  and  that  Virginia  shall  depend  on 
Congress  even  for  passports,  till  Virginia  shall  have 
paid  the  last  farthing,  and  furnished  the  last  soldier. 
Nay,  sir,  there  is  another  alternative  to  which  I 
would  consent ;  even  that  they  should  strike  us  out  of 
the  union,  and  take  away  from  us  all  federal  privileges, 
till  we  comply  with  federal  requisitions ;  but  let  it  de 
pend  upon  our  own  pleasure  to  pay  our  money  in  the 
most  easy  manner  for  our  people.  Were  all  the  states, 
more  terrible  than  the  mother  country,  to  join  against 
us,  I  hope  Virginia  could  defend  herself;  but,  sir,  the 
dissolution  of  the  union  is  most  abhorrent  to  my  mind. 
The  first  thing  I  have  at  heart  is  American  liberty ;  the 
second  thing  is  American  union ;  and  I  hope  the  peo 
ple  of  Virginia  will  endeavor  to  preserve  that  union. 
The  increasing  population  of  the  southern  states,  is  far 
greater  than  that  of  New  England;  consequently,  in  a 
short  time,  they  will  be  far  more  numerous  than  the  peo 
ple  of  that  country.  Consider  this,  and  you  will  find 
this  state  more  particularly  interested  to  support 
American  liberty,  and  not  bind  our  posterity  by 
an  improvident  relinquishment  of  our  rights.  I 
would  give  the  best  security  for  a  punctual  compli 
ance  with  requisitions ;  but  I  beseech  gentlemen,  at 
all  hazards,  not  to  grant  this  unlimited  power  of 
taxation. 

The  honorable  gentleman  has  told  us  that  these 


THE   FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  93 

powers  given  to  Congress,  are  accompanied  by  a  judi 
ciary  which  will  correct  all.  On  examination,  you 
will  find  this  very  judiciary  oppressively  constructed, 
your  jury-trial  destroyed,  and  the  judges  dependent  on 
Congress.  In  this  scheme  of  energetic  government, 
the  people  will  find  two  sets  of  tax  gatherers — the 
state  and  the  federal  sheriffs.  This,  it  seems  to  me, 
will  produce  such  dreadful  oppression,  as  the  people 
cannot  possibly  bear.  The  federal  sheriff  may  com 
mit  what  oppression,  make  what  distresses,  he  pleases, 
and  ruin  you  with  impunity :  for  how  are  you  to  tie  his 
hands  ?  Have  you  any  sufficient,  decided  means  of 
preventing  him  from  sucking  your  blood  by  specula 
tions,  commissions  and  fees?  Thus  thousands  of 
your  people  will  be  most  shamefully  robbed.  Our 
state  sheriffs,  those  unfeeling  blood-suckers,  have,  un 
der  the  watchful  eye  of  our  legislature,  committed  the 
most  horrid  and  barbarous  ravages  on  our  people. 
It  has  required  the  most  constant  vigilance  of  the  le 
gislature  to  keep  them  from  totally  ruining  the  people. 
A  repeated  succession  of  laws  has  been  made,  to  sup 
press  their  iniquitous  speculations  and  cruel  extor 
tions  ;  and  as  often  has  their  nefarious  ingenuity  de 
vised  methods  of  evading  the  force  of  those  laws :  in 
the  struggle,  they  have  generally  triumphed  over*  the 
legislature.  It  is  a  fact,  that  lands  have  sold  for  five 
shillings,  which  were  worth  one  hundred  pounds.  If 
sheriffs,  thus  immediately  under  the  eye  of  our  state 
legislature  and  judiciary,  have  dared  to  commit  these 
outrages,  what  would  they  not  have  done  if  their  mas 
ters  had  been  at  Philadelphia  or  New  York  ?  If  they 
perpetrate  the  most  unwarrantable  outrage,  on  your 
persons  or  property,  you  cannot  get  redress  on  this 
side  of  Philadelphia  or  New  York:  and  how  can  you 
get  it  there  ?  If  your  domestic  avocations  could  per 
mit  you  to  go  thither,  there  you  must  appeal  to  judges 
sworn  to  support  this  Constitution  in  opposition  to 
that  of  any  state,  and  who  may  also  be  inclined  to  fa 
vor  their  own  officers.  When  these  harpies  are  aid- 


94  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

ed  by  excisemen,  who  may  search,  at  any  time,  your 
houses  and  most  secret  recesses,  will  the  people  bear 
it  ?  If  you  think  so,  you  differ  from  me.  Where  I 
thought  there  was  a  possibility  of  such  mischiefs,  I 
would  grant  power  with  a  niggardly  hand ;  and  here 
there  is  a  strong  probability  that  these  oppressions 
shall  actually  happen.  I  may  be  told,  that  it  is  safe 
to  err  on  that  side ;  because  such  regulations  may  be 
made  by  Congress,  as  shall  restrain  these  officers,  and 
because  laws  are  made  by  our  representatives,  and 
judged  by  righteous  judges  :  but,  sir,  as  these  regula 
tions  may  be  made,  so  they  may  not ;  and  many  rea 
sons  there  are  to  induce  a  belief,  that  they  will  not :  I 
shall  therefore  be  an  infidel  on  that  point  till  the  day 
of  my  death. 

This  constitution  is  said  to  have  beautiful  features ; 
but  when  I  come  to  examine  these  features,  sir,  they 
appear  to  me  horribly  frightful.  Among  other  defor 
mities,  it  has  an  awful  squinting;  it  squints  towards 
monarchy :  and  does  not  this  raise  indignation  in  the 
breast  of  every  true  American  ?  Your  president  may 
easily  become  king.  Your  senate  is  so  imperfectly 
constructed,  that  your  dearest  rights  may  be  sacrificed 
by  what  may  be  a  small  minority :  and  a  very  small 
minority  may  continue  forever  unchangeably  this  gov 
ernment,  although  horridly  defective.  Where  are 
your  checks  in  this  government  ?  Your  strong  holds 
will  be  in  the  hands  of  your  enemies.  It  is  on  a  sup 
position  that  your  American  governors  shall  be  ho 
nest,  that  all  the  good  qualities  of  this  government  are 
founded ;  but  its  defective  and  imperfect  construction, 
puts  it  in  their  power  to  perpetrate  the  worst  of  mis 
chiefs,  should  they  be  bad  men.  And,  sir,  would  not 
all  the  world,  from  the  eastern  to  the  western  hemis 
phere,  blame  our  distracted  folly  in  resting  our  rights 
upon  the  contingency  of  our  rulers  being  good  or  bad  ? 
Show  me  that  age  and  country  where  the  rights  and 
liberties  of  the  people  were  placed  on  the  sole  chance 
of  their  rulers  being  good  men,  without  a  consequent 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  95 

loss  of  liberty.      I  say  that  the  loss  of  that  dearest 
privilege  has  ever  followed,  with  absolute  certainty, 
every  such  mad  attempt.     If  your  American  chief  be 
a  man  of  ambition  and  abilities,  how  easy  will  it  be 
for  him  to  render  himself  absolute !     The  army  is  in 
his  hands,  and,  if  he  be  a  man  of  address,  it  will  be  at 
tached  to  him ;  and  it  will  be  the  subject  of  long  me 
ditation  with  him  to  seize  the  first  auspicious  mo 
ment  to  accomplish  his   design.     And,  sir,  will  the 
American  spirit  solely  relieve  you  when  this  happens  ? 
I  would  rather  infinitely,  and  I  am  sure  most  of  this 
convention  are  of  the  same  opinion,  have  a  king,  lords 
and  commons,  than  a  government,  so  replete  with 
such  insupportable  evils.     If  we  make  a  king,  we  may 
prescribe  the  rules  by  which  he  shall  rule  his  people, 
and  interpose  such  checks  as  shall  prevent  him  from 
infringing  them :  but  the  president  in  the  field,  at  the 
head  of  his  army,  can  prescribe  the  terms  on  which  he 
shall  reign  master,  so  far  that  it  will  puzzle  any  Ame 
rican  ever  to  get  his  neck  from  under  the  galling  yoke. 
I  cannot,  with  patience,  think  of  this  idea.     If  ever  he 
violates  the  laws,  one  of  two  things  will  happen :  he 
will  come  at  the  head  of  his  army  to  carry  every  thing 
before  him;  or,  he  will  give   bail,   or  do  what   Mr. 
Chief  Justice  will  order  him.     If  he  be  guilty,  will  not 
the  recollection  of  his  crimes  teach  him  to  make  one 
bold  push  for  the  American  throne  ?     Will  not  the  im 
mense  difference  between  being  master  of  every  thing, 
and  being  ignominiously  tried  and  punished,  power 
fully  excite  him  to  make  this  bold  push  ?     But,  sir, 
where  is  the  existing  force  to  punish  him  ?     Can  he 
not,  at  the  head  of  his  army,  beat  down  every  opposi 
tion?     Away  with  your  president,  we  shall  have  a 
king :  the  army  will  salute  him  monarch ;  your  militia 
will  leave  you,  and  assist  in  making  him  king,  and 
fight  against  you :  and  what  have  you  to  oppose  this 
force?     What  will  then   become  of  you   and   your 
rights  ?     Will  not  absolute  despotism  ensue  ?     [Here 
Mr.  Henry  strongly  and  pathetically  expatiated  on  the 


96  MR-  HENRI'S  SPEECH  OK 

probability  of  the  president's  enslaving  America,  and 
the  horrid  consequences  that  must  result.] 

What  can  be  more  defective  than  the  clause  con 
cerning  the  elections  ?  The  control  given  to  Con 
gress,  over  the  time,  place  and  manner  of  holding 
elections,  will  totally  destroy  the  end  of  suffrage. 
The  elections  may  be  held  at  one  place,  and  the  most 
inconvenient  in  the  state ;  or  they  may  be  at  remote 
distances  from  those  who  have  a  right  of  suffrage : 
hence,  nine  out  of  ten  must  either  not  vote  at  all,  or 
vote  for  strangers :  for  the  most  influential  characters 
will  be  applied  to,  to  know  who  are  the  most  proper  to 
be  chosen.  I  repeat,  that  the  control  of  Congress 
over  the  manner,  &c.  of  electing,  well  warrants  this 
idea.  The  natural  consequence  will  be,  that  this  de 
mocratic  branch  will  possess  none  of  the  public  con 
fidence  :  the  people  will  be  prejudiced  against  repre 
sentatives  chosen  in  such  an  injudicious  manner. 
The  proceedings  in  the  northern  conclave,  will  be  hid 
den  from  the  yeomanry  of  this  country.  We  are  told, 
that  the  yeas  and  nays  shall  be  taken  and  entered  on 
the  journals :  this,  sir,  will  avail  nothing :  it  may  be 
locked  up  in  their  chests,  and  concealed  forever  from 
the  people ;  for  they  are  not  to  publish  what  parts  they 
think  require  secrecy ;  they  may  think,  and  will  think, 
the  whole  requires  it. 

Another  beautiful  feature  of  this  constitution,  is  the 
publication,  from  time  to  time,  of  the  receipts  and  ex 
penditures  of  the  public  money.  This  expression,  from 
time  to  time,  is  very  indefinite  and  indeterminate :  it 
may  extend  to  a  century.  Grant  that  any  of  them  are 
wicked,  they  may  squander  the  public  money  so  as  to 
ruin  you,  and  yet  this  expression  will  give  you  no  re 
dress.  I  say,  they  may  ruin  you ;  for  where,  sir,  is  the 
responsibility  ?  The  yeas  and  nays  will  show  you 
nothing,  unless  they  be  fools  as  well  as  knaves :  for, 
after  having  wickedly  trampled  on  the  rights  of  the 
people,  they  would  act  like  fools  indeed,  were  they  to 
publish  and  divulge  their  iniquity,  when  they  have  it 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  q~t 

equally  in  their  power  to  suppress  and  conceal  it. 
Where  is  the  responsibility — that  leading  principle  in 
the  British  government?  In  that  government,  a  pun 
ishment,  certain  and  inevitable,  is  provided:  but  in 
this,  there  is  no  real,  actual  punishment  for  the  gross 
est  mal-administration.  They  may  go  without  pun 
ishment,  though  they  commit  the  most  outrageous 
violation  on  our  immunities.  That  paper  may  tell 
me  they  will  be  punished.  I  ask,  by  what  law  ?  They 
must  make  the  laAV,  for  there  is  no  existing  law  to  do 
it.  What — will  they  make  a  law  to  punish  them 
selves  ?  This,  sir>  is  my  great  objection  to  the  con 
stitution,  that  there  is  no  true  responsibility,  and  that 
the  preservation  of  our  liberty  depends  on  the  single 
chance  of  men  being  virtuous  enough  to  make  laws  to 
punish  themselves.  In  the  country  from  which  we 
are  descended,  they  have  real,  and  not  imaginary  re 
sponsibility  ;  for  there,  mal-administration  has  cost 
their  heads  to  some  of  the  most  saucy  geniuses  that 
ever  were.  The  senate,  by  making  treaties,  may  de 
stroy  your  liberty  and  laws,  for  want  of  responsibility. 
Two  thirds  of  those  that  shall  happen  to  be  present, 
can,  with  the  president,  make  treaties,  that  shall  be 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land :  they  may  make  the  most 
ruinous  treaties,  and  yet  there  is  no  punishment  for 
them.  Whoever  shows  me  a  punishment  provided  for 
them,  will  oblige  me.  So,  sir,  notwithstanding  there 
are  eight  pillars,  they  want  another.  Where  will  they 
make  another  ?  I  trust,  sir,  the  exclusion  of  the  evils 
wherewith  this  system  is  replete,  in  its  present  form, 
will  be  made  a  condition  precedent  to  its  adoption,  by 
this  or  any  other  state.  The  transition  from  a  general, 
unqualified  admission  to  offices,  to  a  consolidation  of 
government,  seems  easy;  for,  though  the  American 
states  are  dissimilar  in  their  structure,  this  will  assimi 
late  them:  this,  sir,  is  itself  a  strong  consolidating 
feature,  and  is  not  one  of  the  least  dangerous  in  that 
system.  Nine  states  are  sufficient  to  establish  this 
government  over  those  nine.  Imagine  that  nine  have 

VOL.    I.  13 


$tt  MR.   HENRY'S  SPEECH   ON 

come  into  it.  Virginia  has  certain  scruples.  Suppose 
she  will  consequently  refuse  to  join  with  those  states  : 
may  not  they  still  continue  in  friendship  and  union 
with  her?  If  she  sends  her  annual  requisitions  in 
dollars,  do  you  think  their  stomachs  will  be  so  squeam 
ish  as  to  refuse  her  dollars  ?  Will  they  not  accept  her 
regiments  ?  They  would  intimidate  you  into  an  in 
considerate  adoption,  and  frighten  you  with  ideal  evils, 
and  that  the  union  shall  be  dissolved.  'Tis  a  bugbear, 
sir :  the  fact  is,  sir,  that  the  eight  adopting  states  can 
hardly  stand  on  their  own  legs.  Public  fame  tells  us, 
that  the  adopting  states  have  already  heart-burnings 
and  animosity,  and  repent  their  precipitate  hurry :  this, 
sir,  may  occasion  exceeding  great  mischief.  When  I 
reflect  on  these,  and  many  other  circumstances,  1  must 
think  those  states  will  be  fond  to  be  in  confederacy 
with  us.  If  we  pay  our  quota  of  money  annually,  and 
furnish  our  rateable  number  of  men,  when  necessary,  I 
can  see  no  danger  from  a  rejection.  The  history  of 
Switzerland  clearly  proves,  that  w^e  might  be  in  amica 
ble  alliance  \vith  those  states,  without  adopting  this 
constitution.  Switzerland  is  a  confederacy,  consisting 
of  dissimilar  governments.  This  is  an  example,  which 
proves  that  governments,  of  dissimilar  structures,  may 
be  confederated.  That  confederate  republic  has 
stood  upwards  of  four  hundred  years ;  and,  although 
several  of  the  individual  republics  are  democratic,  and 
the  rest  aristocratic,  no  evil  has  resulted  from  this  dis 
similarity,  for  they  have  braved  all  the  power  of  France 
and  Germany,  during  that  long  period.  The  Swiss 
spirit,  sir,  has  kept  them  together :  they  have  encoun 
tered  and  overcome  immense  difficulties,  with  patience 
and  fortitude.  In  the  vicinity  of  powerful  and  ambi 
tious  monarchs,  they  have  retained  their  independence, 
republican  simplicity  and  valor.  [Here  Mr.  Henry 
drew  a  comparison  between  the  people  of  that  country 
and  those  of  France,  and  made  a  quotation  from  Ad- 
dison,  illustrating  the  subject.]  Look  at  the  peasants 
of  that  country,  and  of  France,  and  mark  the  dif- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  99 

ference.  You  will  find  the  condition  of  the  former  far 
more  desirable  and  comfortable.  No  matter  whether 
a  people  be  great,  splendid  and  powerful,  if  they  enjoy 
freedom.  The  Turkish  Grand  Seignior,  along  side  of 
our  president,  would  put  us  to  disgrace :  but  we  should 
be  abundantly  consoled  for  this  disgrace,  should  our 
citizen  be  put  in  contrast  with  the  Turkish  slave. 

The  most  valuable  end  of  government,  is  the  liber 
ty  of  the  inhabitants.  No  possible  advantages  can 
compensate  for  the  loss  of  this  privilege.  Show  me 
the  reason  why  the  American  union  is  to  be  dissolved. 
Who  are  those  eight  adopting  states?  Are  they 
averse  to  give  us  a  little  time  to  consider,  before  we 
conclude  ?  Would  such  a  disposition  render  a  junc 
tion  with  them  eligible :  or,  is  it  the  genius  of  that  kind 
of  government,  to  precipitate  people  hastily  into  mea 
sures  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  grant  no  indul 
gence  ?  If  it  be,  sir,  is  it  for  us  to  accede  to  such  a 
government  ?  We  have  a  right  to  have  time  to  con 
sider — we  shall  therefore  insist  upon  it.  Unless  the 
government  be  amended,  we  can  never  accept  it. 
The  adopting  states  will  doubtless  accept  our  money 
and  our  regiments ;  and  what  is  to  be  the  consequence* 
if  we  are  disunited  ?  I  believe  that  it  is  yet  doubtful, 
whether  it  is  not  proper  to  stand  by  a  while,  and  sec 
the  effect  of  its  adoption  in  other  states.  In  forming 
a  government,  the  utmost  care  should  be  taken,  to 
prevent  its  becoming  oppressive  ;  and  this  government 
is  of  such  an  intricate  and  complicated  nature,  that 
no  man  on  this  earth,  can  know  its  real  operation. 
The  other  states  have  no  reason  to  think,  from  the 
antecedent  conduct  of  Virginia,  that  she  has  any  in 
tention  of  seceding  from  the  union,  or  of  being  less 
active  to  support  the  general  welfare.  Would  they 
not,  therefore,  acquiesce  in  our  taking  time  to  delibe 
rate — deliberate  whether  the  measure  be  not  peri 
lous,  not  only  for  us,  but  the  adopting  states.  Permit 
me,  sir,  to  say,  that 'a  great  majority  of  the  people,  even 
in  the  adopting  states,  arc  averse  to  this  government, 


100  iMR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH    ON 

I  believe  I  would  be  right  to  say,  that  they  have  been 
egregiously  misled.  Pennsylvania  has,  perhaps,  been 
tricked  into  it.  If  the  other  states,  who  have  adopted 
it,  have  not  been  tricked,  still  they  were  too  much  hur 
ried  into  its  adoption.  There  were  very  respectable 
minorities  in  several  of  them ;  and,  if  reports  be  true,  a 
clear  majority  of  the  people  are  averse  to  it.  If  we 
also  accede,  and  it  should  prove  grievous,  the  peace 
and  prosperity  of  our  country,  which  we  all  love,  will 
be  destroyed.  This  government  has  not  the  affection 
of  the  people,  at  present.  Should  it  be  oppressive, 
their  affection  will  be  totally  estranged  from  it — and, 
sir,  you  know,  that  a  government  without  their  affec 
tions,  can  neither  be  durable  nor  happy.  I  speak  as 
one  poor  individual — but,  when  I  speak,  I  speak  the 
language  of  thousands.  But,  sir,  I  mean  not  to  breathe 
the  spirit,  nor  utter  the  language  of  secession. 

I  have  trespassed  so  long  on  your  patience,  I  am 
really  concerned  that  I  have  something  yet  to  say. 
The  honorable  member  has  said  that  we  shall  be 
properly  represented :  remember,  sir,  that  the  num 
ber  of  our  representatives  is  but  ten,  whereof  six  are  a 
majority.  Will  those  men  be  possessed  of  sufficient 
information?  A  particular  knowledge  of  particular 
districts,  will  not  suffice.  They  must  be  well  acquaint 
ed  with  agriculture,  commerce,  and  a  great  variety  of 
other  matters  throughout  the  continent;  they  must 
know  not  only  the  actual  state  of  nations  in  Europe 
and  America,  the  situation  of  their  farmers,  cottagers 
and  mechanics,  but  also  the  relative  situation  and  in 
tercourse  of  those  nations.  Virginia  is  as  large  as 
England.  Our  proportion  of  representatives  is  but 
ten  men.  In  England  they  have  five  hundred  and 
thirty.  The  house  of  commons  in  England,  numerous 
as  they  are,  we  are  told,  is  bribed,  and  have  bartered 
away  the  rights  of  their  constituents :  what  then  shall 
become  of  us  ?  Will  these  few  protect  our  rights  ? 
Will  they  be  incorruptible  ?  You  say  they  will  be  bet 
ter  men  than  the  English  commoners.  I  say  they 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

will  be  infinitely  worse  men,  because  they  are  to  be 
chosen  blindfolded :  their  election,  (the  term,  as  ap 
plied  to  their  appointment,  is  inaccurate,)  will  be  an. 
involuntary  nomination,  and  not  a  choice.  I  have,  I 
fear,  fatigued  the  committee,  yet  I  have  not  said  the 
one  hundred  thousandth  part  of  what  I  have  on  my 
mind,  and  wish  to  impart.  On  this  occasion,  I  con 
ceived  myself  bound  to  attend  strictly  to  the  interest  of 
the  state ;  and  I  thought  her  dearest  rights  at  stake : 
having  lived  so  long — been  so  much  honored — my  ef 
forts,  though  small,  are  due  to  my  country.  I  have 
found  my  mind  hurried  on  from  subject  to  subject,  on 
this  very  great  occasion.  We  have  all  been  out  of  or 
der,  from  the  gentleman  who  opened  to  day,  to  myself. 
I  did  not  come  prepared  to  speak  on  so  multifarious  a 
subject,  in  so  general  a  manner.  I  trust  you  will  in 
dulge  me  another  time.  Before  you  abandon  the  pre 
sent  system,  I  hope  you  will  consider  not  only  its  de 
fects,  most  maturely,  but  likewise  those  of  that  which 
you  are  to  substitute  for  it.  May  you  be  fully  appris 
ed  of  the  dangers  of  the  latter,  not  by  fatal  experience, 
but  by  some  abler  advocate  than  I. 


SPEECH  OF  EDMUND  RANDOLPH, 


ON  THE  EXPEDIENCY  OP  ADOPTING  THK 


FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 


DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  JUNE  6th,  1788. 

1    ' 


The  first  and  second  sections  of  the  first  article  of  the  constitution 
being  under  consideration,  Mr.  Randolph  addressed  the  con 
vention  as  follows  : — 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

I  AM  a  child  of  the  revolution.  My  country,  very  early 
indeed,  took  me  under  her  protection,  at  a  time  when  I 
most  wanted  it;  and  by  a  succession  of  favors  and 
honors,  prevented  even  my  most  ardent  wishes.  I  feel 
the  highest  gratitude  and  attachment  to  my  country ; 
her  felicity  is  the  most  fervent  prayer  of  my  heart. 
Conscious  of  having  exerted  my  faculties  to  the  ut 
most  in  her  behalf,  if  I  have  not  succeeded  in  securing 
the  esteem  of  my  countrymen,  I  shall  reap  abundant 
consolation  from  the  rectitude  of  my  intentions  :  ho 
nors,  when  compared  to  the  satisfaction  accruing  from 
a  conscious  independence  and  rectitude  of  ccfhduct, 
are  no  equivalent.  The  unwearied  study  of  nty  life, 
shall  be  to  promote  her  happiness.  As  a  citizen,  ambi 
tion  and  popularity  are  no  objects  with  me.  I  expect, 
in  the  course  of  a  year,  to  retire  to  that  private  station 
which  I  most  sincerely  and  cordially  prefer  to  all 
others.*  The  security  of  public  justice,  sir,  is  what  I 


Mr.  Randolph  was  at  this  time  Governor  of  Virginia. 


MR.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH,  &c.  ]Q3 

most  fervently  wish — as  I  consider  that  object  to  be  the 
primary  step  to  the  attainment  of  public  happiness.  I 
can  declare  to  the  whole  world,  that  in  the  part  I  take 
in  this  very  important  question,  I  am  actuated  by  a  re 
gard  for  what  1  conceive  to  be  our  true  interest.  I  can 
also,  with  equal  sincerity,  declare  that  I  would  join 
heart  and  hand  in  rejecting  this  system,  did  I  conceive 
it  would  promote  our  happiness :  but  having  a  strong 
conviction  on  my  mind,  at  this  time,  that,  by  a  disunion, 
we  shall  throw  away  all  those  blessings  we  have  so 
earnestly  fought  for,  and  that  a  rejection  of  the  consti 
tution  will  operate  disunion — pardon  me  if  1  discharge 
the  obligation  I  owe  to  my  country  by  voting  for  its 
adoption.  We  are  told  that  the  report  of  dangers  is 
false.  The  cry  of  peace,  sir,  is  false:  say  peace, 
when  there  is  peace :  it  is  but  a  sudden  calm.  The 
tempest  growls  over  you — look  around — wheresoever 
you  look,  you  see  danger.  When  there  are  so  many 
witnesses,  in  many  parts  of  America,  that  justice  is  suf 
focated,  shall  peace  and  happiness  still  be  said  to 
reign?  Candor,  sir,  requires  an  undisguised  repre 
sentation  of  our  situation.  Candor,  sir,  demands  a 
faithful  exposition  of  facts.  Many  citizens  have  found 
justice  strangled  and  trampled  under  foot,  through  the 
course  of  jurisprudence  in  this  country.  Are  those, 
who  have  debts  due  them,  satisfied  with  your  govern 
ment?  Are  not  creditors  wearied  with  the  tedious 
procrastination  of  your  legal  process — a  process  ob 
scured  by  legislative  mists  ?  Cast  your  eyes  to  your 
sea-ports,  see  how  commerce  languishes :  this  country, 
so  blessed  by  nature,  with  every  advantage  that  can 
render  commerce  profitable,  through  defective  legisla 
tion,  is  deprived  of  all  the  benefits  and  emoluments  she 
might  otherwise  reap  from  it.  We  hear  many  com 
plaints  on  the  subject  of  located  lands — a  variety  of 
competitors  claiming  the  same  lands  under  legislative 
acts — public  faith  prostrated,  and  private  confidence 
destroyed.  I  ask  you  if  your  laws  are  reverenced? 
In  every  well  regulated  community,  the  laws  command 


104  MR.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH  ON 

respect.  Are  yours  entitled  to  reverence  ?  We  not 
only  see  violations  of  the  constitution,  but  of  national 
principles  in  repeated  instances.  How  is  the  fact  ?  The 
history  of  the  violations  of  the  constitution,  extends 
from  the  year  1776,  to  this  present  time — violations 
made  by  formal  acts  of  the  legislature;  every  thing 
has  been  drawn  within  the  legislative  vortex.  There 
is  one  example  of  this  violation  in  Virginia,  of  a  most 
striking  and  shocking  nature ;  an  example,  so  horrid, 
that  if  I  conceived  my  country  would  passively  permit 
a  repetition  of  it,  dear  as  it  is  to  me,  I  would  seek 
means  of  expatriating  myself  from  it.  A  man,  who 
was  then  a  citizen,  was  deprived  of  his  life,  thus :  from 
a  mere  reliance  on  general  reports,  a  gentleman  in  the 
house  of  delegates  informed  the  house,  that  a  certain 
man  (Josiah  Phillips)  had  committed  several  crimes, 
and  was  running  at  large,  perpetrating  other  crimes ; 
he  therefore  moved  for  leave  to  attaint  him.  He  ob 
tained  that  leave  instantly.  No  sooner  did  he  obtain 
it,  than  he  drew  from  his  pocket  a  bill  already  written  for 
that  effect ;  it  was  read  three  times  in  one  day,  and  carri 
ed  to  the  senate :  I  will  not  say  that  it  passed  the  same 
day  through  the  senate ;  but  he  was  attainted  very 
speedily  and  precipitately,  without  any  proof  better  than 
vague  reports !  Without  being  confronted  with  his 
accusers  and  witnesses ;  without  the  privilege  of  call 
ing  for  evidence  in  his  behalf,  he  was  sentenced  to 
death,  and  was  afterwards  actually  executed.  Was 
this  arbitrary  deprivation  of  life,  the  dearest  gift  of  God 
to  man,  consistent  with  the  genius  of  a  republican  gov 
ernment  ?  Is  this  compatible  with  the  spirit  of  free 
dom  ?  This,  sir,  has  made  the  deepest  impression 
on  my  heart,  and  I  cannot  contemplate  it  without 
horror. 

There  are  still  a  multiplicity  of  complaints  of  the 
debility  of  the  laws.  Justice,  in  jpany  instances,  is  so 
unattainable,  that  commerce  may  pin  fact,  be  said  to  be 
stopped  entirely.  There  is  no  peace,  sir,  in  this  land : 
can  peace  exist  with  injustice,  licentiousness,  insecu- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

rity  and  oppression  ?  These  considerations,  indepen 
dent  of  many  others  which  I  have  not  yet  enumerated, 
would  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  adoption  of  this 
constitution,  because  it  secures  the  liberty  of  the  citi 
zen,  his  person  and  property,  and  will  invigorate  and 
restore  commerce  and  industry. 

An  additional  reason  to  induce  us  to  adopt  it,  is  that 
excessive  licentiousness  which  has  resulted  from  the 
relaxation  of  our  laws,  and  which  will  be  checked  by 
this  government.  Let  us  judge  from  the  fate  of  more 
ancient  nations.  Licentiousness  has  produced  tyran 
ny  among  many  of  them :  it  has  contributed  as  much, 
(if  not  more,)  as  any  other  cause  whatsoever,  to  the 
loss  of  their  liberties.  I  have  respect  for  the  integrity 
of  our  legislators ;  I  believe  them  to  be  virtuous:  but 
as  long  as  the  defects  of  the  constitution  exist,  so  long 
will  laws  be  imperfect.  The  honorable  gentleman 
went  on  further,  and  said,  that  the  accession  of  eight 
states  is  not  a  reason  for  our  adoption.  Many  other 
things  have  been  alledged  out  of  order — instead  of 
discussing  the  system  regularly,  a  variety  of  points  are 
promiscuously  debated,  in  order  to  make  temporary 
impressions  on  the  members.  Sir,  were  I  convinced 
of  the  validity  of  their  arguments,  I  would  join  them 
heart  and  hand.  Were  I  convinced  that  the  accesions 
of  eight  states,  did  not  render  our  accession  also  ne 
cessary  to  preserve  the  union,  I  would  not  accede  to  it 
till  it  should  be  previously  amended:  but,  sir,  I  am 
convinced  that  the  union  will  be  lost  by  our  rejection. 
Massachusetts  has  adopted  it ;  she  has  recommended 
subsequent  amendments  ;  her  influence  must  be  very 
considerable  to  obtain  them:  I  trust  my  countrymen 
have  sufficient  wisdom  and  virtue  to  entitle  them  to 
equal  respect. 

Is  it  urged,  that  being  wiser,  we  ought  to  prescribe 
amendments  to  the  other  states  ?  I  have  considered 
this  subject  deliberately ;  wearied  myself  in  endeavor 
ing  to  find  a  possibility  of  preserving  the  union,  with 
out  our  unconditional  ratification :  but.  sir,  in  vain ;  I 

VOL.  i.  14 


J06  MR.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH  ON 

find  no  other  means.     I  ask  myself  a  variety  of  ques 
tions  applicable  to  the  adopting  states,  and  I  conclude, 
will  they  repent  of  whaj;  they  have  done  ?     Will  they 
acknowledge  themselves  in  an  error  ?     Or,  will  they 
recede  to  gratify  Virginia?     My  prediction  is,  that 
they  will  not.     Shall  we  stand  by  ourselves,  and  be  se 
vered  from  the  union  if  amendments  cannot  be  had  ? 
I  have  every  reason  for  determining  within  myself,  that 
our  rejection  must  dissolve  the  union ;  and  that  that 
dissolution  will  destroy  our  political  happiness.     The 
honorable  gentleman  was  pleased  to  draw  out  several 
other  arguments,  out  of  order  :  that  this  government 
would  destroy  the  state  governments,  the  trial  by  jury, 
&c.  &c.  and  concluded,  by  an  illustration  of  his  opinion, 
by  a  reference  to  the  confederacy  of  the  Swiss.     Let 
us  argue  with  unprejudiced  minds :  he  says,  that  the 
trial  by  jury  is  gone — is  this  so  ?     Although  I  have  de 
clared  my  determination  to  give  my  vote  for  it,  yet  I 
shall  freely  censure  those  parts  which  appear  to  me 
reprehensible.     The  trial  by  jury,  in  criminal  cases,  is 
secured ;  in  civil  cases,  it  is  not  so  expressly  secured, 
as  I  could  wish  it ;  but  it  does  not  follow,  that  Con 
gress  has  the  power  of  taking  away  this  privilege, 
which  is  secured  by  the  constitution  of  each  state,  and 
not  given  away  by  this  constitution.     I  have  no  fear  on 
this  subject — Congress  must  regulate  it  so  as  to  suit 
every  state.     I  will  risk  my  property  on  the  certainty, 
that  they  will  institute  the  trial  by  jury  in  such  manner 
as  shall  accommodate  the  conveniences  of  the  inhabi 
tants  in  every  state :  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  this 
accommodation,  was  the  principal  cause  of  its  not 
being  provided  for.     It  will  be  the  interest  of  the  indi 
viduals  composing  Congress,  to  put  it  on  this  conven 
ient  footing.     Shall  we  not  choose  men  respectable 
for  their  good  qualities  ?     Or  can  we  suppose  that 
men,  tainted  with  the  worst  vices,  will  get  into  Con 
gress  ?     I  beg  leave  to  differ  from  the  honorable  gen 
tleman,  in  another  point.     He  dreads  that  great  in 
conveniences  will  ensue  from  the  federal  court ;  that 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  1Q7 

our  citizens  will  be  harrassed  by  being  carried  thither. 
I  cannot  think  that  this  power  of  the  federal  judiciary, 
will  necessarily  be  abused.  The  inconvenience  here 
suggested,  being  of  a  general  nature,  affecting  most 
of  the  states,  will,  by  general  consent  of  the  states,  be 
removed ;  and,  I  trust,  such  regulations  shall  be  made, 
in  this  case,  as  will  accommodate  the  people  in  eve 
ry  state.  The  honorable  gentleman  instanced  the 
Swiss  cantons,  as  an  example,  to  show  us  the  possibili 
ty,  if  not  expediency,  of  being  in  amicable  alliance 
with  the  other  states,  without  adopting  this  system. 
Sir,  references  to  history  will  be  fatal  in  political  rea 
soning,  unless  well  guarded.  Our  mental  ability  is  often 
eo  contracted,  and  powers  of  investigation  so  limited, 
that  sometimes  we  adduce  as  an  example  in  our  fa 
vor,  what  in  fact  militates  against  us.  Examine  the 
situation  of  that  country  comparatively  to  us.  Its  ex 
tent  and  situation  are  totally  different  from  ours ;  it 
is  surrounded  by  powerful,  ambitious,  and  reciprocally 
jealous  nations :  its  territory  small  and  the  soil  not 
very  fertile.  The  peculiarity,  sir,  of  their  situation,  has 
kept  these  cantons  together,  and  not  that  system  of 
alliance,  to  which  the  gentleman  seems  to  attribute  the 
durability,  and  felicity  of  their  connexion. 

[Here- Mr.  Randolph  quoted  some  passages  from 
Stanyard,  illustrating  his  argument,  and  largely  com 
mented  upon  them.  The  effect  of-  which  was,  that 
the  narrow  confines  of  that  country  rendered  it  very 
possible  for  a  system  of  confederacy  to  accommo 
date  those  cantons,  that  would  not  suit  the  United 
States  :  that  it  was  the  fear  of  the  ambitious  and  war 
like  nations  that  surrounded  them,  and  the  reciprocal 
jealousy  of  the  other  European  powers  that  rendered 
their  union  so  durable;  and  that  notwithstanding 
these  circumstances,  and  their  being  a  hardy  race  of 
people,  yet  such  was  the  injudicious  construction  of 
their  confederacy,  that  very  considerable  broils  some 
times  interrupted  their  harmony.] 

He  then  continued — I  have  produced  this  example 


108  MR.  RANDOLPH'S   SPEECH  ON 

to  show,  that  we  ought  not  to  be  amused  with  histori 
cal  references,  which  have  no  kind  of  analogy  to  the 
points  under  our  consideration.  We  ought  to  confine 
ourselves  to  those  points  solely,  which  have  an  imme 
diate  and  strict  similitude,  to  the  subject  of  our  dis 
cussion.  The  reference  made  by  the  honorable 
gentleman  over  the  way,  is  extremely  inapplicable  to 
us.  Are  the  Swiss  cantons  circumstanced  as  we  are  ? 
Are  we  surrounded  by  formidable  nations — or  are 
we  situated  in  any  manner  like  them  ?  We  are  not, 
sir.  Then  it  naturally  results,  that  no  such  friendly 
intercourse  as  he  flattered  himself  with,  could  take 
place,  in  case  of  a  dissolution  of  our  union.  We  are 
remotely  situated  from  powerful  nations,  the  dread  of 
whose  attack  might  impel  us  to  unite  firmly  with  one 
another ;  we  are  not  situated  in  an  inaccessible,  strong 
position :  we  have  to  fear  much  from  one  another : 
we  must  soon  feel  the  fatal  eifects  of  an  imperfect  sys 
tem  of  union. 

The  honorable  gentleman  attacks  the  constitution, 
as  he  thinks  it  contrary  to  our  bill  of  rights.  Do  we 
not  appeal  to  the  people,  by  whose  authority  all  gov 
ernment  is  made  ?  That  bill  of  rights  is  of  no  validity, 
because,  I  conceive,  it  is  not  formed  on  due  authority. 
It  is  not  a  part  of  our  constitution :  it  has  never  se 
cured  us  against  any  danger :  it  has  been  repeatedly 
disregarded  and '  violated.  But  we  must  not  discard 
the  confederation,  for  the  remembrance  of  its  past 
services.  I  am  attached  to  old  servants.  I  have  re 
gard  and  tenderness  for  this  old  servant :  but  when 
reason  tells  us,  that  it  can  no  longer  be  retained  with 
out  throwing  away  all  it  has  gained  us,  and  running 
the  risk  of  losing  every  thing  dear  to  us,  must  we  still 
continue  our  attachment  ?  Reason  and  my  duty  tell 
me  not.  Other  gentlemen  may  think  otherwise.  But, 
sir,  is  it  not  possible  that  men  may  differ  in  sentiments, 
and  still  be  honest  ?  We  have  an  inquisition  within 
ourselves,  that  leads  us  not  to  offend  so  much  against 
charity.  The  gentleman  expresses  a  necessity  of  be- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  1Q9 

ing  suspicious  of  those  who  govern.  I  will  agree  with 
him  in  the  necessity  of  political  jealousy  to  a  certain 
extent :  but  we  ought  to  examine,  how  far  this  political 
jealousy  ought  to  be  carried.  I  confess  that  a  certain 
degree  of  it,  is  highly  necessary  to  the  preservation  of 
liberty ;  but  it  ought  not  to  be  extended  to  a  degree 
which  is  degrading  and  humiliating  to  human  nature  ; 
to  a  degree  of  restlessness  and  active  disquietude,  suf 
ficient  to  disturb  a  community,  or  preclude  the  possi 
bility  of  political  happiness  and  contentment.  Confi 
dence  ought  also  to  be  equally  limited.  Wisdom 
shrinks  from  extremes,  and  fixes  on  a  medium  as  her 
choice.  Experience  and  history,  the  least  fallible 
judges,  teach  us  that  in  forming  a  government,  the 
powers  to  be  given  must  be  commensurate  to  the  ob 
ject.  A  less  degree  will  defeat  the  intention,  and  a 
greater  will  subject  the  people  to  the  depravity  of 
rulers,  who,  though  they  are  but  the  agents  of  the 
people,  pervert  their  powers  to  their  own  emolument, 
and  ambitious  views. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  sorry  to  be  obliged  to  detain 
the  house,  but  the  relation  of  a  variety  of  matters, 
renders  it  now  unavoidable.  I  informed  the  house 
yesterday,  before  rising,  that  I  intended  to  show  the 
necessity  of  having  a  national  government,  in  prefer 
ence  to  the  confederation ;  also,  to  show  the  necessi 
ty  of  conceding  the  power  of  taxation,  and  of  distin 
guishing  between  its  objects ;  and  I  am  the  more  hap 
py,  that  I  possess  materials  of  information  for  that 
purpose.  My  intention  then  is,  to  satisfy  the  gentle 
men  of  this  committee,  that  a  national  government  is 
absolutely  indispensable,  and  that  a  confederacy  is  not 
eligible,  in  our  present  situation.  The  introductory 
step  to  this  will  be,  to  endeavor  to  convince  the  house 
of  the  necessity  of  the  union,  and  that  the  present  con 
federation  is  actually  inadequate  and  unamendable. 
The  extent  of  the  country  is  objected  to,  by  the  gentle 
man  over  the  way,  as  an  insurmountable  obstacle  to 
the  establishing  a  national  government  in  the  United 


110  MR.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH  ON 

States.  It  is  a  very  strange  and  inconsistent  doctrine, 
to  admit  the  necessity  of  the  union,  and  yet  urge  this 
last  objection,  which  I  think  goes  radically  to  the  exis 
tence  of  the  union  itself.  If  the  extent  of  the  country 
be  a  conclusive  argument  against  a  national  govern 
ment,  it  is  equally  so,  against  an  union  with  the  other 
states.  Instead  of  entering  largely  into  a  discussion  of 
the  nature  and  effect  of  the  different  kinds  of  govern 
ment,  or  into  an  inquiry  into  the  particular  extent  of 
country,  that  may  suit  the  genius  of  this  or  that  gov 
ernment,  I  ask  this  question — is  this  government  ne 
cessary  for  the  safety  of  Virginia  ?  Is  the  union  indis 
pensable  for  our  happiness  ?  I  confess  it  is  impru 
dent  for  any  nation  to  form  alliance  with  another, 
whose  situation  and  construction  of  government  are 
dissimilar  with  its  own.  It  is  impolitic  and  improper 
for  men  of  opulence  to  join  their  interest  with  men  of 
indigence  and  chance.  But  we  are  now  inquiring, 
particularly,  whether  Virginia,  as  contradistinguished 
from  the  other  states,  can  exist  without  the  union — a 
hard  question,  perhaps,  after  what  has  been  said.  I 
will  venture,  however,  to  say,  she  cannot.  I  shall  not 
rest  contented  with  asserting,  I  shall  endeavor  to 
prove.  Look  at  the  most  powerful  nations  on  earth. 
England  and  France  have  had  recourse  to  this  expe 
dient.  Those  countries  found  it  necessary  to  unite 
with  their  immediate  neighbors,  and  this  union  has 
prevented  the  most  lamentable  mischiefs.  What  di 
vine  pre-eminence  is  Virginia  possessed  of,  above 
other  states  ?  Can  Virginia  send  her  navy  and  thun 
der,  to  bid  defiance  to  foreign  nations  ?  And  can  she 
exist  without  an  union  with  her  neighbors,  when  the 
most  potent  nations  have  found  such  an  union  neces 
sary,  not  only  to  their  political  felicity,  but  their  nation 
al  existence  ?  Let  us  examine  her  ability.  Although 
it  be  impossible  to  determine,  with  accuracy,  what  de 
gree  of  internal  strength  a  nation  ought  to  possess,  to 
enable  it  to  stand  by  itself;  yet  there  are  certain  sure 
facts  and  circumstances,  which  demonstrate,  that  a 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

particular  nation  cannot  stand  singly.     I  have  spoken 
with  freedom,  and,  I  trust,  I  have  done  it  with  decency ; 
but  I  must  also  speak  with  truth.     If  Virginia  can  exist 
without  the  union,  she  must  derive  that  ability  from 
one  or  other  of  these  sources,  viz :  from  her  natural 
situation,  or  because  she  has  no  reason  to  fear  from 
other  nations.     What  is  her  situation  ?     She  is  not  in 
accessible.     She  is  not  a  petty  republic,  like  that  of  St, 
Marino,  surrounded  with  rocks  and  mountains,  with  a 
soil  not  very  fertile,  nor  worthy  the  envy  of  surrounding 
nations.     Were  this,  sir,  her  situation,  she  might,  like 
that  petty  state,  subsist,  separated  from  all  the  world. 
On  the  contrary,  she  is  very  accessible :  the  large,  ca 
pacious  bay  of  Chesapeake,  which  is  but  too  excel 
lently  adapted  for  the  admission  of  enemies,  renders 
her  very  vulnerable.     I  am  informed,  and  I  believe 
rightly,  because  I  derive  my  information  from  those 
whose  knowledge  is  most  respectable,  that  Virginia  is 
in  a  very  unhappy  position,  with  respect  to  the  access 
of  foes  by  sea,  though  happily  situated  for  commerce. 
This  being  her  situation  by  sea,  let  us  look  at  land. 
She  has  frontiers  adjoining  the  states  of  Pennsylvania, 
Maryland  and  North  Carolina.     Two  of  those  states 
have  declared  themselves  members  of  the  union.     Will 
she  be  inaccessible  to  the  inhabitants  of  those  states  ? 
Cast  your  eyes  to  the  western  country,  that  is  inhabit 
ed  by  cruel  savages,  your  natural  enemies.     Besides 
their  natural  propensity  to  barbarity,  they  may  be  ex 
cited,  by  the  gold  of  foreign  enemies,  to  commit  the 
most  horrid  ravages  on  your  people.     Our  great,  in 
creasing  population,  is  one  remedy  to  this  evil ;  but. 
being  scattered  thinly  over  so  extensive  a  country,  how 
difficult  it  is  to  collect  their  strength,  or  defend  the 
country.     This  is  one  point  of  weakness.     I  wish,  for 
the  honor  of  my  countrymen,  that  it  was  the  only  one. 
There  is  another  circumstance  which  renders  us  more 
vulnerable.     Are  we  not  weakened  by  the  population 
of  those  whom  we  hold  in  slavery  ?     The  day  may  come, 
when  they  may  make  an  impression  upon  us.    Gentle- 


112  MR.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH  ON 

men,  who  have  been  long  accustomed  to  the  contem 
plation  of  the  subject,  think  there  is  a  cause  of  alarm 
in  this  case.  The  number  of  those  people,  compared 
to  that  of  the  whites,  is  in  an  immense  proportion : 
their  number  amounts  to  two  hundred  and  thirty-six 
thousand,  that  of  the  whites  only  to  three  hundred  and 
fifty-two  thousand.  Will  the  American  spirit,  so  much 
spoken  of,  repel  an  invading  enemy,  or  enable  you  to 
obtain  an  advantageous  peace?  Manufactures  and 
military  stores,  may  afford  relief  to  a  country  exposed : 
have  we  these  at  present  ?  Attempts  have  been  made 
to  have  these  here.  If  we  shall  be  separated  from  the 
union,  shall  our  chance  of  having  these  be  greater  ? 
Or,  will  not  the  want  of  these  be  more  deplorable  ? 
We  shall  be  told  of  the  exertions  of  Virginia,  under  the 
confederation — her  achievements,  when  she  had  no 
commerce.  These,  sir,  were  necessary  for  her  imme 
diate  safety,  nor  would  these  have  availed,  without  the 
aid  of  the  other  states.  Those  states,  then  our  friends, 
brothers  and  supporters,  will,  if  disunited  from  us,  be 
our  bitterest  ^enemies. 

If  then,  sir,  Virginia,  from  her  situation,  is  not  inac 
cessible,  or  invulnerable  ;  let  us  consider  if  she  be  pro 
tected,  by  having  no  cause  to  fear  from  other  nations : 
has  she  no  cause  to  fear  ?  You  will  have  cause  to 
fear,  as  a  nation,  if  disunited ;  you  will  not  only  have 
this  cause  to  fear  from  yourselves,  from  that  species  of 
population  I  before  mentioned,  and  your  once  sister 
states,  but  from  the  arms  of  other  nations.  Have  you 
no  cause  of  fear  from  Spain,  whose  dominions  border 
on  your  country  ?  Every  nation,  every  people,  in  our 
circumstances,  have  always  had  abundant  cause  to 
fear.  Let  us  see  the  danger  to  be  apprehended  from 
France :  let  us  suppose  Virginia  separated  from  the 
other  states:  as  part  of  the  former  confederated  states, 
she  will  owe  France  a  very  considerable  sum — France 
will  be  as  magnanimous  as  ever.  France,  by  the  law 
of  nations,  will  have  a  right  to  demand  the  whole  of 
her,  or  of  the  others.  If  France  were  to  demand  it,  what 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  U$ 

would  become  of  the  property  of  America?  Could 
she  not  destroy  what  little  commerce  we  have  ? 
Could  she  not  seize  our  ships,  and  carry  havoc  and 
destruction  before  her  on  our  shores  ?  The  most  la 
mentable  desolation  would  take  place.  We  owe  a 
debt  to  Spain  also ;  do  we  expect  indulgence  from  that 
quarter  ?  That  nation  has  a  right  to  demand  the  debt 
due  to  it,  and  power  to  enforce  that  right.  Will  the 
Dutch  be  silent  about  the  debt  due  to  them  ?  Is  there 
any  one  pretension,  that  any  of  these  nations  will  be 
patient  ?  The  debts  due  the  British  are  also  very  con 
siderable  :  these  debts  have  been  withheld  contrary  to 
treaty :  if  Great  Britain  will  demand  the  payment  of 
these  debts,  peremptorily,  what  will  be  the  conse 
quence  ?  Can  we  pay  them  if  demanded  ?  Will 
no  danger  result  from  a  refusal  ?  Will  the  British  na 
tion  suffer  their  subjects  to  be  stripped  of  their  proper 
ty  ?  Is  not  that  nation  amply  able  to  do  its  subjects 
justice  ?  Will  the  resentment  of  that  powerful  and 
supercilious  nation  sleep  forever  ?  If  we  become  one* 
sole  nation,  uniting  with  our  sister  states,  our  means  of 
defence  will  be  greater ;  the  indulgence,  for  the  payment 
of  those  debts,  will  be  greater,  and  the  danger  of  an 
attack  less  probable.  Moreover,  vast  quantities  of 
lands  have  been  sold,  by  citizens  of  this  country,  to 
Europeans,  and  these  lands  cannot  be  found.  Will 
this  fraud  be  countenanced  or  endured  ?  Among  so 
many  causes  of  danger,  shall  we  be  secure,  separated 
from  our  sister  states  ?  Weakness  itself,  sir,  will  in 
vite  some  attack  upon  your  country.  Contemplate 
our  situation  deliberately,  and  consult  history :  it  will 
inform  you,  that  people,  in  our  circumstances,  have 
ever  been  attacked,  and  successfully  :  open  any  page, 
and  you  will  there  find  our  danger  truly  depicted.  If 
such  a  people  had  any  thing,  was  it  not  taken  ?  The 
fate  which  will  befall  us,  I  fear,  sir,  will  be,  that  we 
shall  be  made  a  partition  of.  How  will  these,  our 
troubles,  be  removed  ?  Can  we  have  any  dependence 
on  commerce  ?  Can  we  make  any  computation  on 
VOL.  i.  1/5 


,    114  Mil.  RANDOLPH'S   SPEECH  ON 

this  subject  ?  Where  will  our  flag  appear  ?  So  high 
is  the  spirit  of  commercial  nations,  that  they  will  spend 
five  times  the  value  of  the  object,  to  exclude  their  ri 
vals  from  a  participation  in  commercial  profits:  they 
seldom  regard  any  expenses.  If  we  should  be  divided 
from  the  rest  of  the  states,  upon  what  footing  would 
our  navigation  in  the  Mississippi  be  ?  What  would  be 
the  probable  conduct  of  France  and  Spain?  Every 
gentleman  may  imagine,  in  his  own  mind,  the  natural 
consequences.  To  these  considerations,  I  might  add 
many  others  of  a  similar  nature.  Were  I  to  say,  that 
the  boundary,  between  us  and  North  Carolina,  is  not  yet 
settled,  I  should  be  told,  that  Virginia  and  that  state 
go  together.  But  what,  sir,  will  be  the  consequence  of 
the  dispute  that  may  arise  between  us  and  Mary 
land,  on  the  subject  of  Potomac  river  ?  It  is  thought, 
Virginia  has  a  right  to  an  equal  navigation  with  them 
in  that  river.  If  ever  it  should  be  decided  on  grounds 
of  prior  right,  their  charter  will  inevitably  determine  it 
in  their  favor.  The  country  called  the  Northern  Neck, 
will  probably  be  severed  from  Virginia.  There  is  not 
a  doubt,  but  the  inhabitants  of  that  part  will  annex 
themselves  to  Maryland,  if  Virginia  refuse  to  accede  to 
the  union.  The  recent  example  of  those  regulations, 
lately  made  respecting  that  territory,  will  illustrate 
that  probability.  Virginia  will  also  be  in  danger  of  a 
conflict  with  Pennsylvania,  on  the  subject  of  bounda 
ries.  I  know  that  some  gentlemen  are  thoroughly  per 
suaded,  that  we  have  a  right  to  those  disputed  boun 
daries  :  if  we  have  such  a  right,  I  know  not  where  it  is 
to  be  found. 

Are  we  not  borderers  on  states  that  will  be  separat 
ed  from  us  ?  Call  to  mind  the  history  of  every  part  of 
the  world,  where  nations  have  bordered  on  one  another, 
and  consider  the  consequences  of  our  separation  from 
the  union.  Peruse  those  histories,  and  you  find  such 
countries  to  have  ever  been  almost  a  perpetual  scene 
of  bloodshed  and  slaughter.  The  inhabitants  of  one, 
escaping  from  punishment  into  the  other — protection 


* 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  115 

given  them — consequent  pursuit,  robbery,  cruelty  and 
murder.  A  numerous  standing  army,  that  dangerous 
expedient,  would  be  necessary,  but  not  sufficient, 
for  the  defence  of  such  borders.  Every  gentleman 
will  amplify  the  scene  in  his  own  mind.  If  you  wish 
to  know  the  extent  of  such  a  scene,  look  at  the  histo 
ry  of  England  and  Scotland  before-  the  union;  you 
will  see  their  borderers  continually  committing  depre 
dations  and  cruelties,  of  the  most  calamitous  and  de 
plorable  nature,  on  one  another. 

Mr.  Chairman,  were  we  struck  off  from  the  union, 
and  disputes  of  the  back  lands  should  be  renewed, 
which  are  of  the  most  alarming  nature,  and  which 
must  produce  uncommon  mischiefs,  can  you  inform 
me  how  this  great  subject  would  be  settled  ?  Vir 
ginia  has  a  large  unsettled  country :  she  has,  at  last, 
quieted  it :  but  there  are  great  doubts  whether  she  has 
taken  the  best  way  to  effect  it.  If  she  has  not,  disa 
greeable  consequences  may  ensue.  I  have  before 
hinted  at  some  other  causes  of  quarrel  between  the 
other  states  and  us :  particularly  the  hatred  that  would 
be  generated  by  commercial  competition.  I  will 
only  add,  on  that  subject,  that  controversies  may  arise 
concerning  the  fisheries,  which  must  terminate  in 
wars.  Paper  money  may  also  be  an  additional  source 
of  disputes.  Rhode  Island  has  been  in  one  continued 
train  of  opposition  to  national  duties  and  integrity : 
they  have  defrauded  their  creditors  by  their  paper  mo 
ney.  Other  states  have  also  had  emissions  of  paper 
money,  to  the  ruin  of  credit  and  commerce.  May 
not  Virginia,  at  a  future  day,  also  recur  to  the  same 
expedient  ?  Has  Virginia  no  affection  for  paper  mo 
ney,  or  disposition  to  violate  contracts  ?  I  fear  she  is 
as  fond  of  these  measures  as  most  other  states  in  the 
union.  The  inhabitants  of  the  adjacent  states,  would 
be  affected  by  the  depreciation  of  paper  money,  which 
would  assuredly  produce  a  dispute  with  those  states. 
This  danger  is  taken  away  by  the  present  constitu 
tion,  as  it  provides,  "  That  no  state  shall  emit  bills  of 


1T6  MR.   KANDOLPH'S   SPEECH  ON 

credit"  Maryland  has  counteracted  the  policy  of 
this  state  frequently,  and  may  be  meditating  examples 
of  this  kind  again.  Before  the  revolution,  there  was  a 
contest  about  those  back  lands,  in  which  even  gov 
ernment  was  a  party :  it  was  put  an  end  to  by  the  war. 
Pennsylvania  was  ready  to  enter  into  a  war  with  us 
for  the  disputed  lands  near  the  boundaries,  and  no 
thing  but  the  superior  prudence  of  the  man,  who  was  at 
the  head  of  affairs  in  Virginia,  could  have  prevent 
ed  it. 

I  beg  leave  to  remind  you  of  the  strength  of  Massa 
chusetts,  and  other  states  to  the  north,  and  what  would 
their  conduct  be  to  us  if  disunited  from  them.  In 
case  of  a  conflict  between  us  and  Maryland  or  Penn 
sylvania,  they  would  be  aided  by  the  whole  strength  of 
the  more  northern  states ;  in  short,  by  that  of  all  the 
adopting  states.  For  these  reasons,  I  conceive,  that 
if  Virginia  supposes  she  has  no  cause  of  apprehen 
sion,  she  will  find  herself  in  a  fatal  error.  Suppose 
the  American  spirit  in  the  fullest  vigor  in  Virginia, 
what  military  preparations  and  exertions  is  she  capa 
ble  of  making?  The  other  states  have  upwards  of 
three  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  men  capable  of 
bearing  arms :  this  will  be  a  good  army,  or  they  can 
very  easily  raise  a  good  army  out  of  so  great  a  num 
ber.  Our  militia  amounts  to  fifty  thousand;  even 
stretching  it  to  the  improbable  amount  (urged  by 
some,)  of  sixty  thousand — in  case  of  an  attack,  what 
defence  can  we  make  ?  Who  are  militia  ?  Can  we 
depend  solely  upon  these?  I  will  pay  the  last  tribute 
of  gratitude  to  the  militia  of  my  country :  they  per 
formed  some  of  the  most  gallant  feats  during  the  last 
war,  and  acted  as  nobly  as  men,  inured  to  other  avo 
cations,  could  be  expected  to  do :  but,  sir,  it  is  danger 
ous  to  look  to  them  as  our  sole  protectors.  Did  ever 
militia  defend  a  country?  Those  of  Pennsylvania 
were  said  to  differ  very  little  from  regulars,  yet  these, 
sir,  were  insufficient  for  the  defence  of  that  state. 
The  militia  of  our  country  will  be  wanted  for  agricul- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  H7 

ture :  on  this  noblest  of  arts,  depends  the  virtue  and 
the  very  existence  of  a  country :  if  it  be  neglected, 
every  thing  else  must  be  in  a  state  of  ruin  and  decay. 
It  must  be  neglected  if  those  hands,  which  ought  to 
attend  to  it,  are  occasionally  called  forth  on  military 
expeditions.  Some,  also,  will  be  necessary  for  manu 
factures,  and  those  mechanic  arts  which  are  necessa 
ry  for  the  aid  of  the  farmer  and  planter.  If  we  had 
men,  sufficient  in  number  to  defend  ourselves,  it  could 
not  avail  without  other  requisites.  We  must  have  a 
navy,  to  be  supported  in  time  of  peace  as  well  as  war, 
to  guard  our  coasts  and  defend  us  against  invasions. 
The  impossibility  of  building  and  equipping  a  fleet,  in 
a  short  time,  constitutes  the  necessity  of  having  a  cer 
tain  number  of  ships  of  war  always  ready  in  time  of 
peace.  The  maintaining  a  navy  will  require  money — 
and  where,  sir,  can  we  get  money  for  this  and  other 
purposes  ?  How  shall  we  raise  it  ?  Review  the  enor 
mity  of  the  debts  due  by  this  country  :  the  amount  of 
the  debt  we  owe  to  the  continent,  for  bills  of  credit, 
rating  at  forty  for  one,  will  amount  to  between  six  and 
seven  hundred  thousand  pounds.  There  is  also  due 
the  continent,  the  balance  of  requisitions  due  by  us, 
and,  in  addition  to  this  proportion  of  the  old  conti 
nental  debt,  there  are  the  foreign,  domestic,  state  mili 
tary,  and  loan-office  debts,  to  which,  when  you  add  the 
British  debt,  where  is  the  possibility  of  finding  money 
to  raise  an  army  or  navy  ?  Review  then  your  real  abili 
ty.  Shall  we  recur  to  loans  ?  Nothing  can  be  more 
impolitic :  they  impoverish  a  nation :  we,  sir,  have 
nothing  to  repay  them ;  nor,  sir,  can  we  procure  them. 
Our  numbers  are  daily  increasing  by  emigration ;  but 
this,  sir,  will  not  relieve  us,  when  our  credit  is  gone, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  borrow  money.  If  the  imposts 
and  duties  in  Virginia,  even  on  the  present  footing,  be 
very  unproductive,  and  not  equal  to  our  necessities, 
what  would  they  be  if  we  were  separated  from  the 
union?  From  the  first  of  September,  to  the  first  of 
June,  the  amount,  put  into  the  treasury,  is  only  fifty  nine 


118  MR.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH    ON 

thousand  pounds,  or  a  little  more.  But,  sir,  if  smug 
gling  be  introduced  in  consequence  of  high  duties,  or 
otherwise,  and  the  Potomac  should  be  lost>  what  hope 
is  there  of  getting  money  from  these  ? 

Shall  we  be  asked  if  the  impost  would  be  bettered  by 
the  union  ?  I  answer  that  it  will,  sir.  Credit  being 
restored  and  confidence  diffused  in  the  country,  mer 
chants  and  men  of  wealth  will  be  induced  to  come 
among  us ;  emigration  will  increase,  and  commerce 
will  flourish :  the  impost  will  therefore  be  more  sure 
and  productive.  Under  these  circumstances,  can  you 
find  men  to  defend  you  ?  If  not  men,  where  can  you 
have  a  navy  ?  It  is  an  old  observation,  that  he,  who 
commands  at  sea,  will  command  the  land ;  and  it  is 
justified  by  modern  experience  in  war.  The  sea  can 
only  be  commanded  by  commercial  nations.  The 
United  States  have  every  means,  by  nature,  to  enable 
them  to  distribute  supplies  mutually  among  one  an 
other,  to  supply  other  nations  with  many  articles,  and 
to  carry  for  other  nations.  Our  commerce  would  not  be 
kindly  received  by  foreigners,  if  transacted  solely  by  our 
selves  ;  as  it  is  the  spirit  of  commercial  nations  to  en 
gross  as  much  as  possible,  the  carrying  trade :  this 
makes  it  necessary  to  defend  our  commerce :  but 
how  shall  we  encompass  this  end?  England  has 
arisen  to  the  greatest  height,  in  modern  times,  by  her 
navigation  act  and  other  excellent  regulations.  The 
same  means  would  produce  the  same  effects.  We 
have  inland  navigation.  Our  last  exports  did  not 
exceed  one  million  of  pounds.  Our  export  trade  is  en 
tirely  in  the  hands  of  foreigners.  We  have  no  manufac 
tures — depend  for  supplies  on  other  nations,  and  so 
far  are  we  from  having  any  carrying  trade,  that,  as  I 
have  already  said,  our  exports  are  in  the  hands  of 
foreigners.  Besides  the  profit  that  might  be  made  by 
our  natural  materials,  much  greater  gains  would  ac 
crue  from  their  being  first  wrought  before  they  were 
exported.  England  has  reaped  immense  profits  by 
this,  nay,  even  by  purchasing  and  working  up  those 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  119 

materials  which  their  country  did  not  afford :  her  suc 
cess  in  commerce  is  generally  ascribed  to  her  naviga 
tion  act.  Virginia  would  not,  incumbered  as  she  is, 
agree  to  have  such  an  act.  Thus,  for  the  want  of  a 
navy,  are  we  deprived  of  the  multifarious  advantages 
of  our  natural  situation ;  nor  is  it  possible,  that  if  the 
union  is  dissolved,  we  ever  should  have  a  navy  suffi 
cient  either  for  our  defence  or  the  extension  of  our 
trade.  I  beg  gentlemen  to  consider  these  two  things 
— our  inability  to  raise  and  man  a  navy,  and  the  dread 
ful  consequences  of  the  dissolution  of  the  union. 

I  will  close  this  catalogue  of  the  evils  of  the  dissolu 
tion  of  the  union,  by  recalling  to  your  mind  what  pass 
ed  in  the  year  1781.  Such  was  the  situation  of  our  af 
fairs  then,  that  the  powers  of  a  dictator  were  given  to 
the  commander  in  chief  to  save  us  from  destruction. 
This  shows  the  situation  of  the  country  to  have  been 
such,  as  made  it  ready  to  embrace  an  actual  dictator. 
At  some  future  period,  will  not  our  distresses  impel  us 
to  do  what  the  Dutch  have  done — throw  all  power 
into  the  hands  of  a  stadtholder  ?  How  infinitely  more 
wise  and  eligible,  than  this  desperate  alternative,  is  an 
union  with  our  American  brethren  ?  I  feel  myself  so 
abhorrent  to  any  thing  that  will  dissolve  our  union,  that 
I  cannot  prevail  with  myself  to  assent  to  it  directly  or 
indirectly.  If  the  union  is  to  be  dissolved,  what  step  is 
to  be  taken  ?  Shall  we  form  a  partial  confederacy ; 
or,  is  it  expected  that  we  shall  successfully  apply  to 
foreign  alliance  for  military  aid  ?  This  last  measure, 
sir,  has  ruined  almost  every  nation  that  has  used  it ;  so 
dreadful  an  example  ought  to  be  most  cautiously  avoid 
ed  ;  for  seldom  has  a  nation  recurred  to  the  expedient 
of  foreign  succor,  without  being  ultimately  crushed 
by  that  succor.  We  may  lose  our  liberty  and  inde 
pendence  by  this  injudicious  scheme  of  policy.  Admit 
ting  it  to  be  a  scheme  replete  with  safety,  what  nation 
shall  we  solicit — France  ?  She  will  disdain  a  connex 
ion  with  a  people  in  our  predicament.  I  would  trust 
every  thing  to  the  magnanimity  of  that  nation,  but  she 


120  MR.  RANDOLPH'S'  SPEECH  OK 

would  despise  a  people  who  had,  like  us,  so  imprudently 
separated  from  their  brethren ;  and,  sir,  were  she  to 
accede  to  our  proposal,  with  what  facility  could  she  be 
come  mistress  of  our  country.  To  what  nation  then, 
shall  we  apply — to  Great  Britain  ?  Nobody  has  as 
yet  trusted  that  idea.  An  application  to  any  othery 
must  be  either  fruitless  or  dangerous ;  to  those  who 
advocate  local  confederacies,  and  at  the  same  time 
preach  up  for  republican  liberty,  I  answer,  that  their 
conduct  is  inconsistent ;  the  defence  of  such  partial 
confederacies  will  require  such  a  degree  of  force  arid 
expense,  as  will  destroy  every  feature  of  republicanism. 
Give  me  leave  to  say,  that  1  see  nought  but  destruc 
tion  in  a  local  confederacy.  With  what  state  can  we 
confederate  but  North  Carolina — North  Carolina,  situ 
ated  worse  than  ourselves  ?  Consult  your  own  rea 
son  :  I  beseech  gentlemen  most  seriously  to  reflect  on 
the  consequences  of  such  a  confederacy :  I  beseech 
them  to  consider,  whether  Virginia  and  North  Caroli 
na,  both  oppressed  with  debts  and  slaves,  can  defend 
themselves  externally,  or  make  their  people  happy  in 
ternally.  North  Carolina  having  no  strength  but  mili 
tia,  and  Virginia  in  the  same  situation,  will  make,  I 
fear,  but  a  despicable  figure  in  history.  Thus,  sir,  I 
hope  that  I  have  satisfied  you,  that  we  are  unsafe  with 
out  an  union,  and  that  in  union  alone  safety  con 
sists. 

I  come  now,  sir,  to  the  great  inquiry,  whether  the 
confederation  be  such  a  government  as  we  ought  to 
continue  under ;  whether  it  be  such  a  government,  as 
can  secure  the  felicity  of  any  free  people.  Did  I  be 
lieve  the  confederation  was  a  good  thread,  which 
might  be  broken  without  destroying  its  utility  entirely, 
I  might  be  induced  to  concur  in  putting  it  together ; 
but  I  am  so  thoroughly  convinced  of  its  incapacity  to 
be  mended  or  spliced,  that  I  would  sooner  recur  to  any 
other  expedient. 

When  I  spoke  last,  I  endeavored  to  express  my 
sentiments  concerning  that  system,  and  to  apologize 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  J21 

(if  an  apology  was  necessary,)  for  the  conduct  of  its 
trainers — that  it  was  hastily  devised,  to  enable  us  to 
repel  a  powerful  enemy — that  the  subject  was  novel 
and  that  its  inefficacy  was  not  discovered,  till  requisi 
tions  came  to  be  made  by  Congress.  In  the  then  situa 
tion  of  America,  a  speedy  remedy  was  necessary  to 
ward  off  the  danger,  and  this  sufficiently  answered  that 
purpose :  but  so  universally  is  its  imbecility  now 
known,  that  it  is  almost  useless  for  me  to  exhibit  it  at 
this  time.  Has  not  Virginia,  as  well  .as  every  other 
state,  acknowledged  its  debility,  by  sending  delegates 
to  the  general  convention  ?  The  confederation  is,  of 
all  things,  the  most  unsafe,  not  only  to  trust  to,  in  its 
present  form,  but  even  to  amend.  The  object  of  a 
federal  government,  is  to  remedy  and  strengthen  the 
weakness  of  its  individual  branches;  whether  that 
weakness  arises  from  situation,  or  any  other  external 
cause.  With  respect  to  the  first,  is  it  not  a  miracle 
that  the  confederation  carried  us  through  the  last 
war  ?  It  was  our  unanimity,  sir,  that  carried  us  through 
it.  That  system  was  not  ultimately  concluded  till  the 
year  1781— although  the  greatest  exertions  were  made 
before  that  time.  Then  came  requisitions  of  men  and 
money :  its  defects  then  were  immediately  discovered : 
the  quotas  of  men  were  readily  sent — not  so  those  of 
money.  One  state  feigned  inability,  another  would  not 
comply  till  the  rest  did ;  and  various  excuses  were  of 
fered  ;  so  that  no  money  was  sent  into  the  treasury — 
not  a  requisition  was  fully  complied  with.  Loans  were 
the  next  measure  fallen  upon :  upwards  of  eighty  millions 
of  dollars  were  wanting,  beside  the  emissions  of  dol 
lars,  forty  for  one.  These  things  show  the  impossibili 
ty  of  relying  on  requisitions.  [Here  Mr.  Randolph 
enumerated  the  different  delinquencies  of  different 
states,  and  the  consequent  distresses  of  Congress.]  If 
the  American  spirit  is  to  be  depended  upon,  I  call 
him  to  awake,  to  see  how  his  Americans  have  been 
disgraced:  but  I  have  no  hopes  that  things  will  be 

VOT,.     F  1(> 


1-22  MK.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH  OX 

•better  hereafter.  I  fully  expect  things  will  be  as  they 
have  been,  and  that  the  same  derangements  will  pro 
duce  similar  miscarriages.  Will  the  American  spirit 
produce  money  or  credit,  unless  we  alter  our  system? 
Are  we  not  in  a  contemptible  situation — are  we  not  the 
jest  of  other  nations  ? 

But  it  is  insinuated,  by  the  honorable  gentleman, 
that  we  want  to  be  a  grand,  splendid  and  magnificent 
people :  we  wish  not  to  become  so :  the  magnificence 
of  a  royal  court  is  not  our  object.  We  want  govern 
ment,  sir — a  government  that  will  have  stability,  and 
give  us  security :  for  our  present  government  is  desti 
tute  of  the  one,  and  incapable  of  producing  the  other. 
It  cannot  perhaps,  with  propriety,  be  denominated  a 
government — being  void  of  that  energy  requisite  to 
enforce  its  sanctions.  I  wish  my  country  not  to  be 
contemptible  in  the  eye's  of  foreign  nations.  A  well 
regulated  community  is  always  respected.  It  is  the 
internal  situation,  the  defects  of  government,  that  at 
tract  foreign  contempt — that  contempt,  sir,  is  too 
often  followed  by  subjugation.  Advert  to  the  con 
temptuous  manner,  in  which  a  shrewd  politician  speaks 
of  our  government.  [Here  Mr.  Randolph  quoted  a 
passage  from  Lord  Sheffield,  the  purport  of  which  was, 
that  Great  Britain  might  engross  our  trade  on  her  own 
terms :  that  the  imbecility  and  inefficacy  of  our  gene 
ral  government  were  such,  that  it  was  impossible  we 
could  counteract  her  policy,  however  rigid  or  illiberal 
towards  us,  her  commercial  regulations  might  be.]  Re 
flect  but  a  moment  on  our  situation.  Does  it  not  in 
vite  real  hostility  ?  The  conduct  of  the  British  minis 
try  to  us,  is  the  natural  effect  of  our  unnerved  govern 
ment.  Consider  the  commercial  regulations  between 
us  and  Maryland.  Is  it  not  known  to  gentlemen,  that 
this  state  and  that  have  been  making  reprisals  'on 
each  other,  to  obviate  a  repetition  of  which,  in  some 
degree,  these  regulations  have  been  made  ?  Can  we 
not  see  from  this  circumstance,  the  jealousy,  rivalship 
and  hatred,  that  would  subsist  between  them,  in  case 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  ]23 

this  state  was  out  of  the  union  ?  They  are  importing 
states,  arid  importing  states  will  ever  be  competitors 
and  rivals.  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut  have  been 
on  the  point  of  war,  on  the  subject  of  their  paper  mo 
ney — Congress  did  not  attempt  to  interpose.  When 
Massachusetts  was  distressed  by  the  late  insurrection, 
Congress  could  not  relieve  her.  Who  headed  that 
insurrection  ?  Recollect  the  facility  with  which  it  was 
raised,  and  the  very  little  ability  of  the  ring-leader,  and 
you  cannot  but  deplore  the  extreme  debility  of  our 
merely  nominal  government;  we  are  too  despicable  to 
be  regarded  by  foreign  nations.  The  defects  of  the 
confederation  consisted  principally  in  the  want  of  pow 
er.  It  had  nominally  powers — powers  on  paper,  which 
it  could  not  use.  The  power  of  making  peace  and 
war  is  expressly  delegated  to  Congress  ;  yet  the  power 
of  granting  passports,  though  within  that  of  making 
peace  and  war,  was  considered  by  Virginia  as  belong 
ing  to  herself.  Without  adequate  powers,  vested  in 
Congress,  America  cannot  be  respectable  in  the  eyes 
of  other  nations.  Congress,  sir,  ought  to  be  fully  vest 
ed  with  power  to  support  the  union,  protect  the  inter 
est  of  the  United  States,  maintain  their  commerce,  and 
defend  them  from  external  invasions  arid  insults,  and 
internal  insurrections ;  to  maintain  justice,  and  pro 
mote  harmony  and  public  tranquillity  among  the  states. 
A  government,  not  vested  with  these  powers,  will  ever 
be  found  unable  to  make  us  happy  or  respectable : 
how  far  the  confederation  is  different  from  such  a  gov 
ernment,  is  known  to  all  America.  Instead  of  being 
able  to  cherish  and  protect  the  states,  it  has  been 
unable  to  defend  itself  against  the  encroachments  made 
upon  it  by  the  states :  everyone  of  them  has  conspired 
against  it — Virginia  as  much  as  any.  This  fact  could 
be  proved  by  reference  to  actual  history.  I  might 
quote  the  observations  of  an  able  modern  author,  (not 
because  he  is  decorated  with  the  name  of  author,  but 
because  his  sentiments  are  drawn  from  human  nature,) 
to  prove  the  dangerous  impolicy  of  withholding  neces- 


124  MR.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH  ON 

sary  powers  from  Congress;  but  I  shall  at  this 
time,  fatigue  the  house,  as  little  as  possible.  What 
are  the  powers  of  Congress  ?  They  have  full  authori 
ty  to  recommend  what  they  please :  this  recommenda 
tory  power  reduces  them  to  the  condition  of  poor 
supplicants.  Consider  the  dignified  language  of  the 
members  of  the  American  Congress — May  it  please 
your  high  mightinesses,  of  Virginia,  to  pay  your  just, 
proportionate  quota  of  our  national  debt :  we  humbly 
supplicate,  that  it  may  please  you  to  comply  with  your 
federal  duties !  We  implore,  we  beg  your  obedience ! 
Js  not  this,  sir,  a  fair  representation  of  the  powers  of 
Congress  ?  Their  operations  are  of  no  validity,  when 
counteracted  by  the  states.  Their  authority  to  re 
commend  is  a  mere  mockery  of  government. 

But  the  amendability  of  the  confederation  seems  to 
have  great  weight  on  the  minds  of  some  gentlemen. 
To  what  point  will  the  amendments  go  ?  What  part 
makes  the  most  important  figure?  What  part  de 
serves  to  be  retained  ?  In  it,  one  body  has  the  legisla 
tive,  executive  and  judicial  powers  :  but  the  want  of 
efficient  powers  has  prevented  the  dangers  naturally 
consequent  on  the  union  of  these.  Is  this  union  con 
sistent  with  an  augmentation  of  their  power  ?  Will 
you  then  amend  it,  by  taking  away  one  of  these  three 
powers?  Suppose,  for  instance,  you  only  vested  it 
with  the  legislative  and  executive  powers,  without  any 
control  on  the  judiciary,  what  must  be  the  result  ? 
Are  we  not  taught  by  reason,  experience  and  govern 
mental  history,  that  tyranny  is  the  natural  and  certain 
consequence  of  uniting  these  two  powers,  or  the  le 
gislative  and  judicial  powers,  exclusively,  in  the  same 
body  ?  If  any  one  denies  it,  I  shall  pass  by  him,  as  an 
infidel  not  to  be  reclaimed.  Wherever  any  two  of 
these  three  powers,  are  vested  in  one  single  body,  they 
must,  at  one  time  or  other,  terminate  in  the  destruc 
tion  of  liberty.  In  the  most  important  cases,  the  as 
sent  of  nine  states  is  necessary  to  pass  a  law :  this  is 
too  great  a  restriction,  and  whatever  good  conse- 


THE   FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

quences  it  may,  in  some  cases,  produce,  yet  it  will 
prevent  energy  in  many  other  cases ;  it  will  prevent 
energy,  which  is  most  necessary  on  some  emergencies, 
even  in  cases  wherein  the  existence  of  the  community 
depends  on  vigor  and  expedition.  It  is  incompatible 
with  that  secrecy,  which  is  the  life  of  execution  and 
dispatch.  Did  ever  thirty  or  forty  men  retain  a  se 
cret?  Without  secrecy,  no  government  can  carry  on 
its  operations,  on  great  occasions  :  this  is  what  gives 
that  superiority  in  action  to  the  government  of  one. 
If  any  thing  were  wanting  to  complete  this  farce,  it 
would  be,  that  a  resolution  of  the  assembly  of  Vir 
ginia,  and  the  other  legislatures,  should  be  necessary 
to  confirm  and  render  of  any  validity,  the  congression 
al  acts :  this  would  openly  discover  the  debility  of  the 
general  government  to  all  the  world.  But,  in  fact,  its 
imbecility  is  now  nearly  the  same,  as  if  such  acts  were 
formally  requisite.  An  act  of  the  assembly  of  Vir 
ginia,  controverting  a  resolution  of  Congress,  would 
certainly  prevail.  1  therefore  conclude,  that  the  con 
federation  is  too  defective  to  deserve  correction.  Let 
us  take  farewell  of  it,  with  reverential  respect,  as  an 
old  benefactor.  It  is  gone,  whether  this  house  says 
so,  or  not.  It  is  gone,  sir,  by  its  own  weakness. 

I  am  afraid  I  have  tired  the  patience  of  this  house ; 
but  I  trust  you  will  pardon  me,  as  I  was  urged  by  the 
importunity  of  the  gentleman,  in  calling  for  the  reasons 
of  laying  the  ground  work  of  this  plan.  It  is  objected 
by  the  honorable  gentleman  over  the  way,  (Mr. 
George  Mason,)  that  a  republican  government  is  im 
practicable  in  an  extensive  territory,  and  the  extent  of 
the  United  States  is  urged,  as  a  reason,  for  the  rejec 
tion  of  this  constitution.  Let  us  consider  the  defini 
tion  of  a  republican  government,  as  laid  down  by  a 
man  who  is  highly  esteemed.  Montesquieu,  so  cele 
brated  among  politicians,  says,  "  that  a  republican 
government  is  that,  in  which  the  body,  or  only  a  part 
of  the  people,  is  possessed  of  the  supreme  power ;  a 
monarchical,  that  in  which  a  single  person  governs, 


126  MR.  RANDOLPH'S  SPEECH  ON 

by  fixed  and  established  laws ;  a  despotic  government, 
that  in  which  a  single  person,  without  law,  and  with 
out  rule,  directs  every  thing,  by  his  own  will  arid  ca 
price."  This  author  has  not  distinguished  a  republi 
can  government  from  a  monarchy,  by  the  extent  of  its 
boundaries,  but  by  the  nature  of  its  principles.  He,  in 
another  place,  contradistinguishes  it,  as  a  government 
of  laws,  in  opposition  to  others,  which  he  denominates 
a  government  of  men.  The  empire,  or  government  of 
laws,  according  to  that  phrase,  is  that,  in  which  the 
laws  are  made  with  the  free  will  of  the  people;  hence 
then,  if  laws  be  made  by  the  assent  of  the  people,  the 
government  may  be  deemed  free.  When  laws  are 
made  with  integrity,  and  executed  with  wisdom,  the 
question  is,  whether  a  great  extent  of  country  will  tend 
to  abridge  the  liberty  of  the  people.  If  defensive  force 
be  necessary,  in  proportion  to  the  extent  of  country,  I 
conceive  that,  in  a  judiciously  constructed  government, 
be  the  country  ever  so  extensive,  its  inhabitants  will  be 
proportionably  numerous,  and  able  to  defend  it.  Ex 
tent  of  country,  in  my  conception,  ought  to  be  no  bar 
to  the  adoption  of  a  good  government.  No  extent  on 
earth  seems  to  me  too  great,  provided  the  laws  be 
wisely  made  and  executed.  The  principles  of  repre 
sentation  and  responsibility,  may  pervade  a  large,  as 
well  as  a  small  territory :  and  tyranny  is  as  easily  in 
troduced  into  a  small,  as  into  a  large  district.  If  it 
be  answered,  that  some  of  the  most  illustrious  and  dis 
tinguished  authors,  are  of  a  contrary  opinion,  I  reply, 
that  authority  has  no  weight  with  me,  till  I  am  con 
vinced — that  not  the  dignity  of  names,  but  the  force 
of  reasoning,  gains  my  assent. 

I  intended  to  have  shown  the  nature  of  the  powers 
which  ought  to  have  been  given  to  the  general  gov 
ernment,  and  the  reason  of  investing  it  with  the  pow 
er  of  taxation,  but  this  would  require  more  time  than 
my  strength,  or  the  patience  of  the  committee,  would 
now  admit  of.  I  shall  conclude  with  a  few  observa 
tions,  which  come  from  my  heart.  I  have  labored  for 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  J27 

the  continuance  of  the  union — the  rock  of  our  salva 
tion.  I  believe,  that  as  sure  as  there  is  a  God  in 
Heaven,  our  safety,  our  political  happiness  and  ex 
istence,  depend  on  the  union  of  the  states ;  and,  that 
without  this  union,  the  people  of  this  and  the  other 
states,  will  undergo  the  unspeakable  calamities,  which 
discord,  faction,  turbulence,  war  and  bloodshed,  have 
produced  in  other  countries.  The  American  spirit 
ought  to  be  mixed  with  American  pride — pride  to  see 
the  union  magnificently  triumph.  Let  that  glorious 
pride,  which  once  defied  the  British  thunder,  reani 
mate  you  again.  Let  it  not  be  recorded  of  Ameri 
cans,  that,  after  having  performed  the  most  gallant  ex 
ploits,  after  having  overcome  the  most  astonishing  dif 
ficulties,  and  after  having  gained  the  admiration  of 
the  world  by  their  incomparable  valor  and  policy, 
they  lost  their  acquired  reputation,  their  national  con 
sequence  and  happiness,  by  their  own  indiscretion. 
Let  no  future  historian  inform  posterity,  that  they 
wanted  wisdom  and  virtue,  to  concur  in  any  regular, 
efficient  government.  Should  any  writer,  doomed  to 
so  disagreeable  a  task,  feel  the  indignation  of  an  honest 
historian,  he  would  reprehend  and  recriminate  our  fol 
ly,  with  equal  severity  and  justice.  Catch  the  pre 
sent  moment,  seize  it  with  avidity  and  eagerness,  for 
it  may  be  lost,  never  to  be  regained.  If  the  union  be 
n  ow  lost.  I  fear  it  will  remain  so  forever.  I  believe  gen 
tlemen  are  sine  ere  in  their  opposition,  and  actuated  by 
pure  motives :  but  when  I  maturely  weigh  the  advan 
tages  of  theun'on,  and  dreadful  consequences  of  its 
dissolution ;  when  I  see  safety  on  my  right,  and  de 
struction  on  my  left ;  when  I  behold  respectability  and 
happiness  acquired  by  the  one,  but  annihilated  by  the 
other,  I  cannot  hesitate  to  decide  in  favor  of  the  for 
mer.  I  hope  my  weakness,  from  speaking  .so  long, 
will. apologize  for  my  leaving  this  subject  in  so  mutilat 
ed  a  condition.  If  a  further  explanation  be  desired,  I 
shall  take  the  liberty  to  enter  into  it  more  fully  another 
time. 


SPEECH  OF  JAMES  MADISON, 

ON    THE    EXPEDIENCY   OP    ADOPTING     THE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 
DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  JUNE, 


MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

IN  what  I  am  about  to  otter  to  this  assembly,  1  shall 
not  attempt  to  make  impressions  by  any  ardent  pro 
fessions  of  zeal  for  the  public  welfare :  we  know  that 
the  principles  of  every  man  will  be,  and  ought  to  be 
judged,  not  by  his  professions  and  declarations,  but  by 
his  conduct.  By  that  criterion,  I  wish,  in  common 
with  every  other  member,  to  be  judged;  and  even 
though  it  should  prove  unfavorable  to  my  reputation, 
yet  it  is  a  criterion  from  which  I  by  no  means  would 
depart,  nor  could  if  I  would.  Comparisons  have  been 
made  between  the  friends  of  this  constitution,  and 
those  who  oppose  it.  Although  I  disapprove  of  such 
comparisons,  I  trust,  that  in  every  thing  that  regards 
truth,  honor,  candor  and  rectitude  of  motives,  the 
friends  of  this  system,  here,  and  in  other  states,  are 
not  inferior  to  its  opponents.  But  professions  of  at 
tachment  to  the  public  good,  and  comparisons  of  par 
ties,  at  all  times  invidious,  ought  not  to  govern  or  in 
fluence  us  now.  We  ought,  sir,  to  examine  the  con 
stitution  exclusively  on  its  own  merits.  We  ought  to 
inquire  whether  it  will  promote  the  public  happiness  : 
and  its  aptitude  to  produce  that  desirable  object, 
ought  to  be  the  exclusive  subject  of  our  researches. 


MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH,  &c. 

In  this  pursuit,  we  ought  to  address  our  arguments  not 
to  the  feelings  and  passions,  but  to  those  understand 
ings  and  judgments  which  have  been  selected,  by  the 
people  of  this  country,  to  decide  that  great  question, 
by  a  calm  and  rational  investigation.  I  hope  that 
gentlemen,  in  displaying  their  abilities  on  this  occa 
sion,  will,  instead  of  giving  opinions  and  making  as 
sertions,  condescend  to  prove  and  demonstrate,  by 
fair  and  regular  discussion.  It  gives  me  pain  to  hear 
gentlemen  continually  distorting  the  natural  construc 
tion  of  language.  Assuredly,  it  is  sufficient  if  any  hu 
man  production  can  stand  a  fair  discussion.  Before  I 
proceed  to  make  some  additions  to  the  reasons  which 
have  been  adduced  by  my  honorable  friend  over  the 
way,  I  must  take  the  liberty  to  make  some  observa 
tions  on  what  was  said  by  another  gentleman,  (Mr. 
Henry.)  He  told  us,  that  this  constitution  ought  to 
be  rejected,  because,  in  his  opinion,  it  endangered  the 
public  liberty,  in  many  instances.  Give  me  leave  to 
make  one  answer  to  that  observation — let  the  dangers 
with  which  this  system  is  supposed  to  be  replete,  be 
clearly  pointed  out.  If  any  dangerous  and  unnecessa 
ry  powers  be  given  to  the  general  legislature,  let  them 
be  plainly  demonstrated,  and  let  us  not  rest  satisfied 
with  general  assertions  of  dangers,  without  proof — 
without  examination.  If  powers  be  necessary,  appa 
rent  danger  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  against  conced 
ing  them.  He  has  suggested,  that  licentiousness  has 
seldom  produced  the  loss  of  liberty ;  but  that  the  ty 
ranny  of  rulers  has  almost  always  effected  it.  Since 
the  general  civilization  of  mankind,  I  believe  there 
are  more  instances  of  the  abridgment  of  the  freedom 
of  the  people,  by  gradual  and  silent  encroachments  of 
those  in  power,  than  by  violent  and  sudden  usurpa 
tions  :  but  on  a  candid  examination  of  history,  we  shall 
find  that  turbulence,  violence  and  abuse  of  power,  by 
the  majority  trampling  on  the  rights  of  the  minority, 
have  produced  factions  and  commotions,  which,  in 
republics,  have  more  frequently  than  any  other  cause. 
VOL.  i.  17 


130  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH    ON 

produced  despotism.  If  we  go  over  the  whole  history 
of  ancient  and  modern  republics,  we  shall  find  their 
destruction  to  have  generally  resulted  from  those 
causes.  If  we  consider  the  peculiar  situation  of  the 
United  States,  and  go  to  the  sources  of  that  diversity 
of  sentiment  which  pervades  its  inhabitants,  we  shall 
find  great  danger  to  fear,  that  the  same  causes  may 
terminate  here,  in  the  same  fatal  effects,  which  they 
produced  in  those  republics.  This  danger  ought  to 
be  wisely  guarded  against.  In  the  progress  of  this 
discussion,  it  will  perhaps  appear,  ihat  the  only  pos 
sible  remedy  for  those  evils,  and  the  only  certain 
means  of  preserving  and  protecting  the  principles  of 
republicanism,  will  be  found  in  that  very  system  which 
is  now  exclaimed  against  as  the  parent  of  oppression. 
I  must  confess,  that  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  his 
usual  consistency,  in  the  gentleman's  arguments  on 
this  occasion.  He  informs  us  that  the  people  of  this 
country  are  at  perfect  repose ;  that  every  man  enjoys 
the  fruits  of  his  labor,  peaceably  and  securely,  and 
that  every  thing  is  in  perfect  tranquillity  and  safety.  I 
wish  sincerely,  sir,  this  were  true.  But  if  this  be  real 
ly  their  situation,  why  has  every  state  acknowledged 
the  contrary?  Why  were  deputies  from  all  the  states 
sent  to  the  general  convention?  Why  have  com 
plaints  of  national  and  individual  distresses  been  e.cho- 
ed  and  re-echoed  throughout  the  continent  ?  Why 
has  our  general  government  been  so  shamefully  dis 
graced,  and  our  constitution  violated?  Wherefore 
have  laws  been  made  to  authorize  a  change,  and 
wherefore  are  we  now  assembled  here  ?  A  federal 
government  is  formed  for  the  protection  of  its  indivi 
dual  members.  Ours  was  itself  attacked  with  impu 
nity.  Its  authority  has  been  boldly  disobeyed  and 
openly  despised.  I  think  I  perceive  a  glaring  incon 
sistency  in  another  of  his  arguments.  He  complains 
of  this  constitution,  because  it  requires  the  con 
sent  of  at  least  three  fourths  of  the  states  to  intro 
duce  amendments,  which  shall  be  necessarv  for  the 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

happiness  of  the  people.  The  assent  of  so  many,  he 
considers  as  too  great  an  obstacle  to  the  admission  of 
salutary  amendments,  which  he  strongly  insists,  ought 
to  be  at  the  will  of  a  bare  majority,  and  we  hear 
this  argument,  at  the  very  moment  we  are  called  upon 
to  assign  reasons  for  proposing  a  constitution,  which 
puts  it  in  the  power  of  nine  states  to  abolish  the  pre 
sent  inadequate,  unsafe  and  pernicious  confederation ! 
In  the  first  case,  he  asserts,  that  a  majority  ought  to 
have  the  power  of  altering  the  government,  when  found 
to  be  inadequate  to  the  security  of  public  happiness. 
In  the  last  case,  he  affirms,  that  even  three  fourths  of 
the  community  have  not  a  right  to  alter  a  government, 
which  experience  has  proved  to  be  subversive  of  na 
tional  felicity ;  nay,  that  the  most  necessary  and  ur 
gent  alterations  cannot  be  made  without  the  absolute 
unanimity  of  all  the  states.  Does  not  the  thirteenth 
article  of  the  confederation  expressly  require,  that  no 
alteration  shall  be  made  without  the  unanimous  con 
sent  of  all  the  states  ?  Can  any  thing  in  theory  be  more 
perniciously  improvident  and  injudicious  than  this  sub 
mission  of  the  will  of  the  majority  to  the  most  trifling 
minority  ?  Have  not  experience  and  practice  actual 
ly  manifested  this  theoretical  inconvenience  to  be  ex 
tremely  impolitic  ?  Let  me  mention  one  fact,  which  I 
conceive  must  carry  conviction  to  the  mind  of  any 
one — the  smallest  state  in  the  union  has  obstructed 
every  attempt  to  reform  the  government;  that  little 
member  has  repeatedly  disobeyed  and  counteracted 
the  general  authority ;  nay,  has  even  supplied  the  ene 
mies  of  its  country  with  provisions.  Twelve  states  had 
agreed  to  certain  improvements  which  were  proposed, 
being  thought  absolutely  necessary  to  preserve  the 
existence  of  the  general  government ;  but  as  these  im 
provements,  though  really  indispensable,  could  not,  by 
the  confederation,  be  introduced  into  it  without  the  con 
sent  of  every  state,  the  refractory  dissent  of  that  little 
state  prevented  their  adoption.  The  inconveniences 
resulting  from  this  requisition,  of  unanimous  concur- 


J32  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

rence  in  alterations  of  the  confederation,  must  be 
known  to  every  member  in  this  convention ;  it  is 
therefore  needless  to  remind  them  of  them.  Is  it  not 
self-evident,  that  a  trifling  minority  ought  riot  to  bind 
the  majority  ?  Would  not  foreign  influence  be  exert 
ed  with  facility  over  a  small  minority  ?  Would  the  ho 
norable  gentleman  agree  to  continue  the  most  radi 
cal  defects  in  the  old  system,  because  the  petty  state 
of  Rhode  Island  would  not  agree  to  remove  them  ? 

He  next  objects  to  the  exclusive  legislation  over  the 
district  where  the  seat  of  the  government  may  be  fixed. 
Would  he  submit  that  the  representatives  of  this  state 
should  carry  on  their  deliberations  under  the  control 
of  any  one  member  of  the  union  ?  If  any  state  had  the 
power  of  legislation  over  the  place  where  Congress 
should  fix  the  general  government,  it  would  impair  the 
dignity,  and  hazard  the  safety  of  Congress.  If  the  safe 
ty  of  the  union  were  under  the  control  of  any  particu 
lar  state,  would  not  foreign  corruption  probably  prevail 
in  such  a  state,  to  induce  it  to  exert  its  controlling  in 
fluence  over  the  members  of  the  general  government  ? 
Gentlemen  cannot  have  forgotten  the  disgraceful  insult 
which  Congress  received  some  years  ago.  And,  sir, 
when  we  also  reflect,  that  the  previous  cession  of  par 
ticular  states  is  necessary,  before  Congress  can  legis 
late  exclusively  any  where,  we  must,  instead  of  being 
alarmed  at  this  part,  heartily  approve  of  it. 

But  the  honorable  member  sees  great  danger  in 
the  provision  concerning  the  militia.  Now,  sir,  this  I 
conceive  to  be  an  additional  security  to  our  liberties, 
without  diminishing  the  power  of  the  states,  in  any 
considerable  degree ;  it  appears  to  me  so  highly  ex 
pedient,  that  I  should  imagine  it  would  have  found  ad 
vocates  even  in  the  warmest  friends  of  the  present 
system.  The  authority  of  training  the  militia,  and 
appointing  the  officers,  is  reserved  to  the  states.  But 
Congress  ought  to  have  the  power  of  establishing  a 
uniform  system  of  discipline  throughout  the  states; 
and  to  provide  for  the  execution  of  the  laws,  suppress 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  133 

insurrections,  and  repel  invasions.  These  are  the  only 
cases  wherein  they  can  interfere  with  the  militia ;  and 
the  obvious  necessity  of  their  having  power  over  them 
in  these  cases,  must  flash  conviction  on  any  reflecting 
mind.  Without  uniformity  of  discipline,  military  bodies 
would  be  incapable  of  action :  without  a  general  con 
trolling  power  to  call  forth  the  strength  of  the  union, 
for  the  purpose  of  repelling  invasions,  the  country 
might  be  overrun,  and  conquered  by  foreign  ene 
mies.  Without  such  a  power  to  suppress  insurrec 
tions,  our  liberties  might  be  destroyed  by  intestine 
faction,  and  domestic  tyranny  be  established. 

The  honorable  member  then  told  us,  that  there 
was  no  instance  of  power  once  transferred,  being 
voluntarily  renounced.  Not  to  produce  European  ex 
amples,  which  may  probably  be  done  before  the  rising 
of  this  convention,  have  we  not  seen  already,  in  seven 
states,  (and  probably  in  an  eighth  state,)  legislatures 
surrendering  some  of  the  most  important  powers  they 
possessed  ?  But,  sir,  by  this  government,  powers  are 
not  given  to  any  particular  set  of  men — they  are  in 
the  hands  of  the  people — delegated  to  their  representa 
tives  chosen  for  short  terms ; — to  representatives  at 
all  times  responsible  to  the  people,  and  whose  situa 
tion  is  perfectly  similar  to  their  own : — as  long  as  this 
is  the  case,  we  have  no  danger  to  apprehend.  WThen 
the  gentleman  called  to  our  recollection  the  usual 
effects  of  the  concession  of  powers,  and  imputed  the 
loss  of  liberty  generally  to  open  tyranny,  I  wish  he  had 
gone  something  further.  Upon  a  review  of  history,  he 
would  have  found,  that  the  loss  of  liberty  very  often 
resulted  from  factions  and  divisions ;  from  local  consi 
derations,  which  eternally  lead  to  quarrels :  he  would 
have  found  internal  dissensions  to  have  more  frequently 
demolished  civil  liberty,  than  a  tenacious  disposition  in 
rulers  to  retain  any  stipulated  powers. 

[Here  Mr.  Madison  enumerated  the  various  means 
whereby  nations  had  lost  their  liberties.] 

The  power  of  raising  and  supporting  armies  is  ex- 


134  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

claimed  against,  as  dangerous  and  unnecessary.  I 
sincerely  wish,  sir,  that  there  were  no  necessity  for 
vesting  this  power  in  the  general  government.  But 
suppose  a  foreign  nation  should  declare  war  against 
the  United  States,  must  not  the  general  legislature 
have  the  power  of  defending  the  United  States  ? 
Ought  it  to  be  known  to  foreign  nations,  that  the  general 
government  of  the  United  States  of  America  has  no  pow 
er  to  raise  or  support  an  army,  even  in  the  utmost  dan 
ger,  when  attacked  by  external  enemies?  Would 
not  their  knowledge  of  such  a  circumstance  stimulate 
them  to  fall  upon  us  ?  If,  sir,  Congress  be  not  invested 
with  this  power,  any  great  nation,  prompted  by  ambi 
tion  or  avarice,  will  be  invited  by  our  weakness  to  at 
tack  us ;  and  such  an  attack,  by  disciplined  veterans, 
would  certainly  be  attended  with  success,  when  only 
opposed  by  irregular,  undisciplined  militia.  Whoever 
considers  the  peculiar  situation  of  this  country,  the 
multiplicity  of  its  excellent  inlets  and  harbors,  and  the 
uncommon  facility  of  attacking  it,  however  much 
he  may  regret  the  necessity  of  such  a  power,  cannot 
hesitate  a  moment  in  granting  it.  One  fact  may  eluci 
date  this  argument.  In  the  course  of  the  late  war, 
when  the  weak  parts  of  the  union  were  exposed,  and 
many  states  were  placed  in  the  most  deplorable  situa 
tion  by  the  enemy's  ravages,  the  assistance  of  foreign 
nations  was  thought  so  urgently  necessary  for  our 
protection,  that  the  relinquishment  of  territorial  advan 
tages  was  not  deemed  too  great  a  sacrifice  for  the 
acquisition  of  one  ally.  This  expedient  was  admitted 
with  great  reluctance  even  by  those  states  who  ex 
pected  most  advantages  from  it.  The  crisis,  how 
ever,  at  length  arrived,  when  it  was  judged  necessary 
for  the  salvation  of  this  country,  to  make  certain  ces 
sions  to  Spain ;  whether  wisely,  or  otherwise,  is  not 
for  me  to  say ;  but  the  fact  was,  that  instructions  were 
sent  to  our  representative  at  the  court  of  Spain,  to  em- 

Swer  him  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  that  purpose. 
>w  it  terminated  is  well  known.    This  fact  shows 

';•  ; 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  135 

the  extremities  to  which  nations  will  recur  in  cases  of 
imminent  danger,  and  demonstrates  the  necessity  of 
making  ourselves  more  respectable.  The  necessity 
of  making  dangerous  cessions,  and  of  applying  to  for 
eign  aid,  ought  to  be  provided  against. 

The  honorable  member  then  told  us,  that  there  are 
heart-burnings  in  the  states  that  have  assented  to  the 
new  constitution,  and  that  Virginia  may,  if  she  does 
not  come  into  the  measure,  continue  in  amicable  con 
federacy  with  those  adopting  states.  I  wish,  as  seldom 
as  possible,  to  contradict  the  assertions  of  gentlemen ; 
but  I  can  venture  to  affirm,  without  danger  of  being 
detected  in  an  error,  that  there  is  the  most  conclusive 
evidence  of  the  satisfaction  of  those  states  being  every 
day  augmented,  and  that,  in  that  state  where  it  was 
adopted  only  by  a  majority  of  nineteen,  there  is  not, 
at  this  time,  one  fifth  of  the  people  dissatisfied.  There 
are  some  reasons  which  induce  us  to  conclude,  that 
the  grounds  of  proselytism  extend  every  where ;  its 
principles  begin  to  be  better  understood ;  and  the  in 
flammatory  violence  wherewith  it  was  opposed  by  de 
signing,  illiberal  and  unthinking  minds,  begins  to  sub 
side.  I  will  not  enumerate  the  causes  from  which,  in 
my  conception,  the  heart-burnings  of  a  majority  of  its 
opposers  have  originated.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that  in  all 
cases,  they  were  founded  on  a  misconception  of  the 
nature  and  tendency  of  the  new  government.  Had  it 
been  candidly  examined  and  fairly  discussed,  I  believe, 
sir,  that  but  a  very  inconsiderable  minority  of  the  peo 
ple  of  the  United  States  would  at  any  time  have  op 
posed  it.  With  respect  to  the  Swiss  confederacy, 
which  the  honorable  gentleman  has  proposed  for  our 
example,  as  far  as  historical  authority  may  be  relied 
upon,  we  shall  find  their  government  quite  unworthy 
of  our  imitation.  I  am  sure  if  the  honorable  member 
had  sufficiently  considered  their  history  and  govern 
ment,  he  never  would  have  quoted  their  example  in 
this  place.  He  would  have  found,  that  instead  of  re 
specting  the  rights  of  mankind,  their  government,  (at 


136  MR.  MADISON- S  SPEECH  ON 

^ 
least  that  of  several  of  their  cantons,)  is  one  of  the 

vilest  aristocracies  that  ever  was  instituted.  The 
peasants  of  some  of  their  cantons  are  more  oppressed 
and  degraded  than  the  subjects  of  any  monarch  of 
Europe ;  nay,  almost  as  much  so,  as  those  of  any 
eastern  despot.  It  is  a  novelty  in  politics,  that  from 
the  worst  of  systems,  the  happiest  consequences  should 
arise.  For  it  is  their  aristocratical  rigor,  and  the  pe 
culiarity  of  their  situation,  that  have  so  long  supported 
their  union.  Without  the  closest  compressment,  dis 
memberment  would  unquestionably  ensue,  arid  their 
powerful,  ambitious  neighbors,  would  immediately 
avail  themselves  of  their  least  jarrings.  As  we  are 
not  circumstanced  like  them,  however,  no  conclusive 
precedent  can  be  drawn  from  their  situation.  I  trust, 
the  gentleman  does  not  carry  his  idea  so  far  as  to  re 
commend  a  separation  from  the  adopting  states.  This 
government  may  secure  our  happiness ;  this  is  at  least 
as  probable  as  that  it  shall  be  oppressive.  If  eight 
states  have,  from  a  persuasion  of  its  policy  and  utility, 
adopted  it,  shall  Virginia  shrink  from  it,  without  a  full 
conviction  of  its  danger  and  inutility  ?  I  hope  she 
will  never  shrink  from  any  duty :  I  trust  she  will  not 
determine  without  the  most  serious  reflection  and  de 
liberation. 

I  confess  to  you,  sir,  that  were  uniformity  of  religion 
to  be  introduced  by  this  system,  it  would,  in  my  opin 
ion,  be  ineligible ;  but  I  have  no  reason  to  conclude, 
that  uniformity  of  government  will  produce  that  of  re 
ligion.  To  the  great  honor  of  America,  that  right  is 
perfectly  free  and  unshackled  among  us.  The  gov 
ernment  has  no  jurisdiction  over  it ;  the  least  reflec 
tion  will  convince  us,  there  is  no  danger  to  be  feared 
on  that  ground. 

But  we  are  flattered  with  the  probability  of  obtain 
ing  previous  amendments.  This  point  calls  for  the 
most  serious  care  of  the  convention.  If  amendments 
are  to  be  proposed  by  one  state,  other  states  have  the 
same  right,  and  will  also  propose  alterations*  These 

v  -I' 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

cannot  but  be  dissimilar,  and  opposite  in  their  nature. 
I  beg  leave  to  remark,  that  the  governments  of  the 
different  states  are  in  many  respects  dissimilar  in  their 
structure ;  their  legislative  bodies  are  not  similar ; 
their  executives  are  still  more  different.  In  several  of 
the  states,  the  first  magistrate  is  elected  by  the  people 
at  large ;  in  others,  by  joint  ballot  of  the  members  of 
both  branches  of  the  legislature ;  and  in  others  again, 
in  other  different  manners.  This  dissimilarity  has  oc 
casioned  a  diversity  of  opinion  on  the  theory  of  gov 
ernment,  which  will,  without  many  reciprocal  conces 
sions,  render  a  concurrence  impossible.  Although 
the  appointment  of  an  executive  magistrate  has  not 
been  thought  destructive  to  the  principles  of  democra 
cy,  in  any  of  the  states,  yet,  in  the  course  of  the  de 
bate,  we  find  objections  made  to  the  federal  execu 
tive  :  it  is  urged  that  the  president  will  degenerate  into 
a  tyrant.  I  intended,  in  compliance  with  the  call  of 
the  honorable  member,  to  explain  the  reasons  of  pro 
posing  this  constitution,  and  develope  its  principles ; 
but  I  shall  postpone  my  remarks,  till  we  hear  the  sup 
plement  which  he  has  informed  us,  he  means  to  add  to 
what  he  has  already  offered. 

Give  me  leave  to  say  something  of  the  nature  of  the 
government,  and  to  show  that  it  is  perfectly  safe  and 
just,  to  vest  it  with  the  power  of  taxation.  There  are 
a  number  of  opinions ;  but  the  principal  question  is, 
whether  it  be  a  federal  or  a  consolidated  government. 
In  order  to  judge  properly  of  the  question  before  us, 
we  must  consider  it  minutely,  in  its  principal  parts.  I 
myself  conceive,  that  it  is  of  a  mixed  nature:  it  is,  in 
a  manner,  unprecedented.  We  cannot  find  one  ex 
press  prototype  in  the  experience  of  the  world:  it 
stands  by  itself.  In  some  respects,  it  is  a  government 
of  a  federal  nature :  in  others,  it  is  of  a  consolidated 
nature.  Even  if  we  attend  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  constitution  is  investigated,  ratified  and  made  the 
act  of  the  people  of  America,  I  can  say,  notwithstand 
ing  what  the  honorable  gentleman  has  alledged,  that 

VOL.  i.  18 


.J38  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

- 

this  government  is  not  completely  consolidated ;  nor 
is  it  entirely  federal.     Who  are  the  parties  to  it  ?    The 
people — not    the   people  as    composing    one    great 
body,  but  the  people  as  composing  thirteen  sovereign 
ties.     Were  it,  as  the  gentleman  asserts,  a  consoli 
dated  government,  the  assent  of  a  majority  of  the  peo 
ple  would  be  sufficient  for  its  establishment,  and  as  a 
majority  have  adopted  it  already,  the  remaining  states 
would  be  bound  by  the  act  of  the  majority,  even  if  they 
unanimously  reprobated  it.     Were  it  such  a  govern 
ment  as  is  suggested,  it  would  be  now  binding  on  the 
people  of  this  state,  without  having  had  the  privilege 
of  deliberating  upon  it ;  but,  sir,  no  state  is  bound  by 
it,  as  it  is,  without  its  own  consent.     Should  all  the 
states  adopt  it,  it  will  be  then  a  government  establish 
ed  by  the  thirteen  states  of  America,  not  through  the 
intervention  of  the  legislatures,  but  by  the  people  at 
large.   In  this  particular  respect,  the  distinction  between 
the  existing  and  proposed  governments,  is  very  mate 
rial.     The  existing  system  has  been  derived  from  the 
dependant,  derivative  authority  of  the  legislatures  of 
the  states ;  whereas  this  is  derived  from  the  superior 
power  of  the  people.     If  we  look  at  the  manner  in 
which  alterations  are  to  be  made  in  it,  the  same  idea 
is  in  some  degree  attended  to.     By  the  new  system,  a 
majority  of  the  states  cannot  introduce  amendments  ; 
nor  are  all  the  states  required  for  that  purpose ;  three 
fourths  of  them  must  concur  in  alterations;  in  this 
there  is  a  departure  from  the  federal  idea.     The  mem 
bers  to  the  national  house  of  representatives  are  to  be 
chosen  by  the  people  at  large,  in  proportion  to  the 
numbers  in  the  respective  districts.     When  we  come 
to  the  senate,  its  members  are  elected  by  the  states  in 
their  equal  and  political  capacity ;  but  had  the  gov 
ernment    been    completely  consolidated,  the  senate 
would  have  been  chosen  by  the  people,  in  their  indi 
vidual  capacity,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  members 
of  the  other  house.    Thus  it  is  of  a  complicated  na 
ture,  and  this  complication,  I  trust,  will  be  found  to 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTIONS .  j  39 

exclude  the  evils  of  absolute  consolidation,  as  well  as 
of  a  mere  confederacy.  If  Virginia  were  separated 
from  all  the  states,  her  power  and  authority  would 
extend  to  all  cases ;  in  like  manner,  were  all  powers 
vested  in  the  general  government,  it  would  be  a  con 
solidated  government :  but  the  powers  of  the  federal 
government  are  enumerated ;  it  can  only  operate  iu 
certain  cases :  it  has  legislative  powers  on  defined  and 
limited  objects,  beyond  which  it  cannot  extend  its  ju 
risdiction. 

But  the  honorable  member  has  satirized,  with  pe 
culiar  acrimony,  the  powers  given  to  the  general  gov 
ernment  by  this  constitution.  I  conceive  that  the  first 
question  on  this  subject  is,  whether  these  powers  be 
necessary ;  if  they  be,  we  are  reduced  to  the  dilemma 
of  either  submitting  to  the  inconvenience,  or  losing  the 
union.  Let  us  consider  the  most  important  of  these 
reprobated  powers ;  that  of  direct  taxation  is  most 
generally  objected  to.  With  respect  to  the  exigencies 
of  government,  there  is  no  question  but  the  most  easy 
mode  of.  providing  for  them  will  be  adopted.  When, 
therefore,  direct  taxes  are  not  necessary,  they  will  not 
be  recurred  to.  It  can  be  of  little  advantage  to  those 
in  power,  to  raise  money  in  a  manner  oppressive  to 
the  people.  To  consult  the  conveniences  of  the  peo 
ple,  will  cost  them  nothing,  and  in  many  respects  will 
be  advantageous  to  them.  Direct  taxes  will  only  be 
recurred  to  for  great  purposes.  What  has  brought  on 
other  nations  those  immense  debts,  under  the  pressure 
of  which  many  of  them  labor  ?  Not  the  expenses  of 
their  governments,  but  war.  If  this  country  should  be 
engaged  in  war,  (and  I  conceive  we  ought  to  provide 
for  the  possibility  of  such  a  case,)  how  would  it  be 
carried  on  ?  By  the  usual  means  provided  from  year 
to  year  ?  As  our  imports  will  be  necessary  for  the  ex 
penses  of  government,  and  other  common  exigencies, 
how  are  we  to  carry  on  the  means  of  defence  ?  How 
is  it  possible  a  war  could  be  supported  without  money 
or  credit  ?  And  would,  it  be  possible  for  government 


| 


140  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

to  have  credit,  without  having  the  power  of  raising 
money  ?  No,  it  would  be  impossible  for  any  govern 
ment,  in  such  a  case,  to  defend  itself.  Then,  I  say, 
sir,  that  it  is  necessary  to  establish  funds  for  extraordi 
nary  exigencies,  and  give  this  power  to  the  general 
government ;  for  the  utter  inutility  of  previous  requisi 
tions  on  the  states  is  too  well  known.  Would  it  be 
possible  for  those  countries,  whose  finances  and  reve 
nues  are  carried  to  the  highest  perfection,  to  carry  on 
the  operations  of  government  on  great  emergencies, 
such  as  the  maintenance  of  a  war,  without  an  uncon 
trolled  power  of  raising  money  ?  Has  it  not  been  ne 
cessary  for  Great  Britain,  notwithstanding  the  facility 
of  the  collection  of  her  taxes,  to  have  recourse  very 
often  to  this  and  other  extraordinary  methods  of  pro 
curing  money?  Would  not  her  public  credit  have 
been  ruined,  if  it  was  known  that  her  power  to  raise 
money  was  limited  ?  Has  not  France  been  obliged, 
on  great  occasions,  to  recur  to  unusual  means,  in  or 
der  to  raise  funds  ?  It  has  been  the  case  in  many 
countries,  and  no  government  can  exist,  unless  its 
powers  extend  to  make  provisions  for  every  contingen 
cy.  If  we  were  actually  attacked  by  a  powerful  na 
tion,  and  our  general  government  had  not  the  power 
of  raising  money,  but  depended  solely  on  requisitions, 
our  condition  would  be  truly  deplorable :  if  the  reve 
nues  of  this  commonwealth  were  to  depend  on  twenty 
distinct  authorities,  it  would  be  impossible  for  it  to 
carry  on  its  operations.  This  must  be  obvious  to 
every  member  here  :  I  think,  therefore,  that  it  is  ne 
cessary  for  the  preservation  of  the  union,  that  this 
power  should  be  given  to  the  general  government. 

But  it  is  urged,  that  its  consolidated  nature,  joined 
to  the  power  of  direct  taxation,  will  give  it  a  tendency 
to  destroy  all  subordinate  authority ;  that  its  increas 
ing  influence  will  speedily  enable  it  to  absorb  the  state 
governments.  I  cannot  bring  myself  to  think  that  this 
will  be  the  case.  If  the  general  government  were 
wholly  independent  of  the  governments  of  the  particu- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

lar  states,  then  indeed,  usurpation  might  be  expected 
to  the  fullest  extent :  but.  sir,  on  whom  does  this  gene 
ral  government  depend  ?  It  derives  its  authority  from 
these  governments,  and  from  the  same  sources  from 
which  their  authority  is  derived.  The  members  of  the 
federal  government  are  taken  from  the  same  men 
from  whom  those  of  the  state  legislatures  are  taken. 
If  we  consider  the  mode  in  which  the  federal  represen 
tatives  will  be  chosen,  we  shall  be  convinced,  that  the 
general  will  never  destroy  the  individual  governments ; 
and  this  conviction  must  be  strengthened  by  an  atten 
tion  to  the  construction  of  the  senate.  The  represen 
tatives  will  be  chosen,  probably  under  the  influence  of 
the  members  of  the  state  legislatures :  but  there  is  not 
the  least  probability  that  the  election  of  the  latter  will 
be  influenced  by  the  former.  One  hundred  and  sixty 
members  representing  this  commonwealth  in  one  branch 
of  the  legislature,  are  drawn  from  the  people  at  large, 
and  must  ever  possess  more  influence  than  the  few  men 
who  will  be  elected  to  the  general  legislature.  Those 
who  wish  to  become  federal  representatives,  must  de 
pend  on  their  credit  with  that  class  of  men  who  will  be 
the  most  popular  in  their  counties,  who  generally  rep 
resent  the  people  in  the  state  governments  :  they  can, 
therefore,  never  succeed  in  any  measure  contrary  to 
the  wishes  of  those  on  whom  they  depend.  So  that 
on  the  whole,  it  is  almost  certain,  that  the  deliberations 
of  the  members  of  the  federal  house  of  representatives, 
will  be  directed  to  the  interests  of  the  people  of  Ame 
rica.  As  to  the  other  branch,  the  senators  will  be  ap 
pointed  by  the  legislatures,  and  though  elected  for  six 
years,  I  do  not  conceive  they  will  so  soon  forget  the 
source  from  whence  they  derive  their  political  exist 
ence.  This  election  of  one  branch  of  the  federal,  by 
the  state  legislatures,  secures  an  absolute  dependence 
of  the  former  on  the  latter.  The  biennial  exclusion  of 
one  third,  will  lessen  the  facility  of  a  combination,  and 
preclude  all  likelihood  of  intrigues.  I  appeal  to  our 
past  experience,  whether  they  will  attend  to  the  inter- 


142  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

csts  of  their  constituent  states.  Have  not  those  gen 
tlemen  who  have  been  honored  with  seats  in  Con 
gress,  often  signalized  themselves  by  their  attachment 
to  their  states  ?  Sir,  I  pledge  myself  that  this  gov 
ernment  will  answer  the  expectations  of  its  friends,  and 
foil  the  apprehensions  of  its  enemies.  I  am  persuaded 
that  the  patriotism  of  the  people  will  continue,  and  be 
a  sufficient  guard  to  their  liberties,  and  that  the  ten 
dency  of  the  constitution  will  be,  that  the  state  gov 
ernments  will  counteract  the  general  interest,  and  ul 
timately  prevail.  The  number  of  the  representatives 
is  yet  sufficient  for  our  safety,  and  will  gradually  in 
crease  ;  and  if  we  consider  their  different  sources  of 
information,  the  number  will  not  appear  too  small. 

Sir,  that  part  of  the  proposed  constitution,  which 
gives  the  general  government  the  power  of  laying  and 
collecting  taxes,  is  indispensable  and  essential  to  the 
existence  of  any  efficient,  or  well  organized  system  of 
government :  if  we  consult  reason,  and  be  ruled  by  its 
dictates,  we  shall  find  its  justification  there  :  if  we  re 
view  the  experience  we  have  had,  or  contemplate  the 
history  of  nations,  there  too  we  shall  find  ample  rea 
sons  to  prove  its  expediency.  It  would  be  preposterous 
to  depend  for  necessary  supplies  on  a  body  which  is 
fully  possessed  of  the  power  of  withholding  them.  If 
a  government  depends  on  other  governments  for  its 
revenues ;  if  it  must  depend  on  the  voluntary  contribu 
tions  of  its  members,  its  existence  must  be  precarious. 
A  government  that  relies  on  thirteen  independent 
sovereignties,  for  the  means  of  its  existence,  is  a  solecism 
in  theory,  and  a  mere  nullity  in  practice.  Is  it  con 
sistent  with  reason,  that  such  a  government  can  pro 
mote  the  happiness  of  any  people  ?  It  is  subversive  of 
every  principle  of  sound  policy,  to  trust  the  safety  of  a 
community  with  a  government,  totally  destitute  of  the 
means  of  protecting  itself  or  its  members.  Can  Con 
gress,  after  the  repeated,  unequivocal  proofs  it  has  ex 
perienced  of  the  utter  inutility  and  inefficacy  of  requisi 
tions,  reasonably  expect,  that  they  would  be  hereafter 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  143 

effectual  or  productive  ?  Will  not  the  same  local  in 
terests,  and  other  causes,  militate  against  a  compli 
ance  ?  Whoever  hopes  the  contrary  must  forever  be 
disappointed.  The  effect,  sir,  cannot  be  changed 
without  a  removal  of  the  cause.  Let  each  county  in 
this  commonwealth  be  supposed  free  and  independent  : 
let  your  revenues  depend  on  requisitions  of  propor 
tionate  quotas  from  them :  let  application  be  made 
to  them  repeatedly,  and  then  ask  yourself,  is  it  to  be 
presumed  that  they  would  comply,  or  that  an  adequate 
collection  could  be  made  from  partial  compliances  ? 
It  is  now  difficult  to  collect  the  taxes  from  them  :  how 
much  would  that  difficulty  be  enhanced,  were  you  to 
depend  solely  on  their  generosity  ?  I  appeal  to  the 
reason  of  every  gentleman  here,  and  to  his  candor  to 
say  whether  he  is  not  persuaded,  that  the  present  con 
federation  is  as  feeble  as  the  government  of  Virginia 
would  be  in  that  case :  to  the  same  reason  I  appeal, 
whether  it  be  compatible  with  prudence  to  continue  a 
government  of  such  manifest  and  palpable  weakness 
and  inefficiency. 

If  we  recur  to  history,  and  review  the  annals  of  man 
kind,  I  undertake  to  say,  that  no  instance  can  be  pro 
duced  by  the  most  learned  man,  of  any  confederate 
government,  that  will  justify  a  continuation  of  the  pre 
sent  system ;  or  that  will  not,  on  the  contrary,  demon 
strate  the  necessity  of  this  change,  and  of  substituting 
to  the  present  pernicious  and  fatal  plan,  the  system 
now  under  consideration,  or  one  equally  energetic. 
The  uniform  conclusion  drawn  from  a  review  of  an 
cient  and  modern  confederacies,  is,  that  instead  of  pro 
moting  the  public  happiness,  or  securing  public  tran 
quillity,  they  have,  in  every  instance,  been  productive 
of  anarchy  and  confusion — ineffectual  for  the  preserva 
tion  of  harmony,  and  a  prey  to  their  own  dissensions 
and  foreign  invasions. 

The  Amphictyonic  league  resembled  our  confedera 
tion  in  its  nominal  powers  :  it  was  possessed  of  rather 
more  efficiency.  The  component  states  retained  their 


144  MR.   MADISON'S  SPEECH   ON 

sovereignty,  arid  enjoyed  an  equality  of  suffrage  in  the 
federal  council.  But  though  its  powers  were  more 
considerable  in  many  respects  than  those  of  our  pre 
sent  system,  yet  it  had  the  same  radical  defect.  Its 
powers  were  exercised  over  its  individual  members  in 
their  political  capacities.  To  this  capital  defect  it 
owed  its  disorders,  and  final  destruction.  It  was  com 
pelled  to  recur  to  the  sanguinary  coercion  of  war  to 
enforce  its  decrees.  The  struggles  consequent  on  a 
refusal  to  obey  a  decree,  and  an  attempt  to  enforce  it, 
produced  the  necessity  of  applying  to  foreign  assist 
ance  :  by  complying  with  that  application,  and  employ 
ing  his  wiles  and  intrigues,  Philip  of  Macedon  acquired 
sufficient  influence  to  become  a  member  of  the  league; 
and  that  artful  and  insidious  prince  soon  after  became 
master  of  their  liberties. 

The  Achaean  league,  though  better  constructed  than 
the  Amphictyonic,  in  material  respects,  was  continu 
ally  agitated  with  domestic  dissensions,  and  driven  to 
the  necessity  of  calling  in  foreign  aid ;  this  also  event 
uated  in  the  demolition  of  their  confederacy.  Had 
they  been  more  closely  united,  their  people  would 
have  been  happier;  and  their  united  wisdom  and 
strength  would  not  only  have  rendered  unnecessary  all 
foreign  interpositions  in  their  affairs,  but  would  have 
enabled  them  to  repel  the  attack  of  any  enemy.  If 
we  descend  to  more  modern  examples,  we  shall  find 
the  same  evils  resulting  from  the  same  sources. 

The  Germanic  system  is  neither  adequate  to  the 
external  defence,  or  internal  felicity  of  the  people ; 
the  doctrine  of  quotas  and  requisitions  flourishes  here. 
Without  energy — without  stability — the  empire  is  a 
nerveless  body.  The  most  furious  conflicts,  and  the 
most  implacable  animosities  between  its  members, 
strikingly  distinguish  its  history.  Concert  and  co-ope 
ration  are  incompatible  with  such  an  injudiciously 
constructed  system. 

The  republic  of  the  Swiss  is  sometimes  instanced 
for  its  stability ;  but  even  there,  dissensions  and  wars  of 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION,  14;, 

a  bloody  nature,  have  been  frequently  seen  between 
the  cantons.  A  peculiar  coincidence  of  circumstances 
contributes  to  the  continuance  of  their  political  con* 
nexion.  Their  feeble  association  owes  its  existence  to 
their  singular  situation.  There  is  a  schism  this  mo 
ment  in  their  confederacy,  which,  without  the  necessity 
of  uniting  for  their  external  defence,  would  immediately 
produce  its  dissolution. 

The  confederate  government  of  Holland  is  a  further 
confirmation  of  the  characteristic  imbecility  of  such 
governments.  From  the  history  of  this  government 
we  might  derive  lessons  of  the  most  important  utility. 

[Here  Mr.  Madison  quoted  sundry  passages  from 
De  Witt,  respecting  the  people  of  Holland,  and  the  war 
which  they  had  so  long  supported  against  the  Spanish 
monarch ;  showing  the  impolitic  and  injudicious  struc 
ture  of  their  confederacy;  that  it  was  entirely  desti 
tute  of  energy,  because  their  revenues  depended  chief 
ly  on  requisitions ;  that  during  that  long  war,  the  pro 
vinces  of  Guelderland  and  Overyssel  had  not  paid  their 
respective  quotas,  but  had  evaded  altogether  their 
payments ;  in  consequence  of  which,  two  sevenths  of 
the  resources  of  the  community  had  never  been 
brought  into  action;  nor  contributed  in  the  least  to 
wards  the  prosecution  of  the  war :  that  the  fear  of 
pressing  danger  stimulated  Holland  and  the  other  pro 
vinces  to  pay  all  the  charges  of  the  war :  that  those 
two  provinces  had  continued  their  delinquencies ;  that 
the  province  of  Holland  alone  paid  more  than  all  the 
rest;  still  those  provinces  which  paid  up  their  propor 
tional  shares,  claimed  from  the  failing  states  the 
amounts  of  their  arrearages  ;  that  the  most  fatal  con 
sequences  had  nearly  resulted  from  the  difficulty  of 
adjusting  those  claims,  and  from  the  extreme  aver 
sion  of  the  delinquent  states  to  discharge  even  their 
most  solemn  engagements:  that  there  are  existing 
controversies  between  the  provinces  on  this  account 
at  present ;  and  to  add  to  the  evils  consequent  upon 
requisitions,  that  unanimity  and  the  revision  and  sane- 

VOL.  i.  19 


31  It.    MADISON'S  SPEECH  O,\ 

tion  of  their  constituents,  were  necessary  to  give  va 
lidity  to  the  decisions  of  the  states  general.  He  then 
proceeded,] — Sir,  these  radical  defects  in  their  confe 
deracy  must  have  dissolved  their  association  long  ago, 
were  it  not  for  their  peculiar  position — circumscribed 
in  a  narrow  territory ;  surrounded  by  the  most  power 
ful  nations  in  the  world ;  possessing  peculiar  advan 
tages  from  their  situation;  an  extensive  navigation 
and  a  powerful  navy — advantages  which  it  was  clear 
ly  the  interest  of  those  nations  to  diminish  or  deprive 
them  of.  Their  late  unhappy  dissensions  were  mani 
festly  produced  by  the  vices  of  their  system.  We 
may  derive  much  benefit  from  the  experience  of  that 
unhappy  country.  Governments,  destitute  of  energy, 
will  always  produce  anarchy.  These  facts  are  worthy 
the  most  serious  consideration  of  every  gentleman 
here.  ^Poes  not  the  history  of  these  confederacies 
coincide  with  the  lessons  drawn  from  our  own  expe 
rience  ?  I  most  earnestly  pray  that  America  may 
have  sufficient  wisdom  to  avail  herself  of  the  instruc 
tive  information  she  may  derive  from  a  contemplation 
of  the  sources  of  their  misfortunes,  and  that  she  may 
escape  a  similar  fate,  by  avoiding  the  causes  from 
which  their  infelicity  sprung.  If  the  general  govern 
ment  is  to  depend  on  the  voluntary  contributions  of 
the  states  for  its  support,  dismemberment  of  the  Unit 
ed  States  may  be  the  consequence.  In  cases  of  immi 
nent  danger,  those  states  alone,  more  immediately  ex 
posed  to  it,  would  exert  themselves ;  those  remote 
from  it,  would  be  too  supine  to  interest  themselves 
warmly  in  the  fate  of  those  whose  distresses  they  did 
not  immediately  perceive.  The  general  government 
ought  therefore  to  be  armed  with  power  to  defend  the 
whole  union. 

Must  we  not  suppose,  that  those  parts  of  America 
which  are  most  exposed,  will  first  be  the  scenes  of 
war  ?  Those  nations,  whose  interest  is  incompatible 
with  an  extension  of  our  power,  and  who  are  jealous 
of  our  resources  to  become  powerful  and  wealthy. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  147 

must  naturally  be  inclined  to  exert  every  means  to 
prevent  our  becoming  formidable.  Will  they  not  be 
impelled  to  attack  the  most  exposed  parts  of  the  un 
ion  ?  Will  not  their  knowledge  of  the  weakness  of  our 
government  stimulate  them  the  more  readily  to  such 
an  attack  ?  Those  parts  to  which  relief  can  be  afford 
ed  with  most  difficulty,  are  the  extremities  of  the  coun 
try,  and  will  be  the  first  objects  of  our  enemies.  The 
general  government,  having  no  resources  beyond  what, 
are  adequate  to  its  existing  necessities,  will  not  be 
able  to  afford  any  effectual  succor  to  those  parts 
which  may  be  invaded. 

In  such  a  case,  America  must  perceive  the  danger 
and  folly  of  withholding  from  the  union,  a  power  suf 
ficient  to  protect  the  whole  territory  of  the  United 
States.  Such  an  attack  is  far  from  improbable,  and  if 
it  be  actually  made,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  a  possi 
bility  of  escaping  the  catastrophe  of  a  dismember 
ment.  On  this  subject  we  may  receive  an  estimable 
and  instructive  lesson,  from  an  American  confedera 
cy;  from  an  example  which  has  happened  in  our 
country,  and  which  applies  to  us  with  peculiar  force, 
being  most  analogous  to  our  situation.  I  mean  that 
species  of  association  or  union  which  subsisted  in 
New  England.  The  colonies  of  Massachusetts,  Bris 
tol,  Connecticut  and  New  Hampshire,  were  confede 
rated  together. 

The  object  of  that  confederacy  was  primarily  to  de* 
fend  themselves  against  the  inroads  and  depredation? 
of  the  Indians.  They  had  a  common  council,  consist 
ing  of  deputies  from  each  party,  with  an  equality  of 
suffrage  in  their  deliberations.  The  general  expendi 
tures  and  charges  were  to  be  adequately  defrayed. 
Its  powers  were  very  similar  to  those  of  the  confedera 
tion.  Its  history  proves  clearly,  that  a  government, 
founded  on  such  principles,  must  ever  disappoint  the 
hopes  of  those  who  expect  its  operations  to  be  condu 
cive  to  public  happiness. 

There  are  facts  on  record  to  prove,  that  instead  of 


148  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

answering  the  end  of  its  institution,  or  the  expectation 
of  its  framers,  it  was  violated  with  impunity ;  and  only 
regarded  when  it  coincided  perfectly  with  the  views 
and  immediate  interests  of  the  respective  parties. 

The  strongest  member  of  the  union  availed  itself  of 
its  circumstances  to  infringe  their  confederacy.  Mas 
sachusetts  refused  to  pay  its  quotas.  In  the  war  be 
tween  England  and  Holland,  it  was  found  particularly 
necessary  to  make  more  exertions  for  the  protection 
of  that  country. 

Massachusetts  being  then  more  powerful  and  less 
exposed  than  the  other  colonies,  refused  its  contribu 
tions  to  the  general  defence.  In  consequence  of  this, 
the  common  council  remonstrated  against  the  council  of 
Massachusetts.  This  altercation  terminated  in  the 
dissolution  of  their  union.  From  this  brief  account 
of  a  system  perfectly  resembling  our  present  one,  we 
may  easily  divine  the  inevitable  consequences  of  a 
longer  adherence  to  the  latter. 

[Mr.  Madison  then  recapitulated  many  instances  of 
the  prevalent  persuasion  of  the  wisest  patriots  of  the 
states,  that  the  safety  of  all  America  depended  on 
union ;  and  that  the  government  of  the  United  States 
must  be  possessed  of  an  adequate  degree  of  energy, 
or  that  otherwise  their  connexion  could  not  be  justly 
denominated  an  union.  He  likewise  enumerated  the 
expedients  that  had  been  attempted  by  the  people  of 
America  to  form  an  intimate  association,  from  the 
meeting  at  New  York  in  the  year  1754,  downwards : 
that  their  sentiments  on  this  subject  had  been  uniform, 
both  in  their  colonial  and  independent  conditions ; 
and  that  a  variety  of  causes  had  hitherto  prevented  the 
adoption  of  an  adequate  system.  He  then  continued 
thus,] 

If  we  take  experience  for  our  guide,  we  shall  find  still 
more  instructive  direction  on  this  subject.  The  weak 
ness  of  the  existing  articles  of  the  union,  showed  itself 
during  the  war.  It  has  manifested  itself  since  the  peace, 
f o  such  a  degree  as  can  leave  no  doubt  in  any  rational. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  149 

intelligent  and  unbiassed  mind,  of  the  necessity  of  an 
alteration :  nay,  this  necessity  is  obvious  to  all  America ; 
it  has  forced  itself  on  the  minds  of  the  people.  The  com 
mittee  has  been  informed,  that  the  confederation  was 
not  completed  till  the  year  1781,  when  a  great  portion 
of  the  war  was  ended ;  consequently  no  part  of  the 
merit  of  the  antecedent  operations  of  the  war  could 
justly  be  attributed  to  that  system.  Its  debility  was 
perceived  almost  as  soon  as  it  was  put  in  operation. 
A  recapitulation  of  the  proofs  which  have  been  expe 
rienced  of  its  inefficacy,  is  unnecessary.  It  is  most 
notorious,  that  feebleness  universally  marked  its  cha 
racter.  Shall  we  be  safe  in  another  war  in  the  same 
situation?  That  instrument  required  the  voluntary 
contributions  of  the  states,  and  thereby  sacrificed  some 
of  our  best  privileges.  The  most  intolerable  and  un 
warrantable  oppressions  were  committed  on  the  people 
during  the  late  war.  The  gross  enormity  of  those 
oppressions  might  have  produced  the  most  serious 
consequences,  were  it  not  for  the  spirit  of  liberty, 
which  preponderated  against  every  consideration. 

A  scene  of  injustice,  partiality  and  oppression,  may 
bring  heavenly  vengeance  on  any  people.  We  are 
now  by  our  sufferings,  expiating  the  crimes  of  the 
otherwise  glorious  revolution.  Is  it  not  known  to 
every  member  of  this  committee,  that  the  great  princi 
ples  of  a  free  government  were  reversed  through  the 
whole  progress  of  that  scene?  Was  not  every 
state  harassed  ?  Was  not  every  individual  oppressed 
and  subjected  to  repeated  distresses  ?  Was  this  right  ? 
Was  it  a  proper  form  of  government,  that  warranted, 
authorized,  or  overlooked,  the  most  wanton  violations 
of  property  ?  Had  the  government  been  vested  with 
complete  power  to  procure  a  regular  and  adequate 
supply  of  revenue,  those  oppressive  measures  would 
have  been  unnecessary.  But,  sir,  can  it  be  supposed 
that  a  repetition  of  such  measures  would  ever  be  ac 
quiesced  in  ?  Can  a  government,  that  stands  in  need  of 
such  measures,  secure  the  liberty,  or  promote  the  happi- 


J50  MK.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  OK 

ness  or  glory  of  any  country  ?  If  we  do  not  change 
this  system,  consequences  must  ensue  that  gentlemen 
do  not  now  apprehend.  If  other  testimony  were  neces 
sary,  I  might  appeal  to  that  which  I  am  sure  is  very 
weighty,  but  which  I  mention  with  reluctance.  At  the 
conclusion  of  the  war,  that  man  who  had  the  most  ex 
tensive  acquaintance  with  the  nature  of  the  country, 
who  well  understood  its  interests,  and  who  had  given 
the  most  unequivocal  and  most  brilliant  proofs  of  his 
attachment  to  its  welfare — when  he  laid  down  his 
arms,  wherewith  he  had  so  nobly  and  successfully  de 
fended  his  country,  publicly  testified  his  disapprobation 
of  the  present  system,  and  suggested  that  some  altera 
tion  was  necessary  to  render  it  adequate  to  the  securi 
ty  of  our  happiness.  I  did  not  introduce  that  great 
name  to  bias  any  gentleman  here.  Much  as  I  admire 
and  revere  the  man,  I  consider  these  members  as  not 
to  be  actuated  by  the  influence  of  any  man ;  but  I  in 
troduced  him  as  a  respectable  witness  to  prove  that  the 
articles  of  the  confederation  were  inadequate,  and  that 
we  must  resort  to  something  else.  His  modesty  did 
not  point  out  what  ought  to  be  done,  but  said,  that 
some  great  change  was  necessary.  But,  sir,  testimony, 
if  wished  for,  may  be  found  in  abundance,  and  numer 
ous  conclusive  reasons  may  be  urged  for  this  change. 
Experience  daily  produced  such  irresistible  proofs  of 
the  defects  of  that  system,  that  this  commonwealth 
was  induced  to  exert  her  influence  to  meliorate  it :  she 
began  that  noble  work,  in  which  I  hope  she  will  per 
sist  :  she  proposed  to  revise  it ;  her  proposition  met 
with  the  concurrence,  which  that  of  a  respectable  party 
will  always  meet.  I  am  sure  if  demonstration  were  ne 
cessary  on  the  part  of  this  commonwealth,  reasons  have 
been  abundantly  heard  in  the  course  of  this  debate, 
manifold  and  cogent  enough,  not  only  to  operate  con 
viction,  but  to  disgust  an  attentive  hearer.  Recollect 
the  resolution  of  the  year  1784.  It  was  then  found 
that  the  whole  burden  of  the  union  was  sustained  by 
a  few  states.  This  state  was  likely  to  be  saddled  with 


I'HK  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

a  very  disproportionate  share.  That  expedient  was 
proposed  to  ohviate  this  inconvenience,  which  has 
been  placed  in  its  true  light.  It  has  been  painted  in 
sufficient  horrors  by  the  honorable  gentleman  who 
spoke  last. 

I  agree  with  the  honorable  gentleman,  (Mr.  Henry,) 
that  national  splendor  and  glory  are  not  our  objects  : 
but  does  he  distinguish  between  what  will  render  us 
secure  and  happy  at  home,  and  what  will  render  us  re 
spectable  abroad  ?  If  we  be  free  and  happy  at  home, 
we  cannot  fail  to  be  respectable  abroad. 

The  confederation  is  so  notoriously  feeble,  that  for 
eign  nations  are  unwilling  to  form  any  treaties  with 
us ;  they  are  apprized  that  our  general  government 
cannot  perform  any  of  its  engagements  :  but,  that  they 
may  be  violated,  at  pleasure,  by  any  of  the  states.  Our 
violation  of  treaties  already  entered  into,  proves  this 
truth  unequivocally.  No  nation  will  therefore  make 
any  stipulations  with  Congress,  conceding  any  advan 
tages  of  importance  to  us ;  they  will  be  the  more 
averse  to  entering  into  engagements  with  us,  as  the  im 
becility  of  our  government  enables  them  to  derive 
many  advantages  from  our  trade,  without  granting  us 
any  return.  Were  this  country  united  by  proper  bands, 
in  addition  to  other  great  advantages,  we  could  form 
very  beneficial  treaties  with  foreign  states.  But  this 
can  never  happen  without  a  change  in  our  system. 
Were  we  not  laughed  at  by  the  minister  of  that  nation, 
from  which  we  may  be  able  yet  to  extort  some  of  the 
most  salutary  measures  for  this  country  ?  Were  we 
not  told  that  it  was  necessary  to  temporize  till  our 
government  acquired  consistency  ?  Will  any  nation 
relinquish  national  advantages  to  us  ?  You  will  be 
greatly  disappointed,  if  you  expect  any  such  good 
effects  from  this  contemptible  system.  Let  us  recollect 
our  conduct  to  that  country  from  which  we  have  re 
ceived  the  most  friendly  aid.  How  have  we  dealt  with 
that  benevolent  ally — France  ?  Have  we  complied  with 
our  most  sacred  obligations  to  that  nation  ?  Have  we 


152  MR.  MADISON'S   SPEECH  ON 

paid  the  interest  punctually  from  year  to  year  ?  Is  not 
the  interest  accumulating,  while  not  a  shilling  is  dis 
charged  of  the  principal  ?  The  magnanimity  and 
forbearance  of  that  friendly  monarch  are  so  great,  that 
he  has  called  upon  us  for  his  claims,  even  in  his  own 
distress  and  necessity.  This,  sir,  is  an  additional  mo 
tive  to  increase  our  exertions.  At  this  moment  of  time, 
a  very  considerable  amount  is  due  from  us  to  that 
country  and  to  others.  [Here  Mr.  Madison  mentioned 
the  amount  of  the  debts  due  to  different  foreign  na 
tions.]  We  have  been  obliged  to  borrow  money,  even 
to  pay  the  interest  of  our  debts.  This  is  a  ruinous  and 
most  disgraceful  expedient.  Is  this  a  situation  on  which 
America  can  rely  for  security  and  happiness?  How 
are  we  to  extricate  ourselves?  The  honorable  mem 
ber  tells  us,  we  might  rely  on  the  punctuality  and  friend 
ship  of  the  states,  and  that  they  will  discharge  their 
quotas  for  the  future  ;  but,  sir,  the  contributions  of  the 
states  have  been  found  inadequate  from  the  beginning, 
and  are  every  day  diminishing  instead  of  increasing. 
From  the  month  of  June,  1787,  till  June,  1788,  they 
have  only  paid  two  hundred  seventy  six  thousand  six 
hundred  and  forty  one  dollars  into  the  federal  treasury 
for  the  purposes  of  supporting  the  national  government, 
and  discharging  the  interest  of  the  national  debts :  a 
sum  so  very  insufficient,  that  it  must  greatly  alarm  the 
friends  of  their  country.  Suggestions  and  strong  as 
sertions  dissipate  before  these  facts. 

Sir,  the  subject  of  direct  taxation  is  perhaps  one  of 
the  most  important  that  can  engage  our  attention,  or 
that  can  be  involved  in  the  discussion  of  this  great  and 
momentous  question.  If  it  be  to  be  judged  by  the 
comments  made  upon  it,  by  the  opposers  and  favorers 
of  the  proposed  system,  it  requires  a  most  clear  and 
critical  investigation.  The  objections  against  the  ex 
ercise  of  this  power  by  the  general  government,  as  far 
as  I  am  able  to  comprehend  them,  are  founded  upon 
the  supposition  of  its  being  unnecessary,  impracticable, 
unsafe  and  accumulative  of  expense.  I  shall  therefore 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION,  153 

consider,  first,  how  far  it  may  be  necessary ;  secondly, 
how  far  it  may  be  practicable ;  thirdly,  how  far  it  may 
be  safe,  as  well  with  respect  to  the  public  liberty  at 
large,  as  to  the  state  legislatures ;  and  fourthly,  with 
respect  to  economy. 

First  then,  is  it  necessary  ?  I  must  acknowledge 
that  1  concur  in  opinion  with  those  gentlemen  who 
told  you,  that  this  branch  of  revenue  was  essential  to 
the  salvation  of  the  union.  It  appears  to  me  necessa 
ry,  in  order  to  secure  that  punctuality  which  is  requi 
site  in  revenue  matters.  Without  punctuality  indi 
viduals  will  refuse  it  that  confidence,  without  which  it 
cannot  get  resources.  I  beg  gentlemen  to  consider 
the  situation  of  this  country,  if  unhappily  the  govern 
ment  were  to  be  deprived  of  this  power.  Let  us  sup 
pose  for  a  moment  that  one  of  those  great  nations 
that  may  be  unfriendly  to  us,  should  take  advantage 
of  our  weakness,  which  they  will  be  more  ready  to  do 
when  they  know  the  want  of  this  resource  in  our  gov 
ernment,  and  should  attack  us,  what  forces  could  we 
oppose  tcT.it  ?  Could  we  find  safety  in  such  forces  as 
we  could  call  out  ?  Could  we  call  forth  a  sufficient 
number,  either  by  drafts,  or  in  any  other  way,  to 
repel  a  powerful  enemy  ?  The  inability  of  the  gov 
ernment  to  raise  and  support  regular  troops,  would 
compel  us  to  depend  on  militia.  It  would  then  be  ne 
cessary  to  give  this  power  to  the  government,  or  run 
the  risk  of  national  annihilation.  It  is  my  firm  belief, 
that  if  a  hostile  attack  were  made  this  moment  on  the 
United  States,  it  would  at  once  flash  conviction 
on  the  minds  of  the  citizens,  and  show  them,  to  their 
deep  regret,  the  necessity  of  vesting  the  govern 
ment  with  this  power,  which  alone  can  enable  it 
to  protect  the  community.  I  do  not  wish  to  frighten 
the  members  of  this  convention  into  a  concession  of 
this  power,  but  to  bring  to  their  minds  those  conside 
rations  which  demonstrate  its  necessity.  If  we  were 
secured  from  the  possibility,  or  the  probability  of  dan 
ger,  it  might  be  unnecessary.  I  shall  not  review  that 

VOL.  i  20 


154  MR.   MADISON'S   SPEECH  ON 

concourse  of  dangers  which  may  probably  arise  at  re 
mote  periods  of  futurity,  nor  all  those  which  we  have 
immediately  to  apprehend ;  for  this  would  lead  me  be 
yond  the  bounds  which  I  have  prescribed  to  myself, 
feut  I  will  mention  one  single  consideration,  drawn 
from  fact  itself.  I  hope  to  have  your  attention. 

By  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  his 
most  Christian  majesty,  among  other  things  it  is  stipu 
lated,  that  the  great  principle  on  which  the  armed 
neutrality  in  Europe  was  founded,  should  prevail  in 
case  of  future  wars.  The  principle  is  this,  that  free 
ships  shall  make  free  goods,  and  that  vessels  and 
goods  shall  be  both  free  from  condemnation.  Great 
Britain  did  not  recognize  it.  While  all  Europe  was 
against  her,  she  held  out  without  acceding  to  it.  It 
has  been  considered  for  some  time  past,  that  the 
flames  of  war,  already  kindled,  would  spread,  and  that 
France  and  England  were  likely  to  draw  those  swords 
which  were  so  recently  put  up.  This  is  judged 
probable.  We  should  not  be  surprised,  in  a  short 
time,  if  we  found  ourselves  as  a  neutral  nation — France 
being  on  one  side,  and  Great  Britain  on  the  other. 
Then,  what  would  be  the  situation  of  America  ?  She 
is  remote  from  Europe,  and  ought  not  to  engage  in  her 
politics  or  wars.  The  American  vessels,  if  they  can 
do  it  with  advantage,  may  carry  on  the  commerce  of 
the  contending  nations.  It  is  a  source  of  wealth  which 
we  ought  not  to  deny  to  our  citizens.  But,  sir,  is  there 
not  infinite  danger,  that  in  despite  of  all  our  caution, 
we  shall  be  drawn  into  the  war  ?  If  American  vessels 
have  French  property  on  board,  Great  Britain  will 
seize  them.  By  this  means,  we  shall  be  obliged  to  re 
linquish  the  advantage  of  a  neutral  nation,  or  be  en 
gaged  in  a  war.  A  neutral  nation  ought  to  be  respec 
table,  or  else  it  will  be  insulted  and  attacked.  Ame 
rica,  in  her  present  impotent  situation,  would  run  the 
risk  of  being  drawn  in,  as  a  party  in  the  war,  and  lose 
the  advantage  of  being  neutral.  Should  it  happen, 
that  the  British  fleet  should  be  superior,  have  we  not 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  155 

reason  to  conclude,  from  the  spirit  displayed  by  that 
nation  to  us  and  to  all  the  world,  that  we  should  be  in 
sulted  in  our  own  ports,  and  our  vessels  seized  ?  But 
if  we  be  in  a  respectable  situation ;  if  it  be  known  that 
our  government  can  command  the  whole  resources  of 
the  union,  we  shall  be  suffered  to  enjoy  the  great  ad 
vantages  of  carrying  on  the  commerce  of  the  nations 
at  war ;  for  none  of  them  would  be  willing  to  add  us 
to  the  number  of  their  enemies.  I  shall  say  no  more 
on  this  point,  there  being  others  which  merit  your  con 
sideration. 

The  expedient,  proposed  by  the  gentlemen  opposed 
to  this  clause,  is,  that  requisitions  shall  be  made,  and 
if  not  complied  with,  in  a  certain  time,  that  then  taxa 
tion  shall  be  recurred  to.  I  am  clearly  convinced, 
that  whenever  requisitions  shall  be  made,  they  will 
disappoint  those  who  put  their  trust  in  them.  One 
reason  to  prevent  the  concurrent  exertions  of  all  the 
states,  will  arise  from  the  suspicion,  in  some  states,  of 
delinquency  in  others.  States  will  be  governed  by  the 
motives  that  actuate  individuals. 

When  a  tax  law  is  in  operation,  in  a  particular  state, 
every  citizen,  if  he  knows  of  the  energy  of  the  laws  to 
enforce  payment,  and  that  every  other  citizen  is  per 
forming  his  duty,  will  cheerfully  discharge  his  duty; 
but  were  it  known,  that  the  citizens  of  one  district 
were  not  performing  their  duty,  and  that  it  was  left  to 
the  policy  of  the  government  to  make  them  come  up 
with  it,  the  citizens  of  the  other  districts  would  be 
very  supine  and  careless  in  making  provisions  for  pay 
ment.  Our  own  experience  makes  the  illustration 
more  natural.  If  requisitions  be  made  on  thirteen  dif 
ferent  states,  when  one  deliberates  on  the  subject,  she 
will  know  that  all  the  rest  will  deliberate  upon  it  also. 
This,  sir,  has  been  a  principal  cause  of  the  inefficacy 
of  requisitions  heretofore,  and  will  hereafter  produce 
the  same  evil.  If  the  legislatures  are  to  deliberate  on  this 
subject,  (and  the  honorable  gentleman  opposed  to  this 
clause,  thinks  their  deliberation  necessary,)  is  it  not 


J56  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

presumable,  that  they  will  consider  peculiar  local  cir 
cumstances  ?  In  the  general  council,  on  the  contrary, 
the  sense  of  all  America  will  be  drawn  to  a  single 
point.  The  collective  interest  of  the  union  at  large, 
will  be  known  and  pursued.  No  local  views  will  be 
permitted  to  operate  against  the  general  welfare. 
But  when  propositions  should  come  before  a  particu 
lar  state,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe,  that  qualifica 
tions  of  the  requisitions  would  be  proposed;  compli 
ance  might  be  promised,  and  some  instant  remittances 
might  be  made.  This  will  cause  delays,  which,  in  the 
first  instance,  will  produce  disappointment,  and  pro 
duce  failures  every  where  else.  This,  I  hope,  will  be 
considered  with  the  attention  it  deserves.  The 
public  creditors  will  be  disappointed,  and  of  course, 
become  more  pressing.  Requisitions  will  be  made  for 
purposes  equally  pervading  all  America ;  but  the  ex 
ertions  to  make  compliances,  will  probably  not  be  uni 
form  in  the  states.  If  requisitions  be  made  for  future 
occasions  for  putting  the  states  in  a  condition  of  military 
defence,  or  to  repel  an  invasion,  will  the  exertions  be 
uniform  and  equal  in  all  the  states  ?  Some  parts  of 
the  United  States  are  more  exposed  than  others.  Will 
the  least  exposed  states  exert  themselves  equally? 
We  know  that  the  most  exposed  will  be  more  immedi 
ately  interested,  and  will  incur  less  sacrifices  in  making 
exertions.  I  beg  gentlemen  to  consider,  that  this  ar 
gument  will  apply  with  most  effect  to  the  states  which 
are  most  defenceless  and  exposed.  The  southern 
states  are  most  exposed,  whether  we  consider  their 
situation,  or  the  smallness  of  their  population.  And 
there  are  other  circumstances  which  render  them  still 
more  vulnerable,  which  do  not  apply  to  the  northern 
states.  They  are  therefore  more  interested  in  giving 
the  government  a  power  to  command  the  whole 
strength  of  the  union  in  cases  of  emergency.  Do  not 
gentlemen  conceive  that  this  mode  of  obtaining  sup 
plies  from  the  states,  will  keep  alive  animosities  be 
tween  the  general  government  and  particular  states  ? 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  157 

Where  the  chances  of  failures  are  so  numerous  as 
thirteen,  by  the  thirteen  states,  disappointment,  in  the 
first  place,  and  consequent  animosity,  must  inevitably 
take  place. 

Let  us  consider  the  alternatives,  proposed  by  gen 
tlemen,  instead  of  the  power  of  laying  direct  taxes. 
After  the  states  shall  have  refused  to  comply,  weigh 
the  consequences  of  the  exercise  of  this  power  by  Con 
gress.  When  it  comes  in  the  form  of  a  punishment, 
great  clamors  will  be  raised  among  the  people  against 
the  government ;  hatred  will  be  excited  against  it.  It 
will  be  regarded  as  an  ignominious  stigma  on  the 
state.  It  will  be  considered  at  least  in  this  light  by 
the  state  where  the  failure  is  made,  and  these  senti 
ments  will,  no  doubt,  be  diffused  through  the  other 
states.  Now  let  us  consider  the  effect,  if  collectors 
are  sent  where  the  state  governments  refuse  to  com 
ply  with  requisitions.  It  is  too  much  the  disposition 
of  mankind  not  to  stop  at  one  violation  of  duty.  I 
conceive  that  every  requisition  that  will  be  made  on 
any  part  of  America,  will  kindle  a  contention  between 
the  delinquent  member,  and  the  general  government. 
Is  there  no  reason  to  suppose  divisions  in  the  govern 
ment  (for  seldom  does  any  thing  pass  with  unanimity,) 
on  the  subject  of  requisitions  ?  The  parts  least  ex 
posed  will  oppose  those  measures  which  may  be 
adopted  for  the  defence  of  the  weakest  parts.  Is  there 
no  reason  to  presume,  that  the  representatives  from 
the  delinquent  states  will  be  more  likely  to  foster  diso 
bedience  to  the  requisitions  of  the  government,  than  to 
endeavor  to  recommend  a  compliance  with  them  to 
the  public  ? 

There  is,  in  my  opinion,  another  point  of  view  in 
which  this  alternative  will  produce  great  evil.  I  will 
suppose  a  case  that  is  very  probable,  namely,  that  par 
tial  compliances  will  be  made.  A  difficulty  here 
arises,  which  fully  demonstrates  its  impolicy.  If  a 
part  be  paid,  and  the  rest  be  withheld,  how  is  the  ge 
neral  government  to  proceed  ?  They  are  to  impose  a 


158  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

tax,  but  how  shall  it  be  done  in  this  case  ?  Are  they 
to  impose  it  by  way  of  punishment,  on  those  who  have 
paid,  as  well  as  those  who  have  not  ?  All  these  con 
siderations  taken  into  view,  (for  they  are  not  visionary 
or  fanciful  speculations,)  will  certainly  produce  this 
consequence.  The  general  government,  to  avoid 
those  disappointments  first  described,  and  to  avoid 
the  contentions  and  embarrassments  which  I  have  last 
described,  will,  in  all  probability,  throw  the  public 
burdens  on  those  branches  of  revenue  that  will  be 
more  in  their  power.  They  will  be  continually  ne 
cessitated  to  augment  the  imposts.  If  we  throw  a  dis 
proportion  of  the  burdens  on  that  side,  shall  we  not 
discourage  commerce,  and  suffer  many  political  evils  ? 
Shall  we  not  increase  that  disproportion  on  the  south 
ern  states,  which  for  some  time  will  operate  against 
us  ?  The  southern  states,  from  having  fewer  manu 
factures,  will  import  and  consume  more.  They  will 
therefore  pay  more  of  the  imposts.  The  more  com 
merce  is  burdened,  the  more  the  disproportion  will 
operate  against  them.  If  direct  taxation  be  mixed 
with  other  taxes,  it  will  be  in  the  power  of  the  general 
government  to  lessen  that  inequality.  But  this  in 
equality  will  be  increased  to  the  utmost  extent,  if  the 
general  government  have  not  this  power.  There  is 
another  point  of  view  in  which  this  subject  affords  us 
instruction.  The  imports  will  decrease  in  time  of 
war.  An  honorable  gentleman  has  said,  that  the  im 
posts  would  be  so  productive  that  there  would  be  no 
occasion  for  laying  taxes.  I  will  submit  two  observa 
tions  to  him  and  to  the  committee.  First,  in  time  of 
war  the  imposts  will  be  less ;  and,  as  I  hope  we  are 
considering  a  government  for  a  perpetual  duration, 
we  ought  to  provide  for  every  future  contingency.  At 
present,  our  importations  bear  a  full  proportion  to  the 
full  amount  of  our  sales,  and  to  the  number  of  our  in 
habitants  ;  but  when  we  have  inhabitants  enough,  our 
imports  will  decrease ;  and  as  the  national  demands 
will  increase  with  our  population,  our  resources  will 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  159 

increase  as  our  wants  increase.  The  other  conside 
ration,  which  I  will  submit  on  this  part  of  the  subject, 
is  this.  I  believe  it  will  be  found  in  practice,  that 
those  who  fix  the  public  burdens,  will  feel  a  greater 
degree  of  responsibility  when  they  are  to  impose  them 
on  the  citizens  immediately,  than  if  "they  were  to  say 
what  sum  should  be  paid  by  the  states.  If  they  ex 
ceed  the  limits  of  propriety,  universal  discontent  and 
clamor  will  arise.  Let  us  suppose  they  were  to  col 
lect  the  taxes  from  the  citizens  of  America ;  would 
they  not  consider  their  circumstances  ?  Would  they 
not  attentively  weigh  what  could  be  done  by  the  citi 
zens  at  large  ?  Were  they  to  exceed  in  their  demands, 
what  were  reasonable  burdens,  the  people  would  im 
pute  it  to  the  right  source,  and  look  on  the  imposefs 
as  odious. 

When  I  consider  the  nature  of  the  various  objections 
brought  against  this  clause,  I  should  be  led  to  think, 
that  the  difficulties  were  such  that  gentlemen  would 
not  be  able  to  get  over  them,  and  that  the  power,  as 
defined  in  the  plan  of  the  convention,  was  impractica 
ble.  I  shall  trouble  them  with  a  few  observations  on 
that  point. 

It  has  been  said,  that  ten  men  deputed  from  this 
state,  and  others  in  proportion  from  other  states,  will 
not  be  able  to  adjust  direct  taxes  so  as  to  accommo 
date  the  various  citizens  in  thirteen  states. 

I  confess  I  do  not  see  the  force  of  this  observation. 
Could  not  ten  intelligent  men,  chosen  from  ten  districts 
from  this  state,  lay  direct  taxes  on  a  few  objects  in 
the  most  judicious  manner  ?  It  is  easily  to  be  con 
ceived,  that  they  would  be  acquainted  with  the  situa 
tion  of  the  different  citizens  of  this  country.  Can  any 
one  divide  this  state  into  any  ten  districts  so  as  not  to 
contain  men  of  sufficient  information  ?  Could  not  one 
man  of  knowledge  be  found  in  a  district  ?  When  thus 
selected,  will  they  not  be  able  to  carry  their  know 
ledge  into  the  general  council  ?  I  may  say  with  great 
propriety,  that  the  experience  of  our  own  legislature 


160  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

demonstrates  the  competency  of  Congress  to  lay  taxes 
wisely.  Our  assembly  consists  of  considerably  more 
than  a  hundred,  yet  from  the  nature  of  the  business,  it 
devolves  on  a  much  smaller  number.  It  is  through 
their  sanction,  approved  of  by  all  the  others.  It  will 
be  found  that  there  are  seldom  more  than  ten  men 
who  rise  to  high  information  on  this  subject.  Our  fe 
deral  representatives,  as  has  been  said  by  an  honora 
ble  member,  who  has  entered  into  the  subject  with  a 
great  deal  of  ability,  will  get  information  from  the 
state  governments.  They  will  be  perfectly  well  in 
formed  of  the  circumstances  of  the  people  of  the  dif 
ferent  states,  and  the  mode  of  taxation  that  would  be 
most  convenient  for  them,  from  the  laws  of  the  states. 
In  laying  taxes,  they  may  even  refer  to  the  state  sys 
tems  of  taxation.  Let  it  not  be  forgotten,  that  there 
is  a  probability,  that  that  ignorance,  which  is  com 
plained  of  in  some  parts  of  America,  will  be  continu 
ally  diminishing.  Let  us  compare  the  degree  of 
knowledge  which  the  people  had  in  time  past,  to  their 
present  information.  Does  not  our  own  experience 
teach  us,  that  the  people  are  better  informed  than  they 
were  a  few  years  ago?  The  citizen  of  Georgia 
knows  more  now  of  the  affairs  of  New  Hampshire, 
than  he  did,  before  the  revolution,  of  those  of  South 
Carolina.  When  the  representatives  from  the  differ 
ent  states  are  collected  together,  to  consider  this  sub 
ject,  they  will  interchange  their  knowledge  with  one 
another,  and  will  have  the  laws  of  each  state  on  the 
table.  Besides  this,  the  intercourse  of  the  states  will 
be  continually  increasing.  It  is  now  much  greater 
than  before  the  revolution.  An  honorable  friend  of 
mine  seems  to  conceive,  as  an  insuperable  objection, 
that  if  land'  were  made  the  particular  object  of  taxa 
tion,  it  would  be  unjust,  as  it  would  exonerate  the 
commercial  part  of  the  community ;  that  if  it  were 
laid  on  trade,  it  would  be  unjust  in  discharging  the 
landholders ;  and  that  any  exclusive  selection  would 
be  unequal  and  unfair.  If  the  general  government. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

were  tied  down  to  one  object,  I  confess  the  objection 
would  have  some  force  in  it.  But  if  this  be  not  the 
case,  it  can  have  no  weight.  If  it  should  have  a  gene 
ral  power  of  taxation,  they  could  select  the  most  pro 
per  objects,  and  distribute  the  taxes  in  such  a  manner, 
as  that  they  should  fall  in  a  due  degree  on  every  mem 
ber  of  the  community.  They  will  be  limited  to  fix  the 
proportion  of  each  state,  and  they  must  raise  it  in  the 
most  convenient  and  satisfactory  manner  to  the 
public. 

The  honorable  member  considered  it  as  another 
insuperable  objection,  that  uniform  laws  could  not  be 
made  for  thirteen  states,  and  that  dissonance  would 
produce  inconvenience  and  oppression.  Perhaps  it 
may  not  be  found  on  due  inquiry,  to  be  so  impractica 
ble  as  he  supposes.  But  were  it  so,  where  is  the  evil 
of  different  laws  operating  in  different  states,  to  raise 
money  for  the  general  government  ?  Where  is  the 
evil  of  such  laws  ?  There  are  instances  in  other  coun 
tries,  of  different  laws  operating  in  different  parts  of 
the  country,  without  producing  any  kind  of  oppres 
sion.  The  revenue  laws  are  different  in  England  and 
Scotland  in  several  respects.  Their  laws  relating  to 
custom,  excises  and  trade,  are  similar ;  but  those  re 
specting  direct  taxation  are  dissimilar.  There  is  a 
land  tax  in  England,  and  a  land  tax  in  Scotland,  but 
the  laws  concerning  them  are  not  the  same.  It  is 
much  heavier  in  proportion  in  the  former  than  in  the 
latter.  The  mode  of  collection  is  different ;  yet  this 
is  not  productive  of  any  national  inconvenience.  Were 
we  to  argue  from  the  objections  against  the  proposed 
plan,  we  must  conclude  that  this  dissimilarity  would, 
in  that  point  alone,  have  involved  those  kingdoms  in 
difficulties.  In  England  itself,  there  is  a  variety 
of  different  laws  operating  differently  in  different 
places. 

I  will  make  another  observation  on  the  objection  of 
my  honorable  friend.  He  seemed  to  conclude,  that 
concurrent  collections  under  different  authorities,  were 

VOL.  r.  21 


162  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH   ON 

not  reducible  to  practice.  I  agree  that  were  they  in 
dependent  of  the  people,  the  argument  would  be  good. 
But  they  must  serve  one  common  master.  They  must 
act  in  concert,  or  the  defaulting  party  must  bring  on 
itself  the  resentment  of  the  people.  If  the  general 
government  be  so  constructed,  that  it  will  not 
dare  to  impose  such  burdens  as  will  distress  the 
people,  where  is  the  evil  of  its  having  a  power  of  taxa 
tion  concurrent  with  the  states  ?  The  people  would 
not  support  it,  were  it  to  impose  oppressive  burdens. 
Let  me  make  one  more  comparison  of  the  state  gov 
ernments  to  this  plan.  Do  not  the  states  impose  taxes 
for  local  purposes  ?  Does  the  concurrent  collection 
of  taxes,  imposed  by  the  legislatures  for  general  pur 
poses,  and  of  levies  laid  by  the  counties  for  parochial 
and  county  purposes,  produce  any  inconvenience  or 
oppression  ?  The  collection  of  these  taxes  is  perfect 
ly  practicable,  and  consistent  with  the  views  of  both 
parties.  The  people  at  large  are  the  common  superior 
of  the  state  governments,  and  the  general  government. 
It  is  reasonable  to  conclude,  that  they  will  avoid 
interferences  for  two  causes — to  avoid  public  oppres 
sion,  and  to  render  the  collections  more  productive.  I 
conceive  they  will  be  more  likely  to  produce  disputes, 
in  rendering  it  convenient  for  the  people,  than  to  run 
into  interfering  regulations. 

In  the  third  place,  I  shall  consider,  whether  the  pow 
er  of  taxation  to  be  given  to  the  general  government  be 
safe :  and  first,  whether  it  be  safe  as  to  the  public  liber 
ty  in  general.  It  would  be  sufficient  to  remark,  that  it  is, 
because,  I  conceive,  the  point  has  been  clearly  estab 
lished  by  more  than  one  gentleman  who  have 'already 
spoken  on  the  same  side  with  me.  In  the  decision 
of  this  question,  it  is  of  importance  to  examine, 
whether  elections  of  representatives  by  great  dis 
tricts  of  freeholders,  be  favorable  to  the  fidelity  of 
representatives.  The  greatest  degree  of  treachery  in 
representatives,  is  to  be  apprehended  where  they  are 
chosen  by  the  least  number  of  electors :  because  there 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  163 

is  a  greater  facility  of  using  undue  influence,  and  be 
cause  the  electors  must  be  less  independent.  This 
position  is  verified  in  the  most  unanswerable  manner, 
in  that  country  to  which  appeals  are  so  often  made, 
and  sometimes  instructively.  Who  are  the  most  cor 
rupt  members  of  Parliament  ?  Are  they  not  the  in 
habitants  of  small  towns  and  districts  ?  The  sup 
porters  of  liberty  are  from  the  great  counties.  Have  we 
not  seen  that  the  representatives  of  the  city  of  Lon 
don,  who  are  chosen  by  such  thousands  of  voters,  have 
continually  studied  and  supported  the  liberties  of  the 
people,  and  opposed  the  corruption  of  the  crown  ? 
We  have  seen  continually,  that  most  of  the  members 
in  the  ministerial  majority  are  drawn  from  small  cir 
cumscribed  districts.  We  may  therefore  conclude, 
that  our  representatives  being  chosen  by  such  ex 
tensive  districts,  will  be  upright  and  independent. 
In  proportion  as  we  have  security  against  corrup 
tion  in  representatives,  we  have  security  against  cor 
ruption  from  every  other  quarter  whatsoever. 

I  shall  take  a  view  of  certain  subjects  which  will  lead 
to  some  reflections,  to  quiet  the  minds  of  those  gen 
tlemen  who  think  that  the  individual  governments  will 
be  swallowed  up  by  the  general  government.  In  order 
to  effect  this,  it  is  proper  to  compare  the  state  govern 
ments  to  the  general  government  with  respect  to  re 
ciprocal  dependence,  and  with  respect  to  the  means 
they  have  of  supporting  themselves,  or  of  encroaching 
upon  one  another.  At  the  first  comparison,  we  must 
be  struck  with  these  remarkable  facts.  The  general 
government  has  not  the  appointment  of  a  single  branch 
of  the  individual  governments,  or  of  any  officers  within 
the  states,  to  execute  their  laws.  Are  not  the  states 
integral  parts  of  the  general  government  ?  Is  not  the 
president  chosen  under  the  influence  of  the  state  legis 
latures?  May  we  not  suppose  that  he  will  be  com 
plaisant  to  those  from  whom  he  has  his  appointment, 
and  from  whom  he  must  have  his  reappointment  ? 
The  senators  are  appointed  altogether  by  the  legisla 
tures. 


164  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

The  honorable  gentleman  apprehends  a  coalition 
between  the  president,  senate  and  house  of  represen 
tatives,  against  the  states.  This  could  be  supposed 
only  from  a  similarity  of  the  component  parts. 

A  coalition  is  not  likely  to  take  place,  because  its 
component  parts  are  heterogeneous  in  their  nature. 
The  house  of  representatives  is  not  chosen  by  the 
state  governments,  but  under  the  influence  of  those, 
who  compose  the  state  legislature.  Let  us  suppose 
ten  men  appointed  to  carry  the  government  into  ef 
fect  ;  there  is  every  degree  of  certainty,  that  they  would 
be  indebted,  for  their  re-election,  to  the  members  of  the 
legislatures.  If  they  derive  their  appointment  from 
them,  will  they  not  execute  their  duty  to  them  ?  Be 
sides  this,  will  not  the  people,  (whose  predominant 
interest  will  ultimately  prevail,)  feel  great  attachment 
to  the  state  legislatures?  They  have  the  care  of 
all  local  interests— those  familiar,  domestic  objects, 
for  which  men  have  the  strongest  predilection.  The 
general  government,  on  the  contrary,  has  the  preser 
vation  of  the  aggregate  interests  of  the  union;  ob 
jects,  which  being  less  familiar,  and  more  remote  from 
men's  notice,  have  a  less  powerful  influence  on  their 
minds.  Do  we  not  see  great  and  natural  attachments 
arising  from  local  considerations  ?  This  will  be  the 
case,  in  a  much  stronger  degree,  in  the  state  govern 
ments,  than  in  the  general  government.  The  people 
will  be  attached  to  their  state  legislatures  from  a  thou 
sand  causes :  and  into  whatever  scale  the  people  at 
large  will  throw  themselves,  that  scale  will  prepon 
derate.  Did  we  not  perceive,  in  the  early  stages  of 
the  war,  when  Congress  was  the  idol  of  America,  and 
when  in  pursuit  of  the  object  most  dear  to  America, 
that  they  were  attached  to  their  states  ?  Afterwards, 
the  whole  current  of  their  affection  was  to  the  states, 
and  it  would  be  still  the  case,  were  it  not  for  the  alarm 
ing  situation  of  America. 

At  one  period  of  the  congressional  history,  they  had 
power  to  trample  on  the  states.  When  they  had  that 


THE    FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

fund  of  paper  money  in  their  hands,  and  could  carry 
on  all  their  measures  without  any  dependence  on  the 
states,  was  there  any  disposition  to  debase  the  state 
governments  ?  All  that  municipal  authority  which 
was  necessary  to  carry  on  the  administration  of  the 
government,  they  still  retained  unimpaired.  There 
was  no  attempt  to  diminish  it. 

I  am  led,  by  what  has  fallen  from  gentlemen,  to  take 
this  supposed  combination  in  another  view.  Is  it  sup 
posed,  that  the  influence  of  the  general  government 
will  facilitate  a  combination  between  the  members  ? 
Is  it  supposed,  that  it  will  preponderate  against  that 
of  the  state  governments  ?  The  means  of  influence 
consist  in  having  the  disposal  of  gifts  and  emoluments, 
and  in  the  number  of  persons  employed  by,  and  depen 
dent  upon  a  government.  Will  any  gentleman  com 
pare  the  number  of  persons  who  will  be  employed  in 
the  general  government,  with  the  number  of  those  that 
will  be  in  the  state  governments?  The  number  of 
dependants  upon  the  state  governments  will  be  in 
finitely  greater  than  those  on  the  general  government. 
I  may  say  with  truth,  that  there  never  was  a  more  eco 
nomical  government  in  any  age  or  country ;  nor  which 
will  require  fewer  agents,  or  give  less  influence. 

Let  us  compare  the  members  composing  the  legis 
lative,  executive  and  judicial  powers  in  the  general 
government,  with  those  in  the  states,  and  let  us  take 
into  view  the  vast  number  of  persons  employed  in  the 
states ;  from  the  chief  officers  to  the  lowest,  we  shall 
find  the  scale  preponderating  so  much  in  favor  of  the 
states,  that  while  so  many  persons  are  attached  to 
them,  it  will  be  impossible  to  turn  the  balance  against 
them.  There  will  be  an  irresistible  bias  towards  the 
state  governments.  Consider  the  number  of  militia 
officers,  the  number  of  justices  of  the  peace,  the  num 
ber  of  the  members  of  the  legislatures,  and  all  the  va 
rious  officers  for  districts,  towns  and  corporations,  all 
intermixing  with,  and  residing  among  the  people  at 
large.  While  this  part  of  the  community  retaias  its 


166  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

affection  to  the  state  governments,  I  conceive  the  fact 
to  be,  that  the  state  governments,  and  not  the  general 
government,  will  preponderate.  It  cannot  be  contra 
dicted,  that  they  have  more  extensive  means  of  influ 
ence.  I  have  my  fears,  as  well  as  the  honorable  gen 
tleman  ;  but  my  fears  are  on  the  other  side.  Expe 
rience,  I  think,  wjdl  prove,  (though  there  be  no  infalli 
ble  proof  of  it  here,)  that  the  powerful  and  prevailing 
influence  of  the  states,  will  produce  such  attention  to 
local  considerations,  as  will  be  inconsistent  with  the 
advancement  of  the  interests  of  the  union.  But  I 
choose  rather  to  indulge  my  hopes  than  fears,  because 
I  flatter  myself,  if  inconveniences  should  result  from  it, 
that  the  clause  which  provides  amendments  will  re 
medy  them.  The  combination  of  powers  vested  in 
those  persons,  would  seem  conclusive  in  favor  of  the 
states. 

The  powers  of  the  general  government  relate  to  ex 
ternal  objects,  and  are  but  few.  But  the  powers  in  the 
states  relate  to  those  great  objects  which  immediate 
ly  concern  the  prosperity  of  the  people.  Let  us  ob 
serve  also,  that  the  powers  in  the  general  government 
are  those  which  will  be  exercised  mostly  in  time  of 
war,  while  those  of  the  state  governments  will  be  ex 
ercised  in  time  of  peace.  But  I  hope  the  time  of  war 
will  be  little,  compared  to  that  of  peace.  I  could  not 
complete  the  view  which  ought  to  be  taken  of  this  sub 
ject,  without  making  this  additional  remark,  that  the 
powers  vested  in  the  proposed  government,  are  not  so 
much  an  augmentation  of  authority  in  the  general  gov 
ernment,  as  a  change  rendered  necessary,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  giving  efficacy  to  those  which  were  vested  in  it 
before.  It  cannot  escape  any  gentleman,  that  this 
power  in  theory,  exists  in  the  confederation  as  fully  as 
in  this  constitution.  The  only  difference  is  this,  that  v 
now  they  tax  states,  and  by  this  plan,  they  will  tax  in 
dividuals.  There  is  no  theoretic  difference  between 
the  two.  But  in  practice  there  will  be  an  infinite  dif 
ference  between  them.  The  one  is  an  ineffectual 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  167 

power :  the  other  is  adequate  to  the  purpose  for  which 
it  is  given.  This  change  was  necessary  for  the  pub- 
Jic  safety. 

Let  us  suppose,  for  a  moment,  that  the  acts  of  Con 
gress,  requiring  money  from  the  states,  had  been  as  ef 
fectual  as  the  paper  on  the  table :  suppose  all  the  laws 
of  Congress  had  had  complete  compliance,  will  any 
gentleman  say,  that  as  far  as  we  can  judge  from  past 
experience,  the  state  governments  would  have  been 
debased,  and  all  consolidated  and  incorporated  in  one 
system?  My  imagination  cannot  reach  it.  I  con 
ceive,  that  had  those  acts  the  effect  which  all  laws 
ought  to  have,  the  states  would  have  retained  their 
sovereignty. 

It  seems  to  be  supposed,  that  it  will  introduce  new 
expenses  and  burdens  on  the  people.  I  believe  it  is 
not  necessary  here  to  make  a  comparison  between 
the  expenses  of  the  present  and  of  the  proposed  gov 
ernment.  All  agree  that  the  general  government 
ought  to  have  power  for  the  regulation  of  commerce. 
I  will  venture  to  say,  that  very  great  improvements, 
and  very  economical  regulations  will  be  made.  It  will 
be  a  principal  object  to  guard  against  smuggling,  and 
such  other  attacks  on  the  revenue  as  other  nations  are 
subject  to.  We  are  now  obliged  to  defend  against 
those  lawless  attempts ;  but  from  the  interfering  regu 
lations  of  different  states,  with  very  little  success. 
There  are  regulations  in  different  states  which  are  un 
favorable  to  the  inhabitants  of  other  states,  and  which 
militate  against  the  revenue.  New  York  levies  mo 
ney  from  New  Jersey  by  her  imposts.  In  New  Jersey, 
instead  of  co-operating  with  New  York,  the  legisla 
ture  favors  encroachments  on  her  regulations.  This 
will  not  be  the  case  when  uniform  arrangements  shall 
be  made. 

Requisitions,  though  ineffectual,  are  unfriendly  to 
economy.  When  requisitions  are  submitted  to  the 
states,  there  are  near  two  thousand  five  hundred  per 
sons  deliberating  on  the  mode  of  payment.  All  these, 


168  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

during  their  deliberation,  receive  public  pay.  A  great 
proportion  of  every  session,  in  every  state,  is  employ 
ed  to  consider  whether  they  will  pay  at  all,  and  in  what 
mode.  Let  us  suppose  fifteen  hundred  persons  de 
liberating  on  this  subject.  Let  any  one  make  a  calcu 
lation  ;  and  it  will  be  found  that  a  very  few  days  of 
their  deliberation  will  consume  more  of  the  public 
money,  than  one  year  of  that  of  the  general  legisla 
ture.  This  is  not  all,  Mr.  Chairman.  When  general 
powers  shall  be  vested  in  the  general  government, 
there  will  be  less  of  that  mutability  which  is  seen  in 
the  legislation  of  the  states.  The  consequence  will 
be  a  great  saving  of  expense  and  time.  There  is  an 
other  great  advantage  which  I  will  but  barely  mention. 
The  greatest  calamity  to  which  the  United  States  can 
be  subject,  is  a  vicissitude  of  laws,  and  a  continual 
shifting  and  changing  from  one  object  to  another,  that 
must  expose  the  people  to  various  inconveniences. 
This  has  a  certain  effect,  of  which  sagacious  men  al 
ways  have,  and  always  will  make  an  advantage.  From 
whom  is  advantage  made  ?  From  the  industrious  far 
mers  and  tradesmen,  who  are  ignorant  of  the  means  of 
making  such  advantages.  The  people  will  not  be  ex 
posed  to  these  inconveniences  under  a  uniform  and 
steady  course  of  legislation.  But  they  have  been  so 
heretofore. 

Sir,  it  has  been  said,  that  by  giving  up  the  power  of 
taxation,  we  should  give  up  every  thing ;  that  requisi 
tions  ought  to  be  made  on  the  states,  and  that  then,  if 
they  be  not  complied  with,  Congress  should  lay  direct 
taxes  by  way  of  penalty.  Let  us  consider  the  dilemma 
which  arises  from  this  doctrine.  Either  requisitions 
will  be  efficacious  or  they  will  not.  If  they  be  effica 
cious,  then  I  say,  sir,  we  give  up  every  thing  as  much 
as  by  direct  taxation.  The  same  amount  will  be  paid 
by  the  people  as  by  direct  taxes.  If  they  be  not  effica 
cious,  where  is  the  advantage  of  this  plan  ?  In  what 
respect  will  it  relieve  us  from  the  inconveniences  which 
we  have  experienced  from  requisitions  ?  The  power 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  169 

of  laying  direct  taxes  by  the  general  government,  is 
supposed  by  the  honorable  gentleman,  to  be  chimeri 
cal  and  impracticable.  What  is  the  consequence  of 
the  alternative  he  proposes  ?  We  are  to  rely  upon 
this  power  to  be  ultimately  used,  as  a  penalty  to  com 
pel  the  states  to  comply.  If  it  be  chimerical  and  im 
practicable  in  the  first  instance,  it  will  be  equally  so* 
when  it  will  be  exercised  as  a  penalty.  A  reference 
has  been  made  to  concurrent  executions,  as  an  instance 
of  the  possibility  of  interference  between  the  two  gov 
ernments.  But  it  may  be  answered,  that  under  the 
state  governments,  concurrent  executions  cannot  pro 
duce  the  inconvenience  here  dreaded,  because  they  are 
executed  by  the  same  officer.  Is  it  not  in  the  power 
of  the  general  government  to  employ  the  state  officers  ? 
Is  nothing  to  be  left  to  future  legislation,  or  must  every 
thing  be  immutably  fixed  in  the  constitution  ?  Where 
exclusive  power  is  given  to  the  union,  there  can  be  no 
interference.  Where  the  general  and  state  legislatures 
have  concurrent  power,  such  regulations  will  be  made, 
as  may  be  found  necessary  to  exclude  interferences 
and  other  inconveniences.  It  will  be  their  interest  to 
make  such  regulations. 

It  has  been  said,  that  there  is  no  similarity  between 
petty  corporations  and  independent  states.  I  admit 
that,  in  many  points  of  view,  there  is  a  great  dissimilari 
ty,  but  in  others,  there  is  a  striking  similarity  between 
them, which  illustrates  what  is  before  us.  Have  we 
not  seen  in  our  own  country  (as  has  been  already  sug 
gested  in  the  course  of  the  debates,)  concurrent  collec 
tions  of  taxes  going  on  at  once,  without  producing  any 
inconvenience  ?  We  have  seen  three  distinct  collec 
tions  of  taxes  for  three  distinct  purposes.  Has  it  not 
been  found  practicable  and  easy  for  collections  of  taxes, 
for  parochial,  county  and  state  purposes,  to  go  on  at  the 
same  time  ?  Every  gentleman  must  know,  that  this 
is  now  the  case,  and  though  there  be  a  subordination 
in  these  cases  which  will  not  be  in  the  general  govern 
ment,  yet  in  practice  it  has  been  found,  that  these  differ- 

VOL.  i.  22 


170  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

ent  collections  have  been  concurrently  carried  on,  with 
convenience  to  the  people,  without  clashing  with  one 
another,  and  without  deriving  their  harmony  from  the 
circumstance  of  being  subordinate  to  one  legislative 
body.  The  taxes  will  be  laid  for  different  purposes. 
The  members  of  the  one  government,  as  well  as  of  the 
other,  are  the  agents  of,  and  subordinate  to,  the  people. 
I  conceive  that  the  collections  of  the  taxes  of  the  one 
will  not  impede  those  of  the  other,  and  that  there  can 
be  no  interference.  This  concurrent  collection  ap 
pears  to  me  neither  chimerical  nor  impracticable. 

Gentlemen  compare  resistance  of  the  people  to  col 
lectors,  to  refusal  of  requisitions.  This  goes  against 
all  government.  It  is  as  much  as  to  urge  that  there 
should  be  no  legislature.  The  gentlemen  who  favored 
us  with  their  observations  on  this  subject,  seemed  to 
have  reasoned  on  a  supposition,  that  the  general  gov 
ernment  was  confined,  by  the  paper  on  your  table,  to  lay 
general  uniform  taxes.  Is  it  necessary  that  there 
should  be  a  tax  on  any  given  article  throughout  the 
United  States  ?  It  is  represented  to  be  oppressive,  that 
the  states  who  have  slaves  and  make  tobacco,  should 
pay  taxes  on  these  for  federal  wants,  when  other  states, 
who  have  them  not,  would  escape.  But  does  the  con 
stitution  on  the  table  admit  of  this  ?  On  the  contrary, 
there  is  a  proportion  to  be  laid  on  each  state,  accord 
ing  to  its  population.  The  most  proper  articles  will 
be  selected  in  each  state.  If  one  article  in  any  state 
should  be  deficient,  it  will  be  laid  on  another  article. 
Our  state  is  secured  on  this  foundation.  Its  proportion 
will  be  commensurate  to  its  population.  This  is  a  con 
stitutional  scale,  which  is  an  insuperable  bar  against 
disproportion,  and  ought  to  satisfy  all  reasonable  minds. 
If  the  taxes  be  not  uniform,  and  the  representatives  of 
some  states  contribute  to  lay  a  tax  of  which  they  bear 
no  proportion,  is  not  this  principle  reciprocal  ?  Does 
not  the  same  principle  hold  in  our  state  government  in 
some  degree  ?  It  has  been  found  inconvenient  to  fix  on 
uniform  objects  of  taxation  in  this  state,  as  the  back 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

parts  are  not  circumstanced  like  the  lower  parts  of  the 
country.  In  both  cases,  the  reciprocity  of  the  prin 
ciple  will  prevent  a  disposition  in  one  part  to  oppress 
the  other.  An  honorable  gentleman  seems  to  suppose 
that  Congress,  by  the  possession  of  this  ultimate  power 
as  a  penalty,  will  have  as  much  credit,  and  will  be  as 
able  to  procure  any  sums,  on  any  emergency,  as  if  they 
were  possessed  of  it  in  the  first  instance ;  and  that  the 
votes  of  Congress  will  be  as  competent  to  procure 
loans,  as  the  votes  of  the  British  commons.  Would  the 
votes  of  the  British  house  of  commons  have  that  credit, 
which  they  now  have,  if  they  were  liable  to  be  retarded 
in  their  operation,  and  perhaps  rendered  ultimately  nu 
gatory  as  those  of  Congress  must  be  by  the  proposed 
alternative  ?  When  their  vote  passes,  it  usually  re 
ceives  the  concurrence  of  the  other  branch,  and  it  is 
known  that  there  is  sufficient  energy  in  the  government* 
to  carry  it  into  effect.  But  here,.the  votes  of  Congress 
are,  in  the  first  place,  dependent  on  the  compliance  of 
thirteen  different  bodies,  and  after  non-compliance, 
are  liable  to  be  opposed  and  defeated,  by  the  jealousy 
of  the  states  against  the  exercise  of  this  power,  and 
by  the  opposition  of  the  people,  which  may  be  expected, 
if  this  power  be  exercised  by  Congress  after  partial 
compliances.  These  circumstances  being  known. 
Congress  could  not  command  one  shilling.  He  seems 
to  think  that  we  ought  to  spare  the  present  generation, 
and  throw  our  burdens  upon  posterity.  I  will  not 
contest  the  equity  of  this  reasoning,  but  1  must  say  that 
good  policy,  as  well  as  views  of  economy,  strongly  urge 
us  even  to  distress  ourselves  to  comply  with  our  most 
solemn  engagements.  Wre  must  make  effectual  pro 
vision  for  the  payment  of  the  interest  of  our  public 
debts.  In  order  to  do  justice  to  our  creditors,  and  sup 
port  our  credit  and  reputation,  we  must  lodge  power 
somewhere  or  other  for  this  purpose.  As  yet  the  United 
States  have  not  been  able,  by  any  energy  contained  in 
the  old  system,  to  accomplish  this  end.  Our  creditors 
have  a  right  to  demand  the  principal,  but  would  be 
satisfied  with  a  punctual  payment  of  the  interest  If 


172  MR.  MADISON'S   SPEECH  ON 

we  have  been  unable  to  pay  the  interest,  much  less 
shall  we  be  able  to  discharge  the  principal.  It  ap 
pears  to  me,  that  the  whole  reasoning  used  on  this  occa 
sion  shows,  that  we  ought  to  adopt  this  system,  in  order 
to  enable  us  to  throw  our  burdens  on  posterity.  The 
honorable  member  spoke  of  the  decemviri  at  Rome, 
as  having  some  similitude  to  the  ten  representatives 
who  are  to  be  appointed  by  this  state.  I  can  see 
no  point  of  similitude  here,  to  enable  us  to  draw  any 
conclusion.  For  what  purpose  were  the  decem 
viri  appointed  ?  They  were  invested  with  a  plenary 
commission  to  make  a  code  of  laws.  By  whom  were 
they  appointed — by  the  people  at  large  ?  No ;  my 
memory  is  not  infallible,  but  it  tells  me  they  were  ap 
pointed  by  the  senate  and  composed  of  the  most  influ 
ential  characters  among  the  nobles.  Can  any  thing  be 
inferred  from  that  against  our  federal  representatives  ? 
Who  made  a  discrimination  between  the  nobles  and 
the  people  ? — the  senate.  Those  men  totally  pervert 
ed  the  powers,  which  were  given  them  for  the  purpose 
above  specified,  to  the  subversion  of  the  public  liberty. 
Can  we  suppose  that  a  similar  usurpation  might  be 
made,  by  men  appointed  in  a  totally  different  manner  ? 
As  their  circumstances  were  totally  dissimilar,  I  con 
ceive  that  no  arguments  drawn  from  that  source,  can 
apply  to  this  government.  I  do  not  thoroughly  com 
prehend  the  reasoning  of  the  honorable  gentleman, 
when  he  tells  us,  that  the  federal  government  will  predo 
minate,  and  that  the  state  interests  will  be  lost ;  when, 
at  the  same  time,  he  tells  us,  that  it  will  be  a  faction  of 
seven  states.  If  seven  states  will  prevail  as  states,  I 
conceive  that  state  influence  will  prevail.  If  state  in 
fluence  under  the  present  feeble  government  has  pre 
vailed,  I  think  that  a  remedy  ought  to  be  introduced 
by  giving  the  general  government  power  to  sup 
press  it. 

He  supposes  that  any  argument  with  respect  to  a 
future  war  between  Great  Britain  and  France  is  falla 
cious.  The  other  nations  of  Europe  have  acceded  to 
that  neutrality,  while  Great  Britain  opposed  it.  We 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  173 

need  not  expect,  in  case  of  such  a  war,  that  we  should 
be  suffered  to  participate  of  the  profitable  emoluments 
of  the  carrying  trade,  unless  we  were  in  a  respectable 
situation.  Recollect  the  last  war.  Was  there  ever  a 
war  in  which  the  British  nation  stood  opposed  to  so 
many  nations  ?  All  the  belligerent  powers  in  Europe, 
with  nearly  one  half  of  the  British  empire,  were  united 
against  it.  Yet  that  nation,  though  defeated,  and 
humbled  beyond  any  previous  example,  stood  out 
against  this.  From  her  firmness  and  spirit  in  such  des 
perate  circumstances,  we  may  divine  what  her  future 
conduct  may  be.  I  did  not  contend,  that  it  was  neces 
sary  for  the  United  States  to  establish  a  navy  for  that 
sole  purpose,  but  instanced  it  as  one  reason  out  of  se 
veral,  for  rendering  ourselves  respectable.  I  am  no 
friend  to  naval  or  land  armaments  in  time  of  peace,  but 
if  they  be  necessary,  the  calamity  must  be  submitted  to. 
Weakness  will  invite  insults.  A  respectable  govern 
ment  will  not  only  entitle  us  to  a  participation  of  the  ad 
vantages  which  are  enjoyed  by  other  nations,  but  will 
be  a  security  against  attacks  and  insults.  It  is  to 
avoid  the  calamity  of  being  obliged  to  have  large  ar 
maments,  that  we  should  establish  this  government. 
The  best  way  to  avoid  danger,  is  to  be  in  a  capacity  to 
withstand  it. 

The  imposts,  we  are  told,  will  not  diminish,  because 
the  emigrations  to  the  westward  will  prevent  the  in 
crease  of  population.  Gentlemen  have  reasoned  on 
this  subject  justly,  to  a  certain  degree.  I  admit,  that 
the  imposts  will  increase  till  population  becomes  so 
great  as  to  compel  us  to  recur  to  manufactures.  The 
period  cannot  be  very  far  distant,  when  the  unsettled 
parts  of  America  will  be  inhabited.  At  the  expiration 
of  twenty-five  years  hence,  I  conceive,  that  in  every 
part  of  the  United  States,  there  will  be  as  great  a  popu 
lation  as  there  is  now  in  the  settled  parts.  We  see  al 
ready,  that  in  the  most  populous  parts  of  the  union, 
and  where  there  is  but  a  medium,  manufactures  are 
beginning  to  be  established.  Where  this  is  the  case. 


174  MR.   MADISON'S  SPEECH   ON 

the  amount  of  importations  will  begin  to  diminish. 
Although  the  imposts  may  even  increase  during  the 
term  of  twenty-five  years,  yet  when  we  are  preparing 
a  government  for  perpetuity,  we  ought  to  found  it  on 
permanent  principles,  and  not  on  those  of  a  temporary 
nature. 

Holland  is  a  favorite  quotation  with  honorable  mem 
bers  on  the  other  side  of  the  question.  Had  not  their 
sentiments  been  discovered  by  other  circumstances,  I 
should  have  concluded  from  their  reasonings  on  this 
occasion,  that  they  were  friends  to  the  constitution.  I 
should  suppose,  that  they  had  forgotten  which  side  of 
the  question  they  were  defending.  Holland  has  been 
called  a  republic,  and  a  government  friendly  to  liberty. 
Though  it  may  be  greatly  superior  to  some  other  gov 
ernments  in  Europe,  still  it  is  not  a  republic,  nor  a  de 
mocracy.  Their  legislature  consists,  in  some  degree, 
of  men  who  legislate  for  life.  Their  councils  consist 
of  men  who  hold  their  offices  for  life,  and  who  fill  up 
offices  and  appoint  their  salaries  themselves.  The 
people  have  no  agency,  mediate  or  immediate,  in  the 
government.  If  we  look  at  their  history,  we  shall  find, 
that  every  mischief  which  has  befallen  them,  has  re 
sulted  from  the  existing  confederacy.  If  the  stadthold- 
er  has  been  productive  of  mischief — if  we  ought  to 
guard  against  such  a  magistrate  more  than  any  evil, 
let  me  beseech  the  honorable  gentleman  to  take  no 
tice  of  what  produced  that,  and  of  those  troubles  which 
interrupted  their  tranquillity  from  time  to  time.  The 
weakness  of  their  confederacy  produced  both.  When 
the  French  arms  were  ready  to  overpower  their  repub 
lic,  and  the  Hollanders  were  feeble  in  the  means  of  de 
fence,  which  was  principally  owing  to  the  violence  of 
parties,  they  then  appointed  a  stadtholder,  who  sus 
tained  them.  If  we  look  at  more  recent  events,  we 
shall  have  a  more  pointed  demonstration,  that  their  po 
litical  infelicity  arose  from  the  imbecility  of  their  gov 
ernment.  In  the  late  disorders,  the  states  were  almost 
equally  divided,  three  provinces  on  one  side,  three  on 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  175 

the  other ,  and  the  other  divided:  one  party  inclined  to 
the  Prussians,  and  the  other  to  the  French.  The 
situation  of  France  did  not  admit  of  their  interposing 
immediately  in  their  disputes  by  an  army ;  that  of  the 
Prussians  did.  A  powerful  and  large  army  marched 
into  Holland  and  compelled  the  other  party  to  surren 
der.  We  know  the  distressing  consequences  to  the 
people.  What  produced  those  disputes  and  the  ne 
cessity  of  foreign  interference  but  the  debility  of  their 
confederacy  ?  We  may  be  warned  by  their  example, 
and  shun  their  fate,  by  removing  the  causes  which  pro 
duced  their  misfortunes. 

My  honorable  friend  has  referred  to  the  transactions 
of  the  federal  council  with  respect  to  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi.  I  wish  it  was  consistent  with  delica 
cy  and  prudence  to  lay  a  complete  view  of  the  whole 
matter  before  this  committee.  The  history  of  it  is 
singular  and  curious,  and  perhaps  its  origin  ought  to 
be  taken  into  consideration.  I  will  touch  on  some 
circumstances,  and  introduce  nearly  the  substance  of 
most  of  the  facts  relative  to  it,  that  I  may  not  seem  to 
shrink  from  explanation.  It  was  soon  perceived,  sir, 
after  the  commencement  of  the  war  with  Britain,  that 
among  the  various  objects  that  would  aifect  the  happi 
ness  of  the  people  of  America,  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  was  one.  Throughout  the  whole  history 
of  foreign  negotiation,  great  stress  was  laid  on  its  pre 
servation.  In  the  time  of  our  greatest  distresses,  and 
particularly  when  the  southern  states  were  the  scene 
of  war,  the  southern  states  cast  their  eyes  around  to  be 
relieved  from  their  misfortunes.  It  was  supposed  that 
assistance  might  be  obtained  for  the  relinquishment 
of  that  navigation.  It  was  thought  that  for  so  sub 
stantial  a  consideration,  Spain  might  be  induced  to  af 
ford  decisive  succor.  It  was  opposed  by  the  northern 
and  eastern  states.  They  were  sensible  that  it  might 
be  dangerous  to  surrender  this  important  right,  parti 
cularly  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  western  country.  But 
so  it  was,  that  the  southern  states  were  for  it.  and  the 


176  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

eastern  states  opposed  it.  Since  obtaining  that  happy 
peace,  which  secures  to  us  all  our  claims,  this  subject 
has  been  taken  again  into  consideration,  and  delibe 
rated  upon  in  the  federal  government.  A  temporary 
relinquishment  has  been  agitated.  Several  members 
from  the  different  states,  but  particularly  from  the 
northern,  were  for  a  temporary  surrender,  because  it 
would  terminate  disputes,  and  at  the  end  of  the  short 
period  for  which  it  was  to  be  given,  the  right  would  re 
vert,  of  course,  to  those  who  had  given  it  up.  And 
for  this  temporary  surrender  some  commercial  advan 
tages  were  offered.  For  my  part,  I  considered  that 
this  measure,  though  founded  on  considerations  plau 
sible  and  honorable,  was  yet  not  justifiable  but  on 
grounds  of  inevitable  necessity.  I  must  declare,  in  jus 
tice  to  many  characters  who  were  in  Congress,  that 
they  declared  they  never  would  agree  to  the  measure, 
unless  the  situation  of  the  United  States  was  such  as 
could  not  prevent  it. 

On  the  whole,  I  am  persuaded  that  the  adoption  of 
this  government  will  be  favorable  to  the  preservation 
of  the  right  to  that  navigation.  Emigrations  will  be 
made  from  those  parts  of  the  United  States  which  are 
settled,  to  those  which  are  unsettled.  If  we  afford  pro 
tection  to  the  western  country,  we  shall  see  it  rapidly 
peopled.  Emigrations  from  some  of  the  northern 
states  have  lately  increased.  We  may  conclude,  that 
those  who  emigrate  to  that  country,  will  leave  behind 
them  all  their  friends  and  connexions  as  advocates  for 
this  right. 

What  was  the  cause  of  those  states  being  the  cham 
pions  of  this  right,  when  the  southern  states  were  dis 
posed  to  surrender  it  ?  The  preservation  of  this  right 
will  be  for  the  general  interest  of  the  union.  The 
western  country  will  be  settled  from  the  north  as  well 
as  from  the  south,  and  its  prosperity  will  add  to  the 
strength  and  security  of  the  nation.  I  am  not  able  to 
recollect  all  those  circumstances  which  would  be  ne 
cessary  to  give  gentlemen  a  full  view  of  the  subject.  I 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION'.  177 

can  only  add,  that  I  consider  the  establishment  of  the 
new  government  to  be  the  best  possible  means  of  se 
curing  our  rights  as  well  in  the  western  parts  as  else 
where. 

I  will  not  sit  down  till  I  make  one  more  observation 
on  what  fell  from  an  honorable  member.  He  said, 
that  the  true  difference  between  the  states,  lies  in  this 
circumstance — that  some  are  carrying  states,  and  others 
productive,  and  that  the  operation  of  the  new  gov 
ernment  will  be,  that  there  will  be  a  plurality  of  the 
former  to  combine  against  the  interest  of  the  latter* 
and  that  consequently  it  will  be  dangerous  to  put  it  in 
their  power  to  do  so.  I  would  join  with  him  in  senti 
ment,  if  this  were  the  case.  Were  this  within  the 
bounds  of  probability,  I  should  be  equally  alarmed  ; 
but  I  think  that  those  states  which  are  contradistin 
guished  as  carrying  states,  from  the  non-importing 
states,  will  be  but  few.  I  suppose  the  southern  states 
will  be  considered  by  all,  as  under  the  latter  descrip 
tion.  Some  other  states  have  been  mentioned  by  an 
honorable  member  on  the  same  side,  which  are  not 
considered  as  carrying  states.  New  Jersey  and  Con 
necticut  can  by  no  means  be  enumerated  among  the 
carrying  states.  They  receive  their  supplies  through 
New  York.  Here  then  is  a  plurality  of  non-importing 
states.  I  could  add  another,  if  necessary.  Delaware, 
though  situated  upon  the  water,  is  upon  the  list  of 
non-carrying  states.  I  might  say  that  a  great  part  of 
New  Hampshire  is  so.  I  believe  a  majority  of  the 
people  of  that  state  receive  their  supplies  from  Massa 
chusetts,  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut.  Might  I  not 
add  all  those  states  which  will  be  admitted  hereafter 
into  the  union  ?  These  will  be  non-carrying  states, 
and  will  support  Virginia  in  case  the  carrying  states 
should  attempt  to  combine  against  the  rest.  This 
objection  must  therefore  fall  to  the  ground.* 

:  The  preceding  speech  is  composed  of  several  delivered  by 
Mr.  Madison  during  the  session  of  the  convention. 

COMPILER. 
VOL.   I.  23 


SPEECH  OF   PATRICK  HENRY, 

ON  THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  ADOPTING  THE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  JUNE  7,  1788. 


MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

I  HAVE  thought,  and  still  think,  that  a  full  investiga 
tion  of  the  actual  situation  of  America,  ought  to  pre 
cede  any  decision  on  this  great  and  important  ques 
tion.  That  government  is  no  more  than  a  choice 
among  evils,  is  acknowledged  by  the  most  intelligent 
among  mankind,  and  has  been  a  standing  maxim  for 
ages.  If  it  be  demonstrated,  that  the  adoption  of  the 
new  plan  is  a  little  or  a  trifling  evil,  then,  sir,  I  acknow 
ledge  that  adoption  ought  to  follow :  but,  sir,  if  this 
be  a  truth,  that  its  adoption  may  entail  misery  on  the 
free  people  of  this  country,  I  then  insist,  that  rejection 
ought  to  follow.  Gentlemen  strongly  urge  that  its 
adoption  will  be  a  mighty  benefit  to  us :  but,  sir,  I  am 
made  of  such  incredulous  materials,  that  assertions 
and  declarations  do  not  satisfy  me.  I  must  be  con 
vinced,  sir.  I  shall  retain  my  infidelity  on  that  subject 
till  I  see  our  liberties  secured  in  a  manner  perfectly 
satisfactory  to  my  understanding. 

There  are  certain  maxims,  by  which  every  wise  and 
enlightened  people  will  regulate  their  conduct.  There 
are  certain  political  maxims,  which  no  free  people 
ought  ever  to  abandon :  maxims,  of  which  the  observ 
ance  is  essential  to  the  security  of  happiness.  It  is 


Mil.  HENRY'S  SPEECH,  &< ,-.  179 

impiously  irritating  the  avenging  hand  of  heaven,  when 
a  people,  who  are  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  freedom, 
launch  out  into  the  wide  ocean  of  human  affairs,  and 
desert  those  maxims  which  alone  can  preserve  liberty. 
Such  maxims,  humble  as  they  are,  are  those  only  which 
can  render  a  nation  safe  or  formidable.  Poor  little 
humble  republican  maxims  have  attracted  the  admi 
ration  and  engaged  the  attention  of  the  virtuous  and 
wise  in  all  nations,  and  have  stood  the  shock  of  ages. 
We  do  not  now  admit  the  validity  of  maxims,  which 
we  once  delighted  in.  We  have  since  adopted  maxims 
of  a  different,  but  more  refined  nature ;  new  maxims, 
which  tend  to  the  prostration  of  republicanism. 

We  have  one,  sir,  that  all  men  are  by  nature  free 
and  independent,  and  have  certain  inherent  rights,  of 
which,  when  they  enter  into  society,  they  cannot,  by 
any  compact,  deprive  or  divest  their  posterity.  We 
have  a  set  of  maxims  of  the  same  spirit,  which  must 
be  beloved  by  every  friend  to  liberty,  to  virtue,  to  man 
kind — our  bill  of  rights  contains  those  admirable 
maxims. 

Now,  sir,  I  say,  let  us  consider,  whether  the  picture 
given  of  American  affairs  ought  to  drive  us  from  those 
beloved  maxims. 

The  honorable  gentleman,  (Mr.  Randolph,)  has  said, 
that  it  is  too  late  in  the  day  for  us  to  reject  this  new 
plan.  That  system  which  was  once  execrated  by  the 
honorable  member,  must  now  be  adopted,  let  its  defects 
be  ever  so  glaring.  That  honorable  member  will  not 
accuse  me  of  want  of  candor,  when  I  cast  in  my  mind 
what  he  has  given  the  public,*  and  compare  it  to  what 
has  happened  since.  It  seems  to  me  very  strange  and 
unaccountable,  that  what  was  the  object  of  his  exe 
cration  should  now  receive  his  encomiums.  Some 
thing  extraordinary  must  have  operated  so  great  a 
change  in  his  opinion.  It  is  too  late  in  the  day  !  Gen- 

*  Alluding  to  Mr.  Randolph's  letter  on  that  subject,  to  the  speaker 
of  the  house  of  delegate?. 


I  BO  MK.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

tlemen  must  excuse  me,  if  they  should  declare  again 
and  again,  that  it  is  too  late,  and  I  should  think  dif 
ferently.  I  never  can  believe,  sir,  that  it  is  too  late  to 
save  all  that  is  precious.  If  it  be  proper,  and,  indepen 
dently  of  every  external  consideration,  wisely  construct 
ed,  let  us  receive  it :  but,  sir,  shall  its  adoption,  by 
eight  states,  induce  us  to  receive  it,  if  it  be  replete 
with  the  most  dangerous  defects  ?  They  urge,  that 
subsequent  amendments  are  safer  than  previous 
amendments,  and  that  they  will  answer  the  same  ends. 
At  present,  we  have  our  liberties  and  privileges  in  our 
awn  hands.  Let  us  not  relinquish  them.  Let  us  not 
adopt  this  system  till  we  see  them  secured.  There  is 
some  small  possibility,  that  should  we  follow  the  con 
duct  of  Massachusetts,  amendments  might  be  obtain 
ed.  There  is  a  small  possibility  of  amending  any 
government ;  but,  sir,  shall  we  abandon  our  inesti 
mable  rights,  and  rest  their  security  on  a  mere  possi 
bility  ?  The  gentleman  fears  the  loss  of  the  union. 
If  eight  states  have  ratified  it  unamended,  and  we 
should  rashly  imitate  their  precipitate  example,  do  we 
not  thereby  disunite  from  several  other  states  ?  Shall 
those  who  have  risked  their  lives  for  the  sake  of 
union,  be  at  once  thrown  out  of  it?  If  it  be  amended, 
every  state  will  accede  to  it ;  but  by  an  imprudent 
adoption  in  its  defective  and  dangerous  state,  a  schism 
must  inevitably  be  the  consequence;  I  can  never, 
therefore,  consent  to  hazard  our  unalienable  rights 
on  an  absolute  uncertainty.  You  are  told  there 
is  no  peace,  although  you  fondly  flatter  yourselves  that 
all  is  peace — no  peace ;  a  general  cry  and  alarm  in 
the  country ;  commerce,  riches  and  wealth  vanished ; 
citizens  going  to  seek  comforts  in  other  parts  of  the 
world;  laws  insulted;  many  instances  of  tyrannical 
legislation.  These  things,  sir,  are  new  to  me.  He  has 
made  the  discovery.  As  to  the  administration  of  jus 
tice,  I  believe  that  failures  in  commerce,  &c.  cannot  be 
attributed  to  it.  My  age  enables  me  to  recollect  its 
progress  under  the  old  government.  I  can  justify  it  by 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

saying,  that  it  continues  in  the  same  manner  in  this 
state,  as  it  did  under  the  former  government.  As  to 
other  parts  of  the  continent,  I  refer  that  to  other  gen 
tlemen.  As  to  the  ability  of  those  who  administer  it, 
I  believe  they  would  not  suffer  by  a  comparison  with 
those  who  administered  it  under  the  royal  authority. 
Where  is  the  cause  of  complaint  if  the  wealthy  go 
away  ?  Is  this,  added  to  the  other  circumstances,  of 
such  enormity,  and  does  it  bring  such  danger  over  this 
commonwealth,  as  to  warrant  so  important,  and  so 
awful  a  change,  in  so  precipitate  a  manner  ?  As  to 
insults  offered  to  the  laws,  I  know  of  none.  In  this  re 
spect,  I  believe  this  commonwealth  would  not  suffer 
by  a  comparison  with  the  former  government.  The 
laws  are  as  well  executed,  and  as  patiently  acquiesced 
in,  as  they  were  under  the  royal  administration.  Com 
pare  the  situation  of  the  country;  compare  that  of  our 
citizens  to  what  they  were  then,  and  decide  whether 
persons  and  property  are  not  as  safe  and  secure  as 
they  were  at  that  time.  Is  there  a  man  in  this  com 
monwealth,  whose  person  can  be  insulted  with  impuni 
ty  ?  Cannot  redress  be  had  here  for  personal  insults 
or  injuries,  as  well  as  in  any  part  of  the  world;  as  well 
as  in  those  countries  where  aristocrats  and  monarchs 
triumph  and  reign  ?  Is  not  the  protection  of  property 
in  full  operation  here  ?  The  contrary  cannot,  with 
truth,  be  charged  on  this  commonwealth.  Those  se 
vere  charges  which  are  exhibited  against  it,  appear  to 
me  totally  groundless.  On  a  fair  investigation,  we 
shall  be  found  to  be  surrounded  by  no  real  dangers. 
We  have  the  animating  fortitude  and  persevering 
alacrity  of  republican  men,  to  carry  us  through  misfor 
tunes  and  calamities.  'Tis  the  fortune  of  a  republic  to 
be  able  to  withstand  the  stormy  ocean  of  human  vicis 
situdes.  I  know  of  no  danger  awaiting  us.  Public 
and  private  security  are  to  be  found  here  in  the  highest 
degree.  Sir,  it  is  the  fortune  of  a  free  people,  not  to 
be  intimidated  by  imaginary  dangers.  Fear  is  the 
passion  of  slaves.  Our  political  and  natural  hemis- 


182  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

pheres  are  now  equally  tranquil.  Let  us  recollect  the 
awful  magnitude  of  the  subject  of  our  deliberation. 
Let  us  consider  the  latent  consequences  of  an  errone 
ous  decision,  and  let  not  our  minds  be  led  away  by 
unfair  misrepresentations  and  uncandid  suggestions. 
There  have  been  many  instances  of  uncommon  lenity 
and  temperance  used  in  the  exercise  of  power  in  this 
commonwealth.  I  could  call  your  recollection  to 
many  that  happened  during  the  war  and  since,  but 
every  gentleman  here  must  be  apprised  of  them. 

The  honorable  member  has  given  you  an  elaborate 
account  of  what  he  judges  tyrannical  legislation,  and 
an  ex  post  facto  law  in  the  case  of  Josiah  Phillips. 
He  has  misrepresented  the  facts.  That  man  was  not 
executed  by  a  tyrannical  stroke  of  power;  nor  was 
he  a  Socrates.  He  was  a  fugitive  murderer  and  an 
outlaw ;  a  man  who  commanded  an  infamous  bandit 
ti,  at  a  time  when  the  war  was  at  the  most  perilous 
stage.  He  committed  the  most  cruel  and  shocking 
barbarities.  He  was  an  enemy  to  the  human  name. 
Those,  who  declare  war  against  the  human  race,  may 
be  struck  out  of  existence  as  soon  as  they  are  appre 
hended.  He  was  not  executed  according  to  those 
beautiful  legal  ceremonies  which  are  pointed  out  by 
the  laws,  in  criminal  cases.  The  enormity  of  his 
crimes  did  not  entitle  him  to  it.  I  am  truly  a  friend  to 
legal  forms  and  methods ;  but,  sir,  the  occasion  war 
ranted  the  measure.  A  pirate,  an  outlaw,  or  a  com 
mon  enemy  to  all  mankind,  may  be  put  to  death  at 
any  time.  It  is  justified  by  the  laws  of  nature  and 
nations. 

The  honorable  member  tells  us  then,  that  there  are 
burnings  and  discontents  in  the  hearts  of  our  citizens 
in  general,  and  that  they  are  dissatisfied  with  their 
government.  I  have  no  doubt  the  honorable  member 
believes  this  to  be  the  case,  because  he  says  so.  But 
I  have  the  comfortable  assurance,  that  it  is  a  certain 
fact,  that  it  is  not  so.  The  middle  and  lower  ranks  of 
people  have  not  those  illumined  ideas,  which  the  well- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  133 

born  are  so  happily  possessed  of;  they  cannot  so  rea 
dily  perceive  latent  objects.  The  microscopic  eyes  of 
modern  statesmen,  can  see  abundance  of  defects  in  old 
systems;  and  their  illumined  imaginations  discover 
the  necessity  of  a  change.  They  are  captivated  by 
the  parade  of  the  number  ten ;  the  charms  of  the  ten 
miles  square.  Sir,  I  fear  this  change  will  ultimately 
lead  to  our  ruin.  My  fears  are  not  the  force  of  ima 
gination  ;  they  are  but  too  well  founded.  I  tremble 
for  my  country :  but,  sir,  I  trust,  I  rely,  and  I  am  confi 
dent,  that  this  political  speculation  has  not  taken  so 
strong  a  hold  of  men's  minds,  as  some  would  make 
us  believe. 

The  dangers  which  may  arise  from  our  geographi 
cal  situation,  will  be  more  properly  considered  a  while 
hence.  At  present,  what  may  be  surmised  on  the 
subject,  with  respect  to  the  adjacent  states,  is  merely 
visionary.  Strength,  sir,  is  a  relative  term.  When  I 
reflect  on  the  natural  force  of  those  nations  that  might 
be  induced  to  attack  us,  and  consider  the  difficulty  of 
the  attempt  and  uncertainty  of  the  success,  and  com 
pare  thereto  the  relative  strength  of  our  country,  I  say 
that  we  are  strong.  We  have  no  cause  to  fear  from 
that  quarter;  we  have  nothing  to  dread  from  our 
neighboring  states.  The  superiority  of  our  cause 
would  give  us  an  advantage  over  them,  were  they  so 
unfriendly  or  rash  as  to  attack  us.  As  to  that  part  of 
the  community,  which  the  honorable  gentleman  spoke 
of  as  in  danger  of  being  separated  from  us,  what  in 
citement  or  inducement  could  its  inhabitants  have  to 
wish  such  an  event  ?  It  is  a  matter  of  doubt  whether 
they  would  derive  any  advantage  to  themselves,  or  be 
any  loss  to  us  by  such  a  separation.  Time  has  been, 
and  may  yet  come,  when  they  will  find  it  their  advan 
tage  and  true  interest  to  be  united  with  us.  There  is 
no  danger  of  a  dismemberment  of  our  country,  unless 
a  constitution  be  adopted  which  will  enable  the  gov 
ernment  to  plant  enemies  on  our  backs.  By  the  con 
federation,  the  rights  of  territory  are  secured.  No 


184  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  OX 

treaty  can  be  made  without  the  consent  of  nine  states 
While  the  consent  of  nine  states  is  necessary  to  the 
cession  of  territory,  you  are  safe.  If  it  be  put  in  the 
power  of  a  less  number,  you  will  most  infallibly  lose  the 
Mississippi.  As  long  as  we  can  preserve  our  unaliena- 
ble  rights,  we  are  in  safety.  This  new  constitution 
will  involve  in  its  operation  the  loss  of  the  navigation 
of  that  valuable  river.  The  honorable  gentleman  can 
not  be  ignorant  of  the  Spanish  transactions.  A  treaty 
had  been  nearly  entered  into  with  Spain,  to  relinquish 
that  navigation,  and  that  relinquishment  would  abso 
lutely  have  taken  place,  had  the  consent  of  seven 
states  been  sufficient.  The  honorable  gentleman  told 
us  then,  that  eight  states  having  adopted  this  system, 
we  cannot  suppose  they  will  recede  on  our  account.  1 
know  not  what  they  may  do ;  but  this  I  know,  that  a 
people  of  infinitely  less  importance  than  those  of  Vir 
ginia,  stood  the  terror  of  war.  Vermont,  sir,'  withstood 
the  terror  of  thirteen  states.  Maryland  did  not  accede 
to  the  confederation  till  the  year  1781.  These  two 
states,  feeble  as  they  are,  comparatively  to  us,  were 
not  afraid  of  the  whole  union.  Did  either  of  these 
states  perish  ?  No,  sir,  they  were  admitted  freely  into 
the  union.  Will  not  Virginia  then  be  admitted  ?  I 
flatter  myself  that  those  states  who  have  ratified  the 
new  plan  of  government  will  open  their  arms  and 
cheerfully  receive  us,  although  we  should  propose 
certain  amendments  as  the  conditions  on  which  we 
would  ratify  it.  During  the  late  war,  all  the  states 
were  in  pursuit  of  the  same  object.  To  obtain  that 
object,  they  made  the  most  strenuous  exertions.  They 
did  not  suffer  trivial  considerations  to  impede  its  ac 
quisition.  Give  me  leave  to  say,  that  if  the  smallest 
states  in  the  union  were  admitted  into  it,  after  having 
unreasonably  procrastinated  their  accession,  the 
greatest  and  most  mighty  state  in  the  union,  will  be 
easily  admitted,  when  her  reluctance  to  an  immediate 
accession  to  this  system  is  founded  on  the  most  rea 
sonable  grounds.  When  I  call  this  the  most  mighty 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  185 

.state  in  the  union,  do  I  not  speak  the  truth  ?  Does  not 
Virginia  surpass  every  state  in  the  union,  in  number  of 
inhabitants,  extent  of  territory,  felicity  of  position,  and 
affluence  and  wealth  ?  Some  infatuation  hangs  over 
men's  minds,  that  they  will  inconsiderately  precipitate 
into  measures  the  most  important,  and  give  not  a  mo 
ment's  deliberation  to  others,  nor  pay  any  respect  to 
their  opinions.  Is  this  federalism  ?  Are  these  the  be 
loved  effects  of  the  federal  spirit,  that  its  votaries  will 
never  accede  to  the  just  propositions  of  others  ?  Sir, 
were  there  nothing  objectionable  in  it  but  that,  I  would 
vote  against  it.  I  desire  to  have  nothing  to  do  with 
such  men  as  will  obstinately  refuse  to  change  their 
opinions.  Are  our  opinions  not  to  be  regarded  ?  I 
hope  that  you  will  recollect,  that  you  are  going  to  join 
with  men  who  will  pay  no  respect  even  to  this  state. 

Switzerland  consists  of  thirteen  cantons  expressly 
confederated  for  national  defence.  They  have  stood 
the  shock  of  four  hundred  years :  that  country  has  en 
joyed  internal  tranquillity  most  of  that  long  period. 
Their  dissensions  have  been,  comparatively  to  those 
of  other  countries,  very  few.  What  has  passed  in  the 
neighboring  countries? — wars,  dissensions  and  in 
trigues — Germany  involved  in  the  most  deplorable 
civil  war  thirty  years  successively,  continually  con 
vulsed  with  intestine  divisions,  and  harassed  by  for 
eign  wars — France  with  her  mighty  monarchy  per 
petually  at  war.  Compare  the  peasants  of  Switzer 
land  with  those  of  any  other  mighty  nation :  you  will 
find  them  far  more  happy ;  for  one  civil  war  among 
them,  there  have  been  five  or  six  among  other  na 
tions  :  their  attachment  to  their  country,  and  to  free 
dom,  their  resolute  intrepidity  in  their  defence,  the 
consequent  security  and  happiness  which  they  have 
enjoyed,  and  the  respect  and  awe  which  these  things 
produced  in  their  bordering  nations,  have  signalized 
those  republicans.  Their  valor,  sir,  has  been  active  ; 
everything  that  sets  in  motion  the  springs  of  the  hu 
man  heart,  engaged  them  to  the  protection  of  their  in- 

VOL.  T.  24 


186  MH.  HENRY'S  SPEECH    ON 

estimable  privileges.  They  have  not  only  secured 
their  own  liberty,  but  have  been  the  arbiters  of  the 
fate  of  other  people.  Here,  sir,  contemplate  the  tri 
umph  of  republican  governments  over  the  pride  of 
monarchy.  I  acknowledge,  sir,  that  the  necessity  of 
national  defence  has  prevailed  in  invigorating  their 
councils  and  arms,  and  has  been,  in  a  considerable  de- 
gree,*the  means  of  keeping  these  honest  people  to 
gether.  But,  sir,  they  have  had  wisdom  enough  to 
keep  together  and  render"  themselves  formidable. 
Their  heroism  is  proverbial.  They  would  heroically 
fight  for  their  government,  and  their  laws.  One  of 
the  illumined  sons  of  these  times  would  not  fight  for 
those  objects.  Those  virtuous  and  simple  people 
have  not  a  mighty  and  splendid  president,  nor  enor 
mously  expensive  navies  and  armies  to  support.  No, 
sir,  those  brave  republicans  have  acquired  their  repu 
tation  no  less  by  their  undaunted  intrepidity,  than  by 
the  wisdom  of  their  frugal  and  economical  policy? 
Let  us  follow  their  example,  and  be  equally  happy. 
The  honorable  member  advises  us  to  adopt  a  measure 
which  will  4estroy  our  bill  of  rights :  for,  after  hear 
ing  his  picture  of  nations,  and  his  reasons  for  aban 
doning  all  the  powers  retained  to  the  states  by  the 
confederation,  I  am  more  firmly  persuaded  of  the  im 
propriety  of  adopting  this  *  new  plan  in  its  present 
shape. 

I  had  doubts  of  the  power  of  those  who  went  to  the 
convention ;  but  now  we  are  possessed  of  it,  let  us  exa 
mine  it.  When  we  trusted  the  great  object  of  revising 
the  confederation  to  the  greatest,  the  best  and  most 
enlightened  of  our  citizens,  we  thought  their  delibera 
tions  would  have  been  solely  confined  to  that  revision. 
Instead  of  this,  a  new  system,  totally  different  in  its 
nature,  and  vesting  the  most  extensive  powers  in  Con 
gress,  is  presented.  Will  the  ten  men  you  are  to  send 
to  Congress,  be  more  worthy  than  those  seven  were  ? 
If  power  grew  so  rapidly  in  their  hands,  what  may  it 
not  do  in  the  hands  of  others  ?  If  those  who  go  from 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.       187 

this  state  will  find  power  accompanied  with  temptation, 
our  situation  must  be  truly  critical.  When  about  form 
ing  a  government,  if  we  mistake  the  principles,  or  com 
mit  any  other  error,  the  very  circumstance  promises 
that  power  will  be  abused.  The  greatest  caution  and 
circumspection  are  therefore  necessary :  nor  does  this 
proposed  system  in  its  investigation  here,  deserve  the 
least  charity. 

The  honorable  .  member  says,  that  the  national 
government  is  without  energy.  I  perfectly  agree  with 
him  :  and  when  he  cried  out  union,  I  agreed  with  him  : 
but  I  tell  him  not  to  mistake  the  end  for  the  means. 
The  end  is  union ;  the  most  capital  means,  I  suppose, 
are  an  army  and  navy :  on  a  supposition  I  will  ac 
knowledge  this  ;  still  the  bare  act  of  agreeing  to  that 
paper,  though  it  may  have  an  amazing  influence,  will 
not  pay  our  millions.  There  must  be  things  to  pay 
debts.  What  these  things  are,  or  how  they  are  to  be 
produced,  must  be  determined  by  our  political  wisdom 
and  economy. 

The  honorable  gentleman  alledges,  that  previous 
amendments  will  prevent  the  junction  of  our  riches 
from  producing  great  profits  and  emoluments,  (which 
would  enable  us  to  pay  our  public  debts,)  by  exclud 
ing  us  from  the  union.  I  believe,  sir,  that  a  previous 
ratification  of  a  system  notoriously  and  confessedly  de 
fective,  will  endanger  our  riches ;  our  liberty;  our  all. 
Its  defects  are  acknowledged ;  they  cannot  be  denied. 
The  reason  offered'  by  the  honorable  gentleman  for 
adopting  this  defective  system,  is  the  adoption  by  eight 
states.  I  say,  sir,  that,  if  we  present  nothing  but  what 
is  reasonable  in  the  shape  of  amendments,  they  will  re 
ceive  us.  Union  is  as  necessary  for  them  as  for  us. 
Will  they  then  be  so  unreasonable  as  not  to  join  us  ? 
If  such  be  their  disposition,  I  am  happy  to  know  it  in 
time. 

The  honorable  member  then  observed,  that  nations 
will  expend  millions  for  commercial  advantages  :  that 
is,  they  will  deprive  you  of  every  advantage  if  they  can. 


188  MR.   HENRY'S   SPEECH  ON 

Apply  this  another  way.  Their  cheaper  way,  instead 
of  laying  out  millions  in  making  war  upon  you.  will  be 
to  corrupt  your  senators.  I  know  that  if  they  be  not 
above  all  price,  they  may  make  a  sacrifice  of  our 
commercial  interests.  They  may  advise  your  president 
to  make  a  treaty  that  will  not  only  sacrifice  all  your 
commercial  interests,  but  throw  prostrate  your  bill  of 
rights.  Does  he  fear  that  their  ships  will  outnumber 
ours  on  the  ocean,  or  that  nations,  whose  interests 
come  in  contrast  with  ours,  in  the  progress  of  their 
guilt,  will  perpetrate  the  vilest  expedients  to  exclude 
us  from  a  participation  in  commercial  advantages  ? 
Does  he  advise  us,  in  order  to  avoid  this  evil,  to  adopt 
a  constitution,  which  will  enable  such  nations  to  obtain 
their  ends  by  the  more  easy  mode  of  contaminating  the 
principles  of  our  senators  ?  Sir,  if  our  senators  will 
not  be  corrupted,  it  will  be  because  they  will  be  good 
men;  and  not  because  the  constitution  provides 
against  corruption;  for  there  is  no  real  check  secured 
in  it,  and  the  most  abandoned  and  profligate  acts  may 
with  impunity  be  committed  by  them. 

With  respect  to  Maryland,  what  danger  from 
thence  ?  I  know  none.  I  have  not  heard  of  any  hos 
tility  premeditated  or  committed.  Nine  tenths  of  the 
people  have  not  heard  of  it.  Those  who  are  so  happy 
as  to  be  illumined,  have  not  informed  their  fellow-citi 
zens  of  it.  I  am  so  valiant  as  to  say,  that  no  danger 
can  come  from  that  source,  sufficient  to  make  me 
abandon  my  republican  principles.  The  honorable 
gentleman  ought  to  have  recollected,  that  there  were 
no  tyrants  in  America,  as  there  are  in  Europe :  the 
citizens  of  republican  borders  are  only  terrible  to  ty 
rants  :  instead  of  being  dangerous  to  one  another, 
they  mutually  support  one  another's  liberties.  We 
might  be  confederated  with  the  adopting  states,  with 
out  ratifying  this  system.  No  form  of  government 
renders  a  people  more  formidable.  A  confederacy  of 
states  joined  together,  becomes  strong  as  the  United 
Netherlands.  The  government  of  Holland,  (execrated 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

as  it  is,)  proves  that  the  present  confederation  is  ade 
quate  to  every  purpose  of  human  association.  There 
are  seven  provinces  confederated  together  for  a  long 
time,  containing  numerous  opulent  cities  and  many  of 
the  finest  ports  in  the  world.  The  recollection  of  the 
situation  of  that  country,  would  make  me  execrate 
monarchy.  The  singular  felicity  and  success  of  that 
people,  are  unparalleled ;  freedom  has  done  miracles 
there  in  reclaiming  land  from  the  ocean.  It  is  the 
richest  spot  on  the  face  of  the  globe.  Have  they  no 
men  or  money  ?  Have  they  no  fleets  or  armies  ? 
Have  they  no  arts  or  sciences  among  them  ?  How 
did  they  repel  the  attacks  of  the  greatest  nations  in 
the  world  ?  How  have  they  acquired  their  amazing  in 
fluence  and  power  ?  Did  they  consolidate  govern 
ment,  to  effect  these  purposes  as  we  do  ?  No,  sir,  they 
have  triumphed  over  every  obstacle  and  difficulty, 
and  have  arrived  at  the  summit  of  political  felicity, 
and  of  uncommon  opulence,  by  means  of  a  confede 
racy  ;  that  very  government  which  gentlemen  affect  to 
despise.  They  have,  sir,  avoided  a  consolidation  as 
the  greatest  of  evils.  They  have  lately,  it  is  true, 
made  one  advance  to  that  fatal  progression.  This 
misfortune  burst  on  them  by  iniquity  and  artifice. 
That  stadtholder,  that  executive  magistrate,  contriv 
ed  it,  in  conjunction  with  other  European  nations.  It 
was  not  the  choice  of  the  people.  Was  it  owing  to 
his  energy  that  this  happened  ?  If  two  provinces  have 
paid  nothing,  what  have  not  the  rest  done  ?  And  have 
not  these  two  provinces  made  other  exertions  ?  Ought 
they  to  avoid  this  inconvenience,  to  have  consolidated 
their  different  states,  and  have  a  ten  miles  square  ? 
Compare  that  little  spot,  nurtured  by  liberty,  with  the 
fairest  country  in  the  world.  Does  not  Holland  pos- 
vsess  a  powerful  navy  and  army,  and  a  full  treasury  ? 
They  did  not  acquire  these  by  debasing  the  principles 
and  trampling  on  the  rights  of  their  citizens.  Sir,  they 
acquired  these  by  their  industry,  economy,  and  by  the 
freedom  of  their  government.  Their  commerce  is  the 


190  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

most  extensive  in  Europe  :  their  credit  is  unequalled  : 
their  felicity  will  be  an  eternal  monument  of  the  bless 
ings  of  liberty ;  every  nation  in  Europe  is  taught  by 
them  what  they  are,  and  what  they  ought  to  be.  The 
contrast  between  those  nations  and  this  happy  people, 
is  the  most  splendid  spectacle  for  republicans:  the 
greatest  cause  of  exultation  and  triumph  to  the  sons 
of  freedom.  While  other  nations,  precipitated  by  the 
rage  of  ambition  or  folly,  have,  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
most  magnificent  projects,  rivetted  the  fetters  of  bond 
age  on  themselves  and  their  descendants,  these  repub 
licans  have  secured  their  political  happiness  and  free 
dom.  Where  is  there  a  nation  to  be  compared  to  them  ? 
Where  is  there  now,  or  where  was  there  ever  a  nation, 
of  so  small  a  territory,  and  so  few  in  number,  so 
powerful,  so  wealthy,  so  happy  ?  What  is  the 
cause  of  this  superiority?  Liberty,  sir,  the  freedom 
of  their  government.  Though  they  are  now  unhap 
pily  in  some  degree  consolidated,  yet  they  have 
my  acclamations,  when  put  in  contrast  with  those 
millions  of  their  fellow-men  who  lived  and  died  slaves. 
The  dangers  of  a  consolidation  ought  to  be  guarded 
against  in  this  country.  I  shall  exert  my  poor  talents 
to  ward  them  off.  Dangers  are  to  be  apprehended  in 
whatever  manner  we  proceed  :  but  those  of  a  consoli 
dation  are  the  most  destructive.  Let  us  leave  no  ex 
pedient  untried  to  secure  happiness ;  but  whatever  be 
our  decision,  I  am  consoled,  if  American  liberty  will  re 
main  entire,  only  for  half  a  century ;  and  I  trust  that 
mankind  in  general,  and  our  posterity  in  particular, 
will  be  compensated  for  every  anxiety  we  now  feel. 

Another  gentleman  tells  us,  that  no  inconvenience 
will  result  from  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation 
by  the  general  government ;  that  two  shillings  out  of 
ten  may  be  saved  by  the  impost ;  and  that  four  shillings 
may  be  paid  to  the  federal  collector,  and  four  to  the 
state  collector.  A  change  of  government  will  not  pay 
money.  If  from  the  probable  amount  of  the  impost,  you 
take  the  enormous  and  extravagant  expenses,  which 


TH£  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  191 

will  certainly  attend  the  support  of  this  great  con 
solidated  government,  I  believe  you  will  find  no  reduc 
tion  of  the  public  burdens  by  this  new  system.  The 
splendid  maintenance  of  the  president  and  of  the 
members  of  both  houses ;  and  the  salaries  and  fees  of 
the  swarm  of  officers  and  dependants  on  the  gov 
ernment,  will  cost  this  continent  immense  sums.  Double 
sets  of  collectors  will  double  the  expense.  To  these 
are  to  be  added  oppressive  excise-men  and  custom 
house  officers.  Sir,  the  people  have  an  hereditary  ha 
tred  to  custom-house  officers.  The  experience  of  the 
mother  country  leads  me  to  detest  them.  They  have 
introduced  their  baneful  influence  into  the  administra 
tion,  and  destroyed  one  of  the, most  beautiful  systems 
that  ever  the  world  saw.  Our  forefathers  enjoyed 
liberty  there,  while  that  system  was  in  its  purity,  but 
it  is  now  contaminated  by  influence  of  every  kind. 

The  style  of  the  government,  (we  the  people,)  was 
introduced,  perhaps,  to  recommend  it  to  the  people  at 
large ;  to  those  citizens  who  are  to  be  levelled  and  de 
graded  to  the  lowest  degree,  who  are  likened  to  a 
herd,  and  who,  by  the  operation  of  this  blessed  sys 
tem,  are  to  be  transformed  from  respectable,  indepen 
dent  citizens,  to  abject,  dependent  subjects  or  slaves. 
The  honorable  gentleman  has  anticipated  what  we  arc 
to  be  reduced  to,  by  degradingly  assimilating  our  citi 
zens  to  a  herd. 

[Here  Mr.  Randolph  rose,  and  declared  that  he  did 
not  use  that  word  to  excite  any  odium,  but  merely  to 
convey  the  idea  of  a  multitude.] 

Mr.  Henry  replied,  that  it  made  a  deep  impression 
on  his  mind,  and  that  he  verily  believed,  that  system 
would  operate  as  he  had  said.  [He  then  continued] — 
I  will  exchange  that  abominable  word  for  requisitions ; 
requisitions  which  gentlemen  affect  to  despise,  have 
nothing  degrading  in  them.  On  this  depends  our  po 
litical  prosperity.  I  never  will  give  up  that  darling 
word,  requisitions ;  my  country  may  give  it  up ;  a  ma 
jority  may  wrest  it  from  me,  but  I  will  never  give  it  up 


192  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

till  my  grave.  Requisitions  are  attended  with  one  sin 
gular  advantage.  They  are  attended  by  deliberation. 
They  secure  to  the  states  the  benefit  of  correcting  op 
pressive  errors.  If  our  assembly  thought  requisitions 
erroneous,  if  they  thought  the  demand  was  too 
great,  they  might  at  least  supplicate  Congress  to  re 
consider,  that  it  was  a  little  too  much.  The  power  of 
direct  taxation  was  called  by  the  honorable  gentleman 
the  soul  of  the  government :  another  gentleman  called 
it  the  lungs  of  the  government.  We  all  agree,  that  it 
is  the  most  important  part  of  the  body  politic.  If  the 
power  of  raising  money  be  necessary  for  the  general 
government,  it  is  no  less  so  for  the  states.  If  money 
be  the  vitals  of  Congress,  is  it  not  precious  for  those 
individuals  from  whom  it  is  to  be  taken  ?  Must  I  give 
my  soul,  my  lungs,  to  Congress  ?  Congress  must  have 
our  souls ;  the  state  must  have  our  souls.  This  is  dis 
honorable  and  disgraceful.  These  two  co-ordinate, 
interfering,  unlimited  powers  of  harassing  the  com 
munity,  are  unexampled — unprecedented  in  history: 
they  are  the  visionary  projects  of  modern  politicians : 
tell  me  not  of  imaginary  means,  but  of  reality :  this  po 
litical  solecism  will  never  tend  to  the  benefit  of  the 
community.  It  will  be  as  oppressive  in  practice  as  it 
is  absurd  in  theory.  If  you  part  from  this,  which  the 
honorable  gentleman  tells  you  is  the  soul  of  Congress, 
you  will  be  inevitably  ruined.  I  tell  you,  they  shall  not 
have  the  soul  of  Virginia.  They  tell  us,  that  one  col 
lector  may  collect  the  federal  and  state  taxes.  The 
general  government  being  paramount  to  the  state  le 
gislatures,  if  the  sheriff  is  to  collect  for  both — his  right 
hand  for  the  Congress,  his  left  for  the  state — his  right 
hand  being  paramount  over  the  left,  his  collections  will 
go  to  Congress.  We  will  have  the  rest.  Deficiences 
in  collections  will  always  operate  against  the  states. 
Congress  being  the  paramount,  supreme  power,  must 
not  be  disappointed.  Thus  Congress  will  have  an  un 
limited,  unbounded  command  over  the  soul  of  this 
commonwealth.  After  satisfying  their  uncontrolled 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  193 

demands,  what  can  be  left  for  the  states  ?  Not  a  suf 
ficiency  even  to  defray  the  expense  of  their  internal 
administration.  They  must  therefore  glide  impercep 
tibly  and  gradually  out  of  existence.  This,  sir,  must 
naturally  terminate  in  a  consolidation.  If  this  will  do 
for  other  people,  it  never  will  do  for  me. 

If  we  are  to  have  one  representative  for  every  thirty 
thousand  souls,  it  must  be  by  implication.  The  con 
stitution  does  not  positively  secure  it.  Even  say  it  is 
a  natural  implication,  why  not  give  us  a  right  to  that, 
proportion  in  express  terms,  in  language  that  could 
not  admit  of  evasions  or  subterfuges  ?  If  they  can  use 
implication  for  us,  they  can  also  use  implication  against 
us.  We  are  giving  power ;  they  are  getting  power : 
judge  then,  on  which  side  the  implication  will  be  used. 
When  we  once  put  it  in  their  option  to  assume  con 
structive  power,  danger  will  follow.  Trial  by  jury,  and 
liberty  of  the  press,  are  also  on  this  foundation  of  im 
plication.  If  they  encroach  on  these  rights,  and  you 
give  your  implication  for  a  plea,  you  are  cast ;  for  they 
will  be  justified  by  the  last  part  of  it,  which  gives  them 
full  power  "  To  make  all  laws  which  shall  be  necessa 
ry  and  proper  to  carry  their  powers  into  execution." 
Implication  is  dangerous,  because  it  is  unbounded :  it' 
it  be  admitted  at  all,  and  no  limits  be  prescribed,  it 
admits  of  the  utmost  extension.  They  say,  that  every 
thing  that  is  not  given  is  retained.  The  reverse  of  the 
proposition  is  true  by  implication.  They  do  not  carry 
their  implication  so  far  when  they  speak  of  the  gene 
ral  welfare.  No  implication  when  the  sweeping  clause 
comes.  Implication  is  only  necessary  when  the  ex 
istence  of  privileges  is  in  dispute.  The  existence  of 
powers  is  sufficiently  established.  If  we  trust  our  dear 
est  rights  to  implication,  we  shall  be  in  a  very  unhap 
py  situation. 

Implication  in  England  has  been  a  source  of  dissen 
sion.  There  has  been  a  war  of  implication  between 
the  king  and  people.  For  one  hundred  years  did  the 
mother  country  struggle  under  the  uncertainty  of  im- 

VOL,  i  25 


194  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

plication.  The  people  insisted  that  their  rights  were 
implied:  the  monarch  denied  the  doctrine.  Their 
bill  of  rights  in  some  degree  terminated  the  dispute. 
By  a  bold  implication,  they  said  they  had  a  right  to 
bind  us  in  all  cases  whatsoever.  This  constructive 
power  we  opposed,  and  successfully.  Thirteen  or 
fourteen  years  ago,  the  most  important  thing  that 
eould  be  thought  of,  was  to  exclude  the  possibility  of 
construction  and  implication.  These,  sir,  were  then 
deemed  perilous.  The  first  thing  that  was  thought  of, 
was  a  bill  of  rights.  We  were  not  satisfied  with  your 
constructive  argumentative  rights. 

Mr.  Henry  then  declared,  a  bill  of  rights  indispensa 
bly  necessary ;  that  a  general  positive  provision  should 
be  inserted  in  the  new  system,  securing  to  the  states 
and  the  people,  every  right  which  was  not  conceded 
to  the  general  government ;  and  that  every  implica 
tion  should  be  done  away.  It  being  now  late,  he  con 
cluded  by  observing,  that  he  would  resume  the  sub 
ject  another  time. 

On  the  9th,  Mr.  Henry  continued  his  remarks  as  follows  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

I  find  myself  again  constrained  to  trespass  on  the 
patience  of  this  committee.  I  wish  there  was  a  pros 
pect  of  union  in  our  sentiments ;  so  much  time  would 
not  then  be  taken  up.  But  when  I  review  the  magni 
tude  of  the  subject  under  consideration,  and  of  the 
dangers  which  appear  to  me  in  this  new  plan  of  gov 
ernment,  and  compare  thereto  my  poor  abilities  to 
secure  our  rights,  it  will  take  much  more  time,  in  my 
poor  unconnected  way,  to  traverse  the  objectionable 
parts  of  it ;  there  are  friends  here  who  will  be  abler 
than  myself,  to  make  good  these  objections  which  to 
us  appear  well  founded.  If  we  recollect,  on  last  Sa 
turday,  I  made  some  observations  on  some  of  those 
dangers,  which  these  gentlemen  would  fain  persuade 
us  hang  over  the  citizens  of  this  commonwealth,  to 
induce  us  to  change  the  government,  and  adopt  the 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  195 

new  plan.  Unless  there  be  great  and  awful  dangers, 
the  change  is  dangerous,  and  the  experiment  ought 
not  to  be  made.  In  estimating  the  magnitude  of  these 
dangers,  we  are  obliged  to  take  a  most  serious  view 
of  them,  to  feel  them,  to  handle  them,  and  to  be  fami 
liar  with  them.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  feign  mere  ima 
ginary  dangers:  there  must  be  a  dreadful  reality. 
The  great  question  between  us  is,  does  that  reality 
exist  ?  These  dangers  are  partially  attributed  to  bad 
laws,  execrated  by  the  community  at  large.  It  is  said 
the  people  wish  to  change  the  government.  I  should 
be  happy  to  meet  them  on  that  ground.  Should  the 
people  wish  to  change  it,  we  should  be  innocent  of  the 
dangers.  It  is  a  fact,  that  the  people  do  not  wish  to 
change  their  government.  How  am  I  to  prove  it? 
It  will  rest  on  my  bare  assertion,  unless  supported  by 
an  internal  conviction  in  men's  breasts.  My  poor  say- 
so  is  a  mere  non-entity.  But,  sir.  I  am  persuaded  that 
four  fifths  of  the  people  of  Virginia  must  have  amend 
ments  to  the  new  plan,  to  reconcile  them  to  a  change 
of  their  government.  Our  assertions  form  but  a  slip 
pery  foundation  for  the  people  to  rest  their  political 
salvation  on.  No  government  can  flourish  unless  it  be 
founded  on  the  affection  of  the  people.  Unless  gentle 
men  can  be  sure,  that  this  new  system  is  founded  on 
that  ground,  they  ought  to  stop  their  career. 

I  will  not  repeat  what  the  gentlemen  say,  but  will 
mention  one  thing.  There  is  a  dispute  between  us 
and  the  Spaniards,  about  the  right  of  navigating  the 
Mississippi.  This  dispute  has  sprung  from  the  fede 
ral  government.  I  wish  a  great  deal  to  be  said  on  thi? 
subject.  I  wish  to  know  the  origin  and  progress  of 
the  business,  as  it  would  probably  unfold  great  dan 
gers.  In  my  opinion,  the  preservation  of  that  river 
calls  for  our  most  serious  consideration.  It  has  been 
agitated  in  Congress.  Seven  states  have  voted  so  as 
that  it  is  known  to  the  Spaniards,  that  under  our  ex 
isting  system,  the  Mississippi  shall  be  taken  from  them. 
Seven  states  wished  to  relinquish  this  river  to  then* 


J96  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

The  six  southern  states  opposed  it.  Seven  states  not 
being  sufficient  to  convey  it  away,  it  remains  now 
ours.  If  I  am  wrong,  there  are  a  number  on  this  floor, 
who  can  contradict  the  facts ;  I  will  readily  retract. 
This  new  government,  I  conceive,  will  enable  those 
states,  who  have  already  discovered  their  inclination 
that  way,  to  give  away  this  river.  Will  the  honorable 
gentleman  advise  us  to  relinquish  this  inestimable  na 
vigation,  and  place  formidable  enemies  to  our  backs  ? 
This  weak,  this  poor  confederation  cannot  secure  us. 
We  are  resolved  to  take  shelter  under  the  shield  of 
federal  authority  in  America.  The  southern  parts  of 
America  have  been  protected  by  that  weakness  so 
much  execrated.  I  hope  this  will  be  explained.  I  was 
not  in  Congress  when  these  transactions  took  place, 
I  may  not  have  stated  every  fact.  I  may  have  mis 
represented  matters.  I  hope  to  be  fully  acquainted 
with  every  thing  relative  to  the  subject.  Let  us  hear 
how  the  great  and  important  right  of  navigating  that 
river  has  been  attended  to ;  and  whether  I  am  mistak 
en  in  my  opinion,  that  federal  measures  will  lose  it  to 
us  forever.  If  a  bare  majority  of  Congress  can  make 
laws,  the  situation  of  our  western  citizens  is  dreadful. 
We  are  threatened  with  danger  for  the  non-pay 
ment  of  the  debt  due  to  France.  We  have  informa 
tion  from  an  illustrious  citizen  of  Virginia,  who  is  now 
in  Paris,  which  disproves  the  suggestions  of  such  dan 
ger.  This  citizen  has  not  been  in  the  airy  regions  of 
theoretic  speculation ;  our  ambassador  is  this  worthy 
citizen.  The  ambassador  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  is  not  so  despised  as  the  honorable  gentle 
man  would  make  us  believe.  A  servant  of  a  republic 
is  as  much  respected  as  that  of  a  monarch.  The  ho 
norable  gentleman  tells  us,  that  hostile  fleets  are  to  be 
sent  to  make  reprisals  upon  us  ;  our  ambassador  tells 
you,  that  the  king  of  France  has  taken  into  considera 
tion,  to  enter  into  commercial  regulations  on  recipro 
cal  terms  with  us,  which  will  be  of  peculiar  advantage 
to  ns.  Does  this  look  like  hostility  ?  I  might  go  fur- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  197 

fher;  I  might  say,  not  from  public  authority,  but  good 
information,  that  his  opinion  is,  that  you  reject  this 
government.  His  character  and  abilities  are  in  the 
highest  estimation ;  he  is  well  acquainted,  in  every  re 
spect,  with  this  country ;  equally  so  with  the  policy  of 
the  European  nations.  This  illustrious  citizen  advises 
you  to  reject  this  government,  till  it  be  amended.  His 
sentiments  coincide  entirely  with  ours.  His  attach 
ment  to,  and  services  done  for  this  country,  are  well 
known.  At  a  great  distance  from  us,  he  remembers 
and  studies  our  happiness.  Living  amidst  splendor 
and  dissipation,  he  thinks  yet  of  bills  of  rights — thinks 
of  those  little  despised  things  called  maxims.  Let  us 
follow  the  sage  advice  of  this  common  friend  of  our 
happiness.  It  is  little  usual  for  nations  to  send  armies 
to  collect  debts.  The  house  of  Bourbon,  that  great 
friend  of  America,  will  never  attack  her  for  the  unwilling 
delay  of  payment.  Give  me  leave  to  say,  that  Europe 
is  too  much  engaged  about  objects  of  greater  impor 
tance  to  attend  to  us.  On  that  great  theatre  of  the 
world,  the  little  American  matters  vanish.  Do  you 
believe,  that  the  mighty  monarch  of  France,  beholding 
the  greatest  scenes  that  ever  engaged  the  attention  of 
a  prince  of  that  country,  will  divert  himself  from  those 
important  objects,  and  now  call  for  a  settlement  of  ac 
counts  with  America  ?  This  proceeding  is  not  war 
ranted  by  good  sense.  The  friendly  disposition  to  us, 
and  the  actual  situation  of  France,  render  the  idea  of 
danger  from  that  quarter  absurd.  Would  this  coun 
tryman  of  ours  be  fond  of  advising  us  to  a  measure 
which  he  knew  to  be  dangerous — and  can  it  be  rea 
sonably  supposed,  that  he  can  be  ignorant  of  any  pre 
meditated  hostility  against  this  country  ?  The  honor 
able  gentleman  may  suspect  the  account,  but  I  will  do 
our  friend  the  justice  to  say  that  he  would  warn  us  of 
any  danger  from  France. 

Do  you  suppose  the  Spanish  monarch  will  risk  a 
contest  with  the  United  States,  when  his  feeble  colo 
nies  are  exposed  to  them  ?  Every  advance  the  people 


I 

J98  MR.   HENRY'S   SPEECH  ON 

here  make  to  the  westward,  makes  him  tremble  for 
Mexico  and  Peru.  Despised  as  we  are  among  our 
selves  under  our  present  government,  we  are  terrible 
to  that  monarchy.  If  this  be  not  a  fact,  it  is  general 
ly  said  so. 

We  are  in  the  next  place  frightened  by  dangers  from 
Holland.  We  must  change  our  government  to  escape 
the  wrath  of  that  republic.  Holland  groans  under  a 
government  like  this  new  one.  A  stadtholder,  sir,  a 
Dutch  president  has  brought  on  that  country,  miseries 
which  will  not  permit  them  to  collect  debts  with  fleets 
or  armies.  The  wife  of  a  Dutch  stadtholder  brought 
one  hundred  thousand  men  against  that  republic,  and 
prostrated  all  opposition.  This  president  will  bring 
miseries  on  us  like  those  of  Holland.  Such  is  the  con 
dition  of  European  affairs,  that  it  would  be  unsafe  for 
them  to  send  fleets  or  armies  to  collect  debts.  But 
here,  sir,  they  make  a  transition  to  objects  of  another 
kind.  We  are  presented  with  dangers  of  a  very  un 
common  nature.  I  am  not  acquainted  with  the  arts  of 
painting.  Some  gentlemen  have  a  peculiar  talent  for 
them.  They  are  practised  with  great  ingenuity  on 
this  occasion.  As  a  counterpart  to  what  we  have 
already  been  intimidated  with,  we  are  told,  that  some 
lands  have  been  sold  which  cannot  be  found ;  and  that 
this  will  bring  war  on  this  country.  Here  the  picture 
will  not  stand  examination.  Can  it  be  supposed,  that 
if  a  few  land  speculators  and  jobbers  have  violated  the 
principles  of  probity,  that  it  will  involve  this  country  in 
war  ?  Is  there  no  redress  to  be  otherwise  obtained, 
even  admitting  the  delinquents  and  sufferers  to  be  nu 
merous  ?  When  gentlemen  are  thus  driven  to  produce 
imaginary  dangers,  to  induce  this  convention  to  assent 
to  this  change,  I  am  sure  it  will  not  be  uncandid  to  say, 
that  the  change  itself  is  really  dangerous.  Then  the 
Maryland  compact  is  broken,  and  will  produce  peril 
ous  consequences.  I  see  nothing  very  terrible  in  this. 
The  adoption  of  the  new  system  will  not  remove  the 
evil  Will  they  forfeit  good  neighborhood  with  us,  be- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  199 

cause  the  compact  is  broken  ?  Then  the  disputes  con 
cerning  the  Carolina  line  are  to  involve  us  in  dangers. 
A  strip  of  land  running  from  the  westward  of  the 
Allegany  to  the  Mississippi,  is  the  subject  of  this 
pretended  dispute.  I  do  not  know  the  length  or  breadth 
of  this  disputed  spot.  Have  they  not  regularly  con 
firmed  our  right  to  it  and  relinquished  all  claims  to  it  ? 
I  can  venture  to  pledge,  that  the  people  of  Carolina 
will  never  disturb  us.  The  strength  of  this  despised 
country  has  settled  an  immense  tract  of  country  to 
the  westward.  Give  me  leave  to  remark,  that  the 
honorable  gentleman's  observations  on  our  frontiers, 
north  and  south,  east  and  west,  are  all  inaccurate. 

Will  Maryland  fight  against  this  country  for  seeking 
amendments  ?  Were  there  not  sixty  members  in  that 
state  who  went  in  quest  of  amendments  ?  Sixty  against 
eight  or  ten  were  in  favor  of  pursuing  amendments. 
Shall  they  fight  us  for  doing  what  they  themselves 
have  done  ?  They  have  sought  amendments,  but  dif 
ferently  from  the  manner  in  which  I  wish  amendments 
to  be  got.  The  honorable  gentleman  may  plume  him 
self  on  this  difference.  Will  they  fight  us  for  this  dis 
similarity  ?  Will  they  fight  us  for  seeking  the  object 
they  seek  themselves  ?  When  they  do,  it  will  be  time 
for  me  to  hold  my  peace.  Then,  sir,  comes  Pennsylva 
nia,  in  terrible  array.  Pennsylvania  is  to  go  in  conflict 
with  Virginia.  Pennsylvania  has  been  a  good  neigh 
bor  heretofore.  She  is  federal — something  terrible : 
Virginia  cannot  look  her  in  the  face.  If  we  sufficiently 
attend  to  the  actual  situation  of  things,  we  will  con 
clude,  that  Pennsylvania  will  do  what  we  do.  A  num 
ber  of  that  country  are  strongly  opposed  to  it.  Many 
of  them  have  lately  been  convinced  of  its  fatal  ten 
dency.  They  are  disgorged  of  their  federalism.  I 
beseech  you  to  bring  this  matter  home  to  yourselves. 
Was  there  a  possibility  for  the  people  of  that  state  to 
know  the  reasons  of  adopting  that  system  or  under 
stand  its  principles,  in  so  very  short  a  period  after  its 
formation?  This  is  the  middle  of  June.  Those 


200  M&.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

transactions  happened  last  August.  The  matter  was 
circulated  by  every  effort  of  industry,  and  the  most 
precipitate  measures  taken  to  hurry  the  people  into  an 
adoption.  Yet  now,  after  having  had  several  months 
since  to  investigate  it,  a  very  large  part  of  this  commu 
nity — -a  very  great  majority  of  this  community,  do 
not  understand  it.  I  have  heard  gentlemen  of  re 
spectable  abilities  declare  they  did  not  understand 
it.  If  after  great  pains,  men  of  high  learning,  who 
have  received  the  aid  of  a  regular  education,  do  not 
understand  it ;  if  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  under 
stood  it  in  so  short  a  time,  it  must  have  been  from  in 
tuitive  understandings,  and  uncommon  acuteness  of 
perception.  Place  yourselves  in  their  situation  ;  would 
you  fight  your  neighbors  for  considering  this  great 
and  awful  matter  ?  If  you  wish  for  real  amendments, 
such  as  the  security  of  the  trial  by  jury,  it  will  reach 
the  hearts  of  the  people  of  that  state.  Whatever  may 
be  the  disposition  of  the  aristocratical  politicians  of 
that  country,  I  know  there  are  friends  of  human  na 
ture  in  that  state.  If  so,  they  will  never  make  war  on 
those  who  make  professions  of  what  they  are  attached 
to  themselves. 

As  to  the  danger  arising  from  borderers,  it  is  mutual 
and  reciprocal.  If  it  be  dangerous  for  Virginia,  it  is 
equally  so  for  them.  It  will  be  their  true  interest  to 
be  united  with  us.  The  danger  of  our  being  their  ene 
mies,  will  be  a  prevailing  argument  in  our  favor.  It 
will  be  as  powerful  to  admit  us  into  the  union,  as  a  vote 
of  adoption  without  previous  amendments  could  pos 
sibly  be. 

Then  the  savage  Indians  are  to  destroy  us.  We 
cannot  look  them  in  the  face.  The  danger  is  here  di 
vided  ;  they  are  as  terrible  to  the  other  states  as  to 
us :  but,  sir,  it  is  well  known  that  we  have  nothing  to 
fear  from  them.  Our  back  settlers  are  considerably 
stronger  than  they,  and  their  superiority  increases 
daily.  Suppose  the  states  to  be  confederated  all 
around  us,  what  we  want  in  number,  we  shall  make  up 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  201 

otherwise.  Our  compact  situation  and  natural  strength 
will  secure  us.  But  to  avoid  all  dangers,  we  must  take 
shelter  under  the  federal  government.  Nothing  gives 
a  decided  importance  but  this  federal  government. 
You  will  sip  sorrow,  according  to  the  vulgar  phrase,  if 
you  want  any  other  security  than  the  laws  of  Virginia. 
•  A  number  of  characters  of  the  greatest  eminence  in 
this  country,  object  to  this  government,  for  its  conso 
lidating  tendency.  This  is  not  imaginary.  It  is  a 
formidable  reality.  If  consolidation  proves  to  be  as 
mischievous  to  this  country,  as  it  has  been  to  other 
countries,  what  will  the  poor  inhabitants  of  this  country 
do  ?  This  government  will  operate  like  an  ambus- 
ca.de.  It  will  destroy  the  state  governments,  and  swal 
low  up  the  liberties  of  the  people,  without  giving  them 
previous  notice.  If  gentlemen  are  willing  to  run  the 
hazard,  let  them  run  it ;  but  I  shall  exculpate  myself 
by  my  opposition,  and  monitory  warnings  within  these 
walls.  But  then  comes  paper  money.  We  are  at 
peace  on  this  subject.  Though  this  is  a  thing  which 
that  mighty  federal  convention  had  no  business  with, 
yet  I  acknowledge  that  paper  money  would  be  the  bane 
of  this  country.  I  detest  it.  Nothing  can  justify  a 
people  in  resorting  to  it,  but  extreme  necessity.  It  is 
at  rest,  however,  in  this  commonwealth.  It  is  no  longer 
solicited  or  advocated. 

Sir,  I  ask  you,  and  every  other  gentleman  who  hears 
me,  if  he  can  restrain  his  indignation  at  a  system, 
which  takes  from  the  state  legislatures  the  care  and 
preservation  of  the  interests  of  the  people ;  one  hun 
dred  and  eighty  representatives^  the  choice  of  the  peo 
ple  of  Virginia,  cannot  be  trusted  with  their  interests. 
They  are  a  mobbish,  suspected  herd.  This  country 
has  not  virtue  enough  to  manage  its  own  internal  inter 
ests.  These  must  be  referred  to  the  chosen  ten.  If 
we  cannot  be  trusted  with  the  private  contracts  of  the 
citizens,  we*  must  be  depraved  indeed.  If  he  can 
prove,  that,  by  one  uniform  system  of  abandoned  princi 
ples,  the  legislature  has  betrayed  the  rights  of  the  peo 

VOL.  i.  26 


202  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  Oft 

pie,  then  let  us  seek  another  shelter.  So  degrading 
an  indignity — so  flagrant  an  outrage  on  the  states — so 
vile  a  suspicion  is  humiliating  to  my  mind,  and  many 
others. 

Will  the  adoption  of  this  new  plan  pay  our  debts  ? 
This,  sir,  is  a  plain  question.  It  is  inferred,  that  our 
grievances  are  to  be  redressed,  and  the  evils  of  the 
existing  system  to  be  removed  by  the  new  constitution. 
Let  me  inform  the  honorable  gentleman,  that  no  nation 
ever  paid  its  debts  by  a  change  of  government,  with 
out  the  aid  of  industry.  You  never  will  pay  your  debts 
but  by  a  radical  change  of  domestic  economy.  At 
present,  you  buy  too  much,  and  make  too  little  to  pay. 
Will  this  new  system  promote  manufactures,  industry 
and  frugality  ?  If,  instead  of  this,  your  hopes  and  de 
signs  will  be  disappointed,  you  relinquish  a  great 
deal,  and  hazard  infinitely  more  for  nothing.  Will  it 
enhance  the  value  of  your  lands  ?  Will  it  lessen  your 
burdens  ?  Will  your  looms  and  wheels  go  to  work 
by  the  act  of  adoption  ?  If  it  will  in  its  consequences 
produce  these  things,  it  will  consequently  produce  a 
reform,  and  enable  you  to  pay  your  debts.  Gentlemen 
must  prove  it.  I  am  a  sceptic — an  infidel  on  this 
point.  I  cannot  conceive  that  it  will  have  these  happy 
consequences.  I  cannot  confide  in  assertions  and  al 
legations.  The  evils  that  attend  us,  lie  in  extrava 
gance  and  want  of  industry,  and  can  only  be  removed 
by  assiduity  and  economy.  Perhaps  we  shall  be  told 
by  gentlemen,  that  these  things  will  happen,  because 
the  administration  is  to  be  taken  from  us,  and  placed 
in  the  hands  of  the  luminous  few,  who  will  pay  differ 
ent  attention,  and  be  more  studiously  careful  than  we 
can  be  supposed  to  be. 

With  respect  to  the  economical  operation  of  the 
new  government,  I  will  only  remark,  that  the  national 
expenses  will  be  increased — if  not  doubled,  it  will  ap 
proach  it  very  near.  I  might,  without  incurring  the 
imputation  of  illiberality  or  extravagance,  say,  that  the 
expense  will  be  multiplied  tenfold.  I  might  tell  you 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  203 

of  a  numerous  standing  army;  a  great,  powerful 
navy ;  a  long  and  rapacious  train  of  officers  and  de 
pendents,  independent  of  the  president,  senators  and 
representatives,  whose  compensations  are  without 
limitation.  How  are  our  debts  to  be  discharged  un 
less  the  taxes  are  increased,  when  the  expenses  of 
government  are  so  greatly  augmented  ?  The  defects 
of  this  system  are  so  numerous  and  palpable,  and  so 
many  states  object  to  it,  that  no  union  can  be  expected, 
unless  it  be  amended.  Let  us  take  a  review  of  the 
facts.  New  Hampshire  and  Rhode  Island  have  re 
jected  it.  They  have  refused  to  become  federal. 
New  York  and  North  Carolina  are  reported  to  be 
strongly  against  it.  From  high  authority,  give  me 
leave  to  tell,  that  New  York  is  in  high  opposition. 
Will  any  gentleman  say  that  North  Carolina  is  not 
against  it  ?  They  may  say  so,  but  I  say  that  the  adop 
tion  of  it,  in  those  two  states,  amounts  to  entire  un 
certainty.  The  system  must  be  amended  before  these 
four  states  will  accede  to  it.  Besides,  there  are  seve 
ral  other  states  who  are  dissatisfied,  and  wish  altera 
tions.  Massachusetts  has,  in  decided  terms,  proposed 
amendments ;  but  by  her  previous  ratification,  has  put 
the  cart  before  the  horse.  Maryland  instituted  a  com 
mittee  to  propose  amendments.  It  then  appears,  that 
two  states  have  actually  refused  to  adopt — two  of 
those  who  have  adopted,  have  a  desire  of  amending. 
And  there  is  a  probability  of  its  being  rejected  by 
New  York  and  North  Carolina.  The  other  states  have 
acceded  without  proposing  amendments.  With  re 
spect  to  them,  local  circumstances  have,  in  my  judg 
ment,  operated  to  produce  its  unconditional,  instantane 
ous  adoption.  The  locality  of  the  seat  of  government, 
ten  miles  square,  and  the  seat  of  justice,  with  all  their 
concomitant  emoluments,  operated  so  powerfully  with 
the  first  adopting  state,  that  it  was  adopted  without 
taking  time  to  reflect.  We  are  told  that  numerous  ad 
vantages  will  result  from  the  concentration  of  the 
wealth  and  grandeur  of  the  United  States  in  one  happy 


204  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  OK 

spot,  to  those  who  will  reside  in  or  near  it.  Prospects 
of  profit  and  emoluments  have  a  powerful  influence  on 
the  human  mind.  We,  sir,  have  no  such  projects  as 
that  of  a  grand  seat  of  government  for  thirteen  states, 
and  perhaps  for  one  hundred  states  hereafter.  Con 
necticut  and  New  Jersey  have  their  localities  also. 
New  York  lies  between  them.  They  have  no  ports, 
and  are  not  importing  states.  New  York  is  an  im 
porting  state,  and  taking  advantage  of  its  situation, 
makes  them  pay  duties  for  all  the  articles  of  their  con 
sumption  :  thus,  these  two  states  being  obliged  to  im 
port  all  they  want,  through  the  medium  of  New  York, 
pay  the  particular  taxes  of  that  state.  1  know  the  force 
and  effect  of  reasoning-  of  this  sort,  by  experience. 
When  the  impost  was  proposed  some  years  ago,  those 
states  which  were  not  importing  states,  readily  agreed 
to  concede  to  Congress,  the  power  of  laying  an  impost 
on  all  goods  imported  for  the  use  of  the  continental 
treasury.  Connecticut  and  New  Jersey  therefore,  are 
influenced  by  advantages  of  trade  in  their  adoption. 
The  amounts  of  all  imposts  are  to  go  into  one  common 
treasury.  This  favors  adoption  by  the  non-importing 
states ;  as  they  participate  in  the  profits  which  were 
before  exclusively  enjoyed  by  the  importing  states. 
Notwithstanding  this  obvious  advantage  to  Connecti 
cut,  there  is  a  formidable  minority  there  against  it. 
After  taking  this  general  review  of  American  affairs, 
as  respecting  federalism,  will  the  honorable  gentleman 
tell  me,  that  he  can  expect  union  in  America  ?  When 
so  many  states  are  pointedly  against  it;  when  two 
adopting  states  have  pointed  out,  in  express  terms, 
their  dissatisfaction  as  it  stands ;  and  when  there  is  so 
respectable  a  body  of  men  discontented  in  every  state, 
can  the  honorable  gentleman  promise  himself  harmony, 
of  which  he  is  so  fond  ?  If  he  can,  I  cannot.  To  me 
it  appears  unequivocally  clear,  that  we  shall  not  have 
that  harmony.  If  it  appears  to  the  other  states,  that 
our  aversion  is  founded  on  just  grounds,  will  they  not 
be  willing  to  indulge  us  ?  If  disunion  will  really  result 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  205 

from  Virginia's  proposing  amendments,  will  they  not 
wish  the  re-establishment  of  the  union,  and  admit  us. 
if  not  on  such  terms  as  we  prescribe,  yet  on  advanta 
geous  terms  ?  Is  not  union  as  essential  to  their 
happiness,  as  to  ours  ?  Sir,  without  a  radical  altera 
tion,  the  states  will  never  be  embraced  in  one  fe 
deral  pale.  If  you  attempt  to  force  it  down  men's 
throats  and  call  it  union,  dreadful  consequences  must 
follow. 

He  has  said  a  great  deal  about  disunion  and  the 
dangers  that  are  to  arise  from  it.  When  we  are  on  the 
subject  of  union  and  dangers,  let  me  ask,  how  will  his 
present  doctrine  hold  with  what  has  happened  ?  Is  it 
consistent  with  that  noble  and  disinterested  conduct, 
which  he  displayed  on  a  former  occasion  ?  Did  he  not 
tell  us  that  he  withheld  his  signature  ?  Where  then 
were  the  dangers  which  now  appear  to  him  so  formi 
dable  ?  He  saw  all  America  eagerly  confiding  that 
the  result  of  their  deliberations  would  remove  their 
distresses.  He  saw  all  America  acting  under  the  im 
pulses  of  hope,  expectation  and  anxiety,  arising  from 
their  situation  and  their  partiality  for  the  members  of 
that  convention:  yet  his  enlightened  mind,  knowing 
that  system  to  be  defective,  magnanimously  and  nobly 
refused  its  approbation.  He  was  not  led  by  the  il 
lumined — the  illustrious  few.  He  was  actuated  by  the 
dictates  of  his  own  judgment ;  and  a  better  judgment 
than  I  can  form.  He  did  not  stand  out  of  the  way  of 
information.  He  must  have  been  possessed  of  every 
intelligence.  What  alteration  have  a  few  months 
brought  about  ?  The  internal  difference  between 
right  and  wrong  does  not  fluctuate.  It  is  immutable. 
I  ask  this  question  as  a  public  man,  and  out  of  no  par 
ticular  view.  I  wish,  as  such,  to  consult  every  source 
of  information,  to  form  my  judgment  on  so  awful  a 
question.  I  had  the  highest  respect  for  the  honorable 
gentleman's  abilities.  I  considered  his  opinion  as  a 
great  authority.  He  taught  me,  sir,  in  despite  of  the 
approbation  of  that  great  federal  convention,  to  doubt 


206  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

of  the  propriety  of  that  system.  When  I  found  my 
honorable  friend  in  the  number  of  those  who  doubted, 
I  began  to  doubt  also.  I  coincided  with  him  in  opinion. 
I  shall  be  a  staunch  and  faithful  disciple  of  his.  I  ap 
plaud  that  magnanimity  which  led  him  to  withhold  his 
signature.  If  he  thinks  now  differently,  he  is  as  free 
as  I  am.  Such  is  my  situation,  that  as  a  poor  individu 
al,  I  look  for  information  every  where. 

This  government  is  so  new,  it  wants  a  name.  I  wish 
its  other  novelties  were  as  harmless  as  this.  He  told 
us,  we  had  an  American  dictator  in  the  year  1781. 
We  never  had  an  American  President.  In  making  a  dic 
tator,  we  follow  the  example  of  the  most  glorious,  mag 
nanimous  and  skilful  nations.  In  great  dangers  this 
power  has  been  given.  Rome  had  furnished  us  with 
an  illustrious  example.  America  found  a  person  wor 
thy  of  that  trust :  she  looked  to  Virginia  for  him. 
We  gave  a  dictatorial  power  to  hands  that  used  it 
gloriously ;  and  which  were  rendered  more  glorious 
by  surrendering  it  up.  Where  is  there  a  breed  of  such 
dictators  ?  Shall  we  find  a  set  of  American  presidents 
of  such  a  breed  ?  Will  the  American  President  come 
and  lay  prostrate  at  the  feet  of  Congress  his  laurels  ? 
I  fear  there  are  few  men  who  can  be  trusted  on  that 
head.  The  glorious  republic  of  Holland  has  erected 
monuments  to  her  warlike  intrepidity  and  valor :  yet 
she  is  now  totally  ruined  by  a  stadtholder ;  a  Dutch 
president.  The  destructive  wars  into  which  that  na 
tion  has  been  plunged,  has  since  involved  her  in  ambi 
tion.  The  glorious  triumphs  of  Blenheim  and  Ra- 
millies  were  not  so  conformable  to  the  genius,  nor  so 
much  to  the  true  interest  of  the  republic,  as  those  nu 
merous  and  useful  canals  and  dykes,  and  other  objects 
at  which  ambition  spurns.  That  republic  has,  however, 
by  the  industry  of  its  inhabitants,  and  policy  of  its  ma 
gistrates,  suppressed  the  ill  effects  of  ambition.  Not 
withstanding  two  of  their  provinces  have  paid  nothing, 
yet  I  hope  the  example  of  Holland  will  tell  us,  that  we 
can  live  happily  without  changing  our  present  despis- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  207 

ed  government.  Cannot  people  be  as  happy  under  a 
mild,  as  under  an  energetic  government  ?  Cannot 
content  and  felicity  be  enjoyed  in  a  republic,  as  well 
as  in  a  monarchy,  because  there  are  whips,  chains  and 
scourges  used  in  the  latter  ?  If  I  am  not  as  rich  as  my 
neighbor,  if  I  give  my  mite,  my  all,  republican  forbear 
ance  will  say,  that  it  is  sufficient.  So  said  the  honest 
confederates  of  Holland :  "  You  are  poor ;  we  are 
rich.  We  will  go  on  and  do  better,  far  better,  than  be 
under  an  oppressive  government."  Far  better  will  it 
be  for  us  to  continue  as  we  are,  than  go  under  that 
tight,  energetic  government.  I  am  persuaded  of  what 
the  honorable  gentleman  says,  that  separate  confede 
racies  will  ruin  us.  In  my  judgment,  they  are  evils 
never  to  be  thought  of  till  a  people  are  driven  by  neces 
sity.  When  he  asks  my  opinion  of  consolidation,  of 
one  power  to  reign  over  America,  with  a  strong  hand, 
I  will  tell  him,  I  am  persuaded  of  the  rectitude  of  my 
honorable  friend's  opinion,  (Mr.  Mason,)  that  one  gov 
ernment  cannot  reign  over  so  extensive  a  country  as 
this  is,  without  absolute  despotism.  Compared  to 
such  a  consolidation,  small  confederacies  are  little 
evils,  though  they  ought  to  be  rucurred  to,  but  in  case 
of  necessity.  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  are  despis 
ed.  They  could  exist  separated  from  the  rest  of  Ame 
rica.  Maryland  and  Vermont  were  not  overrun  when 
out  of  the  confederacy.  Though  it  is  not  a  desirable 
object,  yet,  I  trust,  that  on  examination  it  will  be  found, 
that  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  would  not  be  swal 
lowed  up  in  case  it  was  necessary  for  them  to  be  join 
ed  together. 

When  we  come  to  the  spirit  of  domestic  peace,  the 
humble  genius  of  Virginia  has  formed  a  government, 
suitable  to  the  genius  of  her  people.  I  believe  the 
hands,  that  formed  the  American  constitution,  triumph 
in  the  experiment.  It  proves,  that  the  man  who  form 
ed  it,  and  perhaps  by  accident,  did  what  design  could  not 
do  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  After  all  your  reforms 
in  government,  unless  you  consult  the  genius  of  the 


208  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH   ON 

inhabitants,  you  will  never  succeed ;  your  system  can 
have  no  duration.  Let  me  appeal  to  the  candor  of 
the  committee,  if  the  want  of  money  be  not  the  source 
of  all  our  misfortunes.  We  cannot  be  blamed  for  not 
making  dollars.  This  want  of  money  cannot  be  sup 
plied  by  changes  in  government.  The  only  possible 
remedy,  as  I  have  before  asserted,  is  industry  aided  by 
economy.  Compare  the  genius  of  the  people  with  the 
government  of  this  country.  Let  me  remark,  that  it 
stood  the  severest  conflict,  during  the  war,  to  which 
human  virtue  has  ever  been  called.  I  call  upon  every 
gentleman  here  to  declare,  whether  the  king  of  England 
had  any  subjects  so  attached  to  his  family  and  gov 
ernment — so  loyal  as  we  were.  But  the  genius  of 
Virginia  called  us  for  liberty ;  called  us  from  those 
beloved  endearments,  which,  from  long  habits,  we 
were  taught  to  love  and  revere.  We  entertained  from 
our  earliest  infancy,  the  most  sincere  regard  and  reve 
rence  for  the  mother  country.  Our  partiality  extend 
ed  to  a  predilection  for  her  customs,  habits,  manners 
and  laws.  Thus  inclined,  when  the  deprivation  of  our 
liberty  was  attempted,  what  did  we  do  ?  What  did  the 
genius  of  Virginia  tell  us  ?  "  Sell  all  and  purchase  li 
berty."  This  was  a  severe  conflict.  Republican 
maxims  were  then  esteemed.  Those  maxims,  and 
the  genius  of  Virginia,  landed  you  safe  on  the  shore  of 
freedom.  On  this  awful  occasion,  did  you  want  a  fe 
deral  government?  Did  federal  ideas  possess  your 
minds  ?  Did  federal  ideas  lead  you  to  the  most  splen 
did  victories  ?  I  must  again  repeat  the  favorite  idea, 
that  the  genius  of  Virginia  did,  and  will  again  lead  us 
to  happiness.  To  obtain  the  most  splendid  prize,  you 
did  not  consolidate.  You  accomplished  the  most  glo 
rious  ends,  by  the  assistance  of  the  genius  of  your  coun 
try.  Men  were  then  taught  by  that  genius,  that  they 
were  fighting  for  what  was  most  dear  to  them.  View 
the  most  affectionate  father,  the  most  tender  mother, 
operated  on  by  liberty,  nobly  stimulating  their  sons, 
their  dearest  sons,  sometimes  their  only  son,  to  ad- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  209 

vunce  to  the  defence  of  his  country.  We  have  seen 
sons  of  Cincinnatus,  without  splendid  magnificence  or 
parade,  going,  with  the  genius  of  their  great  progeni 
tor  Cincinnatus,  to  the  plough — men  who  served  their 
country  without  ruining  it ;  men  who  had  served  it  to 
the  destruction  of  their  private  patrimonies ;  their 
country  owing  them  amazing  amounts,  for  the  pay 
ment  of  which  no  adequate  provision  was  then  made. 
We  have  seen  such  men  throw  prostrate  their  arms  at 
your  feet.  They  did  not  call  for  those  emoluments, 
which  ambition  presents  to  some  imaginations.  The 
soldiers,  who  were  able  to  command  every  thing,  in 
stead  of  trampling  on  those  laws,  which  they  were  in 
stituted  to  defend,  most  strictly  obeyed  them.  The 
hands  of  justice  have  not  been  laid  on  a  single  Ameri 
can  soldier.  Bring  them  into  contrast  with  European 
veterans — you  will  see  an  astonishing  superiority  over 
the  latter.  There  has  been  a  strict  subordination  to 
the  laws.  The  honorable  gentleman's  office  gave  him 
an  opportunity  of  viewing  if  the  laws  were  administer 
ed  so  as  to  prevent  riots,  routs  and  unlawful  assemblies. 
From  his  then  situation,  he  could  have  furnished  UF 
with  the  instances  in  which  licentiousness  trampled  on 
the  laws.  Among  all  our  troubles,  we  have  paid  almost 
to  the  last  shilling,  for  the  sake  of  justice :  we  have  paid 
as  well  as  any  state ;  I  will  not  say  better.  To  sup 
port  the  general  government  and  our  own  legislature ; 
to  pay  the  interest  of  the  public  debts,  and  defray  con 
tingencies,  we  have  been  heavily  taxed.  To  add  to 
these  things,  the  distresses  produced  by  paper  money, 
and  by  tobacco  contracts,  were  sufficient  to  render 
any  people  discontented.  These,  sir,  were  great 
temptations ;  but  in  the  most  severe  conflict  of  misfor 
tunes,  this  code  of  laws — this  genius  of  Virginia,  call 
it  what  you  will,  triumphed  over  every  thing. 

Why  did  it  please  the  gentleman,  (Mr.  Corbin,)  to 
bestow  such  epithets  on  our  country  ?  Have  the 
worms  taken  possession  of  the  wood,  that  our  strong 
vessel — our  political  vessel,  has  sprung  a  leak  ?  He 

VOL.  i.  27 


Mil.   HENRY'S   SPEECH  ON 

may  know  better  than  I,  but  I  consider  such  epithets 
to  be  the  most  illiberal  and  unwarrantable  aspersions 
on  our  laws.  The  system  of  laws  under  which  we 
have  lived,  has  been  tried  and  found  to  suit  our  genius. 
I  trust  we  shall  not  change  this  happy  system.  I  can 
not  so  easily  take  leave  of  an  old  friend.  Till  I  see 
him  following  after  and  pursuing  other  objects,  which 
can  pervert  the  great  objects  of  human  legislation, 
pardon  me  if  I  withhold  my  assent. 

Some  here  speak  of  the  difficulty  in  forming  a  new 
code  of  laws.  Young  as  we  were,  it  was  not  wonder 
ful  if  there  was  a  difficulty  in  forming  and  assimilating 
one  system  of  laws.  I  shall  be  obliged  to  the  gentle 
man,  if  he  would  point  out  those  glaring,  those  great 
faults.  The  efforts  of  assimilating  our  laws  to  our 
genius  have  not  been  found  altogether  vain.  I  shall 
pass  over  some  other  circumstances  which  I  intended 
to  mention,  and  endeavor  to  come  to  the  capital  objec 
tion,  which  my  honorable  friend  made.  My  worthy 
friend  said,  that  a  republican  form  of  government 
would  not  suit  a  very  extensive  country ;  but  that  if  a 
government  were  judiciously  organized  and  limits  pre 
scribed  to  it;  an  attention  to  these  principles  might 
render  it  possible  for  it  to  exist  in  an  extensive  territo 
ry.  Whoever  will  be  bold  to  say,  that  a  continent  can 
be  governed  by  that  system,  contradicts  all  the  expe 
rience  of  the  world.  It  is  a  work  too  great  for  human 
wisdom.  Let  me  call  for  an  example.  Experience 
has  been  called  the  best  teacher.  I  call  for  an  exam 
ple  of  a  great  extent  of  country,  governed  by  one  gov 
ernment,  or  Congress,  call  it  what  you  will.  I  tell  him 
that  a  government  may  be  trimmed  up  according  to 
gentlemen's  fancy,  but  it  never  can  operate ;  it  will  be 
but  very  short-lived.  However  disagreeable  it  may  be 
to  lengthen  my  objections,  I  cannot  help  taking  no 
tice  of  what  the  honorable  gentleman  said.  To  me 
it  appears  that  there  is  no  check  in  that  government. 
The  president,  senators  and  representatives  all  imme 
diately,  or  mediately,  are  the  choice  of  the  people. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

Tell  me  not  of  checks  on  paper  ;  but  tell  me  of  checks 
founded  on  self-love.  The  English  government  is 
founded  on  self-love.  This  powerful,  irresistible  stimu 
lus  of  self-love  has  saved  that  government.  It  has 
interposed  that  hereditary  nobility  between  the  king 
and  commons.  If  the  house  of  lords  assists  or  per 
mits  the  king  to  overturn  the  liberties  of  the  people, 
the  same  tyranny  will  destroy  them ;  they  will  there 
fore  keep  the  balance  in  the  democratic  branch.  Sup 
pose  they  see  the  commons  encroach  upon  the  king ; 
self-love,  that  great,  energetic  check,  will  call  upon 
them  to  interpose ;  for,  if  the  king  be  destroyed,  their 
destruction  must  speedily  follow.  Here  is  a  conside 
ration  which  prevails  in  my  mind,  to  pronounce  the 
British  government  superior,  in  this  respect,  to  any 
government  that  ever  was  in  any  country.  Compare 
this  with  your  congressional  checks.  I  beseech  gen 
tlemen  to  consider  whether  they  can  say,  when  trust 
ing  power,  that  a  mere  patriotic  profession  will  be 
equally  operative  and  efficacious,  as  the  check  of  self- 
love.  In  considering  the  experience  of  ages,  is  it  not 
seen  that  fair,  disinterested  patriotism  and  professions 
of  attachment  to  rectitude,  have  never  been  solely 
trusted  to  by  an  enlightened,  free  people.  If  you  de 
pend  on  your  president's  and  senators'  patriotism,  you 
are  gone.  Have  you  a  resting  place  like  the  British 
government  ?  Where  is  the  rock  of  your  salvation  ? 
The  real  rock  of  political  salvation  is  self-love,  per 
petuated  from  age  to  age  in  every  human  breast,  and 
manifested  in  every  action.  If  they  can  stand  the 
temptations  of  human  nature,  you  are  safe.  If  you 
have  a  good  president,  senators  and  representatives, 
there  is  no  danger.  But  can  this  be  expected  from 
human  nature  ?  Without  real  checks,  it  will  not  suf 
fice  that  some  of  them  are  good.  A  good  president, 
or  senator,  or  representative  will  have  a  natural  weak 
ness.  Virtue  will  slumber :  the  wicked  will  be  con 
tinually  watching :  consequently  you  will  be  undone. 
Where  are  your  checks  ?  You  have  no  hereditary  no- 


•212  MR-  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

bility — an  order  of  men,  to  whom  human  eyes  can  be 
cast  up  for  relief:  for,  says  the  constitution,  there  is  no 
title  of  nobility  to  be  granted ;  which,  by  the  by,  would 
not  have  been  so  dangerous,  as  the  perilous  cession  of 
powers  contained  in  that  paper :  because,  as  Montes 
quieu  says,  when  you  give  titles  of  nobility,  you  know 
what  you  give ;  but  when  you  give  power,  you  know 
not  what  you  give.  If  you  say,  that  out  of  this  deprav 
ed  mass,  you  can  collect  luminous  characters,  it  will 
not  avail,  unless  this  luminous  breed  will  be  propagat 
ed  from  generation  to  generation ;  and  even  then,  if  the 
number  of  vicious  characters  will  preponderate,  you 
are  undone.  And  that  this  will  certainly  be  the  case, 
is,  to  my  mind,  perfectly  clear.  In  the  British  gov 
ernment,  there  are  real  balances  and  checks ;  in  this 
system,  there  are  only  ideal  balances.  Till  I  am  con 
vinced  that  there  are  actual,  efficient  checks,  I  will  not 
give  my  assent  to  its  establishment.  The  president 
and  senators  have  nothing  to  lose.  They  have  not 
that  interest  in  the  preservation  of  the  government, 
that  the  king  and  lords  have  in  England.  They  will 
therefore  be  regardless  of  the  interests  of  the  people. 
The  constitution  will  be  as  safe  with  one  body,  as  with 
two.  It  will  answer  every  purpose  of  human  legisla 
tion.  How  was  the  constitution  of  England  when  only 
the  commons  had  the  power  ?  I  need  only  remark, 
that  it  was  the  most  unfortunate  era  when  the  country 
returned  to  king,  lords  and  commons,  without  sufficient 
responsibility  in  the  king.  When  the  commons  of 
England,  in  the  manly  language  which  became  free 
men,  said  to  their  king,  you  are  our  servant,  then  the 
temple  of  liberty  was  complete.  From  that  noble 
source  have  we  derived  our  liberty :  that  spirit  of  pa 
triotic  attachment  to  one's  country,  that  zeal  for  liber 
ty,  and  that  enmity  to  tyranny,  which  signalized  the 
then  champions  of  liberty,  we  inherit  from  our  British 
ancestors.  And  I  am  free  to  own,  that  if  you  cannot 
love  a  republican  government,  you  may  love  the  Bri 
tish  monarchy :  for,  although  the  king  is  not  sufficient- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  213 

ly  responsible,  the  responsibility  of  his  agents,  and  the 
efficient  checks  interposed  by  the  British  constitution, 
render  it  less  dangerous  than  other  monarchies,  or  op 
pressive  tyrannical  aristocracies.  What  are  their 
checks  of  exposing  accounts?  Their  checks  upon 
paper  are  inefficient  and  nugatory.  Can  you  search 
your  president's  closet  ?  Is  this  a  real  check  ?  We 
ought  to  be  exceedingly  cautious  in  giving  up  this 
life,  this  soul — our  money — this  power  of  taxation  to 
Congress.  What  powerful  check  is  there  here  to  prevent 
the  most  extravagant  and  profligate  squandering  of  the 
public  money?  What  security  have  .we  in  money 
matters?  Inquiry  is  precluded  by  this  constitution. 
I  never  wish  to  see  Congress  supplicate  the  states. 
But  it  is  more  abhorrent  to  my  mind  to  give  them  an 
unlimited  and  unbounded  command  over  our  souls, 
our  lives,  our  purses,  without  any  check  or  restraint. 
How  are  you  to  keep  inquiry  alive  ?  How  discover 
their  conduct  ?  We  are  told  by  that  paper,  that  a  re 
gular  statement  and  account  of  the  receipts  and  ex 
penditures  of  all  public  money,  shall  be  published  from 
time  to  time.  Here  is  a  beautiful  check !  What 
time  ?  Here  is  the  utmost  latitude  left.  If  those  who 
are  in  Congress  please  to  put  that  construction  upon 
it,  the  words  of  the  constitution  will  be  satisfied  by  pub 
lishing  those  accounts  once  in  one  hundred  years. 
They  may  publish  or  not,  as  they  please.  Is  this  like 
the  present  despised  system,  whereby  the  accounts 
are  to  be  published  monthly  ? 

I  come  now  to  speak  something  of  requisitions, 
which  the  honorable  gentleman  thought  so  truly  con 
temptible  and  disgraceful.  That  honorable  gentleman 
being  a  child  of  the  revolution,  must  recollect  with  gra 
titude  the  glorious  effects  of  requisitions.  It  is  an 
idea  that  must  be  grateful  to  every  American.  An 
English  army  was  sent  to  compel  us  to  pay  money 
contrary  to  our  consent.  To  force  us  by  arbitrary 
and  tyrannical  coercion  to  satisfy  their  unbounded  de 
mands.  We  wished  to  pay  with  our  own  consent. 


1>14  MR.  HENRVS  SPEECH  ON 

Rather  than  pay  against  our  consent,  we  engaged  in 
that  bloody  contest,  which  terminated  so  gloriously. 
By  requisitions  we  pay  with  our  own  consent ;  by  their 
means  we  have  triumphed  in  the  most  arduous  strug 
gle  that  ever  tried  the  virtue  of  man.  We  fought  then, 
for  what  we  are  contending  now — to  prevent  an  ar 
bitrary  deprivation  of  our  property,  contrary  to  our 
consent  and  inclination.  I  shall  be  told  in  this  place, 
that  those  who  are  to  tax  us  are  our  representatives. 
To  this  I  answer,  that  there  is  no  real  check  to  prevent 
their  ruining  us.  There  is  no  actual  responsibility. 
The  only  semblance  of  a  check  is  the  negative  power 
of  not  re-electing  them.  This,  sir,  is  but  a  feeble  bar 
rier,  when  their  personal  interest,  their  ambition  and 
avarice  come  to  be  put  in  contrast  with  the  happiness 
of  the  people.  All  checks  founded  on  any  thing  but 
self-love,  will  not  avail.  This  constitution  reflects,  in 
the  most  degrading  and  mortifying  manner,  on  the  vir 
tue,  integrity  and  wisdom  of  the  state  legislatures :  it 
presupposes  that  the  chosen  few  who  go  to  Congress, 
will  have  more  upright  hearts,  and  more  enlightened 
minds,  than  those  who  are  members  of  the  individual 
legislatures.  To  suppose  that  ten  gentlemen  shall 
have  more  real  substantial  merit,  than  one  hundred 
and  seventy,  is  humiliating  to  the  last  degree.  If,  sir, 
the  diminution  of  numbers  be  an  augmentation  of  me 
rit,  perfection  must  centre  in  one.  If  you  have  the  fa 
culty  of  discerning  spirits,  it  is  better  to  point  out  at 
once  the  man  who  has  the  most  illumined  qualities. 
If  ten  men  be  better  than  one  hundred  and  seventy,  it 
follows  of  necessity  that  one  is  better  than  ten — the 
choice  is  more  refined. 

Such  is  the  danger  of  the  abuse  of  implied  power, 
that  it  would  be  safer  at  once  to  have  seven  representa 
tives,  the  number  to  which  we  are  now  entitled,  than 
depend  on  the  uncertain  and  ambiguous  language  of 
that  paper.  The  number  may  be  lessened  instead  of 
being  increased ;  and  yet  by  argumentative,  construc 
tive,  implied  power,  the  proportion  of  taxes  may  con- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  215 

tinue  the  same  or  be  increased.  Nothing  is  more 
perilous  than  constructive  power,  which  gentlemen 
are  so  willing  to  trust  their  happiness  to. 

If  sheriffs  prove  now  an  over-match  for  our  legisla 
ture  ;  if  their  ingenuity  has  eluded  the  vigilance  of  our 
laws,  how  will  the  matter  be  amended  when  they 
come  clothed  with  federal  authority?  A  strenu 
ous  argument  offered  by  gentlemen  is,  that  the  same 
sheriffs  may  collect  for  the  continental  and  state  treasu 
ries.  I  have  before  shown,  that  this  must  have  an 
inevitable  tendency  to  give  a  decided  preference  to  the 
federal  treasury  in  the  actual  collections,  and  to  throw 
all  deficiencies  on  the  state.  This  imaginary  remedy 
for  the  evil  of  congressional  taxation,  will  have  another 
oppressive  operation.  The  sheriff  comes  to-day  as  a 
state  collector — next  day  he  is  federal — how  are  you  to 
fix  him?  How  will  it  be  possible  to  discriminate  op 
pressions  committed  in  one  capacity,  from  those  per 
petrated  in  the  other  ?  Will  not  his  ingenuity  perplex 
the  simple,  honest  planter  ?  This  will  at  least  involve 
in  difficulties,  those  who  are  unacquainted  with  legal 
ingenuity.  When  you  fix  him,  where  are  you  to  punish 
him  ?  For,  I  suppose,  they  will  not  stay  in  our  courts  : 
they  must  go  to  the  federal  court ;  for,  if  I  understand 
that  paper  right,  all  controversies  arising  under  that 
constitution,  or  under  the  laws  made  in  pursuance 
thereof,  are  to  be  tried  in  that  court.  When  gentle 
men  told  us,  that  this  part  deserved  the  least  excep 
tion,  I  was  in  hopes,  they  would  prove  that  there 
was  plausibility  in  their  suggestions,  and  that  oppres 
sion  would  probably  not  follow.  Are  we  not  told, 
that  it  shall  be  treason  to  levy  war  against  the  United 
States  ?  Suppose  an  insult  offered  to  the  federal  laws 
at  an  immense  distance  from  Philadelphia,  will  this  be 
deemed  treason  ?  And  shall  a  man  be  dragged  many 
hundred  miles  to  be  tried  as  a  criminal,  for  hav 
ing,  perhaps  justifiably,  resisted  an  unwarrantable 
attack  upon  his  person  or  property?  I  am  not 
well  acquainted  with  federal  jurisprudence ;  but  it  ap- 


216  MR.  HENRY'S   SPEECH  ON 

pears  to  me  that  these  oppressions  must  result  from 
this  part  of  the  plan.  It  is  at  least  doubtful,  and  where 
there  is  even  a  possibility  of  such  evils,  they  ought  to 
be  guarded  against. 

There  are  to  be  a  number  of  places  fitted  out  for 
arsenals  and  dock-yards  in  the  different  states.  Unless 
you  sell  to  Congress  such  places  as  are  proper  for  these, 
within  your  state,  you  will  not  be  consistent  after  adop 
tion;  it  results  therefore  clearly  that  you  are  to  give 
into  their  hands,  all  such  places  as  are  fit  for  strong 
holds.  When  you  have  these  fortifications  and  garri 
sons  within  your  state,  your  legislature  will  have  no 
power  over  them,  though  they  see  the  most  dangerous 
insults  offered  to  the  people  daily.  They  are  also  to 
have  magazines  in  each  state ;  these  depositories  for 
arms,  though  within  the  state,  will  be  free  from  the  con 
trol  of  its  legislature.  Are  we  at  last  brought  to  such 
a  humiliating  and  debasing  degradation,  that  we  can 
not  be  trusted  with  arms  for  our  own  defence  ?  There  is 
a  wide  difference  between  having  our  arms  in  our  own 
possession  and  under  our  own  direction,  and  having 
them  under  the  management  of  Congress  ?  If  our  de 
fence  be  the  real  object  of  having  those  arms,  in  whose 
hands  can  they  be  trusted  with  more  propriety,  or 
equal  safety  to  us,  as  in  our  own  ?  If  our  legis 
lature  be  unworthy  of  legislating  for  every  foot  in 
this  state,  they  are  unworthy  of  saying  another  word. 

The  clause  which  says  that  Congress  shall  "  pro 
vide  for  arming,  organizing  arid  disciplining  the  mili 
tia,  and  for  governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be 
employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  reserv 
ing  to  the  states  respectively,  the  appointment  of  the 
officers,"  seemed  to  put  the  states  in  the  power  of 
Congress.  I  wished  to  be  informed,  if  Congress  neg 
lected  to  discipline  them,  whether  the  states  were  not 
precluded  from  doing  it.  Not  being  favored  with  a 
particular  answer,  I  am  confirmed  in  my  opinion,  that 
the  states  have  not  the  power  of  disciplining  them, 
without  recurring  to  the  doctrine  of  constructive,  im- 


THE    FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  217 

plied  powers.  If  by  implication  the  states  may  disci 
pline  them,  by  implication  also  Congress  may  officer 
them ;  because,  in  a  partition  of  power,  each  has  a 
right  to  come  in  for  part;  and  because  implication  is 
to  operate  in  favor  of  Congress  on  all  occasions,  where 
their  object  is  the  extension  of  power,  as  well  as  in  fa 
vor  of  the  states.  We  have  not  one  fourth  of  the  arms 
that  would  be  sufficient  to  defend  ourselves.  The 
power  of  arming  the  militia,  and  the  means  of  pur 
chasing  arms,  are  taken  from  the  states  by  the  para- " 
mount  powers  of  Congress.  If  Congress  will  not  arm 
them,  they  will  not  be  armed  at  all. 

There  have  been  no  instances  shown  of  a  voluntary 
cession  of  power,  sufficient  to  induce  me  to  grant  the 
most  dangerous  powers :  a  possibility  of  their  future 
relinquishment  will  not  persuade  me  to  yield  such 
powers. 

Congress,  by  the  power  of  taxation,  by  that  of  rais 
ing  an  army,  and  by  their  control  over  the  militia,  have 
the  sword  in  one  hand  and  the  purse  in  the  other. 
Shall  we  be  safe  without  either  ?  Congress  have  an 
unlimited  power  over  both :  they  are  entirely  given  up 
by  us.  Let  him  candidly  tell  me,  where  and  when  did 
freedom  exist,  when  the  sword  and  purse  were  given  up 
by  the  people  ?  Unless  a  miracle  in  human  affairs 
interposed,  no  nation  ever  retained  its  liberty  after  the 
loss  of  the  sword  and  purse.  Can  you  prove  by  any 
argumentative  deduction,  that  it  is  possible  to  be  safe 
without  retaining  one  of  these  ?  If  you  give  them  up,  you 
are  gone.  Give  us  at  least  a  plausible  apology  why  Con 
gress  should  keep  their  proceedings  in  secret.  They 
have  the  power  of  keeping  them  secret  as  long  as  they 
please ;  for  the  provision  for  a  periodical  publication  is 
too  inexplicit  and  ambiguous  to  avail  any  thing.  The 
expression,  from  time  to  time,  as  I  have  more  than  once 
observed,  admits  of  any  extension.  They  may  carry 
on  the  most  wicked  and  pernicious  of  schemes  under 
the  dark  veil  of  secrecy.  The  liberties  of  a  people 
never  were  nor  ever  will  be  secure,  when  the  transoc- 

VOL.  i.  28 


218  Mil.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

tions  of  their  rulers  may  be  concealed  from  them.  The 
most  iniquitous  plots  may  be  carried  on  against  their 
liberty  and  happiness.  1  am  not  an  advocate  for  di 
vulging  indiscriminately  all  the  operations  of  govern 
ment,  though  the  practice  of  our  ancestors  in  some  de 
gree  justifies  it.  Such  transactions  as  relate  to  milita 
ry  operations,  or  affairs  of  great  consequence,  the  im 
mediate  promulgation  of  which  might  defeat  the  inter 
ests  of  the  community,  I  would  not  wish  to  be  published, 
till  the  end  which  required  their  secrecy  should  have 
been  effected.  But  to  cover,  with  the  veil  of  secrecy, 
the  common  routine  of  business,  is  an  abomination  in 
the  eyes  of  every  intelligent  man,  and  every  friend  to 
his  country. 

[Mr.  Henry  then,  in  a  very  animated  manner,  expati 
ated  on  the  evil  and  pernicious  tendency  of  keeping 
secret  the  common  proceedings  of  government,  and 
said,  that  it  was  contrary  to  the  practice  of  other  free 
nations.  The  people  of  England,  he  asserted,  had 
gained  immortal  honor,  by  the  manly  boldness  where 
with  they  divulged  to  all  the  world  their  political  dis 
quisitions  and  operations ;  and  that  such  a  conduct 
inspired  other  nations  with  respect.  He  illustrated 
his  arguments  by  several  quotations.]  He  then  con 
tinued  : — 

I  appeal  to  this  convention,  if  it  would  not  be  better 
for  America  to  take  off  the  veil  of  secrecy.  Look  at 
us — hear  our  transactions.  If  this  had  been  the  lan 
guage  of  the  federal  convention,  what  would  have  been 
the  result  ?  Such  a  constitution  would  not  have  come 
out  to  your  utter  astonishment,  conceding  such  dan 
gerous  powers,  and  recommending  secrecy  in  the  fu 
ture  transactions  of  government.  I  believe  it  would 
have  given  more  general  satisfaction,  if  the  proceed 
ings  of  that  convention  had  not  been  concealed  from 
the  public  eye.  This  constitution  authorizes  the  same 
conduct.  There  is  not  an  English  feature  in  it.  The 
transactions  of  Congress  may  be  concealed  a  century 
from  the  public  consistently  with  the  constitution. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

This,  sir,  is  a  laudable  imitation  of  the  transactions  of 
the  Spanish  treaty.  We  have  not  forgotten  with  what 
a  thick  veil  of  secrecy  those  transactions  were  co 
vered. 

We  are  told  that  this  government,  collectively  taken, 
is  without  an  example  ;  that  it  is  national  in  this  part, 
and  federal  in  that  part,  &c.  We  may  be  amused,  if 
we  please,  by  a  treatise  of  political  anatomy.  In  the 
brain  it  is  national:  the  stamina  are  federal — some 
limbs  are  federal,  others  national.  The  senators  are 
voted  for  by  the  state  legislatures  ;  so  far  it  is  federal. 
Individuals  choose  the  members  of  the  first  branch ; 
here  it  is  national.  It  is  federal  in  conferring  general 
powers,  but  national  in  retaining  them.  It  is  not  to 
be  supported  by  the  states — the  pockets  of  individuals 
are  to  be  searched  for  its  maintenance.  What  signi 
fies  it  to  me,  that  you  have  the  most  curious  anatomi 
cal  description  of  it  in  its  creation  ?  To  all  the  com 
mon  purposes  of  legislation  it  is  a  great  consolidation  of 
government.  You  are  not  to  have  the  right  to  legislate 
in  any  but  trivial  cases :  you  are  not  to  touch  private 
contracts :  you  are  not  to  have  the  right  of  having 
arms  in  your  own  defence:  you  cannot  be  trusted 
with  dealing  out  justice  between  man  and  man. 
What  shall  the  states  have  to  do  ? — Take  care  of  the 
poor,  repair  and  make  highways,  erect  bridges,  and  so 
on  and  so  on.  Abolish  the  state  legislatures  at  once. 
What  purposes  should  they  be  continued  for  ?  Our 
legislature  will  indeed  be  a  ludicrous  spectacle — one 
hundred  and  eighty  men  marching  in  solemn,  farcical 
procession,  exhibiting  a  mournful  proof  of  the  lost  li 
berty  of  their  country,  without  the  power  of  restoring 
it.  But,  sir,  we  have  the  consolation,  that  it  is  a  mixed 
government ;  that  is,  it  may  work  sorely  on  your  neck, 
but  you  will  have  some  comfort  by  saying,  that  it  was 
a  federal  government  in  its  origin. 

I  beg  gentlemen  to  consider;  lay  aside  your  preju 
dices — is  this  a  federal  government  ?  Is  it  not  a  con 
solidated  government  for  every  purpose  almost  ?  Is 


•2'2(1  31K.  IIKNKY'S  SPEECH  ON 

the  government  of  Virginia  a  state  government,  alter 
this  government  is  adopted  ?  I  grant  that  it  is  a  repub 
lican  government ;  but  for  what  purposes  ?  For  such 
trivial,  domestic  considerations,  as  render  it  unworthy 
the  name  of  a  legislature.  I  shall  take  leave  of  this 
political  anatomy  by  observing,  that  it  is  the  most  ex 
traordinary  that  ever  entered  into  the  imagination  of 
man.  If  our  political  diseases  demand  a  cure,  this  is 
an  unheard  of  medicine.  The  honorable  member,  I 
am  convinced,  wanted  a  name  for  it.  Were  your 
health  in  danger,  would  you  take  new  medicine  ?  I 
need  not  make  use  of  these  exclamations ;  for  every 
member  in  this  committee  must  be  alarmed  at  making 
new  and  unusual  experiments  in  government.  Let  us 
have  national  credit  and  a  national  treasury  in  case  of 
war.  You  never  can  want  national  resources  in  time 
of  war,  if  the  war  be  a  national  one,  if  it  be  necessary, 
and  this  necessity  be  obvious  to  the  meanest  capacity. 
The  utmost  exertions  will  be  used  by  the  people  of 
America  in  that  case.  A  republic  has  this  advantage 
over  a  monarchy,  that  its  wars  are  generally  founded 
on  more  just  grounds.  A  republic  can  never  enter  into 
a  war,  unless  it  be  a  national  war,  unless  it  be  approv 
ed  of,  or  desired  by  the  whole  community.  Did  ever 
a  republic  fail  to  use  the  utmost  resources  of  the  com 
munity  when  a  war  was  necessary  ?  I  call  for  an  ex 
ample.  I  call  also  for  an  example,  when  a  republic  has 
been  engaged  in  a  war  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  its 
people.  There  are  thousands  of  examples  where  the 
ambition  of  its  prince  has  precipitated  a  nation  into 
the  most  destructive  war.  No  nation  ever  withheld 
power  when  its  object  was  just  and  right.  I  will  ha 
zard  an  observation ;  I  find  fault  with  the  paper  before 
you,  because  the  same  power  that  declares  war,  has 
the  ability  to  carry  it  on.  Is  it  so  in  England  ?  The 
king  declares  war :  the  house  of  commons  gives  the 
means  of  carrying  it  on.  This  is  a  strong  check  on 
the  king.  He  will  enter  into  no  war  that  is  unnecessa 
ry ;  for  the  commons,  having  the  power  of  withholding 


THK  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  221 

the  moans,  will  exercise  that  power,  unless  the  object 
of  the  war  be  for  the  interest  of  the  nation.  How  is  it 
here  ?  The  Congress  can  both  declare  war  and  carry 
it  on,  and  levy  your  money  as  long  as  you  have  a 
shilling  to  pay. 

I  shall  now  speak  a  little  of  the  colonial  confedera 
cy  which  was  proposed  at  Albany.  Massachusetts 
did  not  give  her  consent  to  the  project  at  Albany  so 
as  to  consolidate  with  the  other  colonies.  Had  there 
been  a  consolidation  at  Albany,  where  would  have 
been  their  charter  ?  Would  that  confederacy  have 
preserved  their  charter  from  Britain  ?  The  strength 
and  energy  of  the  then  designed  government  would 
have  crushed  American  opposition. 

The  American  revolution  took  its  origin  from  the 
comparative  weakness  of  the  British  government 
not  being  concentred  in  one  point.  A  concentration 
of  the  strength  and  interest  of  the  British  government 
in  one  point,  would  have  rendered  opposition  to  its  ty 
rannies  fruitless.  For  want  of  that  consolidation  do 
we  now  enjoy  liberty,  and  the  privilege  of  debating  at 
this  moment.  I  am  pleased  with  the  colonial  establish 
ment.  The  example,  which  the  honorable  member 
has  produced  to  persuade  us  to  depart  from  our  pre 
sent  confederacy,  rivets  me  to  my  former  opinion,  and 
convinces  me  that  consolidation  must  end  in  the  de 
struction  of  our  liberties. 

The  honorable  gentleman  has  told  us  of  our  ingrati 
tude  to  France.  She  does  not  intend  to  take  payment 
by  force.  Ingratitude  shall  not  be  laid  to  my  charge. 
I  wish  to  see  the  friendship  between  this  country  and 
that  magnanimous  ally  perpetuated.  Requisitions  will 
enable  us  to  pay  the  debts  we  owe  to  France  and  other 
countries.  She  does  not  desire  us  to  go  from  our  be 
loved  republican  government.  The  change  is  incon 
sistent  with  our  engagements  with  those  nations.  It 
is  cried  out,  that  those  in  opposition  wish  disunion. 
This  is  not  true.  They  are  the  most  strenuous  friends 
to  it.  This  government  will  clearly  operate  disunion. 


222  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

If  it  be  heard  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  that 
you  are  going  to  disunite  and  dissolve  the  confederacy, 
what  says  France  ?  Will  she  be  indifferent  to  an  event 
that  will  so  radically  affect  her  treaties  with  us  ?  Our 
treaty  with  her  is  founded  on  the  confederation — we 
are  bound  to  her  as  thirteen  states  confederated. 
What  will  become  of  the  treaty?  It  is  said  that  trea 
ties  will  be  on  a  better  footing.  How  so  ?  Will  the 
president,  senate  and  house  of  representatives  be  par 
ties  to  them  ?  I  cannot  conceive  how  the  treaties  can 
be  as  binding,  if  the  confederacy  is  dissolved,  as  they 
are  now.  Those  nations  will  not  continue  their  friend 
ship  then ;  they  will  become  our  enemies.  I  look  on 
the  treaties  as  the  greatest  pillars  of  safety.  If  the 
house  of  Bourbon  keeps  us,  we  are  safe.  Dissolve 
that  confederacy — who  has  you  ? — The  British. 
Federalism  will  not  protect  you  from  the  British.  Is 
a  connexion  with  that  country  more  desirable  ?  I  was 
amazed  when  gentlemen  forgot  the  friends  of  America. 
I  hope  that  this  dangerous  change  will  not  be  effected. 
It  is  safe  for  the  French  and  Spaniards,  that  we  should 
continue  to  be  thirteen  states ;  but  it  is  not  so,  that  we 
should  be  consolidated  into  one  government.  They 
have  settlements  in  America ;  will  they  like  schemes 
of  popular  ambition  ?  Will  they  not  have  some  seri 
ous  reflections  ?  You  may  tell  them  you  have  not 
changed  your  situation ;  but  they  will  not  believe  you. 
If  there  be  a  real  check  intended  to  be  left  on  Con 
gress,  it  must  be  left  in  the  state  governments.  There 
will  be  some  check,  as  long  as  the  judges  are  incor 
rupt.  As  long  as  they  are  upright,  you  may  preserve 
your  liberty.  But  what  will  the  judges  determine 
when  the  state  and  federal  authority  come  to  be  con 
trasted  ?  Will  your  liberty  then  be  secure,  when  the 
congressional  laws  are  declared  paramount  to  the 
laws  of  your  state,  and  the  judges  are  sworn  to  support 
them  ? 

I  am  constrained  to  make  a  few  remarks  on  the  ab 
surdity  of  adopting  this  system,  and  relying  on  the 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  £23 

chance  of  getting  it  amended  afterwards.  When  it  is 
confessed  to  be  replete  with  defects,  is  it  not  offering 
to  insult  your  understandings,  to  attempt  to  reason  you 
out  of  the  propriety  of  rejecting  it,  till  it  be  amended  ? 
Does  it  not  insult  your  judgments  to  tell  you — adopt 
first,  and  then  amend  ?  Is  your  rage  for  novelty  so 
great,  that  you  are  first  to  sign  and  seal,  and  then  to 
retract  ?  Is  it  possible  to  conceive  a  greater  solecism  ? 
I  am  at  a  loss  what  to  say.  You  agree  to  bind  your 
selves  hand  and  foot — for  the  sake  of  what  ?  Of  being 
unbound.  You  go  into  a  dungeon — for  what  ?  To 
get  out.  Is  there  no  danger  when  you  go  in,  that 
the  bolts  of  federal  authority  shall  shut  you  in  ?  Human 
nature  never  will  part  from  power.  Look  for  an  exam 
ple  of  a  voluntary  relinquishment  of  power,  from  one 
end  of  the  globe  to  another — you  will  find  none.  Nine 
tenths  of  our  fellow-men  have  been,  and  are  now,  de 
pressed  by  the  most  intolerable  slavery,  in  the  different 
parts  of  the  world ;  because  the  strong  hand  of  power 
has  bolted  them  in  the  dungeon  of  despotism.  Review 
the  present  situation  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  which 
is  pre.tended  to  be  the  freest  quarter  of  the  globe.  Cast 
your  eyes  on  the  countries  called  free  there.  Look  at 
the  country  from  which  we  are  descended,  I  beseech 
you ;  and  although  we  are  separated  by  everlasting, 
insuperable  partitions,  yet  there  are  some  virtuous 
people  there  who  are  friends  to  human  nature  and 
liberty.  Look  at  Britain ;  see  there  the  bolts  and  bars 
of  power;  see  bribery  and  corruption  defiling  the 
fairest  fabric  that  ever  human  nature  reared.  Can  a 
gentleman,  who  is  an  Englishman,  or  who  is  acquaint 
ed  with  the  English  history,  desire  to  prove  these  evils  ? 
See  the  efforts  of  a  man  descended  from  a  friend  of 
America ;  see  the  efforts  of  that  man,  assisted  even  by 
the  king,  to  make  reforms.  But  you  find  the  faults  too 
strong  to  be  amended.  Nothing  but  bloody  war  can 
alter  them.  See  Ireland  :  that  country  groaned  from 
century  to  century,  without  getting  their  government 
amended.  Previous  adoption  was  the  fashion  there. 
They  sent  for  amendments  from  time  to  time,  but 


224  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

never  obtained  them,  though  pressed  by  the  severest 
oppression,  till  eighty  thousand  volunteers  demanded 
them  sword  in  hand — till  the  power  of  Britain  was 
prostrate ;  when  the  American  resistance  was  crowned 
with  success.  Shall  we  do  so  ?  If  you  judge  by  the 
experience  of  Ireland,  you  must  obtain  the  amendments 
as  early  as  possible.  But,  I  ask  you  again,  where  is  the 
example  that  a  government  was  amended  by  those 
who  instituted  it  ?  Where  is  the  instance  of  the 
errors  of  a  government  rectified  by  those  who  adopted 
them  ? 

I  shall  make  a  few  observations  to  prove,  that 
the  power  over  elections,  which  is  given  to  Congress, 
is  contrived  by  the  federal  government;  that  the 
people  may  be  deprived  of  their  proper  influence  in 
the  government,  by  destroying  the  force  and  effect  of 
their  suffrages.  Congress  is  to  have  a  discretiona 
ry  control  over  the  time,  place  and  manner  of 
elections.  The  representatives  are  to  be  elected  con 
sequently  when  and  where  they  please.  As  to  the 
time  and  place  gentlemen  have  attempted  to  obvi 
ate  the  objection  by  saying,  that  the  time  js  to 
happen  once  in  two  years,  and  that  the  place  is 
to  be  within  a  particular  district,  or  in  the  respect- 
tive  counties.  But  how  will  they  obviate  the 
danger  of  referring  the  manner  of  election  to  Con 
gress  ?  Those  illumined  genii  may  see  that  this  may  not 
endanger  the  rights  of  the  people ;  but  to  my  un 
enlightened  understanding,  it  appears  plain  and  clear, 
that  it  will  impair  the  popular  weight  in  the  gov 
ernment.  Look  at  the  Roman  history.  They  had 
two  ways  of  voting:  the  one  by  tribes,  and  the 
other  by  centuries.  By  the  former,  numbers  prevailed : 
in  the  latter,  riches  preponderated.  According  to 
the  mode  prescribed,  Congress  may  tell  you,  that  they 
have  a  right  to  make  the  vote  of  one  gentleman  go 
as  far  as  the  votes  of  one  hundred  poor  men.  The 

Eower  over  the  manner  admits  of  the  most  dangerous 
ititude.     They  may  modify  it  as  they  please.     They 
may  regulate  the  number  of  votes  by  the  quantity  of 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  225 

property,     without    involving    any     repugnancy    to 
the    constitution.      I   should    not   have  thought    of 
this  trick  or  contrivance,  had   I  not  seen  how  the 
public    liberty    of  Rome   was    trifled    with    by    the 
mode  of  voting  by  centuries,  whereby  one  rich  man 
had  as  many  votes  as  a  multitude  of  poor  men.     The 
plebeians  were  trampled  on  till  they  resisted.     The 
patricians  trampled  on  the  liberties  of  the  plebeians, 
till  the  latter  had   spirit   to    assert    their    right    to 
freedom   and  equality.     The  result  of  the  American 
mode   of  election  may  be  similar.      Perhaps  I  shall 
be  told,  that  I  have  gone  through  the  regions  of  fancy; 
that  I  deal   in  noisy  exclamations,  and  mighty  pro 
fessions  of  patriotism.     Gentlemen   may  retain  their 
opinions;    but  I  look  on    that    paper    as  the   most 
fatal  plan,  that   could  possibly  be  conceived  to  en 
slave  a  free  people.     If  such  be  your  rage  for  novelty, 
take  it  and  welcome,  but  you  never   shall  have  my 
consent.      My  sentiments  may  appear    extravagant^ 
but  1  can  tell  you,  that  a  number  of  my  fellow-citizens 
have  kindred  sentiments ;    arid  I  am  anxious,   if  my 
country  should  come  into  the  hands  of  tyranny,  to  ex 
culpate  myself  from  being  in  any  degree  the   cause ; 
and  to  exert  my  faculties  to  the  utmost  to  extricate 
her.     Whether  I  am  gratified  or  not  in  my  beloved 
form  of  government,  I   consider  that  the  more  she 
is   plunged  into   distress,  the    more   it    is    my   duty 
to  relieve  her.     Whatever  may  be  the  result,  I  shall 
wait  with  patience    till    the  day  may   come,   when 
an  opportunity  shall  offer  to  exert  myself  in  her  cause. 
But  I  should  be  led  to  take  that  man  for  a  lunatic, 
who  should  tell  me  to  run  into  the  adoption  of  a  gov 
ernment   avowedly  defective,   in   hopes  of  having   it 
amended  afterwards.      Were  I  about  to  give   away 
the   meanest  particle  of  my  own  property,  I  should 
act  with  more  prudence  and  discretion.     My  anxiety 
and  fears  are   great,   lest  America,  by  the  adoption 
of  this  system,  should  be  cast  into  a  fathomless  abyss. 

29 


SPEECH  OF  JOHN  MARSHALL. 

ON  THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  ADOPTING  THE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 
DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  JUNE  20th,  178C 


The  first  and  Second  sections  of  the  third  article  of  the  constitution 
being  under  consideration,  Mr.  Marshall  addressed  the  conven 
tion  as  follows  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

THIS  part  of  the  plan  before  us,  is  a  great  improve 
ment  on  that  system  from  which  we  are  now  departing. 
Here  are  tribunals  appointed  for  the  decision  of  con 
troversies,  which  were  before,  either  not  at  all,  or  im 
properly  provided  for.  That  many  benefits  will  result 
from  this  to  the  members  of  the  collective  society, 
every  one  confesses.  Unless  its  organization  be  de 
fective,  and  so  constructed  as  to  injure,  instead  of  ac 
commodating  the  convenience  of  the  people,  it  merits 
our  approbation.  After  such  a  candid  and  fair  dis 
cussion  by  those  gentlemen  who  support  it,  after  the 
very  able  manner  in  which  they  have  investigated  and 
examined  it,  I  conceived  it  would  be  no  longer  consi 
dered  as  so  very  defective,  and  that  those,  who  oppos 
ed  it,  would  be  convinced  of  the  impropriety  of  some 
of  their  objections.  But  I  perceive  they  still  continue 
the  same  opposition.  Gentlemen  have  gone  on  an  idea, 
that  the  federal  courts  will  not  determine  the  causes, 
which  may  come  before  them,  with  the  same  fairness 
and  impartiality,  with  which  other  courts  decide. 


MR.  MARSHALL'S  SPEECH,  &c.  227 

What  are  the  reasons  of  this  supposition  ?  Do  they 
draw  them  from  the  manner  in  which  the  judges  are 
chosen,  or  the  tenure  of  their  office  ?  What  is  it  that 
makes  us  trust  our  judges  ? — Their  independence  in 
office  and  manner  of  appointment.  Are  not  the 
judges  of  the  federal  court  chosen  with  as  much  wis 
dom,  as  the  judges  of  the  state  governments  ?  Are 
they  not  equally,  if  not  more  independent  ?  If  so,  shall 
we  not  conclude  that  they  will  decide  with  equal  im 
partiality  and  candor  ?  If  there  be  as  much  wisdom 
and  knowledge  in  the  United  States,  as  in  a  particular 
state,  shall  we  conclude  that  that  wisdom  and  know 
ledge  will  not  be  equally  exercised  in  the  selection  of 
the  judges  ? 

The  principle  on  which  they  object  to  the  federal 
jurisdiction,  seems  to  me  to  be  founded  on  a  belief, 
that  a  fair  trial  will  not  be  had  in  those  courts.  If 
this  committee  will  consider  it  fully,  they  will  find  it 
has  no  foundation,  and  that  we  are  as  secure  there  as 
any  where  else.  What  mischief  results  from  some 
causes  being  tried  there  ?  Is  there  not  the  utmost 
reason  to  conclude,  that  judges  wisely  appointed,  and 
independent  in  their  office,  will  never  countenance  any 
unfair  trial  ?  What  are  the  subjects  of  its  jurisdiction  ? 
Let  us  examine  them  with  an  expectation  that  causes 
will  be  as  candidly  tried  there,  as  elsewhere,  and  then 
determine.  The  objection,  which  was  made  by  the 
honorable  member  who  was  first  up  yesterday,  (Mr. 
Mason,)  has  been  so  fully  refuted,  that  it  is  not  worth 
while  to  notice  it.  He  objected  to  Congress  having 
power  to  create  a  number  of  inferior  courts  according 
to  the  necessity  of  public  circumstances.  I  had  an 
apprehension  that  those  gentlemen,  who  placed  no 
confidence  in  Congress,  would  object  that  there  might 
be  no  inferior  courts.  I  own  that  I  thought,  that  those 
gentlemen  would  think  there  would  be  no  inferior 
courts,  as  it  depended  on  the  will  of  Congress,  but  that 
we  should  be  dragged  to  the  centre  of  the  union.  But 
I  did  not  conceive,  that  the  power  of  increasing  the 


228  MR.  MARSHALL'S  SPEECH  ON 

number  of  courts  could  be  objected  to  by  any  gentle 
man,  as  it  would  remove  the  inconvenience  of  being 
dragged  to  the  centre  of  the  United  States.  I  own 
that  the  power  of  creating  a  number  of  courts  is,  in 
my  estimation,  so  far  from  being  a  defect,  that  it 
seems  necessary  to  the  perfection  of  this  system.  Af 
ter  having  objected  to  the  number  and  mode,  he  ob 
jected  to  the  subject  matter  of  their  cognizance. 
[Here  Mr.  Marshall  read  the  2d  section.]  These,  sir, 
are  the  points  of  federal  jurisdiction  to  which  he  ob 
jects,  with  a  few  exceptions.  Let  us  examine  each 
of  them  with  a  supposition  that  the  same  impartiality 
will  be  observed  there,  as  in  other  courts,  and  then 
see  if  any  mischief  will  result  from  them.  With  re 
spect  to  its  cognizance  in  all  cases  arising  under  the 
constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  he  says, 
that  the  laws  of  the  United  States  being  paramount  to 
the  laws  of  the  particular  states,  there  is  no  case  but 
what  this  will  extend  to.  Has  the  government  of  the 
United  States  power  to  make  laws  on  every  subject  ? 
Does  he  understand  it  so  ?  Can  they  make  laws  af 
fecting  the  mode  of  transferring  property,  or  contracts, 
or  claims  between  citizens  of  the  same  state  ?  Can 
they  go  beyond  the  delegated  powers  ?  If  they  were 
to  make  a  law  not  warranted  by  any  of  the  powers 
enumerated,  it  would  be  considered  by  the  judges  as 
an  infringement  of  the  constitution  which  they  are  to 
guard.  They  would  not  consider  such  a  law  as  com 
ing  under  their  jurisdiction.  They  would  declare  it 
void.  It  will  annihilate  the  state  courts,  says  the  ho 
norable  gentleman.  Does  not  every  gentleman  here 
know,  that  the  causes  in  our  courts  are  more  numer 
ous  than  they  can  decide,  according  to  their  present 
construction?  Look  at  the  dockets;  you  will  find 
them  crowded  with  suits,  which  the  life  of  man  will  not 
see  determined.  If  some  of  these  suits  be  carried  to 
other  courts,  will  it  be  wrong  ?  They  will  still  have 
business  enough.  Then  there  is  no  danger  that  par 
ticular  subjects,  small  in  proportion,  being  taken  out 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  229 

of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state  judiciaries,  will  render 
them  useless  and  of  no  effect.  Does  the  gentleman 
think  that  the  state  courts  will  have  no  cognizance  of 
cases  not  mentioned  here  ?  Are  there  any  words  in 
this  constitution,  which  exclude  the  courts  of  the 
states  from  those  cases  which  they  now  possess? 
Does  the  gentleman  imagine  this  to  be  the  case? 
Will  any  gentleman  believe  it  ?  Are  not  controver 
sies  respecting  lands,  claimed  under  the  grants  of  dif 
ferent  states,  the  only  controversies  between  citizens 
of  the  same  state,  which  the  federal  judiciary  can  take 
cognizance  of?  The  case  is  so  clear,  that  to  prove  it 
would  be  an  useless  waste  of  time.  The  state  courts 
will  not  lose  the  jurisdiction  of  the  causes  they  now  de 
cide.  They  have  a  concurrence  of  jurisdiction  with 
the  federal  courts  in  those  cases,  in  which  the  latter 
have  cognizance. 

How  disgraceful  is  it  that  the  state  courts  cannot 
be  trusted,  says  the  honorable  gentleman.  What  is 
the  language  of  the  constitution  ?  Does  it  take  away 
their  jurisdiction  ?  Is  it  not  necessary  that -the  federal 
courts  should  have  cognizance  of  cases  arising  under 
the  constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States  ? 
What  is  the  service  or  purpose  of  a  judiciary,  but  to 
execute  the  laws  in  a  peaceable,  orderly  manner, 
without  shedding  blood,  or  creating  a  contest,  or  avail 
ing  yourselves  of  force  ?  If  this  be  the  case,  where 
can  its  jurisdiction  be  more  necessary  than  here  ? 
To  what  quarter  will  you  look  for  protection  from  an 
infringement  on  the  constitution,  if  you  will  not  give 
the  power  to  the  judiciary  ?  There  is  no  other  body 
that  can  afford  such  a  protection.  But  the  honora 
ble  member  objects  to  it,  because,  says  he,  the  of 
ficers  of  the  government  will  be  screened  from  merited 
punishment  by  the  federal  judiciary.  The  federal  she 
riff,  says  he,  will  go  into  a  poor  man's  house  and  beat 
him,  or  abuse  his  family,  and  the  federal  court  will  pro 
tect  him.  Does  any  gentleman  believe  this  ?  Is  it 
necessary  that  the  officers  shall  commit  a  trespass  on 


230  MR.   MARSHALL'S  SPEECH   ON 

the  property  or  persons  of  those  with  whom  they  are 
to  transact  business  ?  Will  such  great  insults  on  the 
people  of  this  country  be  allowable?  Were  a  law 
made  to  authorize  them,  it  would  be  void.  The  injur 
ed  man  would  trust  to  a  tribunal  in  his  neighborhood. 
To  such  a  tribunal  he  would  apply  for  redress,  and  get 
it.  There  is  no  reason  to  fear  that  he  would  not  meet 
that  justice  there,  which  his  country  will  be  ever  will 
ing  to  maintain.  But  on  appeal,  says  the  honorable 
gentleman,  what  chance  is  there  to  obtain  justice  ? 
This  is  founded  on  an  idea',  that  they  will  not  be  im 
partial.  There  is  no  clause  in  the  constitution,  which 
bars  the  individual  member  injured,  from  applying  to 
the  state  courts  to  give  him  redress.  He  says,  that 
there  is  no  instance  of  appeals  as  to  fact  in  common 
law  cases.  The  contrary  is  well  known  to  you,  Mr. 
Chairman,  to  be  the  case  in  this  commonwealth. 
With  respect  to  mills,  roads  and  other  cases,  appeals 
lie  from  the  inferior  to  the  superior  court,  as  to  fact 
as  well  as  law.  Is  it  clear,  that  there  can  be  no 
case  in  common  law,  in  which  an  appeal  as  to  fact 
might  be  proper  and  necessary  ?  Can  you  not  con 
ceive  a  case  where  it  would  be  productive  of  advan 
tages  to  the  people  at  large,  to  submit  to  that  tribunal 
the  final  determination,  involving  facts  as  well  as  law? 
Suppose  it  should  be  deemed  for  the  convenience  of 
the  citizens,  that  those  things  which  concerned  foreign 
ministers,  should  be  tried  in  the  inferior  courts :  if  jus 
tice  should  be  done,  the  decision  would  satisfy  all. 
But  if  an  appeal  in  matters  of  fact  could  not  be  carried 
to  the  superior  court,  then  it  would  result,  that  such 
cases  could  not  be  tried  before  the  inferior  courts,  for 
fear  of  injurious  and  partial  decisions. 

But,  sir,  where  is  the  necessity  of  discriminating  be 
tween  the  three  cases  of  chancery,  admiralty  and  com 
mon  law  ?  Why  not  leave  it  to  Congress  ?  Will  it 
enlarge  their  powers  ?  Is  it  necessary  for  them  wan 
tonly  to  infringe  your  rights  ?  Have  you  any  thing  to 
apprehend,  when  they  can,  in  no  case,  abuse  their 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  231 

power  without  rendering  themselves  hateful  to  the  peo 
ple  at  large  ?  When  this  is  the  case,  something  may 
be  left  to  the  legislature,  freely  chosen  by  ourselves^ 
from  among  ourselves,  who  are  to  share  the  burdens 
imposed  upon  the  community,  and  who  can  be  chang 
ed  at  our  pleasure.  Where  power  may  be  trusted,  and 
there  is  no  motive  to  abuse  it,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  as 
well  to  leave  it  undetermined,  as  to  fix  it  in  the  con 
stitution. 

With  respect  to  disputes  between  a  state  and  the 
citizens  of  another  state,  its  jurisdiction  has  been  de 
cried  with  unusual  vehemence.  I  hope  no  gentleman 
will  think  that  a  state  will  be  called  at  the  bar  of  the 
federal  court.  Is  there  no  such  case  at  present  ?  Are 
there  not  many  cases  in  which  the  legislature  of  Vir 
ginia  is  a  party,  and  yet  the  state  is  not  sued  ?  It  is 
not  rational  to  suppose,  that  the  sovereign  power  shall 
be  dragged  before  a  court.  The  intent  is,  to  enable 
states  to  recover  claims  of  individuals  residing  in  other 
states.  I  contend  this  construction  is  warranted  by 
the  words.  But,  say  they,  there  will  be  partiality  in  it, 
if  a  state  cannot  be  defendant — if  an  individual  cannot 
proceed  to  obtain  judgment  against  a  state,  though  he 
may  be  sued  by  a  state.  It  is  necessary  to  be  so,  and 
cannot  be  avoided.  I  see  a  difficulty  in  making  a  state 
defendant,  which  does  not  prevent  its  being  plaintiff. 
If  this  be  only  what  cannot  be  avoided,  why  object  to 
the  system  on  that  account  ?  If  an  individual  has  a 
just  claim  against  any  particular  state,  is  it  to  be  pre 
sumed,  that  on  application  to  its  legislature,  he  will  not 
obtain  satisfaction  ?  But  how  could  a  state  recover 
any  claim  from  a  citizen  of  another  state,  without  the 
establishment  of  these  tribunals  ? 

The  honorable  member  objects  to  suits  being  insti 
tuted  in  the  federal  courts  by  the  citizens  of  one  state 
against  the  citizens  of  another  state.  Were  I  to  con 
tend,  that  this  was  necessary  in  all  cases,  and  that  the 
government  without  it  would  be  defective,  I  should  not 
use  my  own  judgment.  But  are  not  the  objections  to 


232  MR.  MARSHALL'S  SPEECH  ON 

it  carried  too  far  ?     Though  it  may  not,  in  general,  be 
absolutely  necessary,  a  case  may  happen,  as  has  been 
observed,  in  which  a  citizen  of  one  state  ought  to  be 
able  to  recur  to  this  tribunal,  to  recover  a  claim  from 
the  citizen  of  another  state.     What  is  the  evil  which 
this  can  produce?     Will  he   get  more  than  justice 
there  ? — The  independence  of  the  judges  forbids  it. 
What  has  he  to  get? — Justice.     Shall  we  object  to 
this,  because  the  citizen  of  another  state  can  obtain 
justice  without  applying  to  our  state  courts  ?     It  may 
be  necessary  with  respect  to  the  laws  and  regulations 
of  commerce,  which  Congress  may  make.    It  may  be  ne 
cessary  in  cases  of  debt,  and  some  other  controversies. 
In  claims  for  land  it  is  not  necessary,  but  it  is  not  danger 
ous.  In  the  court  of  which  state  will  it  be  instituted — said 
the  honorable  gentleman.     It  will  be  instituted  in  the 
court  of  the  state  where  the  defendant  resides,  where 
the  law  can  come  at  him,  and  nowhere  else.     By  the 
laws  of  which  state  will  it  be  determined — said  he.     By 
the  laws  of  the  state  where  the  contract  was  made. 
According  to  those  laws,  and  those  only,  can  it  be  de 
cided.     Is  this  a  novelty  ? — No,  it  is  a  principle  in  the 
jurisprudence  of  this  commonwealth.     If  a  man  con 
tracted  a  debt  in  the  East  Indies,  and  it  was  sued  for 
here,  the  decision  must  be  consonant  to  the  laws  of  that 
country.     Suppose    a    contract    made   in    Maryland, 
where  the  annual  interest  is  at  six  per  centum,  and  a 
suit  instituted  for  it  in  Virginia,  what  interest  would 
be  given  now,  without  any  federal  aid  ?     The  interest 
of  Maryland  most  certainly,  and  if  the  contract  had 
been  made  in  Virginia,  and  suit  brought  in  Maryland, 
the  interest  of  Virginia  must  be  given  without  doubt. 
It  is  now  to  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  that  state 
where  the  contract  was  made.     The  laws  which  gov 
erned  the  contract  at  its  formation,  govern  it  in  its 
decision.     To  preserve  the  peace  of  the  union  only,  its 
jurisdiction  in  this  case  ought  to  be  recurred  to.     Let  us 
consider,  that  when  citizens  of  one  state  carry  on  trade 
in  another  state,  much  must  be  due  to  the  one  from 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  233 

the  other,  as  the  case  between  North  Carolina  and 
Virginia.  Would  not  the  refusal  of  justice  to  our  citi 
zens,  from  the  courts  of  North  Carolina,  produce  dis 
putes  between  the  states  ?  Would  the  federal  judicia 
ry  swerve  from  their  duty,  in  order  to  give  partial  and 
unjust  decisions  ? 

The  objection  respecting  the  assignment  of  a  bond 
to  a  citizen  of  another  state,  has  been  fully  answered. 
But  suppose  it  were  to  be  tried  as  he  says,  what  would 
be  given  more  than  was  actually  due  in  the  case  he 
mentioned  ?  It  is  possible,  in  our  courts  as  they  now 
stand,  to  obtain  a  judgment  for  more  than  justice. 
But  the  court  of  chancery  grants  relief.  Would  it  not 
be  so  in  the  federal  court  ?  Would  not  depositions 
be  taken  to  prove  the  payments,  and  if  proved,  would 
not  the  decision  of  the  court  be  accordingly  ? 

He  objects,  in  the  next  place,  to  its  jurisdiction  in 
controversies  between  a  state  and  a  foreign  state. 
Suppose,  says  he,  in  such  a  suit,  a  foreign  state  is  cast, 
will  she  be  bound  by  the  decision  ?  If  a  foreign  state 
brought  a  suit  against  the  commonwealth  of  Virginia, 
would  she  not  be  barred  from  the  claim  if  the  federal 
judiciary  thought  it  unjust  ?  The  previous  consent  of 
the  parties  is  necessary ;  and,  as  the  federal  judiciary 
will  decide,  each  party  will  acquiesce.  It  will  be  the 
means  of  preventing  disputes  with  foreign  nations. 
On  an  attentive  consideration  of  these  courts,  I  trust 
every  part  will  appear  satisfactory  to  the  committee. 

The  exclusion  of  trial  by  jury  in  this  case,  he  urged, 
would  prostrate  our  rights.  Does  the  word  court  only 
mean  the  judges  ?  Does  not  the  determination  of  a 
jury,  necessarily  lead  to  the  judgment  of  the  court  ? 
Is  there  any  thing  here  which  gives  the  judges  exclu 
sive  jurisdiction  of  matters  of  fact  ?  What  is  the  ob 
ject  of  a  jury  trial  ? — To  inform  the  court  of  the  facts. 
When  a  court  has  cognizance  of  facts,  does  it  not  fol 
low,  that  they  can  make  inquiry  by  a  jury  ?  It  is  im 
possible  to  be  otherwise.  I  hope  that  in  this  country, 
where  impartiality  is  so  much  admired,  the  laws  will  di- 

VOL.  r.  30 


234  MR.  MARSHALL'S  SPEECH  ON 

rect  facts  to  be  ascertained  by  a  jury.     But,  says  the 
honorable  gentleman,  the  juries  in  the  ten  miles  square 
will  be  mere  tools  of  parties,  with  which  he  would  not 
trust  his  person  or  property  ;  which,  he  says,  he  would 
rather  leave  to  the  court.     Because  the  government 
may  have  a  district  ten  miles  square,  will  no  man  stay 
there  but  the  tools  and  officers  of  the  government  ? 
Will  nobody  else  be  found  there  ?     Is  it  so  in  any 
other  part  of  the  world,  where  a  government  has  legis 
lative  power  ?    Are  there  none  but  officers  and  tools 
of  the  government  of  Virginia  in  Richmond  ?    Will 
there  not  be  independent  merchants,  and  respectable 
gentlemen  of  fortune,  within  the  ten  miles  square  ? 
Will  there  not  be  worthy  farmers  and  mechanics  ? 
Will  not  a  good  jury  be  found  there  as  well  as  any 
where  else  ?    Will  the  officers  of  the  government  be 
come  improper  to  be  on  a  jury  ?     What  is  it  to  the 
government,  whether  this  man  or  that  man  succeeds  ? 
— It  is  all  one  thing.      Does   the    constitution    say, 
that  juries  shall  consist  of  officers,  or  that  the  su 
preme  court  shall  be  held  in  the  ten  miles  square  ? 
It  was  acknowledged  by  the  honorable  member,  that 
it  was    secure  in  England.     What  makes  it  secure 
there  ?    Is  it  their  constitution  ?    What  part  of  their 
constitution    is    there,   that    the    parliament   cannot 
change  ?    As  the  preservation  of  this  right  is  in  the 
hands  of  parliament,  and  it  has  ever  been  held  sacred 
by  them,  will  the  government  of  America  be  less  honest 
than  that  of  Great  Britain  ?     Here  a  restriction  is  to 
be  found.     The  jury  is  not  to  be  brought  out  of  the 
state.     There  is  no  such  restriction  in  that  govern 
ment  ;  for  the  laws  of  parliament  decide  every  thing 
respecting  it.     Yet  gentlemen  tell  us,  that  there  is 
safety  there,  and  nothing  here  but  danger.     It  seems 
to  me,  that  the  laws  of  the  United  States  will  general 
ly  secure  trials  by  a  jury  of  the  vicinage,  or  in  such 
manner  as  will  be  most  safe  and  convenient  for  the 
people. 

But  it  seems  that  the  right  of  challenging  the  jurors. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  235 

is  not  secured  in  this  constitution.  Is  this  done  by 
our  own  constitution,  or  by  any  provision  of  the  English 
government  ?  Is  it  done  by  their  magna  charta,  or 
bill  of  rights  ?  This  privilege  is  founded  on  their 
laws.  If  so,  why  should  it  be  objected  to  the  Ameri 
can  constitution,  that  it  is  not  inserted  in  it  ?  If  we 
are  secure  in  Virginia,  without  mentioning  it  in  our 
constitution,  why  should  not  this  security  be  found  in 
the  federal  court  ? 

The  honorable  gentleman  said  much  about  the 
quit  rents  in  the  Northern  Neck.  I  will  refer  it  to  the 
honorable  gentleman  himself.  Has  he  not  acknow 
ledged  that  there  was  no  complete  title  ?  Was  he  not 
satisfied,  that  the  right  of  the  legal  representative  of 
the  proprietor  did  not  exist  at  the  time  he  mentioned  ? 
If  so,  it  cannot  exist  now.  I  will  leave  it  to  those 
gentlemen  who  come  from  that  quarter.  I  trust  they 
will  not  be  intimidated  on  this  account,  in  voting  on 
this  question.  A  law  passed  in  1782,  which  secures 
this.  He  says  that  many  poor  men  may  be  harassed 
and  injured  by  the  representative  of  lord  Fairfax.  If 
he  has  no  right,  this  cannot  be  done.  If  he  has  this 
right  and  comes  to  Virginia,  what  laws  will  his  claims 
be  determined  by  ? — By  those  of  this  state.  By  what 
tribunals  will  they  be  determined? — By  our  state  courts. 
Would  not  the  poor  man,  who  was  oppressed  by  an 
unjust  prosecution,  be  abundantly  protected  and  satis 
fied  by  the  temper  of  his  neighbors,  and  would  he  not 
find  ample  justice  ?  \Vhat  reason  has  the  honorable 
member  to  apprehend  partiality  or  injustice?  He 
supposes,  that  if  the  judges  be  judges  of  both  the  fede 
ral  and  state  courts,  they  will  incline  in  favor  of  one 
government.  If  such  contests  should  arise,  who  could 
more  properly  decide  them,  than  those  who  are  to 
swear  to  do  justice  ?  If  we  can  expect  a  fair  decision 
any  where,  may  we  not  expect  justice  to  be  done  by 
the  judges  of  both  the  federal  and  state  governments? 
But,  says  the  honorable  member,  laws  mav  be  executed 


•236  MR.  MARSHALL'S  SPEECH  ON 

tyrannically.  Where  is  the  independency  of  your 
judges  ?  If  a  law  be  executed  tyrannically  in  Virginia, 
to  what  can  you  trust  ? — To  your  judiciary.  What 
security  have  you  for  justice  ? — Their  independence. 
Will  it  not  be  so  in  the  federal  court? 

Gentlemen  ask  what  is  meant  by  law  cases,  and  if 
they  be  not  distinct  from  facts.  Is  there  no  law  aris 
ing  on  cases  in  equity  and  admiralty  ?  Look  at  the 
acts  of  assembly ;  have  you  not  many  cases,  where 
law  and  fact  are  blended  ?  Does  not  the  jurisdiction 
in  point  of  law  as  well  as  fact,  find  itself  completely 
satisfied  in  law  and  fact  ?  The  honorable  gentleman 
says,  that  no  law  of  Congress  can  make  any  exception 
to  the  federal,  appellate  jurisdiction  of  fact  as  well  as 
law.  He  has  frequently  spoken  of  technical  terms, 
and  the  meaning  of  them.  What  is  the  meaning  of  the 
term  exception  ?  Does  it  not  mean  an  alteration  and 
diminution?  Congress  is  empowered  to  make  ex 
ceptions  to  the  appellate  jurisdiction,  as  to  law  and 
fact,  of  the  supreme  court.  These  exceptions  certain 
ly  go  as  far  as  the  legislature  may  think  proper,  for  the 
interest  and  liberty  of  the  people.  Who  can  under 
stand  this  word,  exception,  to  extend  to  one  case  as 
well  as  the  other  ?  I  am  persuaded,  that  a  reconsidera 
tion  of  this  case  will  convince  the  gentleman,  that 
he  was  mistaken.  This  may  go  to  the  cure  of  the 
mischief  apprehended.  Gentlemen  must  be  satisfied, 
that  this  power  will  not  be  so  much  abused  as  they 
have  said. 

The  honorable  member  says,  that  he  derives  no 
consolation  from  the  wisdom  and  integrity  of  the  le 
gislature,  because  we  call  them  to  rectify  defects 
which  it  is  our  duty  to  remove.  We  ought  well  to 
weigh  the  good  and  evil  before  we  determine.  We 
ought  to  be  well  convinced,  that  the  evil  will  be  really 
produced  before  we  decide  against  it.  If  we  be  con 
vinced  that  the  good  greatly  preponderates,  though 
there  be  small  defects  in  it,  shall  we  give  up  that  which 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  237 

is  really  good,  when  we  can  remove  the  little  mischief 
it  may  contain,  in  the  plain,  easy  method  pointed  out  in 
the  system  itself? 

I  was  astonished  when  I  heard  the  honorable  gentle 
man  say,  that  he  wished  the  trial  by  jury  to  be  struck 
out  entirely.  Is  there  no  justice  to  be  expected  by  a 
jury  of  our  fellow-citizens  ?  Will  any  man  prefer  to  be 
tried  by  a  court,  when  the  jury  is  to  be  of  his  country 
men,  and  probably  of  his  vicinage  ?  We  have  reason 
to  believe  the  regulations  with  respect  to  juries  will  be 
such  as  shall  be  satisfactory.  Because  it  does  not  con 
tain  all,  does  it  contain  nothing  ?  But  I  conceive 
that  this  committee  will  see  there  is  safety  in  the 
case,  and  that  there  is  no  mischief  to  be  apprehended. 

He  states  a  case,  that  a  man  may  be  carried  from  a 
federal  to  an  anti-federal  corner,  (and  vice  versa)  where 
men  are  ready  to  destroy  him.  Is  this  probable  ?  Is  it 
presumable  that  they  will  make  a  law  to  punish  men 
who  are  of  different  opinions  in  politics  from  them 
selves  ?  Is  it  presumable,  that  they  will  do  it  in 
one  single  case,  unless  it  be  such  a  case  as  must 
satisfy  the  people  at  large  ?  The  good  opinion 
of  the  people  at  large  must  be  consulted  by  their  repre 
sentatives;  otherwise  mischiefs  would  be  produced, 
which  would  shake  the  government  to  its  foundation. 
As  it  is  late,  I  shall  not  mention  all  the  gentleman's 
argument ;  but  some  parts  of  it  are  so  glaring,  that  I 
cannot  pass  them  over  in  silence,  He  says  that  the 
establishment  of  these  tribunals,  and  more  particularly 
in  their  jurisdiction  of  controversies  between  citizens 
of  these  states  and  foreign  citizens  and  subjects,  is  like 
a  retrospective  law.  Is  there  no  difference  between  a 
tribunal  which  shall  give  justice  and  effect  to  an  exist 
ing  right,  and  creating  a  right  that  did  not  exist  before  ? 
The  debt  or  claim  is  created  by  the  individual;  he 
has  bound  himself  to  comply  with  it;  does  the  crea 
tion  of  a  new  court  amount  to  a  retrospective  law  ? 

We  are  satisfied  with  the  provision  made  in  this 
country  on  the  subject  of  trial  by  jury.  Does  our  con- 


. 
238  MK.  MARSHALL'S  SPEECH    ON 

stitution  direct  trials  to  be  by  jury  ?  It  is  required  in 
our  bill  of  rights,  which  is  not  a  part  of  the  constitution. 
Does  any  security  arise  from  hence  ?  Have  you  a 
jury  when  a  judgment  is  obtained  on  a  replevin  bond, 
or  by  default  ?  Have  you  a  jury  when  a  motion  is  made 
for  the  commonwealth  against  an  individual ;  or  when 
a  motion  is  made  by  one  joint  obligor  against  another, 
to  recover  sums  paid  as  security  ?  Our  courts  decide 
in  all  these  cases,  without  the  intervention  of  a  jury ; 
yet  they  are  all  civil  cases.  The  bill  of  rights  is  merely 
recommendatory.  Were  it  otherwise,  the  consequence 
would  be,  that  many  laws  which  are  found  convenient, 
would  be  unconstitutional.  What  does  the  govern 
ment  before  you  say  ?  Does  it  exclude  the  legislature 
from  giving  a  trial  by  jury  in  civil  cases  ?  If  it  does  not 
forbid  its  exclusion,  it  is  on  the  same  footing  on  which 
your  state  government  stands  now.  The  legislature 
of  Virginia  does  not  give  a  trial  by  jury  where  it  is  not 
necessary.  But  gives  it  wherever  it  is  thought  expedi 
ent.  The  federal  legislature  will  do  so  too,  as  it  is 
formed  on  the  same  principles. 

The  honorable  gentleman  says,  that  unjust  claims 
will  be  made,  and  the  defendant  had  better  pay  them 
than  go  to  the  supreme  court.  Can  you  suppose  such 
a  disposition  in  one  of  your  citizens,  as  that  to  op 
press  another  man,  he  will  incur  great  expenses  ? 
What  will  he  gain  by  an  unjust  demand  ?  Does  a 
claim  establish  a  right  ?  He  must  bring  his  witnesses 
to  prove  his  claim.  If  he  does  not  bring  his  witnesses, 
the  expenses  must  fall  upon  him.  Will  he  go  on  a  cal 
culation  that  the  defendant  will  not  defend  it,  or  can 
not  produce  a  witness  ?  Will  he  incur  a  great  deal  of 
expense,  from  a  dependence  on  such  a  chance  ?  Those 
who  know  human  nature,  black  as  it  is,  must  know 
that  mankind  are  too  well  attached  to  their  interest  to 
run  such  a  risk.  I  conceive  that  this  power  is  abso 
lutely  necessary,  and  not  dangerous ;  that  should  it  be 
attended  by  little  inconveniences,  they  will  be  altered, 
and  that  they  can  have  no  interest  in  not  altering  them. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  239 

Is  there  any  real  danger  ?  When  I  compare  it  to  the 
exercise  of  the  same  power  in  the  government  of 
Virginia,  I  am  persuaded  there  is  not.  The  fede 
ral  government  has  no  other  motive,  and  has  every 
reason  of  doing  right,  which  the  members  of  our  state 
legislature  have.  Will  a  man  on  the  Eastern  Shore,  be 
sent  to  be  tried  in  Kentucky ;  or  a  man  from  Kentucky 
be  brought  to  the  Eastern  Shore  to  have  his  trial  ?  A 
government  by  doing  this  would  destroy  itself.  I  am 
convinced,  the  trial  by  jury  will  be  regulated  in  the  man 
ner  most  advantageous  to  the  community. 


SPEECH  OF    PATRICK  HENRY, 

ON  THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  ADOPTING  THE 

FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION, 
DELIVERED  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  VIRGINIA,  JUNE  24th,  1788. 


The  resolution  of  Mr.  Wythe  being  under  consideration,  which 
proposed,  "  That  the  committee  should  ratify  the  constitution,  and 
that  whatsoever  amendments  might  be  deemed  necessary  should  be 
recommended  to  the  consideration  of  the  Congress,  which  should 
first  assemble  under  the  constitution,  to  be  acted  upon  according  to 
the  mode  prescribed  therein  ;"  Mr.  Henry  thus  addressed  the 
convention. 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

THE  proposal  of  ratification  is  premature.  The  im 
portance  of  the  subject  requires  the  most  mature  de 
liberation.  The  honorable  member  must  forgive  me 
for  declaring  my  dissent  from  it,  because,  if  I  understand 
it  rightly,  it  admits  that  the  new  system  is  defective  arid 
most  capitally:  for  immediately  after  the  proposed 
ratification,  there  comes  a  declaration,  that  the  paper 
before  you  is  not  intended  to  violate  any  of  these  three 
great  rights — the  liberty  of  religion,  liberty  of  the 
press,  and  the  trial  by  jury.  What  is  the  inference, 
when  you  enumerate  the  rights  which  you  are  to  en 
joy?  That  those  not  enumerated  are  relinquished. 
There  are  only  three  things  to  be  retained :  religion, 
freedom  of  the  press,  and  jury  trial.  Will  not  the  ratifi 
cation  carry  every  thing,  without  excepting  these  three 
things  ?  Will  not  all  the  world  pronounce,  that  we 


3111.    HENRY'S    SPEECH,  &c.  241 

intended  to  give  up  all  the  rest?  Every  thing  it 
speaks  of,  by  way  of  rights,  is  comprised  in  these  three 
things.  Your  subsequent  amendments,  only  go  to 
these  three  amendments.  I  feel  myself  distressed,  be 
cause  the  necessity  of  securing  our  personal  rights, 
seems  not  to  have  pervaded  the  minds  of  men :  for 
many  other  valuable  things  are  omitted.  For  in 
stance:  general  warrants,  by  which  an  officer  may 
search  suspected  places,  without  evidence  of  the  com 
mission  of  a  fact,  or  seize  any  person  without  evidence 
of  his  crime,  ought  to  be  prohibited.  As  these  are  ad 
mitted,  any  man  may  be  seized ;  any  property  may  be 
taken,  in  the  most  arbitrary  manner,  without  any  evi 
dence  or  reason.  Every  thing  the  most  sacred,  may 
be  searched  and  ransacked  by  the  strong  hand  of 
power.  We  have  infinitely  more  reason  to  dread  ge 
neral  warrants  here,  than  they  have  in  England ;  be 
cause  there,  if  a  person  be  confined,  liberty  may  be 
quickly  obtained  by  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  But 
here,  a  man  living  many  hundred  miles  from  the  judges, 
may  rot  in  prison  before  he  can  get  that  writ. 

Another  most  fatal  omission  is,  with  respect  to 
standing  armies.  In  your  bill  of  rights  of  Virginia, 
they  are  said  to  be  dangerous  to  liberty,  and  it  tells 
you,  that  the  proper  defence  of  a  free  state  consists  in 
militia;  and  so  I  might  go  on  to  ten  or  eleven  things 
of  immense  consequence  secured  in  your  bill  of  rights, 
concerning  which  that  proposal  is  silent.  Is  that  the 
language  of  the  bill  of  rights  in  England  ?  Is  it  the 
language  of  the  American  bill  of  rights,  that  these 
three  rights,  and  these  only,  are  valuable  ?  Is  it  the 
language  of  men  going  into  a  new  government  ?  Is  it 
not  necessary  to  speak  of  those  things  before  you  go 
into  a  compact  ?  How  do  these  three  things  stand  ? 
As  one  of  the  parties,  we  declare  we  do  not  mean  to 
give  them  up.  This  is  very  dictatorial ;  much  more 
so,  than  the  conduct  which  proposes  alterations  as  the 
condition  of  adoption.  In  a  compact,  there  are  two 
parties— one  accepting,  and  another  proposing.  As 

VOL.  i.  31 


242  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

a  party,  we  propose  that  we  shall  secure  these  three 
things ;  and  before  we  have  the  assent  of  the  other 
contracting  party,  we  go  into  the  compact,  and  leave 
these  things  at  their  mercy.     What  will  be  the  conse 
quence  ?     Suppose  the  other  states  will  call  this  dic 
tatorial  :  they  will  say,  Virginia  has  gone  into  the 
government,  and  carried  with  her  certain  propositions, 
which  she  says,  ought  to  be  concurred  in  by  the  other 
states.     They  will  declare,  that  she  has  no  right  to 
dictate  to  other  states  the  conditions  on  which  they 
shall  come  into  the  union.     According  to  the  honora 
ble  member's  proposal,  the  ratification  will  cease  to  be 
obligatory  unless  they  accede  to  these  amendments. 
We  have  ratified  it.     You  have  committed  a  violation, 
they  will  say.     They  have  not  violated  it.     We  say  we 
will  go  out  of  it.     You  are  then  reduced  to  a  sad  di 
lemma  ;  to  give  up  these  three  rights,  or  leave  the 
government.     This  is  worse  than  our  present  confede 
ration,  to  which  we  have  hitherto  adhered  honestly 
and  faithfully.     We  shall  be  told  we  have  violated  it, 
because  we  have  left  it  for  the  infringement  and  vio 
lation  of  conditions,  which  they  never  agreed  to  be  a 
part  of  the  ratification.     The  ratification  will  be  com 
plete.     The  proposal  is  made  by  one  party.     We,  as 
the  other,  accede  to  it,  and  propose  the  security  of 
these  three  great  rights ;  for  it  is  only  a  proposal.     In 
order  to  secure  them,  you  are  left  in  that  state  of  fatal 
hostility,  which  I  shall  as  much  deplore  as  the  honora 
ble  gentleman.     I  exhort  gentlemen  to  think  seriously, 
before  they  ratify  this  constitution,  and  persuade  them 
selves  that  they  will  succeed  in  making  a  feeble  effort 
to  get  amendments  after  adoption.     With  respect  to 
that  part  of  the  proposal,  which  says,  that  every  power 
not  granted,  remains  with  the  people ;  it  must  be  pre 
vious  to  adoption,  or  it  will  involve  this  country  in  in 
evitable  destruction.     To  talk  of  it,  as  a  thing  subse 
quent,  not  as  one  of  your  unalienable  rights,  is  leaving 
it  to  the  casual  opinion  of  the  Congress  who  shall  take 
up  the  consideration  of  that  matter.     They  will  not 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  i>43 

reason  with  you  about  the  effect  of  this  constitution. 
They  will  not  take  the  opinion  of  this  committee  con 
cerning  its  operation.  They  will  construe  it  as  they 
please.  If  you  place  it  subsequently,  let  me  ask  the 
consequences  ?  Among  ten  thousand  implied  powers 
which  they  may  assume,  they  may,  if  we  be  engaged 
in  war,  liberate  every  one  of  your  slaves,  if  they  please. 
And  this  must  and  will  be  done  by  men,  a  majority  of 
whom  have  not  a  common  interest  with  you.  They 
will,  therefore,  have  no  feeling  for  your  interests. 

It  has  been  repeatedly  said  here,  that  the  great  ob 
ject  of  a  national  government,  is  national  defence. 
That  power,  which  is  said  to  be  intended  for  security 
and  safety,  may  be  rendered  detestable  and  oppressive. 
If  you  give  power  to  the  general  government  to  pro 
vide  for  the  general  defence,  the  means  must  be  com 
mensurate  to  the  end.  All  the  means  in  the  possession 
of  the  people,  must  be  given  to  the  government  which 
is  entrusted  with  the  public  defence.  In  this  state  there 
are  two  hundred  and  thirty  six  thousand  blacks,  and 
there  are  many  in  several  other  states  :  but  there  are 
few  or  none  in  the  northern  states,  and  yet,  if  the  north 
ern  states  shall  be  of  opinion  that  our  numbers  are 
numberless,  they  may  call  forth  every  national  re 
source.  May  Congress  not  say,  that  every  black  man 
must  fight  ?  Did  we  not  see  a  little  of  this  in  the  last 
war?  We  were  not  so  hard  pushed,  as  to  make 
emancipation  general :  but  acts  of  assembly  passed, 
that  every  slave  who  would  go  to  the  army  should  be 
free.  Another  thing  will  contribute  to  bring  this  event 
about ;  slavery  is  detested ;  we  feel  its  fatal  effects ; 
we  deplore  it  with  all  the  pity  of  humanity.  Let  all 
these  considerations,  at  some  future  period,  press 
with  full  force  on  the  minds  of  Congress.  Let  that 
urbanity,  which  I  trust  will  distinguish  America,  and 
the  necessity  of  national  defence — let  all  these  things 
operate  on  their  minds,  and  they  will  search  that  pa 
per,  and  see  if  they  have  power  of  manumission.  And 
have  they  not,  sir  ?  Have  they  not  power  to  provide 


244  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

for  the  general  defence  and  welfare  ?  May  they  not 
think  that  these  call  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  ?  May 
they  not  pronounce  all  slaves  free,  and  will  they  not  be 
warranted  by  that  power  ?  There  is  no  ambiguous 
implication,  or  logical  deduction.  The  paper  speaks 
to  the  point.  They  have  the  power  in  clear  unequivo 
cal  terms,  and  will  clearly  and  certainly  exercise  it. 
As  much  as  I  deplore  slavery,  I  see  that  prudence  for 
bids  its  abolition.  I  deny  that  the  general  govern 
ment  ought  to  set  them  free,  because  a  decided  majo 
rity  of  the  states  have  not  the  ties  of  sympathy  and 
fellow-feeling  for  those  whose  interest  would  be  affect 
ed  by  their  emancipation.  The  majority  of  Congress 
is  to  the  north,  and  the  slaves  are  to  the  south.  In 
this  situation,  I  see  a  great  deal  of  the  property  of  the 
people  of  Virginia  in  jeopardy,  and  their  peace  and 
tranquillity  gone  away.  I  repeat  it  again,  that  it  would 
rejoice  my  very  soul,  that  every  one  of  my  fellow-be 
ings  was  emancipated.  As  we  ought  with  gratitude 
to  admire  that  decree  of  heaven,  which  has  numbered 
us  among  the  free,  we  ought  to  lament  and  deplore 
the  necessity  of  holding  our  fellow-men  in  bondage. 
But  is  it  practicable,  by  any  human  means,  to  liberate 
them,  without  producing  the  most  dreadful  and  ruinous 
consequences?  We  ought  to  possess  them  in  the 
manner  we  have  inherited  them  from  our  ancestors, 
as  their  manumission  is  incompatible  with  the  felicity 
of  the  country.  But  we  ought  to  soften,  as  much  as 
possible,  the  rigor  of  their  unhappy  fate.  I  know  that 
in  a  variety  of  particular  instances,  the  legislature,  lis 
tening  to  complaints,  have  admitted  their  emancipa 
tion.  Let  me  not  dwell  on  this  subject.  I  will  only 
add,  that  this,  as  well  as  every  other  property  of  the 
people  of  Virginia,  is  in  jeopardy,  and  put  in  the  hands 
of  those  who  have  no  similarity  of  situation  with  us. 
This  is  a  local  matter,  and  I  can  see  no  propriety  in 
subjecting  it  to  Congress. 

With  respect  to  subsequent  amendments,  proposed 
by  the  worthy  member.  I  am  distressed  when  I  hear 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  24/> 

the  expression.  It  is  a  new  one  altogether,  and  such 
an  one  as  stands  against  every  idea  of  fortitude  and 
manliness,  in  the  states,  or  any  one  else.  Evils  admit 
ted,  in  order  to  be  removed  subsequently,  and  tyranny 
submitted  to,  in  order  to  be  excluded  by  a  subsequent 
alteration,  are  things  totally  new  to  me.  But  I  am  sure 
he  meant  nothing  but  to  amuse  the  committee.  I 
know  his  candor.  His  proposal  is  an  idea  dreadful  to 
me.  I  ask — does  experience  warrant  such  a  thing 
from  the  beginning  of  the  world  to  this  day  ?  Do  you 
enter  into  a  compact  of  government  first,  and  after 
wards  settle  the  terms  of  the  government  ?  It  is  ad 
mitted  by  every  one,  that  this  is  a  compact.  Although 
the  confederation  be  lost,  it  is  a  compact  constitution, 
or  something  of  that  nature.  I  confess  I  never  heard 
of  such  an  idea  before.  It  is  most  abhorrent  to  my 
mind.  You  endanger  the  tranquillity  of  your  country, 
you  stab  its  repose,  if  you  accept  this  government  un 
altered.  How  are  you  to  allay  animosities  ? — For 
such  there  are,  great  and  fatal.  He  flatters  me  and 
tells  me,  that  I  could  influence  the  people,  and  re 
concile  them  to  it.  Sir,  their  sentiments  are  as  firm 
and  steady,  as  they  are  patriotic.  Were  I  to  ask  them 
to  apostatize  from  their  native  religion,  they  would 
despise  me.  They  are  not  to  be  shaken  in  their 
opinions  with  respect  to  the  propriety  of  preserving 
their  rights.  You  never  can  persuade  them,  that  it  is 
necessary  to  relinquish  them.  Were  I  to  attempt  to 
persuade  them  to  abandon  their  patriotic  sentiments, 
I  should  look  on  myself  as  the  most  infamous  of  men. 
I  believe  it  to  be  a  fact,  that  the  great  body  of  yeo 
manry  are  in  decided  opposition  to  it.  I  may  say 
with  confidence,  that  for  nineteen  counties  adjacent 
to  each  other,  nine  tenths  of  the  people  are  consci 
entiously  opposed  to  it.  I  may  be  mistaken,  but  I  give 
you  it  as  my  opinion,  and  my  opinion  is  founded  on 
personal  knowledge  in  some  measure,  and  other  good 
authority.  I  have  not  hunted  popularity  by  declaim 
ing  to  injure  this  government.  Though  public  fame 


246  MK.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

might  say  so,  it  was  not  owing  to  me  that  this  flame  of 
opposition  has  been  kindled  and  spread.  These  men 
never  will  part  with  their  political  opinions.  If  they 
should  see  their  political  happiness  secured  to  the 
latest  posterity,  then  indeed  they  might  agree  to  it. 
Subsequent  amendments  will  not  do  for  men  of  this 
cast.  Do  you  consult  the  union  in  proposing  them  ? 
You  may  amuse  them  as  long  as  you  please,  but  they 
will  never  like  it.  You  have  not  solid  reality — the 
hearts  and  hands  of  the  men  who  are  to  be  governed. 
Have  gentlemen  no  respect  to  the  actual  dispositions 
of  the  people  in  the  adopting  states  ?  Look  at  Penn 
sylvania  and  Massachusetts.  These  two  great  states 
have  raised  as  great  objections  to  that  government  as 
we  do.  There  was  a  majority  of  only  nineteen  in 
Massachusetts.  We  are  told,  that  only  ten  thousand 
were  represented  in  Pennsylvania,  although  seventy 
thousand  had  a  right  to  be  represented.  Is  not  this  a 
serious  thing  ?  Is  it  not  worth  while  to  turn  your  eyes 
for  a  moment  from  subsequent  amendments,  to  the 
situation  of  your  country  ?  Can  you  have  a  lasting 
union  in  these  circumstances  ?  It  will  be  in  vain  to 
expect  it.  But  if  you  agree  to  previous  amendments, 
you  shall  have  union,  firm  and  solid.  I  cannot  con 
clude  without  saying,  that  I  shall  have  nothing  to  do 
with  it,  if  subsequent  amendments  be  determined  upon. 
Oppressions  will  be  carried  on  as  radically  by  the  ma 
jority,  when  adjustments  and  accommodations  will  be 
held  up.  I  say,  I  conceive  it  my  duty,  if  this  govern 
ment  is  adopted  before  it  is  amended,  to  go  home.  I 
shall  act  as  I  think  my  duty  requires.  Every  other  gen 
tleman  will  do  the  same.  Previous  amendments,  in 
my  opinion,  are  necessary  to  procure  peace  and  tran 
quillity.  I  fear,  if  they  be  not  agreed  to,  every  move 
ment  and  operation  of  government  will  cease,  and  how 
long  that  baneful  thing,  civil  discord,  will  stay  from  this 
country,  God  only  knows.  When  men  are  free  from 
restraint,  how  long  will  you  suspend  their  fury  ?  The 
interval  between  this  and  bloodshed,  is  but  a  moment. 

' 

.:->: 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  247 

The  licentious  and  wicked  of  the  community,  will 
seize  with  avidity  every  thing  you  hold.  In  this  un 
happy  situation,  what  is  to  be  done  ?  It  surpasses  my 
stock  of  wisdom.  If  you  will,  in  the  language  of  free 
men,  stipulate  that  there  are  rights  which  no  -man  un 
der  heaven  can  take  from  you,  you  shall  have  me  going 
along  with  you,  and  not  otherwise. — [Here  Mr.  Henry 
informed  the  committee,  that  he  had  a  resolution  pre 
pared,  to  refer  a  declaration  of  rights,  with  certain 
amendments  to  the  most  exceptionable  parts  of  the 
constitution,  to  the  other  states  in  the  confederacy,  for 
their  consideration,  previous  to  its  ratification.  The 
clerk  then  read  the  resolution,  the  declaration  of  rights, 
and  amendments,  which  were  nearly  the  same  as  those 
ultimately  proposed  by  the  convention,  for  the  consi 
deration  of  Congress.  He  then  resumed  the  subject] 
I  have  thus  candidly  submitted  to  you,  Mr.  Chairman, 
and  this  committee,  what  occurred  to  me  as  proper 
amendments  to  the  constitution,  and  a  declaration  of 
rights  containing  those  fundamental,  unalienable  pri 
vileges,  which  I  conceive  to  be  essential  to  liberty  and 
happiness.  I  believe,  that  on  a  review  of  these  amend 
ments  it  will  still  be  found,  that  the  arm  of  power  will 
be  sufficiently  strong  for  national  purposes,  when  these 
restrictions  shall  be  a  part  of  the  government.  I  be 
lieve  no  gentleman,  who  opposes  me  in  sentiments, 
will  be  able  to  discover  that  any  one  feature  of  a 
strong  government  is  altered;  and  at  the  same  time 
your  unalienable  rights  are  secured  by  them.  The 
government  unaltered  may  be  terrible  to  America, 
but  can  never  be  loved,  till  it  be  amended.  You  find 
all  the  resources  of  the  continent  may  be  drawn  to 
a  point.  In  danger,  the  president  may  concentre  to 
a  point  every  effort  of  the  continent.  If  the  govern 
ment  be  constructed  to  satisfy  the  people  and  remove 
their  apprehensions,  the  wealth  and  strength  of  the 
continent  will  go  where  public  utility  shall  direct, 
This  government,  with  these  restrictions,  will  be  a 
strong  government  united  with  the  privileges  of  the 


248  Mil.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  OX 

people.  In  my  weak  judgment,  a  government  i^ 
strong,  when  it  applies  to  the  most  important  end  of 
all  governments — the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  peo 
ple.  In  the  honorable  member's  proposal,  jury  trial, 
the  press,  and  religion,  and  other  essential  rights,  are 
not  to  be  given  up.  Other  essential  rights — what  are 
they  ?  The  world  will  say,  that  you  intended  to  give 
them  up.  When  you  go  into  an  enumeration  of  your 
rights,  and  stop  that  enumeration,  the  inevitable  con 
clusion  is,  that  what  is  omitted  is  intended  to  be  sur 
rendered. 

Anxious  as  I  am  to  be  as  little  troublesome  as  pos 
sible,  I  cannot  leave  this  part  of  the  subject,  without 
adverting  to  one  remark  of  the  honorable  gentle 
man.  He  says,  that  rather  than  bring  the  union  into 
danger,  he  will  adopt  it  with  its  imperfections.  A 
great  deal  is  said  about  disunion,  and  consequent  dan 
gers.  I  have  no  claim  to  a  greater  share  of  fortitude 
than  others,  but  I  can  see  no  kind  of  danger.  I  form  my 
judgment  on  a  single  fact  alone,  that  we  are  at  peace 
with  all  the  world,  nor  is  there  any  apparent  cause  of 
a  rupture  with  any  nation  in  the  world.  Is  it  among 
the  American  states  that  the  cause  of  disunion  is  to  be 
feared  ?  Are  not  the  states  using  all  their  efforts  for  the 
promotion  of  union  ?  New  England  sacrifices  local 
prejudices  for  the  purposes  of  union.  We  hear  the 
necessity  of  the  union,  and  predilection  for  the  union, 
re-echoed  from  all  parts  of  the  continent :  and  all  at 
once  disunion  is  to  follow !  If  gentlemen  dread  dis 
union,  the  very  thing  they  advocate  will  inevitably 
produce  it.  A  previous  ratification  will  raise  insur 
mountable  obstacles  to  union.  New  York  is  an  insur 
mountable  obstacle  to  it,  and  North  Carolina  also. 
They  will  never  accede  to  it,  till  it  be  amended.  A  great 
part  of  Virginia  is  opposed  most  decidedly  to  it,  as  it 
stands.  This  very  spirit  which  will  govern  us  in  these 
three  states,  will  find  a  kindred  spirit  in  the  adopting 
states.  Give  me  leave  to  say,  that  it  is  very  problema 
tical  whether  the  adopting  states  can  stand  on  their 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  240 

own  legs.  I  hear  only  on  one  side,  but  as  far  as  my 
information  goes,  there  are  heart-burnings  and  animosi 
ties  among  them.  Will  these  animosities  be  cured  by 
subsequent  amendments  ? 

Turn  away  from  America,  and  consider  European 
politics.  The  nations  there,  which  can  trouble  us  are 
France,  England  and  Spain.  But  at  present  we  know 
for  a  certainty,  that  those  nations  are  engaged  in  very 
different  pursuits  from  American  conquests.  We  are 
told  by  our  intelligent  ambassador,  that  there  is  no  such 
danger  as  has  been  apprehended.  Give  me  leave  then  to 
say,  that  dangers  from  beyond  the  Atlantic  are  imagina 
ry.  From  these  premises  then,  it  may  be  concluded, 
that  from  the  creation  of  the  world,  to  this  time,  there 
never  was  a  more  fair  and  proper  opportunity  than  we 
have  at  this  day  to  establish  such  a  government  as  will 
permanently  establish  the  most  transcendent  political  fe 
licity.  Since  the  revolution  there  has  not  been  so  much 
experience.  Since  then,  the  general  inte  rests  of  A  meri- 
ca  have  not  been  better  understood,  nor  the  union 
more  ardently  loved,  than  at  this  present  moment.  1 
acknowledge  the  weakness  of  the  old  confederation. 
Every  man  says,  that  something  must  be  done,  Where 
is  the  moment  more  favorable  than  this  ?  During  the 
war,  when  ten  thousand  dangers  surrounded  us,  Ameri 
ca  was  magnanimous.  What  was  the  language  of  the 
little  state  of  Maryland  ?  "  I  will  have  time  to  consi 
der.  I  will  hold  out  three  years.  Let  what  may  come, 
I  will  have  time  to  reflect."  Magnanimity  appeared 
every  where.  What  was  the  upshot  ? — America  tri 
umphed.  Is  there  any  thing  to  forbid  us  to  offer  these 
amendments  to  the  other  states  ?  If  this  moment  goes 
away  unimproved,  we  shall  never  see  its  return.  We 
now  act  under  a  happy  system,  which  says,  that  a  ma 
jority  may  alter  the  government  when  necessary.  But 
by  the  paper  proposed,  a  majority  will  forever  endea 
vor  in  vain  to  alter  it.  Three  fourths  may.  Is  not  this 
the  most  promising  time  for  securing  the  necessary  al- 
L  32 


250  MR.  HENRY'S  SPEECH  ON 

terations  ?  Will  you  go  into  that  government,  where 
it  is  a  principle,  that  a  contemptible  minority  may  pre 
vent  an  alteration?  What  will  be  the  language 
of  the  majority  ? — Change  the  government. — Nay, 
seven  eighths  of  the  people  of  America  may  wish 
the  change;  but  the  minority  may  come  with  a 
Roman  Veto,  and  object  to  the  alteration.  The  lan 
guage  of  a  magnanimous  country  and  of  freemen  is. 
till  you  remove  the  defects  we  will  not  accede.  It 
would  be  in  vain  for  me  to  show,  that  there  is  no  dan 
ger  to  prevent  our  obtaining  those  amendments,  if  you 
are  not  convinced  already.  If  the  other  states  will  not 
agree  to  them,  it  is  not  an  inducement  to  union.  The 
language  of  this  paper  is  not  dictatorial,  but  merely  a 
proposition  for  amendments.  The  proposition  of 
Virginia  met  with  a  favorable  reception  before.  We 
proposed  that  convention  which  met  at  Annapolis.  It 
was  not  called  dictatorial.  We  proposed  that  at 
Philadelphia.  Was  Virginia  thought  dictatorial  ? 
But  Virginia  is  now  to  lose  her  pre-eminence. 
Those  rights  of  equality,  to  which  the  meanest  in 
dividual  in  the  community  is  entitled,  are  to  bring  us 
down  infinitely  below  the  Delaware  people.  Have 
we  not  a  right  to  say,  hear  our  propositions? 
Why,  sir,  your  slaves  have  a  right  to  make  their 
humble  requests.  Those,  who  are  in  the  meanest 
occupations  of  human  life,  have  a  right  to  com 
plain.  What  do  we  require  ?  Not  pre-eminence, 
but  safety ;  that  our  citizens  may  be  able  to  sit  down  in 
peace  and  security  under  their  own  fig-trees.  I  am 
confident  that  sentiments  like  these  will  meet  with 
unison  in  every  state ;  for  they  will  wish  to  banish 
discord  from  the  American  soil.  I  am  certain 
that  the  warmest  friend  of  the  constitution,  wishes 
to  have  fewer  enemies — fewer  of  those  who  pester 
and  plague  him  with  opposition.  I  could  not  with 
hold  from  my  fellow-citizens  any  thing  so  reason 
able.  I  fear  you  will  have  no  union,  unless  you  re- 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  251 

move  the  cause  of  opposition.  Will  you  sit  down 
contented  with  the  name  of  union  without  any  solid 
foundation  ? 

Mr.  Henry  then  concluded,  by  expressing  his  hope, 
that  his  resolution  would  be  adopted,  and  added, 
that  if  the  committee  should  disapprove  of  any  of 
his  amendments,  others  might  be  substituted. 


INAUGURAL  ADDRESS 

OF 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON, 

PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

DELIVERED  APRIL  30th,    1789. 


Fellow-citizens  of  the  Senate,  and 
of  the  House  of  Representatives, 

AMONG  the  vicissitudes  incident  to  life,  no  event 
could  have  filled  me  with  greater  anxieties,  than  that 
of  which  the  notification  was  transmitted  by  your  or 
der,  and  received  on  the  fourteenth  day  of  the  present 
month.  On  the  one  hand,  I  was  summoned  by  my 
country,  whose  voice  I  can  never  hear  but  with  vene 
ration  and  love,  from  a  retreat  which  I  had  chosen 
with  the  fondest  predilection,  and  in  my  flattering 
hopes  with  an  immutable  decision  as  the  asylum  of 
my  declining  years ;  a  retreat  which  was  rendered  eve 
ry  day  more  necessary,  as  well  as  more  dear  to  me, 
by  the  addition  of  habit  to  inclination,  and  of  frequent 
interruptions  in  my  health  to  the  gradual  waste  com 
mitted  on  it  by  time.  On  the  other  hand,  the  magni 
tude  and  difficulty  of  the  trust,  to  which  the  voice  of 
my  country  called  me,  being  sufficient  to  awaken  in  the 
wisest  and  most  experienced  of  her  citizens  a  distrust 
ful  scrutiny  into  his  qualifications,  could  not  but  over 
whelm  with  despondence  one,  who  inheriting  inferior 
endowments  from  nature,  and  unpractised  in  the  du 
ties  of  civil  administration,  ought  to  be  peculiarly  con* 
scious  of  his  own  deficiencies.  In  this  conflict  of  emo 
tions,  all  I  dare  aver,  is,  that  it  has  been  my  faithful 


INAUGURAL  ADDRESS.  253 

study  to  collect  my  duty  from  a  just  appreciation  of 
every  circumstance  by  which  it  might  be  affected. 
All  I  dare  hope  is,  that  if  in  executing  this  task,  I  have 
been  too  much  swayed  by  a  grateful  remembrance  of 
former  instances,  or  by  an  affectionate  sensibility  to 
this  transcendent  proof  of  the  confidence  of  my  fellow- 
citizens,  and  have  thence  too  little  consulted  my  inca 
pacity  as  well  as  disinclination  for  the  weighty  and  un 
tried  cares  before  me,  my  error  will  be  palliated  by 
the  motives  which  misled  me,  and  its  consequences  be 
judged  by  my  country,  with  some  share  of  the  partiali 
ty  in  which  they  originated. 

Such  being  the  impressions  under  which  I  have,  in 
obedience  to  the  public  summons,  repaired  to  the  pre 
sent  station,  it  would  be  peculiarly  improper  to  omit 
in  this  first  official  act,  my  fervent  supplications  to  that 
Almighty  Being  who  rules  over  the  universe — who 
presides  in  the  councils  of  nations — and  whose  provi 
dential  aids  can  supply  every  human  defect,  that  his 
benediction  may  consecrate  to  the  liberties  and  happi 
ness  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  a  government 
instituted  by  themselves  for  these  essential  purposes ; 
and  may  enable  every  instrument,  employed  in  its  ad 
ministration,  to  execute  with  success,  the  functions  al 
lotted  to  his  charge.  In  tendering  this  homage  to  the 
great  author  of  every  public  and  private  good,  I  assure 
myself  that  it  expresses  your  sentiments  not  less  than 
my  own,  nor  those  of  my  fellow-citizens  at  large,  less 
than  either.  No  people  can  be  bound  to  acknowledge 
and  adore  the  invisible  hand,  which  conducts  the  af 
fairs  of  men,  more  than  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
Every  step,  by  which  they  have  advanced  to  the  cha 
racter  of  an  independent  nation,  seems  to  have  been 
distinguished  by  some  token  of  providential  agency  : 
and  in  the  important  revolution  just  accomplished  in 
the  system  of  their  united  government,  the  tranquil  de 
liberations  and  voluntary  consent  of  so  many  distinct 
communities,  from  which  the  event  has  resulted,  can 
not  be  compared  with  the  means,  by  which  most  gov- 


254  PRESIDENT  WASHINGTON'S 

ernments  have  been  established,  without  some  return 
of  pious  gratitude  along  with  a  humble  anticipation 
of  the  future  blessings  which  the  past  seem  to  presage. 
These  reflections,  arising  out  of  the  present  crisis,  have 
forced  themselves  too  strongly  on  my  mind  to  be  sup 
pressed.  You  will  join  with  me,  I  trust,  in  thinking 
that  there  are  none  under  the  influence  of  which,  the 
proceedings  of  a  new  and  free  government  can  more 
auspiciously  commence. 

By  the  article  establishing  the  executive  depart 
ment,  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the  President,  "  to  recom 
mend  to  your   consideration,   such  measures  as  he 
shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient."     The  circum 
stances  under  which  I  now  meet  you,  will  acquit  me 
from  entering  into  that  subject,  farther  than  to  refer  to 
the  great  constitutional  charter  under  which  you  are 
assembled ;  and  which,  in  defining  your  powers,  desig 
nates  the  objects  to  which  your  attention  is  to  be  given. 
It  will  be  more  consistent  with  those  circumstances, 
and  far  more  congenial  with  the  feelings  which  actu 
ate  me,  to  substitute,  in  place  of  a  recommendation  of 
particular  measures,  the  tribute  that  is  due  to  the  ta 
lents,  the  rectitude,  and  the  patriotism  which  adorn  the 
characters  selected  to  devise  and  adopt  them.    In  these 
honorable  qualifications,  I  behold  the  surest  pledges, 
that  as,  on  one  side,  no  local  prejudices  or  attach 
ments,  no  separate  views,  nor  party  animosities,  will 
misdirect  the  comprehensive  and   equal  eye    which 
ought  to  watch  over  this  great  assemblage  of  commu 
nities  and  interests ;  so  on  another,  that  the  founda 
tions  of  our  national  policy  will  be  laid  in  the  pure  and 
immutable  principles  of  private  morality ;  and  the  pre 
eminence  of  free  government,  be  exemplified  by  all  the 
attributes  which  can  win  the  affections  of  its  citizens, 
and  command  the  respect  of  the  world.     I  dwell  on 
this  prospect  with  every  satisfaction  which  an  ardent 
love  for  my  country  can  inspire:  since  there  is  no 
truth  more  thoroughly  established,  than  that  there  ex 
ists  in  the  economy  and  course  of  nature,  an  indissolu- 


INAUGURAL  ADDRESS.  255 

ble  union  between  virtue  and  happiness,  between  duty 
and  advantage,  between  the  genuine  maxims  of  an 
honest  and  magnanimous  policy  and  the  solid  rewards 
of  public  prosperity  and  felicity :  since  we  ought  to  be 
no  less  persuaded,  that  the  propitious  smiles  of  heaven 
can  never  be  expected  on  a  nation  that  disregards  the 
eternal  rules  of  order  and  right,  which  heaven  itself 
has  ordained :  and  since  the  preservation  of  the  sacred 
fire  of  liberty,  and  the  destiny  of  the  republican  model 
of  government,  are  justly  considered  as  deeply,  perhaps 
as  finally  staked,  on  the  experiment  entrusted  to  the 
hands  of  the  American  people. 

Besides  the  ordinary  objects  submitted  to  your  care, 
it  will  remain  with  your  judgment  to  decide,  how  far 
an  exercise  of  the  occasional  power  delegated  by  the 
fifth  article  of  the  constitution  is  rendered  expedient 
at  the  present  juncture  by  the  nature  of  objections 
which  have  been  urged  against  the  system,  or  by  the 
degree  of  inquietude  which  has  given  birth  to  them. 
Instead  of  undertaking  particular  recommendations 
on  this  subject,  in  which  I  could  be  guided  by  no  lights 
derived  from  official  opportunities,  I  shall  again  give 
way  to  my  entire  confidence  in  your  discernment  and 
pursuit  of  the  public  good ;  for  I  assure  myself  that 
whilst  you  carefully  avoid  every  alteration  which 
might  endanger  the  benefits  of  an  united  and  effective 
government,  or  which  ought  to  await  the  future  les 
sons  of  experience;  a  reverence  for  the  characteristic 
rights  of  freemen,  and  a  regard  for  the  public  harmo 
ny,  will  sufficiently  influence  your  deliberations  on  the 
question  how  far  the  former  can  be  more  impregna- 
bly  fortified,  or  the  latter  be  safely  and  advantageously 
promoted. 

To  the  preceding  observations  I  have  one  to  add, 
which  will  be  most  properly  addressed  to  the  House  of 
Representatives.  It  concerns  myself,  and  will  there 
fore  be  as  brief  as  possible.  When  I  was  first  honor 
ed  with  a  call  into  the  service  of  my  country,  then  on 
the  eve  of  an  arduous  struggle  for  its  liberties,  the 


256  PRESIDENT  WASHINGTON'S,  &c. 

light  in  which  I  contemplated  my  duty  required  that 
1  should  renounce  every  pecuniary  compensation. 
From  this  resolution  I  have  in  no  instance  departed. 
And  being  still  under  the  impressions  which  produced 
it,  I  must  decline,  as  inapplicable  to  myself,  any  share 
in  the  personal  emoluments,  which  may  be  indispensa 
bly  included  in  a  permanent  provision  for  the  execu 
tive  department;  and  must  accordingly  pray  that  the 
pecuniary  estimates  for  the  station  in  which  I  am  plac 
ed,  may,  during  my  continuance  in  it,  be  limited  to 
such  actual  expenditures  as  the  public  good  may  be 
thought  to  require. 

Having  thus  imparted  to  you  my  sentiments,  as  they 
have  been  awakened  by  the  occasion  which  brings  us 
together,  I  shall  take  my  present  leave ;  but  not  with 
out  resorting  once  more  to  the  benign  Parent  of  the 
human  race,  in  humble  supplication,  that  since  he  has 
been  pleased  to  favor  the  American  people,  with  op 
portunities  for  deliberating  in  perfect  tranquillity,  and 
dispositions  for  deciding  with  unparalleled  unanimity 
on  a  form  of  government,  for  the  security  of  their  un 
ion,  and  the  advancement  of  their  happiness ;  so  his 
divine  blessing  may  be  equally  conspicuous  in  the  en 
larged  views,  the  temperate  consultations,  and  the 
wise  measures  on  which  the  success  of  this  govern 
ment  must  depend. 


SPEECH  OF  WILLIAM  L.  SMITH. 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS. 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  UNITED 

STATES. 


Oil  the  3d  of  January,  1794,  the  house  of  representatives  resolved 
itself  into  a  committee  of  the  whole,  on  the  report  of  Mr.  Jeffer 
son,  Secretary  of  State, "  On  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  privileges 
and  restrictions  of  the  commercial  intercourse  of  the  United  States 
with  foreign  nations,  and  the  measures  which  he  thought  proper 
to  be  adopted  for  the  improvement  of  the  commerce  and  naviga 
tion  of  the  same,"  when  Mr.  Madison  introduced  a  series  of  reso 
lutions,  proposing  to  impose  "  further  restrictions  and  higher 
duties,  in  certain  cases,  on  the  manufactures  and  navigation  of 
foreign  nations,  employed  in  the  commerce  of  the  United  States, 
than  those  now  imposed."  On  the  13th,  Mr.  Smith  addressed 
the  committee  as  follows  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

AMONG  the  various  duties  which  are  assigned  by  the 
constitution  to  the  legislature  of  the  United  States, 
there  is  perhaps  none  of  a  more  important  nature  than 
the  regulation  of  commerce,  none  more  generally  in 
teresting  to  our  fellow-citizens,  none  which  more  seri 
ously  claims  our  diligent  and  accurate  investigation. 

It  so  essentially  involves  our  navigating,  agricultu 
ral,  commercial  and  manufacturing  interests,  that  an 
apology  for  the  prolixity  of  the  observations  which  I 
am  about  to  submit  to  the  committee,  will  scarcely  be 
requisite. 

VOL.  i.  33, 


258  MR.    SMITH'S   SPEECH  ON 

In  the  view  which  I  shall  take  of  the  question,  dis 
engaging  the  inquiry  from  all  topics  of  a  political  na 
ture,  I  shall  strictly  confine  myself  to  those  which  are 
commercial,  and  which  alone  are,  in  my  judgment,  pro 
perly  connected  with  the  subject. 

Called  upon  to  decide  on  propositions,  merely  com 
mercial,  and  springing  from  a  report,  in  its  nature 
limited  to  commercial  regulations,  it  would  be  as  ill- 
timed,  as  it  would  be  irregular,  to  mingle  with  the  dis 
cussion  considerations  of  a  political  nature.  I  shall 
accordingly  reject  from  the  inquiry  every  idea  which 
has  reference  to  the  Indians,  the  Algerines,  or  the 
Western  Posts.  Whenever  those  subjects  require  our 
deliberations,  I  shall  not  yield  to  any  member  in 
readiness  to  vindicate  the  honor  of  our  country  and 
to  concur  in  such  measures  as  our  best  interests  may 
demand. 

This  line  of  procedure  will,  I  trust,  be  deemed  by 
those  gentlemen  who  follow  me  the  only  proper  one, 
and  that  the  debate  will  be  altogether  confined  to 
commercial  views ;  these  will  of  themselves  open  a 
field  of  discussion  sufficiently  spacious,  without  the 
intervention  of  arguments  derived  from  other  sources. 
It  would  indeed  argue  a  weakness  of  ground  in  the 
friends  of  the  propositions,  and  imply  a  distrust  of  the 
merits  of  their  cause,  were  they  compelled  to  bolster 
it  up  with  such  auxiliaries,  and  to  resort  for  support 
to  arguments,  not  resulting  from  the  nature  of  the 
subject,  but  from  irrelative  and  extraneous  conside 
rations. 

The  propositions,  as  well  as  the  report,  being  pre 
dicated  upon  facts  and  principles  having  relation  to 
our  commerce  and  navigation  with  foreign  countries, 
by  those  facts  and  principles,  and  those  alone,  ought 
the  propositions  to  stand  or  fall. 

It  will  not  be  denied,  that  this  country  is  at  present 
in  a  very  delicate  crisis,  and  one  requiring  dispassion 
ate  reflection,  cool  and  mature  deliberation.  It  will 
be  much  to  be  regretted  then,  if  passion  should  usurp 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  259 

the  place  of  reason;  if  superficial,  narrow  and  preju 
diced  views  should  mislead  the  public  councils  from 
the  true  path  of  national  interest. 

The  report  of  the  secretary  of  state,  on  the  privi 
leges  and  restrictions  on  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States  in  foreign  countries,  is  now  before  the  commit 
tee.  The  tendency  of  that  report,  (whatever  may 
have  been  the  design  of  the  reporter,)  appears  to  be,  to 
induce  a  false  estimate  of  the  comparative  condition 
of  our  commerce  with  certain  foreign  nations,  and  to 
urge  the  legislature  to  adopt  a  scheme  of  retaliating 
regulations,  restrictions  and  exclusions. 

The  most  striking  contrast,  which  the  performance 
evidently  aims  at,  is  between  Great  Britain  and  France. 
For  this  reason,  and  as  these  are  the  two  powers  with 
whom  we  have  the  most  extensive  relations  in  trade,  I 
shall,  by  a  particular  investigation  of  the  subject,  en 
deavor  to  lay  before  the  committee  an  accurate  and 
an  impartial  comparison  of  the  commercial  systems  of 
the  two  countries  in  reference  to  the  United  States,  as 
a  test  of  the  solidity  of  the  inferences  which  are  at 
tempted  to  be  established  by  the  report.  A  fair  com 
parison  can  only  be  made  with  an  eye  to  what  may  be 
deemed  the  permanent  system  of  the  countries  in  ques 
tion.  The  proper  epoch  for  it,  therefore,  will  precede 
the  commencement  of  the  pending  French  revolution. 

The  commercial  regulations  of  France,  during  the 
period  of  the  revolution,  have  been  too  fluctuating,  too 
much  influenced  by  momentary  impulses,  and,  as  tar  as 
they  have  looked  towards  this  country  with  a  favora 
ble  eye,  too  much  manifesting  an  object  of  the  mo 
ment,  which  cannot  be  mistaken,  to  consider  them  as 
a  part  of  a  system.  But  though  the  comparison  will 
be  made  with  principal  reference  to  the  condition  of 
our  trade  with  France  and  Great  Britain  antecedent 
to  the  existing  revolution,  the  regulations  of  the  sub 
sequent  period  will  perhaps  not  be  passed  over  alto 
gether  unnoticed. 

The  table  which  I  have  before  me,  comprises  the 


2150  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH  CIS 

principal  features  of  the  subject  within  a  short  com 
pass.  It  is  the  work  of  a  gentleman  of  considerable 
commercial  knowledge,  and  I  believe  may  be  relied  on 
for  its  correctness.  An  attentive  reference  to  it  will, 
with  some  supplementary  remarks,  convey  a  just  con 
ception  of  the  object.  A  view  to  conciseness  and  sim 
plicity  has  excluded  from  it  all  articles  (the  produc 
tion  and  manufactures  of  the  United  States,)  which 
are  not  of  considerable  importance. 

Accustomed  as  our  ears  have  been  to  a  constant 
panegyric  on  the  generous  policy  of  France  towards 
this  country  in  commercial  relations,  and  to  as  con 
stant  a  philippic  on  the  unfriendly,  illiberal  and  perse 
cuting  policy  of  Great  Britain  towards  us  in  the  same 
relations,  we  naturally  expect  to  find,  in  a  table  which 
exhibits  their  respective  systems,  numerous  discrimina 
tions  in  that  of  France  in  our  favor,  and  many  valuable 
privileges  granted  to  us,  which  are  refused  to  other 
foreign  countries ;  in  that  of  Great  Britain,  frequent 
discriminations  to  our  prejudice,  and  a  variety  of  pri 
vileges  refused  to  us,  which  are  granted  to  other  foreign 
nations.  But  an  inspection  of  the  table  will  satisfy 
every  candid  mind  that  the  reverse  of  what  has  been 
supposed  is  truly  the  case ;  that  neither  in  France  nor 
the  French  West  Indies  is  there  more  than  one  solitary 
and  unimportant  distinction  in  our  favor,  (I  mean  the 
article  of  fish  oil,)  either  with  regard  to  our  exports 
thither,  our  imports  from  thence,  or  our  shipping ;  that 
both  in  Great  Britain  and  the  British  West  Indies, 
there  are  several  material  distinctions  in  our  favor, 
with  regard  both  to  our  exports  thither  and  to  our  im 
ports  from  thence,  and,  as  it  respects  Great  Britain, 
with  regard  also  to  our  shipping ;  that  in  the  market 
of  Great  Britain  a  preference  is  secured  to  six  of  our 
most  valuable  staples,  by  considerably  higher  duties  on 
the  rival  articles  of  other  foreign  countries ;  that  our 
navigation  thither  is  favored  by  our  ships,  when  carry 
ing  our  own  productions,  being  put  upon  as  good  a 
footing  as  their  own  ships,  and  by  the  exemption  of  se- 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  261 

veral  of  our  productions,  when  carried  in  our  ships, 
from  duties  which  are  paid  on  the  like  articles  of  other 
foreign  countries  carried  in  the  ships  of  those  coun 
tries;  that  several  of  our  productions  may  be  car 
ried  from  the  United  States  to  the  British  West  Indies, 
while  the  like  productions  cannot  be  carried  thither 
from  any  other  foreign  country ;  and  that  several  of 
the  productions  of  those  countries  may  be  brought 
from  thence  to  the  United  States,  which  cannot  be  car 
ried  from  thence  to  any  other  foreign  country. 

These  important  differences  in  the  systems  of  the 
two  countries  will  appear  more  fully  by  passing  in  re 
view  each  article,  and  presenting,  at  the  same  time, 
the  remarks  which  it  will  suggest. 

[Here  Mr.  Smith  entered  into  a  critical  examina 
tion  of  our  export  trade  with  France  and  Great  Bri 
tain,  from  which  he  drew  an  inference,  that  Great  Bri 
tain  and  her  dominions  consumed  annually  a  much 
greater  amount  of  our  commodities  than  France  and 
her  dominions,  and  consequently,  that  Great  Britain 
was  a  much  better  customer,  as  a  consumer,  than 
France.  He  then  proceeded  to  take  a  view  of  our 
import  trade  with  those  countries,  from  which  he  drew 
the  conclusion,  that  Great  Britain  was  our  best  furnish 
er  as  well  as  our  best  customer.  Mr.  Smith  next  advert 
ed  to  our  navigation  with  France  and  England.  After 
going  into  a  detail  of  facts  upon  this  subject,  he  pro 
ceeded  thus] — 

We  find  then,  upon  a  comprehensive  and  particular 
investigation  of  the  system  of  Great  Britain,  that  in 
stead  of  its  wearing  an  aspect  particularly  unfriendly 
towards  us,  it  has  in  fact  a  contrary  aspect ;  that  com 
pared  with  other  foreign  nations,  it  makes  numerous 
and  substantial  discriminations  in  our  favor ;  that  it 
secures  by  means,  which  operate  as  bounties  upon 
our  commodities,  a  preference  in  her  markets  to  the 
greatest  number  of  our  principal  productions,  and 
thereby  materially  promotes  our  agriculture  and  com 
merce  ;  that  in  the  system  of  France  there  is  but  a 


262  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH  ON 

single  and  not  very  important  instance  of  a  similar 
kind ;  that  if  France  allows  us  some  advantages  of 
navigation  in  her  islands,  she  allows  the  same  advan 
tages  to  all  other  foreign  nations,  while  Great  Britain 
allows  advantages  to  our  navigation  with  herself  di 
rectly  which  she  does  not  allow  to  other  foreign  na 
tions  ;  that  if  France  admits  our  salted  fish  into  her 
West  India  islands,  she  does  it  under  such  duties  upon 
ours  and  such  premiums  upon  her  own  as  would  ex 
clude  us  from  them,  if  she  had  capacity  to  supply 
herself,  while  she  formally  prohibits  our  flour ;  that  if 
Great  Britain  excludes  our  fish  from  her  islands,  she 
freely  admits  our  flour ;  that  while  France,  as  far  as 
we  are  permitted  to  trade  with  her  islands,  lets  in 
other  foreign  nations  to  a  competition  with  us  on  equal 
terms,  Great  Britain  excludes  from  a  competition  with 
most  of  the  articles  of  the  United  States,  which  she 
admits  into  the  islands,  the  like  articles  of  other  for 
eign  countries ;  that  while  France  permits  us  to  be 
supplied  directly  from  her  islands  with  nothing  more 
than  she  permits  to  other  nations,  and  with  only  the 
two  articles  of  molasses  and  rum,  Great  Britain  allows 
us  to  be  supplied  directly  from  her  islands  with  a  con 
siderable  number  of  essential  articles,  and  refuses  a 
direct  supply  of  those  articles  to  other  foreign  coun 
tries  ;  that  if  the  system  of  France  is  somewhat  more 
favorable  to  our  navigation,  that  of  Great  Britain  is  far 
more  favorable  to  our  agriculture,  our  commerce,  and 
to  the  due  and  comfortable  supply  of  our  wants  ;  that 
Great  Britain  is  a  better  furnisher  than  France  of  the 
articles  we  want,  from  other  foreign  countries,  and  a 
better  customer  for  what  we  have  to  sell ;  and  that 
the  actual  relations  of  commerce  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  are  more  extensive  and  im 
portant  than  between  the  United  States  and  France, 
and  it  may  be  added,  or  any  other  country  in  the  world, 
for  our  trade  with  France  is  no  doubt  second  in  impor 
tance. 
Where  then  is  the  ground  for  extolling  the  liberal 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  263 

policy  of  France,  the  superior  importance  of  our  com 
mercial  connexion  with  her,  and  for  exclaiming  against 
the  illiberal  and  oppressive  policy  of  Great  Britain, 
and  for  representing  our  intercourse  with  her  as  secon 
dary  in  consequence  and  utility?  There  is  none. 
'Tis  altogether  a  deception  which  has  been  long 
successfully  practised  upon  the  people  of  the  Unit 
ed  States,  and  which  it  is  high  time  we  should 
unmask. 

If  we  pass  from  the  fact  of  the  footing  of  our  com 
merce  with  France  and  Great  Britain  to  the  principles 
and  motives  of .  their  respective  systems,  we  shall  find 
as  little  room  for  eulogium  on  the  one  as  censure  on 
the  other.  Candor  will  assign  to  both  the  same  station 
in  our  good  or  bad  opinion. 

Both  (like  other  nations)  have  aimed  at  securing 
the  greatest  possible  portion  of  benefit  to  themselves, 
with  no  greater  concession  to  our  interests  than  was 
supposed  to  coincide  with  their  own. 

The  colonial  system  of  France  is  the  great  theme 
of  the  plaudits  of  her  partizans..  The  detail,  already 
entered  into  respecting  it,  will  now  be  further  elucidat 
ed  by  a  concise  view  of  its  general  principles  and  pro 
gress. 

An  ordinance  of  the  year  1 727,  like  the  British  navi 
gation  act,  had  given  to  the  mother  country  a  monopo 
ly  of  the  trade  of  the  colonies,  and  had  entirely  exclud 
ed  foreigners  from  it. 

Experience  having  shown,  as  we  learn  from  an  ordi 
nance  of  30th  August,  1784,  that  it  was  necessary  to 
moderate  the  rigor  of  that  system,  small  relaxations 
from  time  to  time  accordingly  took  place,  and  by  the 
ordinance  just  mentioned,  more  important  alterations 
were  made. 

That  ordinance  establishes  several  free  ports  in  the 
French  islands,  one  at  St.  Lucie,  one  at  Martinique, 
one  at  Guadaloupe,  one  at  Tobago,  and  three  at  St. 
Domingo,  and  grants  permission,  "  till  the  king  should 
please  otherwise  to  ordain,"  to  foreign  vessels  of  at 


•264  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH  ON 

least  sixty  tons  burthen  to  carry  to  those  free  ports 
wood  of  all  kinds,  pit  coal,  live  animals,  salted  beef, 
but  not  pork,  salted  cod  and  fish,  rice,  Indian  corn,  ve 
getables,  green  hides  in  the  hair  or  tanned,  peltry,  tur 
pentine  and  tar,  and  to  take  from  the  same  ports,  mo 
lasses,  rum  and  merchandizes  which  had  been  imported 
from  France,  charging  the  articles  which  are  per 
mitted  to  be  imported,  with  the  duties  stated  in  the 
table. 

The  steps  which  succeeded  that  ordinance,  calculat 
ed  to  narrow  its  operation  in  regard  to  the  article  of 
fish,  have  been  already  noted  so  particularly  as  to 
render  a  recapitulation  unnecessary. 

It  is  sufficient  to  repeat  that  they  manifested  on  this 
point  a  decided  disposition  to  exclude  as  far  as  pos 
sible  foreign  fish,  from  a  competition  with  their  own. 

It  appears  then  that  the  general  principle  of  the  co 
lony  system  of  France,  like  that  of  Great  Britain,  was 
a  system  of  monopoly,  and  that  some  temporary  devia 
tions  from  it  were,  from  time  to  time,  made  from  ne 
cessity  or  the  force  of  .circumstances. 

In  like  manner,  the  navigation  act  of  Great  Britain 
gives  the  mother  country  a  monopoly  of  the  trade  of 
her  colonies,  not  only  as  to  navigation,  but  as  to  sup 
ply  ;  but  the  force  of  circumstances  has  led  to  some  de 
viations. 

The  deviations  of  France  have  extended  partially  to 
navigation,  as  well  as  to  supply.  Those  of  Great 
Britain  have  extended  further  than  those  of  France, 
as  to  supply,  but  have  been  narrower  as  to  navigation. 
Neither  however  has  deviated  further  than  particular 
situation  dictated.  Great  Britain  has  been  less  re 
laxed  on  the  article  of  navigation  than  France,  be 
cause  the  means  of  navigation  possessed  by  the  for 
mer  were  more  adequate  than  those  possessed  by  the 
latter.  France  has  been  more  restrictive  on  the  article 
of  exports  than  Great  Britain,  because  her  home  mar 
ket  was  more  adequate  to  the  consumption  of  the  pro 
ductions  of  her  islands  than  that  of  Great  Britain  to 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS. 

those  of  her  islands,  and  because  the  latter  found  ad 
vantages  in  allowing  a  freer  export  to  the  United 
States  as  an  article  of  exchange.  France  permitted 
the  introduction  of  salted  beef  and  fish  into  her  islands, 
because  she  could  not  sufficiently  furnish  those  arti 
cles  herself:  she  prohibited  flour  and  pork,  because 
she  thought  herself  competent  to  the  supply  of  them : 
Great  Britain  prohibited  fish,  because  she  knew  her 
self  able  to  furnish  it,  and  like  France,  was  jealous  of 
an  interference  with  her  fisheries,  as  a  main  support  of 
her  navigation.  She  permitted  flour,  because  she 
knew  herself  unable  to  supply  it.  As  far  as  the  mea 
sures  of  France  may  have  had  a  conciliatory  aspect 
towards  this  country,  she  was  influenced  by  the  desire 
of  sharing  more  largely  in  our  trade,  and  diverting  it 
more  from  her  ancient  rival.  As  far  as  the  measures 
of  Great  Britain  may  have  made  any  concession  to  us, 
they  have  proceeded  from  a  sense  of  our  importance 
to  her  as  a  customer,  from  the  utility  of  our  supplies 
to  her,  from  a  conviction  that  it  was  necessary  to  fa 
cilitate  to  us  the  means  of  re-exchange,  that  it  was 
better  to  take  our  commodities,  which  were  paid  for 
in  commodities,  than  those  of  other  countries,  which 
she  might  have  to  pay  for  in  specie,  that  it  was  good 
policy  to  give  us  some  douceur^  as  well  to  hinder  our 
commerce  from  running  into  another  channel,  as  to 
prevent  collisions  which  might  be  mutually  injurious. 

These  are  the  true  features  of  the  systems  of  both 
countries,  as  to  motives.  If  we  are  unprejudiced,  we 
shall  see  in  neither  of  them  either  enmity  or  particular 
friendship;  but  we  shall  see* in  both  a  predominant 
principle  of  self-interest,  the  universal  rule  of  national 
conduct. 

Having  completed  my  comparison  of  the  two  sys 
tems  of  France  and  Great  Britain  towards  this  coun 
try,  I  shall  now  extend  it  to  those  of  other  countries,  in 
order  to  mark  the  principal  differences. 

[Here  Mr.  Smith  described  the  situation  of  our  com 
mercial  relations  with  the  United  Netherlands.  Sweden. 

VOL.  i.  31 


266  MR.   SMITH'S   SPEECH  ON 

Spain,  Portugal  and  Denmark,  and  drew  the  conclu 
sion  that  the  system  of  Great  Britain,  not  only  as 
compared  with  that  of  France,  was  entitled  to  our 
preference,  but  that  it  was  also  greatly  to  be  prefer 
red  to  that  of  all  the  beforementioned  nations,  except 
perhaps  the  United  Netherlands.  He  then  continued 
his  speech  as  follows :] 

From  the  view  which  has  been  taken,  this  general 
reflection  results,  that  the  system  of  every  country  is 
selfish  according  to  its  circumstances,  and  contains  all 
those  restrictions  and  exclusions  which  it  deems  useful 
to  its  own  interests.  Besides  this,  a  desire  to  secure 
to  the  mother  country  a  monopoly  of  the  trade  of  its 
colonies,  is  a  predominant  feature  in  the  system  of  al 
most  every  country  in  Europe.  Nor  is  it  without 
foundation  in  reason.  Colonies,  especially  small  isl 
ands,  are  usually  maintained  and  defended  at  the 
expense  of  the  mother  country,  and  it  seems  a  natural 
recompense  for  that  service,  that  the  mother  country 
should  enjoy,  exclusively  of  other  nations,  the  benefit 
of  trade  with  its  colonies.  This  was  thought  reasona 
ble  by  the  United  States,  while  colonies,  even  after 
their  disputes  on  the  point  of  taxation  had  begun : 
and  however  the  question  may  stand  between  the 
mother  country  and  its  colonies,  between  the  former 
and  foreign  nations,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the  equity 
of  the  exclusion  can  be  contested.  At  any  rate,  its  be 
ing  the  most  prevailing  system  of  nations  having  colo 
nies,  there  is  110  room  for  acrimony  against  a  particu 
lar  one  that  pursues  it.  This  ought  not  to  dissuade 
the  United  States  from  availing  itself  of  every  just  and 
proper  influence  to  gain  admission  into  the  colony 
trade  of  the  nations  concerned ;  but  this  object  ought 
to  be  pursued  with  moderation,  not  under  the  instiga 
tion  of  a  sense  of  injury,  but  on  the  ground  of  temperate 
negotiation  and  reasonable  equivalent. 

These  observations  ought  to  produce  two  effects,  to 
moderate  our  resentments  against  particular  nations 
and  our  partialities  for  others,  and  to  evince  the  im- 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  2t)7 

practicability  and  Quixotism  of  an  attempt  by  violence, 
on  the  part  of  this  young  country,  to  break  through  the 
fetters  which  the  universal  policy  of  nations  imposes 
on  their  intercourse  with  each  other. 

Our  moderation  in  this  respect  ought  to  be  excited 
by  another  reflection — does  not  our  own  system  pre 
sent  a  number  of  exclusions  and  restrictions  similar  to 
those  of  which  we  complain  ?  Let  us  look  into  our 
impost  and  tonnage  acts ;  do  they  not  exhibit  a  num 
ber  of  instances  of  duties  prohibitory  in  their  principle 
and  extent?  Do  they  not  by  additional  duties  on 
foreign  vessels  and  on  goods  brought  in  foreign  ves 
sels,  secure  a  decided  superiority  to  our  ships  in  the 
navigation  between  this  country  and  all  those  to  which 
they  are  permitted  to  go  ?  If  duties  on  goods  of  one 
country,  imported  into  another,  are  oppressions  and 
grievances,  (as  the  Secretary  of  State  seems  frequent 
ly  to  suppose,)  how  few  are  the  foreign  articles  brought 
into  the  United  States,  on  which  considerable  duties 
are  not  laid. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  after  pointing  out  the  exclu 
sions,  restrictions  and  burdens  which  prevent  our  en 
joying  all  the  advantages  which  we  could  desire  in  the 
trade  with  foreign  countries,  proceeds  to  indicate  the 
remedies ;  these  are  counter-exclusions,  restrictions 
and  burdens. 

The  reason  of  the  thing  and  the  general  observa 
tions  of  the  Secretary  of  State',  would  extend  the  regu 
lations  to  be  adopted  to  all  the  nations  with  whom  we 
have  connexions  in  trade ;  but  his  conclusion  would 
seem  to  confine  them  to  Great  Britain,  on  the  sugges 
tion  that  she  alone  has  declined  friendly  arrangements 
by  treaty,  and  that  there  is  no  reason  to  conclude, 
that  friendly  arrangements  would  be  declined  by  other 
nations. 

The  suggestion  with  regard  to  Great  Britain,  ap 
pears  not  to  be  well  founded,  if  we  are  to  judge  from 
the  correspondence  with  the  British  minister,  Mr. 
Hammond,  communicated  by  the  president  to  tht> 


31K.  SMITH'S   SPEECH  ON 

house.  Mr.  Jefferson  asks  him,  if  he  is  empowered  to 
treat  on  the  subject  of  commerce  j  he  replies,  that  he 
is  fully  authorized  to  enter  into  a  negotiation  for  that 
purpose,  though  not  as  yet  empowered  to  conclude. 
Upon  further  difficulty  and  objection  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Jefferson,  Mr.  Hammond  renews  his  assurance  of 
his  competency  to  enter  on  a  negotiation,  which  he 
rests  on  his  commission,  as  minister  plenipotentiary, 
and  his  instructions  ;  Mr.  Jefferson  requires  a  commu 
nication  of  his  full  powers  for  that  purpose,  and  de 
clines  the  negotiation.  This  was  by  no  construction 
a  declining  on  the  part  of  the  British  minister.  Forms 
were  the  obstacle  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  whose 
zeal,  at  best,  was  not  greater  than  Mr.  Hammond's. 

But  with  regard  to  Spain,  these  observations  occur. 
A  secret  article  with  France,  stipulated  for  Spain  a 
right  to  become  a  party  to  our  commercial  treaty  with 
France,  on  the  same  terms.  She  has  never  availed 
herself  of  the  right.  Do  we  not  know,  that  measures 
have  been  since  pursued  towards  forming  a  treaty  of 
commerce  with  her  ?  Do  we  not  know  that  none  has 
been  formed  ?  Have  we  not  reason  to  suspect,  that 
such  a  treaty,  on  eligible  terms,  could  not  be  obtained 
but  at  a  price  which  we  should  be  unwilling  to  pay  for 
it  ?  Have  no  measures  been  pursued  towards  effect 
ing  a  commercial  treaty  with  a  power  so  interesting  to 
us  as  Portugal  ?  What  was  the  object  of  sending  a 
minister  there  ?  How  happens  it,  that  there  is  no  re 
turn  ?  Is  not  there  reason  to  conclude,  from  the  long 
delay,  that  there  are  serious  obstacles  to  the  forming 
a  proper  treaty  of  commerce  with  that  nation  ? 

Why  then  is  Great  Britain  selected,  but  that  it  is 
most  in  unison  with  our  passions  to  enter  into  collisions 
with  her  ? 

If  retaliations  for  restrictions,  exclusions  and  bur 
dens,  are  to  take  place,  they  ought  to  be  dealt  out,  with 
a  proportional  hand,  to  all  those  from  whom  they  are 
experienced.  This,  justice  and  an  inoffensive  conduct 
require.  If,  suffering  equal  impediments  to  our  trade 


31K.   MADISON'S    RESOLUTIONS.  269 

from  one  power  as  another,  we  retaliate  on  one  and 
not  on  another,  we  manifest  that  we  are  governed  by  a 
spirit  of  hostility  towards  the  power  against  whom  our 
retaliation  is  directed,  and  we  ought  to  count  upon  a 
reciprocation  of  that  spirit.  If,  suffering  fewer  from 
one  than  from  another,  we  retaliate  only  on  that  party 
from  whom  we  suffer  least,  the  spirit  of  enmity,  by 
which  we  were  actuated,  becomes  more  unequivocal. 
If,  receiving  a  positively  better  treatment  from  one 
than  another,  we  deal  most  harshly  towards  that  pow 
er  which  treats  us  best,  will  it  be  an  evidence  either 
of  justice  or  moderation?  Will  it  not  be  a  proof 
either  of  caprice,  or  of  a  hatred  and  aversion,  of  a  na 
ture  to  overrule  the  considerations  both  of  equity  and 
prudence. 

Whatever  questions  may  be  raised  about  the  pre 
ference  due  to  the  British  commercial  system,  as  com 
pared  with  that  of  France,  there  can  be  none,  compar 
ing  it  either  with  that  of  Spain  or  Portugal. 

Where  then  is  the  justification  of  the  attempt  to 

S'oduce  a  war  of  commercial  regulations  with  Great 
ritain,  passing  over  greater  objections  to  the  policy 
observed  toward  us  by  other  nations  ? 

Commercial  regulations  ought  to  be  bottomed  on 
commercial  motives :  but  if  political  grievances  are  to 
be  implicated,  is  there  no  power  proposed  to  be  ex 
empted,  of  whom  we  have  cause  to  complain? 

The  propositions,  (which  may  be  considered  as  a 
commentary  on  the  report,)  do  every  thing  but  name 
Great  Britain.  Professedly  confined  to  the  powers 
with  whom  we  have  no  treaties  of  commerce,  the  ar 
ticles  selected,  as  the  objects  of  regulation,  have 
scarcely  any  application  but  to  Great  Britain.  This 
is  but  a  flimsy  cover  ;  the  design  will  be  mistaken  by 
no  one,  and  there  would  have  been  much  more  dignity 
in  naming  the  party  with  whom  it  was  meant  to  con 
tend. 

The  idea  of  an  apportionment  of  retaliation  to 
grievance  is  rendered  impossible  by  our  treaties. 


270  MR.  SMITH'S   SPEECH  ON 

These  contain  precise  stipulations  of  mutual  privileges, 
and  in  each  case  the  general  principle  of  the  party 
being  on  the  footing  of  the  most  favored  nation. 

But  at  least  it  might  be  done  with  regard  to  the  pow 
ers  with  whom  we  have  no  treaties,  and  the  not  propo 
sing  it  will  be  considered  as  a  clear  proof  that  the 
ostensible  object  is  one  thing,  the  real  object  another. 

Will  it  be  believed  out  of  doors,  that  all  this  pro 
ceeds  from  a  pure  zeal  for  the  advancement  of  com 
merce  and  navigation  ?  Have  the  views  of  our  public 
councils  been  uniform  on  this  point  ?  Have  they  never 
contributed  to  lose  favorable  opportunities  for  making 
such  a  treaty,  by  recalling  powers  for  that  purpose  once 
given,  by  defeating  efforts  made  to  send  them  when 
they  might  have  been  useful  ? 

Whatever  may  be  the  motive,  the  operation  may 
clearly  be  pronounced  to  be  a  phenomenon  in  political 
history — a  government,  attempting  to  aid  commerce 
by  throwing  it  into  confusion ;  by  obstructing  the  most 
precious  channels  in  which  it  flows,  under  the  pretence 
of  making  it  flow  more  freely ;  by  damming  up  the 
best  outlet  for  the  surplus  commodities  of  the  country, 
and  the  best  inlet  for  the  supplies,  of  which  it  stands  in 
need ;  by  disturbing  without  temptation,  a  beneficial 
course  of  things,  in  an  experiment  precarious,  if  not 
desperate ;  by  arresting  the  current  of  a  prosperous 
and  progressive  navigation,  to  transfer  it  to  other  coun 
tries,  and  by  making  all  this  wild  work  in  the  blamea- 
ble,  but  feeble  attempt  to  build  up  the  manufactures 
and  trade  of  another  country  at  the  expense  of  the 
United  States. 

Let  us  take  a  closer  view  of  the  project.  It  has 
been  proved  that  it  does  not  rest  on  a  basis  of  distribu 
tive  justice,  and  observations  have  been  made  to  evince 
its  impolicy.  But  this  demands  a  more  critical  exa 
mination. 

Let  it  be  premised,  that  it  is  a  project  calculated  to 
disturb  the  existing  course  of  three  fourths  of  our  im 
port  trade,  two  fifths  of  our  export  trade,  and  the 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  271 

means  on  which  depend  two  thirds,  at  least,  of  our 
revenues. 

To  be  politic,  therefore,  it  ought  to  unite  these  dif 
ferent  ingredients : 

1.  An  object  of  adequate  utility  to  the  country. 

2.  A  moral  certainty  at  least  of  success. 

3.  An  assurance  that  the  advantage  likely  to  be  ob 
tained,  is  not  overbalanced  by  the  inconveniences  likely 
to  be  incurred,  and  as  an  equivalent  for  the  jeopardy 
to  which  advantages  in  our  possession  are  exposed. 

1.  The  direct  object  professed  to  be  aimed  at,  is  a 
freer  trade  with  Great  Britain,  and  access  to  her  West 
India  islands,  in  our  own  ships.     A  collateral  one,  the 
success  of  which  seems  most  relied  on,  is  to  transfer  a 
part  of  our  too  great  trade  with  Great  Britain  to 
other  nations,  particularly  France. 

The  first  is  no  doubt  an  object  of  real  magnitude, 
worthy  of  every  reasonable  and  promising  exertion. 
The  second,  in  the  single  light  of  obviating  a  too  great 
dependence  for  supply  on  one  nation,  is  not  unworthy  of 
attention,  but,  as  before  observed,  it  ought  only  to  be 
aimed  at  by  expedients  neither  embarrassing  nor  ex 
pensive  ;  it  is  a  very  insufficient  object  to  be  pursued 
either  at  hazard  or  expense  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  It  has  been  already  shown,  that  to  pursue  it, 
either  by  prohibitions  or  partial  increase  of  duties, 
would  be  a  costly  undertaking  to  this  country. 

2.  The  second  ingredient  is,  "  a  moral  certainty  of 
success."     The  argument  used  to  prove  the  proba 
bility,  nay,  the  certainty  of  success,  is  this ;  the  United 
States  are  a  most  important  customer  to  Great  Bri 
tain  ;  they  now  take  off  near  three  millions  in  her 
manufactures,  and  by  the  progress  of  their  population, 
which  is  likely  to  exceed  that  of  their  manufactures,  the 
probability  is,  that  their  importance  as  a  customer 
will  increase  every  year ;  their  importance  to  Great 
Britain,  as  a  source   of  supply,  is  not  less  than  as  a 
customer   for  her  manufactures;  the    articles    with 
which  they  furnish  her,  are  those  of  prime  necessity, 


272  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH  ON 

consisting  of  the  means  of  subsistence,  and  the  mate 
rials  for  ship-building  and  manufactures,  while  the 
articles  we  derive  from  her,  are  mostly  those  of  con 
venience  and  luxury ;  her  supplies  to  us  are  therefore 
less  useful  than  ours  to  her ;  that  it  would  be  contrary 
to  all  good  policy  in  Great  Britain,  to  hazard  the  turn 
ing  of  a  commerce  so  beneficial,  into  other  channels ; 
beside  all  this,  Great  Britain  is  immersed  in  debt, 
and  in  a  state  of  decripitude ;  the  derangement  of  our 
commerce  with  her,  would  endanger  a  shock  to  the 
whole  fabric  of  her  credit,  and  by  affecting  injuriously 
the  interests  of  a  great  portion  of  her  mercantile  body, 
and  by  throwing  out  of  employ  a  large  number  of  her 
manufacturers,  would  raise  a  clamor  against  the  mi 
nistry  too  loud  and  too  extensive  to  be  resisted ;  and 
that  they  would  consequently  be  compelled  by  the 
weight  of  these  considerations  to  yield  to  our  wishes. 

It  is  as  great  an  error  in  the  councils  of  a  country 
to  over-rate  as  to  under-rate  its  importance.  The 
foregoing  argument  does  this,  and  it  does  it  in  defiance 
of  experience.  Similar  arguments  were  formerly  used 
in  favor  of  a  non-importation  scheme ;  the  same  conse 
quences  now  foretold,  were  then  predicted  in  the  most 
sanguine  manner ;  but  the  prediction  was  not  fulfilled. 
This  it  would  seem,  ought  to  be  a  caution  to  us  now. 
and  ought  to  warn  us  against  relying  upon  the  like  ef 
fects,  promised  from  a  measure  of  much  less  force, 
namely,  an  increase  of  duties. 

If  our  calculations  are  made  on  the  ordinary  course 
of  the  human  passions,  or  on  a  just  estimate  of  relative 
advantages  for  the  contest  proposed,  we  shall  not  be 
sanguine  in  expecting  that  the  victory  will  be  readily 
yielded  to  us,  or  that  it  will  be  easily  obtained. 

The  navigation  act  of  Great  Britain,  the  principles  of 
which  exclude  us  from  the  advantages  we  wish  to  en 
joy,  is  deemed  by  English  politicians,  as  the  palladium 
of  her  riches,  greatness  and  security. 

After  having  cherished  it  for  such  a  long  succession 
of  years,  after  having  repeatedly  hazarded  much  for 


MR.    MADISON'S    RESOLUTIONS.  273 


the  maintenance  of  it,  with  so  strong  a  conviction 
of  its  immense  importance,  is  it  at  all  probable  that 
she  would  surrender  it  to  us  without  a  struggle — that 
she  would  permit  us  to  extort  the  abandonment  of  it 
from  her  without  a  serious  trial  of  strength  ? 

Prejudices  riveted  by  time  and  habit,  opinions  fixed 
by  long  experience  of  advantages,  a  sense  of  interest, 
irritated  pride,  a  spirit  of  resentment  at  the  attempt,  all 
these  strong  circumstances  would  undoubtedly  prompt 
to  resistance.  It  would  be  felt,  that  if  a  concession 
were  made  to  us  upon  the  strength  of  endeavors  to  ex 
tort  it,  the  whole  system  must  be  renounced ;  it  would 
be  perceived,  that  the  way  having  been  once  successful 
ly  pointed  out  to  other  nations,  would  not  fail  to  be  fol 
lowed,  and  that  a  surrender  to  one  would  be  a  surren 
der  to  all. 

Resistance  therefore  would  certainly  follow  in  one 
or  other  mode,  a  war  of  arms  or  of  commercial  re 
gulations. 

If  the  first  should  be  determined  upon,  it  would  not 
be  difficult  for  Great  Britain  to  persuade  the  other  pow 
ers,  with  whom  she  is  united,  that  they  ought  to  make 
common  cause  with  her.  She  would  represent  that 
our  regulations  were  in  fact  only  a  covert  method  of 
taking  part  in  the  war  by  embarrassing  her,  and  that 
it  was  the  interest  of  the  cause,  in  which  they  were 
combined,  to  frustrate  our  attempts. 

If  war  could  be  foreseen  as  the  certain  conse 
quence  of  the  experiment  proposed  to  be  made,  no 
arguments  would  be  necessary  to  dissuade  from  it. 
Every  body  would  be  sensible  that  more  was  to  be 
lost  than  gained,  and  that  so  great  a  hazard  ought  not 
to  be  run. 

But  we  are  assured  that  there  is  no  danger  of  this  con 
sequence,  that  no  nation  would  have  a  right  to  take 
umbrage  at  any  regulations  we  should  adopt  with  re 
gard  to  our  own  trade,  and  that  Great  Britain  would 
take  care  how  she  put  to  risk  so  much  as  she  would 
hazard  by  a  quarrel  with  us. 

VOL*  i-  35 


274  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH   Oi\ 

All  this  is  far  more  plausible  than  solid.  Experience 
has  proved  to  us  that  the  councils  of  that  country  are 
influenced  by  passion  as  well  as  our  own.  If  we  should 
seize  the  present  moment  to  attack  her  in  a  point  where 
she  is  peculiarly  susceptible,  she  would  be  apt  to  re 
gard  it  as  a  mark  of  determined  hostility.  This  would 
naturally  tend  to  kindle  those  sparks  of  enmity 
which  are  alledged  to  exist  on  her  side.  War  is  as 
often  the  result  of  resentment  as  of  calculation.  A 
direct  and  immediate  war  between  us  would  not  be 
surprising ;  but  if  this  should  not  take  place,  mutual 
ill  offices  and  irritations,  which  naturally  grow  out  of 
such  a  state  of  things,  would  be  apt  quickly  to  lead  to  it. 
Insults  and  aggressions  might  become  so  multiplied 
and  open  as  riot  to  permit  forbearance  on  either  side. 

It  would  be  a  calculation  with  Great  Britain  whether 
she  could  best  oppose  us  by  retaliating  regulations,  or 
by  arms. 

As  circumstances  at  the  moment  of  deliberation 
should  point,  according  to  the  then  view  of  probabilities, 
would  be  the  result.  The  decision  may  be  in  favor  of 
war,  under  the  idea  that  its  distresses  might  induce  us 
to  enter  into  a  commercial  treaty  upon  her  own  terms ; 
who  can  pronounce  that  this  would  not  be  the  result, 
when  it  is  considered  that  she  is  likely  to  be  aided  by  so 
many  other  maritime  powers  now  in  her  connexion  ? 

Let  us  however  take  it  for  granted  that  she  would 
prefer  the  other  course,  that  of  retaliating  regulations ; 
how  will  the  contest  stand  ?  The  proportion  of  the 
whole  exports  of  Great  Britain,  which  comes  to  the 
United  States,  is  about  one  fifth ;  the  proportion  of  our 
exports,  which  goes  to  Great  Britain,  is  about  one 
eighth  of  the  whole  amount  of  her  imports.  Taking 
the  mean  of  these  proportions  of  imports  and  ex 
ports,  the  proportion  which  our  trade  with  Great  Bri 
tain  bears  to  the  totality  of  her  trade  is  about  one  sixth. 

The  proportion  of  imports  from  the  dominions  of 
Great  Britain  into  the  United  States,  may  be  stated  at 
three  fourths  of  our  whole  importation ;  the  proportion 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  275 

which  our  exports  to  the  same  dominions  bears  to  our 
total  exportation  may  be  stated  at  two  fifths ;  taking 
the  mean  of  these  two,  the  proportion  which  our  trade 
with  Great  Britain  bears  to  our  whole  trade  is  some 
thing  more  than  one  half. 

It  follows  then,  that  while  a  commercial  warfare  with 
Great  Britain  would  disturb  the  course  of  about  one 
sixth  of  her  trade,  it  would  disturb  the  course  of  more 
than  one  half  of  ours. 

This  much  greater  proportional  derangement  of  our 
trade  than  of  hers  by  a  contest,  is  a  mathematical 
demonstration  that  the  contest  would  be  unequal  on 
our  part,  that  we  should  put  more  to  hazard  than  Great 
Britain  would  do,  should  be  likely  to  suffer  greater  in 
convenience  than  her,  and  consequently,  (the  resolu 
tion  and  perseverance  of  the  two  parties  being  sup 
posed  equal,)  would  be  soonest  induced  to  abandon  the 
contest. 

The  inequality  of  the  contest  is  evinced  by  these  fur 
ther  considerations.  The  capital  of  Great  Britain  is 
greater  in  proportion  to  numbers  than  ours.  A  manu 
facturing  as  well  as  an  agricultural  nation,  the  objects 
of  her  industry  and  the  materials  of  her  trade  are  as 
much  diversified  as  can  well  be  conceived,  while  ours 
are  few  and  simple.  The  habits  of  her  people  admit 
of  her  bringing  into  action  every  source  of  revenue 
which  she  possesses,  while  those  of  ours  embarrass  the 
government  at  every  step,  and  would  render  substitutes 
for  the  existing  ones  extremely  difficult.  The  govern 
ment  of  Great  Britain  has  all  the  energy,  which  can 
be  derived  either  from  the  nature  of  a  government,  or 
from  long  habits  of  obedience  in  the  people,  while 
ours  is  in  its  infancy,  neither  confirmed  by  age  nor 
habit,  and  with  many  circumstances  to  lessen  its  force. 
No  one  can  but  be  sensible,  that  in  proportion  to  the 
capital  of  a  merchant  or  a  nation,  is  the  faculty  to  en 
dure  partial  derangements  to  the  trade  carried  on  by 
the  one  or  the  other ;  that  in  proportion  to  the  diversi 
ty  of  objects  which  a  merchant  or  a  nation  can  bring 


276  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH  ON 

to  market,  is  the  faculty  to  find  new  resources  of  trade, 
and  to  bear  the  temporary  suspension  of  existing  ones ; 
that  in  proportion  to  the  habitude  of  a  nation  to  en 
dure  taxation,  is  the  facility  of  a  government  to  find 
substitutes  for  revenues  lost ;  that  in  proportion  to  the 
energy  of  a  government  and  the  habits  of  obedience  of 
a  people,  is  the  chance  of  perseverance  on  the  part  of 
such  government,  in  measures  producing  inconven 
iences  to  the  community. 

Great  Britain  then  would  have  less  to  resist  and 
more  means  of  resistance  than  the  United  States; 
the  United  States  more  to  resist  and  less  means  of  re 
sistance  than  Great  Britain.  Which  party  are  the 
chances  against  in  such  a  contest  ?  Can  any  one 
say  that  the  United  States  ought,  in  such  a  compara 
tive  situation,  to  count  on  success  in  an  experiment 
like  that  proposed,  with  sufficient  assurance  to  be  jus 
tified  in  hazarding  upon  it  so  great  a  derangement  of 
its  affairs,  as  may  result  from  the  measure  ? 

The  main  argument  for  the  chance  of  success,  is, 
that  our  supplies  to  Great  Britain  are  more  necessary 
to  her  than  hers  to  us.  But  this  is  a  position  which 
our  self-love  gives  more  credit  to  than  facts  will  alto 
gether  authorize.  Well  informed  men  in  other  coun 
tries,  (whose  opportunities  of  information  are  at  least 
as  good  as  ours,)  affirm,  that  great  Britain  can  obtain 
a  supply  of  most  of  the  articles  she  obtains  from  us,  as 
cheap  and  of  as  good  .a  quality  elsewhere,  with  only 
two  exceptions,  namely,  tobacco  and  grain,  and  the 
latter  is  only  occasionally  wanted :  a  considerable  sub 
stitute  for  our  tobacco,  though  not  of  equal  quality, 
may  be  had  elsewhere  :  and  even  admitting  this  posi 
tion  to  be  too  strongly  stated,  yet  there  is  no  good 
reason  to  doubt  that  it  is  in  a  great  degree  true.  The 
colonies  of  the  different  European  powers  on  this  con 
tinent,  some  countries  on  the  Mediterranean,  and  the 
northern  countries  of  Europe,  are  in  situations  adapted 
to  becoming  our  competitors. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  manufactured  articles  which 


MR.  MADISON'S   RESOLUTIONS.  277 

we  do  npt  make  ourselves,  (the  greatest  part  of  which 
are,  in  civilized  countries,  necessaries,)  are  as  impor 
tant  to  us,  as  our  materials  for  manufacture  (the  only 
articles  for  which  her  demand  is  constant,)  are  to 
Great  Britain.  The  position  is  as  true,  that  no  other 
nation  can  supply  us  as  well  as  that  country,  with  seve 
ral  essential  articles  which  we  want,  as  that  no  nation 
can  supply  her  equally  well  with  certain  articles  which 
she  takes  from  us  ;  and  as  to  other  articles  of  subsis 
tence,  it  is  certain  that  our  demand  for  manufactured 
supplies  is  more  constantly  urgent  than  her  demand 
for  those  articles.  Where  indeed  shall  we  find  a  sub 
stitute  for  the  vast  supply  of  manufactures  which  we 
get  from  that  country  ?  No  gentleman  will  say  that 
we  can  suddenly  replace  them  by  our  manufactures,  or 
that  this,  if  practicable,  could  be  done  without  a  vio 
lent  distortion  of  the  natural  course  of  our  industry. 
A  substitute  of  our  own ,  being  out  of  the  question, 
where  else  shall  we  find  one  ? 

France  was  the  power  which  could  best  have  filled 
any  chasm  that  might  have  been  created.  But  this  is 
no  longer  the  case.  'Tis  undeniable  that  the  money 
capitals  of  that  country  have  been  essentially  destroy 
ed  ;  that  manufacturing  establishments,  except  those 
for  war,  have  been  essentially  deranged.  The  destruc 
tion  to  which  Lyons  appears  to  be  doomed,  is  a  severe 
blow  to  the  manufactures  of  France ;  that  city,  se 
cond  in  importance  in  all  respects,  was  perhaps  the 
first  in  manufacturing  importance.  It  is  more  than 
probable  that  France,  for  years  to  come,  will  herself 
want  a  foreign  supply  of  manufactured  articles. 

At  a  moment  then,  when  the  manufactures  of  Great 
Britain  have  become  more  necessary  than  ever  to  us, 
can  we  expect  to  succeed  in  a  contest,  which  supposes 
that  we  can  dispense  with  them  ? 

It  may  be  said  that  the  resolutions  proposed  do  not 
suppose  this ;  but  they  do  suppose  it,  for  they  ought  to 
proceed  upon  the  possibility,  nay,  probability,  that  a 
system  of  commercial  retaliation  will  be  adopted  by 


278  MR.   SMITH'S  SPEECH  ON 

Great  Britain,  in  which  case  we  must  inevitably  sus 
tain  a  defeat,  if  we  cannot  dispense  both  with  her  sup 
plies  and  with  her  market  for  our  supplies. 

Will  it  be  answered  that  her  manufactures  will  find 
their  way  to  us  circuitously,  and  our  supplies  to  her  in 
like  manner  ?  If  so,  what  are  our  regulations  to  pro 
duce  but  distress  and  loss  to  us  ?  The  manufactures 
of  Great  Britain  will  still  be  consumed,  and  our  ma 
terials  will  still  nourish  those  manufactures. 

The  manufactures  we  take  from  her  being  less 
bulky  than  the  supplies  we  send  her,  the  charges  of  a 
circuitous  transportation  would  be  less  than  those  of 
a  like  transportation  of  our  commodities.  In  all  the 
cases  therefore,  in  which  those  charges  fall  upon  her, 
they  would  be  lighter  than  in  the  cases  in  which  the 
latter  charges  fell  upon  us.  Moreover,  as  the  articles 
of  Great  Britain  would  meet  less  competition  in  our 
markets  than  ours  in  hers,  the  increased  charges  on 
her  manufactures  would  much  oftener  fall  upon  us  than 
those  upon  our  materials  would  fall  upon  her.  So 
that  both  ways  we  should  sustain  loss. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  what  are  the  regulations 
Great  Britain  could  adopt  to  counteract  ours  ? 

I  answer,  she  could,  (among  other  conceivable 
things,)  prohibit  or  lay  prohibitory  duties  on  her  com 
modities  to  this  country,  and  on  ours  to  her,  in  our 
bottoms ;  and  she  might  in  addition,  temporarily  grant 
the  same  privileges  to  Dutch  or  other  friendly  bottoms 
which  are  now  granted  to  those  of  the  United  States 
in  the  trade  between  us  and  herself;  or  she  might  go 
no  further  in  this  particular  than  to  permit  the  impor 
tation  of  our  commodities  in  some  of  those  bottoms. 
This,  it  is  true,  would  be  a  departure  from  the  system 
of  her  navigation  act;  but  when  the  question  was, 
whether  she  should  surrender  it  permanently  to  us  by 
extortion,  or  temporarily  to  a  power  more  friendly  to 
her,  till  the  issue  of  the  experiment  could  be  decided, 
who  can  doubt  what  would  be  the  course  which  in 
terest  and  resentment  would  dictate  ? 


MR.  MADISON'S   RESOLUTIONS.  276 

But  there  are  numerous  other  regulations  which 
could  be  adopted,  and  which  equally  with  the  forego 
ing  would  have  the  effect  of  transferring  the  trade  be 
tween  the  two  countries  to  the  management  of  some 
third  party ;  for  after  all,  it  is  not  improbable  this  will 
be  the  result  of  the  contest,  that  instead  of  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  carrying  on  jointly  as  they 
now  do  the  trade  between  the  two  countries,  it  will  be 
carried  on  either  directly  or  circuitously  by  some  third 
power,  more  to  our  detriment  than  to  that  of  Great 
Britain. 

The  manufactures  of  that  country  will  get  to  us 
nearly  in  the  same  quantities  they  now  do,  with  the 
disadvantage  of  additional  charges ;  such  of  our  com 
modities,  as  she  cannot  have  of  equal  quality  elsewhere, 
will  get  to  her  also :  the  rest  will  be  supplanted  by  the 
like  commodities  of  other  nations,  and  we  shall  lose 
the  best  market  we  have  for  them. 

Those  who  advocate  the  system  of  contention, 
should  tell  us  where  a  substitute  will  be  found.  The 
merchants,  who  know  that  it  is  now  difficult  enough  to 
find  markets  for  our  surplus  commodities — that  France, 
in  ordinary  times,  affords  a  very  contracted  one,  and 
that  the  French  West  Indies  are  not  likely,  in  settled 
times,  to  be  as  good  customers  as  they  have  been  for 
some  time  past,  cannot  desire  to  see  the  sphere  abridg 
ed,  and  our  landholders  will  quickly  reprobate  the  plan. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  the  contest  would  be  likely  to 
issue  against  us,  and  to  end  in  defeat  and  disgrace. 

What  would  be  our  situation  if  we  should  make  an 
attempt  of  the  kind  and  fail  in  it  ?  Our  trade  would 
then  truly  be  in  the  power  and  at  the  disposal  of  Great 
Britain. 

3.  The  third  ingredient  stated,  as  necessary  to  justi 
fy  the  proposed  attempt,  is  this ;  that  the  prospect  of 
advantages  should  be  at  least  an  equivalent  for  those 
in  possession,  which  would  be  put  in  jeopardy  by  the 
experiment. 

ft  has  been  shown,  that  in  fact  there  is  no  real  pros- 


280  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH  ON 

pect  of  advantage,  but  a  considerable  one  of  incon 
venience  and  loss.  This  puts  an  end  to  comparison. 
But  it  may  be  added,  that  our  situation  is  precisely 
such  an  one  as  to  forbid  experiments.  It  is  so,  from 
the  stage  at  which  we  are,  as  a  people,  too  little  ad 
vanced,  too  little  matured  for  hazardous  experiments 
of  any  sort. 

This  is  not  all :  our  general  situation  at  this  time  is 
an  eligible  one ;  we  are  making  as  rapid  a  progress  in 
most  of  the  great  branches  of  political  prosperity  as  we 
can  reasonably  desire,  and  it  would  be  imprudent  to 
hazard  such  a  situation,  upon  precarious  speculations 
of  greater  advantage.  The  prosperity  of  a  nation  is 
not  a  plant  to  thrive  in  a  hotbed ;  moderation  in  this 
respect  is  the  truest  wisdom ;  it  is  so  plain  a  path,  that 
it  requires  a  peculiar  sublimation  of  ideas  to  deviate 
from  it. 

It  is  agreed  on  all  hands,  that  all  our  great  national 
interests,  our  population,  agriculture,  manufactures, 
commerce  and  our  navigation,  are  in  a  thriving  and 
progressive  state,  advancing,  faster  than  was  to  have 
been  expected,  and  as  fast  as  can  reasonably  be  de 
sired. 

Our  navigation,  in  the  short  space  of  three  years, 
ending  the  31st  of  December,  179°.,  has  increased  in 
the  ratio  of  nearly  one  fifth. 

The  proportions  of  our  tonnage  have  been  as  fol 
lows  : — 

In  1790  tons  479091  ) 

1791  -         -       501790  )  showing  an  increase  of  89192  tons. 

1792  -  568283) 

The  proportion  of  foreign  tonnage  during  the  same 
years,  has  been — 

In  1790  tons  258919) 

1791  -         -       240799  >  showing  a  decrease  of  14656  tons. 

1792  -         -  244263) 

This  proves  that  our  present  system  is  highly  fa 
vorable  to  the  increase  of  our  navigation,  and  that  we 
are  gradually  supplanting  foreigners. 


MR.  MADISON'S    RESOLUTIONS.  281 

The  truth  is,  that  the  difference  in  the  tonnage  duty, 
and  the  addition  of  one  tenth  upon  the  duties  on  goods 
imported  in  foreign  bottoms,  is  a  powerful  encourage 
ment  to  our  shipping,  and  as  it  has  not  been  of  a  mag 
nitude  to  excite  retaliation,  it  is  much  more  likely  to 
promote  the  interests  of.  our  navigation,  than  violent 
measures,  v/hich  would  compel  to  retaliation;  pru 
dence  admonishes  us  to  stop  where  we  are,  for  the  pre 
sent,  rather  than  risk  the  advantages  we  possess,  in 
trials  of  strength,  that  never  fail  to  injure  more  or  less 
both  parties. 

If  we  turn  from  our  shipping  to  our  agriculture,  we 
shall  find  no  reason  to  be  dissatisfied. 

The  amount  of  our  exports  for  the  year,  ending  30th 
September,  1792,  as  appears  by  the  last  return  of  ex 
ports  to  this  house,  exceeded  the  two  preceding  years 
by  five  hundred  eighty-nine  thousand,  six  hundred 
and  one  dollars  and  sixteen  cents.  It  exceeded  the 
mean  of  the  two  preceding  years,  by  one  million,  five 
hundred  ninety-seven  thousand,  nine  hundred  and 
eighty-three  dollars  and  thirty-six  cents.  Our  reve 
nues  are  unquestionably  more  productive  than  was 
looked  for.  Those  from  imports  have  exceeded,  in  a 
year,  four  millions,  six  hundred  thousand  dollars.  Of 
the  increase  of  our  manufactures  we  have  no  precise 
standard,  but  those,  who  attend  most  to  the  subject,  en 
tertain  no  doubt  that  they  are  progressive. 

This  certainly  is  not  a  state  of  things  that  invites  to 
hazardous  experiments.  These  are  perhaps  never 
justifiable,  but  when  the  affairs  of  a  nation  are  in  an 
unprosperous  train. 

We  experience,  indeed,  some  embarrassments  from 
the  effects  of  the  European  war,  but  these  are  tempo 
rary,  and  will  cease  with  that  war,  which  of  itself  of- 
iers  us  some  indemnifications,  I  mean  a  freer  trade  to 
the  West  Indies. 

I  am  greatly  mistaken  if  the  considerations,  which 
have  been  suggested,  do  not  conclusively  prove  the 
impolicy  of  the  plan  which  is  now  recommended  for 

VOL.  i.  36 


282  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH  ON 

our  adoption.  So  strong  and  decided  is  my  own  con 
viction,  that  I  cannot  but  persuade  myself,  that  of  the 
committee  will  lead  to  its  rejection. 

A  few  miscellaneous   observations    will    conclude 
what  I  have  to  offer  on  this  very  interesting  subject. 

1.  It  has  been  made  an  objection  to  the  present  foot 
ing  on  which  our  trade  is  with  Great  Britain,  that  it  is 
regulated  by  annual  proclamation  of  the  executive,  in 
stead  of  a  permanent  law.  This  was  at  first  laid  down 
by  the  secretary  of  state  in  terms  so  general  as  to  in 
clude  the  West  Indies ;  but  he  has  since  corrected  the 
error,  and  told  us  that  our  trade  with  the  British  West 
Indies  is  regulated  by  a  standing  law.  The  fact  itself, 
nevertheless,  is  of  no  real  importance.  The  actual 
footing,  on  which  we  are  placed,  is  the  only  material 
point;  the  mode  of  doing  it  is  of  little  consequence. 
The  annual  proclamation  of  the  British  executive  is 
equivalent  to  the  decree,  revocable  at  pleasure,  of  any 
single  legislator,  of  the  monarch  of  Spain  or  Portugal, 
and  it  may  be  added,  of  the  French  convention,  which, 
though  a  numerous  body,  yet  forming  only  one  assem 
bly,  without  checks,  is  as  liable  to  fluctuation  as  a  sin 
gle  legislator ;  and  in  fact,  its  resolutions  have  been 
tound  as  fickle  and  variable,  as  it  was  possible  for  the 
resolutions  of  any  single  person  to  be.  To  prove  this, 
if  proof  were  required,  it  would  be  only  necessary  to 
refer  to  the  frequent  changes  in  the  regulations  they 
have  made  with  regard  to  the  trade  of  this  country — 
to-day  one  thing,  to-morrow  another.  Instability  is 
more  applicable  to  no  political  institution  than  to  a 
legislature,  consisting  of  a  single  popular  assembly. 

2.  The  additional  duties  proposed,  are  objectiona 
ble,  because  the  existing  duties  are  already,  generally 
speaking,  high  enough  for  the  state  of  our  mercantile 
capital  and  the  safety  of  collection.  They  are  near 
twenty  per  centum  on  an  average,  upon  the  value  of  the 
objects  on  which  they  are  laid ;  higher  than  the  du 
ties  of  several  countries,  and  high  enough  for  our  pre 
sent  condition.  To  augment  the  rates  materially  will 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  283 

be  in  the  abstract  to  oppress  trade ;  for  we  must  have 
for  our  consumption  the  manufactures  of  the  country 
on  which  they  are  proposed  to  be  laid. 

3.  To  serve  as  a  contrast  to  the  conduct  of  Great 
Britain,  we  are  told  of  the  liberal  overtures  for  a  com 
mercial  treaty  lately  made  by  France. 

It  has  been  already  remarked,  that  the  conduct  of 
France  towards  us  since  the  commencement  of  the  re 
volution,  is  no  basis  of  reasoning :  it  has  undergone  as 
many  revolutions  as  their  political  systems  :  their  mea 
sures  at  one  period,  with  respect  to  our  tobacco,  were 
of  a  complexion  peculiarly  hostile  to  us.  The  duty  of 
twenty-five  livres  per  kentle  on  that  article,  carried  in 
our  bottoms  to  France,  and  of  only  eighteen  livres 
fifteen  sous  on  the  same  article,  carried  in  French  bot 
toms,  amounted  to  a  complete  prohibition  to  carry  our 
tobacco  in  our  own  bottoms. 

The  duty  of  twenty  livres  per  kentle  on  foreign  fish 
is  another  important  instance  of  severity  of  regulations, 
a  duty  admitted  by  the  secretary  of  state  to  be  pro 
hibitory. 

If  there  have  been  regulations  and  propositions  of  a 
more  favorable  nature,  they  are  to  be  ascribed  to 
causes  of  the  moment.  During  the  continuance  of 
the  revolution,  it  is  of  necessity  that  we  have  carte 
blanche  in  the  French  West  Indies.  We  know  that  we 
are  getting  admission  into  the  British  and  Spanish 
Islands  also. 

And  as  to  the  overtures  for  a  permanent  system,  Mr. 
Genet's  instructions  published  by  him  explain  the 
object.  Privileges  of  trade  in  the  West  India  Islands 
are  to  be  the  price  of  our  becoming  a  party  in  the  war. 
The  declamations  against  the  liberticide  maxims  of  the 
ancient  government  and  in  favor  of  free  principles  of 
commerce,  resolve  themselves  into  this.  This  is  a  bar 
gain  which  I  trust  a  majority  of  this  house  will  not  be 
willing  to  make ;  I  am  sure  our  constituents  would  not 
thank  us  for  it. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  are  we  to  sit  with  folded  arms 
and  tamely  submit  to  all  the  oppressions,  restrictions 


2#4  MR.  SMITH'S  SPEECH  ON 

and  exclusions  to  which  our  trade  is  subject — if  not, 
what  are  we  to  do  ?  I  answer,  nothing  certainly  at 
the  present  juncture.  If  the  foundation  of  the  question 
were  more  solid  than  I  believe  it  to  be,  candidly  and 
dispassionately  considered,  this  is  of  all  moments 
the  most  unfavorable  for  an  experiment.  Any  move 
ment  of  the  kind  would,  as  before  observed,  be  constru 
ed  into  a  political  manoeuvre  and  an  attempt  to  embar 
rass  one  of  the  belligerent  powers,  and  would  interest 
the  feelings  of  all  those  united  with  her,  producing 
consequently  either  war  or  additional  trammels  in 
every  quarter  upon  our  trade ;  besides  the  weighty 
argument,  that  the  great  source  of  subsidiary  supply 
to  which  we  might  have  heretofore  looked  has  been 
obstructed. 

But  I  answer  further,  that  we  ought  with  great  cau 
tion  to  attempt  any  thing  at  a  future  day,  till  we  have 
acquired  a  maturity  which  will  enable  us  to  act  with 
greater  effect,  and  to  brave  the  consequences,  even  if 
they  should  amount  to  war,  and  till  we  have  secured 
more  adequate  means  of  internal  supply ;  to  which  point 
we  should  bend  our  efforts,  as  the  only  rational  and  safe 
expedient,  in  our  present  circumstances,  for  counteract 
ing  the  effects  of  the  spirit  of  monopoly,  which  more  or 
less  tinctures  not  the  system  of  Great  Britain  merely, 
but  that  of  all  Europe.  But  this  it  seems  is  not  the  favor 
ite  course,  it  is  not  high  seasoned  enough  for  our  politi 
cal  palate ;  we  not  only  turn  aside  from  it  with  neglect, 
but  we  object  away  the  plainest  provisions  of  the  con 
stitution  to  disable  ourselves  from  pursuing  it. 

Every  year,  for  years  to  come,  will  make  us  a  more 
important  customer  to  Great  Britain,  and  a  more  im 
portant  furnisher  of  what  she  wants.  If  this  does  not 
lead  to  such  a  treaty  of  commerce  as  we  desire,  the 
period  is  not  very  distant  when  we  may  insist  with 
much  better  effect  on  what  we  desire,  without  any 
thing  like  the  same  degree  of  hazard.  This  last  ob 
servation  is  not  meant  to  be  confined  to  Great  Britain, 
but  to  extend  to  any  other  power,  as  far  as  the  stipula 
tions  of  treaty  may  permit. 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  285 

Wisdom  admonishes  us  to  be  patient,  "to  make 
haste  slowly."  Our  progress  is  and  will  be  rapid 
enough,  if  we  do  not  throw  away  our  advantages. 
Why  should  we  be  more  susceptible  than  all  the  world  ? 
Why  should  this  young  country  throw  down  the  gaunt 
let  in  favor  of  free  trade  against  the  world  ?  There  may 
be  spirit  in  it,  but  there  will  certainly  not  be  prudence. 

But  again  it  may  be  asked,  shall  we  put  nations,  dis 
posed  to  a  more  liberal  system,  upon  the  same  footing 
with  those  differently  disposed  ?  Will  not  this  tend 
to  produce  an  unfriendly  treatment  from  all  ? 

I  answer  first,  that  I  think  it  has  been  proved,  that 
the  nation  against  which  we  have  been  invited  prin 
cipally  to  aim  our  artillery,  treats  us  with  at  least  as 
much  liberality  as  other  nations,  I  mean  in  a  commer 
cial  sense. 

I  answer  secondly,  that  if  there  be  nations,  who 
are  seriously  disposed  to  establish  with  us  more  free 
and  beneficial  principles  of  trade,  the  path  is  plain ; 
let  treaties  be  formed,  fixing  upon  a  solid  basis  the 
privileges  which  we  are  to  enjoy,  and  the  equivalent. 
I  have  no  objection  to  granting  greater  privileges  to 
one  power  than  to  another,  if  it  can  be  put  on  the  stable 
foundation  of  contract,  ascertaining  the  boon  and  the 
equivalent.  But  I  think  it  folly  to  be  granting  volun 
tarily  boons  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States  with 
out  equivalent.  The  mode  of  treaty  secures  the 
ground ;  it  is  inoffensive  to  any  third  power.  Our  re 
ply  to  objections  would  in  that  case  be,  "  here  is  the 
price  to  us  clearly  defined  and  fixed  by  treaty,  for 
which  we  grant  the  greater  advantages  of  which  you 
complain :  give  us  the  price,  and  the  like  advantages 
are  yours."  But  capriciously  to  grant  greater  privi 
leges  by  law  to  one  nation  than  to  another,  when,  upon 
a  fair  comparison,  we  are  not  better  treated  by  one 
than  by  another,  is  neither  equitable,  politic,  nor  safe. 

Let  us  then  leave  changes  for  the  present  to  the 
course  of  national  treaties,  and  continue  to  proceed  in 
the  path  in  which  we  have  hitherto  found  prosperity 
and  safetv. 


SPEECH  OF  JOHN  NICHOLAS, 

ON 

MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS, 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES,    JANUARY    16,    1794. 


In  the  committee  of  the  whole,  Mr.  Nicholas  spoke  as  follows  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

I  FEEL  a  great  embarrassment,  in  speaking  on  this 
subject,  from  a  distrust  of  my  ability  to  treat  properly 
its  acknowledged  importance,  and  from  the  apparent 
expectation  of  the  audience.  I  feel  too,  as  the  mem 
ber  from  Maryland  who  spoke  yesterday  did,  from  the 
imputation  of  motives,  well  knowing  that  the  Repre 
sentatives  of  my  country  are  industriously  reported 
to  be  enemies  of  the  government,  and  promoters  of 
anarchy,  and  that  the  present  measure  is  imputed  to 
these  principles.  It  is  somewhat  remarkable,  that 
farther  North  we  are  charged  with  selfishness  and  want 
of  attachment  to  the  general  welfare,  for  a  supposed 
opposition  to  measures  of  the  import  of  the  present. 
I  mention  this  contradictory  inference,  to  show  that 
the  shameful  designs,  charged  upon  us,  are  not  proved 
by  the  fact,  and  to  place  the  guilt  where  it  only  exists, 
in  the  malignity  of  the  accuser. 

It  is  a  commonly  received  opinion,  that  trade  should 
be  entrusted  to  the  direction  of  those  immediately  in 
terested  in  it,  and  that  the  actual  course  of  it,  is  the 
best  which  it  could  take ;  this  principle  is  by  no  means 


MR.  NICHOLAS'  SPEECH,  &c.  287 

a  safe  one,  and  as  applied  to  the  trade  of  America,  is 
extremely  fallacious.  It  can  never  be  just,  where  the 
beginning  and  growth  of  commerce  have  not  been 
free  from  all  possible  constraint  as  to  its  direction,  as 
that  can  never  be  called  a  business  of  election,  which 
has  been  created  under  foreign  influence.  The  man 
ner  in  which  America  was  first  peopled,  and  the  nurture 
she  received  from  Great  Britain,  afford  the  most  strik 
ing  contrast  to  the  requisite  beforementioned.  The 
first  inhabitants  of  America  were  educated  in  Great 
Britain,  and  brought  with  them  all  the  wants  of  their 
own  country ;  to  be  gratified  chiefly  by  the  productions 
of  that  country,  aided  by  British  capital  in  the  settle 
ment  of  the  wilderness ;  and  depending  on  the  same 
means  for  the  conveyance  of  its  produce  to  a  place 
of  consumption,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  demand  for 
British  commodities  should  keep  pace  with  the  im 
provement  of  the  country.  In  the  commencement  of 
American  population  and  during  its  early  stages,  there 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  a  chance  of  comparing  the 
advantages  of  commercial  connexion  with  different 
countries,  and  it  will  be  found,  that  in  its  progress  it 
was  still  more  restrained.  In  the  last  years  of  the  de 
pendence  of  America  on  Great  Britain,  the  principal 
part  of  America  was  occupied  by  large  trading  com 
panies,  composed  of  people  in  Great  Britain,  and  con 
ducted  by  factors,  who  sunk  large  sums  in  the  hands 
of  the  farmers  to  attach  them  to  their  respective  stores, 
by  which  means,  competition  was  precluded,  and  a 
dependence  on  the  supplies  of  those  stores  completely 
established.  Since  the  revolution,  the  business  has  been 
conducted  by  persons  in  the  habit  of  dependence  on 
Great  Britain,  and  who  had  no  other  capital  than  the 
manufactures  of  that  country,  furnished  on  credit. 
The  business  is  still  almost  wholly  conducted  by  the 
same  means.  In  no  stage  of  its  growth  then,  does 
there  appear  to  have  been  a  power  in  the  consumer 
to  have  compared  the  productions  of  Great  Britain, 
with  those  of  any  other  country,  as  to  their  quality  or 


288  MR.  NICHOLAS'   SPEECH  ON 

price,  and  therefore  there  is  no  propriety  in  calling  the 
course  of  trade,  the  course  of  its  choice. 

The  subject  before  the  committee,  naturally  divides 
itself  into  navigation  and  manufactures,  in  speaking  of 
which^  I  shall  offer  some  other  considerations,  to  show 
that  the  same  effects  are  by  no  means  to  be  expected 
from  the  greatest  commercial  wisdom  in  individuals, 
which  are  in  the  power  of  the  general  concert  of  the 
community;  the  one  having  in  view  profit  on  each  sepa 
rate  transaction,  the  other  promoting  an  advantageous 
result  to  the  whole  commerce  of  the  country. 

In  considering  the  importance  of  navigation  to  all 
countries,  but  especially  to  such  as  have  so  extensive 
a  production  of  bulky  articles,  as  America,  I  think  I 
shall  show  that  the  last  observation  is  accurately 
right,  and  that  the  interest  of  the  whole  community, 
not  those  only  who  are  the  carriers,  but  those  also  who 
furnish  the  object  of  carriage,  positively  demands  a 
domestic  marine,  equal  to  its  whole  business,  and  that, 
even  if  it  is  to  exist  under  rates  higher  than  those  of 
foreign  navigation,  it  is  to  be  preferred.  In  circum 
stances  of  tolerable  equality,  that  can  never  however 
entirely  be  the  case ;  for  in  the  carriage  of  the  produce 
of  one  country,  by  the  shipping  of  another,  to  any  other 
place  than  the  country  to  which  the  shipping  belongs, 
there  is  considerably  more  labor  employed,  than  would 
have  been  by  domestic  shipping,  as  the  return  to  their 
own  country,  is  to  be  included.  On  this  ground,  it 
may  be  confidently  asserted,  that  where  the  materials 
of  navigation  are  equally  attainable,  they  will  always 
be  more  advantageously  employed  by  the  country  for 
whose  use  they  are  intended,  and  that  if  under  such 
circumstances,  another  country  is  employed  as  the 
carrier,  it  must  be  under  the  influence  of  some  other 
cause  than  interest,  as  it  respects  that  particular  busi 
ness.  A  dependence  on  the  shipping  of  another  coun 
try,  tends  to  establish  a  place  of  deposit  in  that  coun 
try,  of  those  exports  which  are  for  the  use  of  others,  if 
it  is  at  a  convenient  distance  from  them.  The  super- 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  289 

intendence  of  property,  makes  short  voyages  desirable 
for  the  owner,  and  the  connexion,  that  soon  takes  place, 
between  the  money  capital  of  a  country  and  its  ship 
ping  interests,  greatly  strengthens  the  vortex.  The 
attainment  of  wealth  beyond  the  demands  of  naviga 
tion,  leads  to  an  interest  in  the  cargo  itself,  and  then 
the  agency  in  selling  to  the  consumer,  becomes  im 
portant.  It  is  apparent,  that  as  the  final  sale  depends 
on  the  wants  of  the  purchaser,  all  intermediate  expenses 
of  care  and  agency,  must  be  taken  from  the  price  to 
which  the  maker  would  be  entitled.  Our  own  com 
merce  has  involved  this  loss  in  a  remarkable  degree, 
and  it  has  gone  to  an  enormous  extent,  from  a  necessi 
ty  of  submitting  to  the  perfidy  of  agents,  arising  from 
a  dependence  established  by  means  of  the  so  much 
boasted  credit. 

That  there  is  this  tendency  in  the  employment  of 
foreign  shipping,  is  not  only  proved  by  the  commercial 
importance  of  Holland,  which  became  thus  from  her 
naval  resources,  the  store-house  of  Europe,  without 
furnishing  any  thing  from  her  own  productions,  but 
also  from  the  varied  experience  of  America.  Before 
the  revolution,  every  thing  for  European  consumption 
was  carried  to  Great  Britain ;  but  since  America  has 
possessed  shipping  of  her  own,  and  in  the  northern 
states,  there  has  been  an  accession  of  capital,  the  ex 
port  to  England  is  reduced  one  half.  It  is  true  indeed, 
that  there  is  still  nearly  one  half  of  what  she  receives, 
that  is  re-exported ;  but  it  will  be  found,  that  she  still 
retains  a  proportionate  share  of  those  influences,  which 
formerly  carried  the  whole.  Great  Britain,  under  all 
the  discouragements  of  our  laws,  which  we  are  told  by 
the  mercantile  members  of  the  committee,  amount  to 
a  prohibition  where  they  have  any  rivals,  did,  until 
the  European  war,  possess  one  third  of  the  foreign 
tonnage  employed  in  America.  This  has  been  sup 
ported  by  the  dependence  into  which  the  southern 
states  were  placed  by  credit,  and  here,  as  in  every 
other  step  of  the  connexion,  this  engine  extorts  ad- 

VOL.  T.  37 


•290  MR.  NICHOLAS'  SPEECH  ON 

vantages  from  us,  beyond  the  compensation  which  is 
always  secured  in  the  first  advance.  If  there  is  wanted 
other  proof  of  the  British  interest  in  the  American 
navigation,  being  supported  in  direct  opposition  to 
our  interests,  it  may  be  found  in  the  comparative 
state  of  the  tonnage  employed,  where  it  appears  that, 
after  the  protecting  duties  once  had  their  effect,  the 
additional  tonnage,  to  a  considerable  amount,  has 
been  entirely  American,  and  that  the  British  tonnage 
has  remained  very  nearly  stationary,  and  in  proportion 
to  their  undue  influence. 

In  time  of  war,  in  addition  to  the  inconveniences 
before  stated,  which  are  enhanced  by  throwing  the 
trade  from  its  accustomed  channel,  there  are  great 
and  important  losses  brought  on  a  country  by  this 
kind  of  dependence.  If  your  carriers  are  parties  to 
the  war,  you  are  subjected  to  war  freight  and  war  in 
surance  on  your  cargo,  and  you  are  cut  off  from  all 
the  markets  to  which  they  are  hostile ;  and  indeed, 
from  our  experience  in  the  present  war,  I  may  say  you 
are  cut  off  from  the  market  of  your  carriers  them 
selves,  as  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  British 
vessels  to  have  escaped  in  our  seas  last  summer.  To 
what  extent  this  loss  goes,  may  be  seen  from  a  calcula 
tion  in  the  secretary  of  state's  report  on  the  fisheries, 
making  the  proportion  of  war  to  that  of  peace  in  the 
last  one  hundred  years,  as  forty-two  to  one  hundred ; 
and  on  that  calculation  there  can  be  no  hesitation  in 
determining  that  the  interest  of  the  farmers  requires 
that  this  foreign  dependence  should  end  here.  But 
the  European  war,  by  making  a  temporary  exclusion  of 
British  shipping,  has  already  brought  on  us  the  great 
est  mischief  of  such  a  regulation,  and  by  the  encour 
agement  it  has  afforded  to  our  shipping,  almost  com 
pleted  the  remedy ;  so  that  we  have  reason  to  consi 
der  this  as  a  fortunate  period.  But  it  is  not  merely 
the  advancement  of  our  marine  that  is  contemplated 
by  the  present  resolutions ;  the  security  of  that  which 
we  have,  is  also  dependent  on  them.  The  danger 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  291 

from  the  Algerines  has  been  estimated  in  this  house  at 
five  per  centum  on  the  vessel  and  cargo,  but  the  whole 
encouragement  to  our  own  shipping  in  our  existing 
laws,  consists  in  the  one  tenth  additional  duty  on  goods 
imported  in  foreign  vessels.  Whenever  there  shall  be 
an  European  peace,  which  cannot  be  far  distant,  the 
whole  difference  between  the  two  sums  will  be  a  direct 
encouragement  on  British  ships,  and  will  probably  be 
equal  to  two  freights.  Do  gentlemen  rely  on  the  pre 
carious  prospect  of  building  frigates,  and  the  more 
precarious  service  to  be  rendered  by  them  when  built, 
so  much  as  to  neglect  any  other  regulations  for  the 
safety  of  our  shipping,  when  they  are  so  much  in  their 
power  ? 

Having  shown,  that  the  actual  state  of  our  com 
merce  is  by  no  means  the  most  beneficial,  as  far  as 
navigation  is  concerned,  I  will  proceed  to  consider  the 
benefits  derived  from  the  consumption  of  those  Euro 
pean  manufactures,  which  form  the  principal  part  of 
the  stores  of  America:  and  here  it  may  safely  be 
said,  that  national  policy  by  no  means  justifies  the 
almost  exclusive  preference,  given  to  those  of  Great 
Britain.  It  is  not  always  true,  that  the  commodity 
which  is  bought  for  least  money  is  the  best  bargain ; 
for  the  means  of  payment  form  an  important  considera 
tion  in  all  traffic,  and  accommodations  in  it,  may  more 
than  counterbalance  an  inequality  of  price.  If  one 
man  will  receive  an  article  in  exchange,  which  you  can 
sell  to  no  other,  it  will  certainly  be  a  saving  to  deal 
with  him,  at  a  high  advance  on  his  property.  If  there 
are  countries  which  would  become  great  consumers  of 
American  produce,  on  the  terms  of  reciprocal  con 
sumption,  arid  we  find  a  difficulty,  as  is  often  the  case, 
in  vending  that  produce,  is  it  not  of  great  national 
importance  to  excite  those  acts,  which  are  to  become 
the  foundation  of  the  connexion,  even  if  in  the  first 
instance,  it  is  to  be  attended  with  inconvenience  and 
loss  ?  France  may  be  made  a  connexion  of  this  sort ; 
she  is  at  this  time,  almost,  if  not  quite  on  a  footing 


292  MR.  NICHOLAS'  SPEECH    ON 

with  Great  Britain  in  the  consumption  of  American 
products,  and  every  hand  which  shall  receive  employ 
ment  from  us,  will  add  to  her  wants.  We  are  told,  that 
it  is  of  no  less  importance  to  us  to  find  a  country 
which  can  supply  us  advantageously,  than  one  which 
will  consume  our  productions,  and  that,  as  commerce 
is  no  longer  carried  on  by  barter,  it  is  no  less  beneficial 
to  sell  in  one  country  and  buy  in  another,  than  if  we 
could  complete  the  exchange  in  the  same  country. 
This  might  be  true,  if  your  production  was  limited, 
and  the  demand  for  it  certain ;  but  with  a  greatly  im 
proving  agriculture,  and  some  risk  in  our  markets, 
the  object  is  important.  Great  Britain  being  the  fac 
tory  of  those  things,  which  would  make  her  most  de 
pendent  on  the  agricultural  interest,  and  her  national 
wealth  being  probably  at  the  greatest  height,  there  is 
no  expectation  that  her  consumption  will  increase. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  labor  is  now  to  receive  its  direc 
tion  in  France  to  the  manufacturing  arts,  so  far  as  con 
cerns  America  you  will  take  from  the  agricultural 
strength  a  large  class  of  people,  and  by  that  means 
create  a  dependence  on  you,  at  least  to  the  amount  of 
their  own  consumption,  and  the  wealth  you  will  diffuse, 
will  give  ability  to  thousands  who  are  now  too  poor  to 
bid  for  your  commodities.  Nor  is  it  probable  that  you 
will  purchase  this  important  benefit,  on  very  disadvan 
tageous  terms  ;  for  it  is  agreed  on  all  hands,  that  many 
important  arts  are  well  understood  there,  and  that 
labor,  which  forms  the  principal  part  of  the  cost  of 
most  articles,  is  considerably  cheaper  in  France,  than 
in  England. 

Another  very  important  operation  of  a  discrimina 
tion  in  favor  of  France,  will  be,  that  by  encouraging 
liberal  industry,  you  may  put  an  end  to  some  practices, 
which,  in  the  existing  state  of  consumption,  greatly  de 
preciate  our  commodities;  I  mean  the  public  provi 
sion  made  in  granaries,  and  the  supply  from  them  in 
times  of  scarcity,  which  destroy  the  competition  that 
raises  every  thing  to  its  just  value.  Different  conse- 


MR,  MADISON'S   RESOLUTIONS. 

quences  have  been  foretold,  as  likely  to  result  from 
those  measures,  to  which  I  shall  give  a  short  examina 
tion.  We  are  told,  that  the  preference,  long  since  given 
by  our  laws,  has  been  equal  to  a  prohibition  of  British 
vessels,  and  that  to  the  extent  to  which  it  has  gone, 
the  best  effects  have  been  produced.  To  secure  this 
operation  from  a  recent  attack,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
extend  it  to  some  branches  of  trade,  to  which  its  prin 
ciple  would  equally  extend,  is  the  object  of  the  marine 
resolutions.  We  have  no  reason  to  apprehend  bad 
effects  from  an  action,  which  has  hitherto  had  good 
consequences.  As  to  the  increased  duties  on  manu 
factures,  I  think  the  prospect  in  no  way  threatening, 
for  if  there  should  be  found  no  country  to  supply  our 
wants  on  better  terms,  the  diminution  of  consumption 
will  be  only  in  proportion  to  the  duty.  This  can  be  by 
no  means  alarming,  considered  as  the  worst  conse 
quence  of  the  measure  to  men,  with  whom  the  impost 
is  the  favorite  mode  of  collecting  the  revenue,  at  a 
time  when  the  public  wants  are  equal  to  any  possible 
produce.  If  there  shall  be  found  a  competitor  with 
Great  Britain  for  our  consumption,  the  great  object 
will  be  attained,  as  it  must  be  accompanied  by  a  cor 
responding  consumption  of  American  productions. 
But  we  are  told,  that  there  will  be  a  conflict  of  commer 
cial  regulations  between  this  country  and  Great  Bri 
tain,  and  that  the  consequence  will  be  the  loss  of  the 
market  she  affords  us.  The  probable  consequences 
of  such  a  conflict,  will  best  determine  whether  it  is  to 
be  expected ;  as  it  will  commence  on  her  part  as  well  as 
ours,  with  a  view  to  consequences.  The  danger,  which 
she  can  alone  apprehend,  is  the  loss  of  the  market  for 
her  manufactures,  and  to  obviate  this,  it  would  be  ab 
surd  to  widen  the  breach  between  us,  as  that  would 
tend,  in  a  direct  proportion,  to  the  establishment  of  un 
friendly  habits,  and  manufactures,  either  here  or  in  other 
countries,  which  would  rival  her  own.  If,  however, 
the  ultimate  advantage  would  justify  such  measures, 
the  immediate  distress  of  her  people  would  forbid  it 


294  MR.  NICHOLAS'  SPEECH  ON 

The  American  trade  must  be  the  means  of  distributing 
bread  to  several  hundred  thousand  persons,  whose  oc 
cupation  would  be  wholly  ended  with  the  trade,  and  the 
government  is  by  no  means  in  a  situation  to  bear  their 
discontent. 

Their  navigation  and  manufactures  draw  many  im 
portant  ingredients  from  America,  which  would  be  lost 
to  them.  The  creditors  of  the  people  of  America  to 
an  immense  amount,  would  be  deprived  of  the  remit 
tances  which  depend  on  a  friendly  intercourse.  On 
the  whole,  it  would  add  to  the  disorders  of  the  govern 
ment  among  those,  who  perhaps  have  heretofore  contri 
buted  to  its  support,  without  gratifying  any  thing  but 
an  arrogant  resentment.  But  we  are  told,  that  our  own 
citizens  would  be  equal  sufferers,  and  are  more  to  be 
injured  by  being  stopped  in  a  career  of  rapid  improve 
ment  :  it  will  be  hard  to  anticipate  any  real  misfortune 
to  America,  in  such  a  contest,  unless  the  temporary 
loss  of  indulgences,  which  are  by  no  means  necessary, 
can  be  so  called.  The  consumption  of  Great  Britain 
is,  according  to  the  most  friendly  calculation,  not  more 
than  one  third  of  our  purchases  from  her,  and  therefore 
the  national  wealth,  independent  of  the  gratification  of 
our  appetites,  will  receive  an  immense  addition,  and  a 
vast  fund  will  be  procured  to  make  lasting  and  valua 
ble  improvements,  which  would  be  degraded  by  com 
parison  with  the  gewgaws  of  a  day.  It  is  to  be  remark 
ed,  that  the  diminution  of  our  exports  would  be  divided 
among  large  classes  of  people,  and  in  all  cases  rather 
form  a  deduction  from  the  annual  income,  than  a  total 
loss :  this  will  result  from  the  various  objects  of  American 
industry  and  the  division  of  the  markets  of  its  produce. 
This  forms  an  important  difference  between  America 
and  Great  Britain,  in  an  estimate  of  the  effects  of  a 
rupture  between  the  two  countries.  In  my  opinion, 
the  habits  of  the  southern  states  are  such  as  to  require 
the  control,  which  is  said  to  be  the  consequence  of  these 
measures.  Under  the  facility  offered  by  the  modes  of 
trade  before  spoken  of,  and  the  credit  which  is  said  to 


MR.    MADISON'S   RESOLUTIONS.  295 

be  so  beneficial,  they  have  not  only  involved  them 
selves  in  debt,  but  have  contracted  habits,  which,  with 
the  power  of  gratification,  must  always  keep  them  so. 
We  did  hope  that  the  administration  of  justice  would 
have  corrected  the  evil,  but  we  now  find  that  it  cannot 
be  corrected  but  by  entire  changes.  It  is  founded  in 
the  policy  of  the  merchant  himself,  and  this  circum 
stance  is  enough  to  present  to  the  minds  of  the  com 
mittee  a  long  train  of  dependent  mischiefs ;  it  is  a  fact, 
supported  by  the  best  evidence,  that  our  merchants 
who  get  their  goods  from  the  manufacturer,  pay  as 
much  for  them  as  the  shopkeeper,  who  buys  at  Balti 
more  or  Philadelphia.  This  is  one  of  the  conse 
quences  of  the  want  of  credit,  which  always  will  fol 
low  a  reliance  on  collection  from  farmers  ;  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  that  the  merchant  is  indemnified  for 
his  disgrace,  as  well  as  his  advance.  The  result  of  the 
whole  train  of  indulgence  is,  that  our  goods  are 
bought  at  an  advance  from  a  half  to  one  fourth  of 
what  they  could  be  afforded  for  in  cash  sales ;  nor 
does  the  mischief  stop  here ;  it  brings  a  subjection 
which  materially  affects  the  sale  of  our  produce.  I 
believe  myself,  that  the  war  with  Great  Britain  did  not 
bring  half  the  mischief  on  us  that  their  credit  has,  and 
I  very  much  suspect  that  a  credit  for  consumption  will 
always  be  found  equally  mischievous.  It  by  no  means 
resembles  money  loans,  as  is  insinuated  by  the  gentle 
man  from  South  Carolina,  by  freeing  a  man's  own  re 
sources  for  any  other  use.  It  is  certain,  that  there  is 
no  other  safe  regulation  of  a  farmer's  expenses,  than 
his  income  and  experience  every  day  proves — that  when 
so  regulated  they  always  fall  short  of  the  income,  and 
that  when  they  depend  on  credit  they  always  exceed  it, 
and  thereby  subject  future  revenue.  Lessening  the 
importation  of  foreign  manufactures  will  increase  our 
household  fabrics,  which  experience  has  proved  to  be 
highly  profitable,  as  the  labor  is  done  by  a  part  of  the 
community  of  little  power  in  any  other  application. 
Regular  efforts  in  this  way  have  been,  in  my  country, 
certainly  productive  of  independence. 


296  MR.   NICHOLAS'   SPEECH  ON 

It  is  acknowledged,  that  we  may  derive  great  advan* 
tages  from  France  in  our  commerce ;  but  it  is  said  they 
should  be  secured  by  treaty,  and  we  should  not  pay 
beforehand  for  them.  If  advantages  are  to  be  drawn 
by  treaty  from  foreign  nations,  to  enable  the  executive 
to  procure  them  we  must  advance  the  impost  beyond 
the  revenue  standard,  or  they  will  have  nothing  to  give 
in  exchange.  Will  gentlemen  agree  to  involve  France 
in  this  measure  indiscriminately,  when  we  have  al 
ready  a  commercial  treaty  with  her,  which  was  con 
comitant  with  that  treaty  which  gave  us  independence? 
Will  they,  under  such  proofs  of  friendliness,  and  while 
they  are  laboring  under  a  revolution  that  must  strength 
en  our  connexion,  show  distrust  of  their  justice,  when 
the  distinction  now  proposed  may  give  them  a  know 
ledge  of  those  advantages  they  may  derive  from  our 
trade,  and  thereby  make  them  more  eager  for  a  per 
manent  contract  ?  It  will  be  always  in  our  power, 
when  we  find  ourselves  deceived,  to  restore  the  equali 
ty  with  Great  Britain.  We  are  asked,  what  will  be 
come  of  our  revenue  under  such  an  establishment  ? 
The  answer  is  obvious  from  my  former  observations. 
If  the  consumption  is  reduced  only  by  means  of  reve 
nue,  the  revenue  will  increase ;  if  it  is  lessened  by  com 
petition,  it  will  not  be  diminished,  for  the  present  rates 
will  continue  on  all  foreign  goods,  and  we  shall  be  bet 
ter  able  to  pay  from  the  improvement  of  our  foreign 
markets.  But  if  there  should  be  a  diminution  without 
lessening  the  power  of  the  people  to  pay,  what  mis 
chief  will  there  be  ?  Every  body  understands  that  the 
people  pay  the  revenue,  although  it  is  collected  by 
custom-house  officers ;  and  there  is  reason  to  believe, 
that  the  expense  of  collection  is  greater  in  that  way 
than  any  other,  as  there  is  not  only  the  apparent  ex 
pense,  but  a  secret  compensation  to  the  merchants  for 
advancing  it. 

But  we  are  told,  that  we  are  including  countries,  in 
the  general  description,  which  are  our  best  customers — 
Spain,  Portugal,  the  Hanse  Towns  and  Denmark.  It 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  297 

will  be  found,  that  they  are  little  within  the  reach  of 
the  propositions,  not  being  carriers  and  in  a  small  de 
gree  manufacturers  of  the  articles  to  be  taxed.  It  will 
be  in  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  save  them,  in  filling 
up  the  blanks ;  but  this  is  not  intended  to  shut  out  any 
nation,  which  chooses  to  trade  with  us  on  liberal  terms, 
and  if  we  are  satisfied  with  our  footing  in  their  trade, 
there  is  no  doubt  but  we  can  secure  it  by  treaty :  they 
will  not  complain  of  our  taking  away  benefits,  which 
they  may  resume  at  any  time.  We  are  told,  that  this 
business  is  merely  commercial,  and  that  we  should  not 
think  of  our  political  relations  to  Great  Britain ;  hut 
in  my  opinion,  most  of  our  grievances  have  commer 
cial  objects,  and  therefore  are  to  be  remedied  by  com 
mercial  resistance ;  if  you  take  away  what  is  contended 
for,  contest  must  end.  The  Indian  war  and  the  Alge- 
rine  attack,  have  both  commercial  views,  or  Great  Bri 
tain  must  stand  without  excuse  for  instigating  the 
most  horrid  cruelties.  I  consider,  however,  the  pro 
positions  before  you,  as  the  strongest  weapon  America 
possesses,  and  the  most  likely  to  restore  her  to  all  her 
rights,  political  and  commercial  and  I  trust  I  have 
shown,  that  the  means  will  have  a  beneficial  effect,  if 
they  should  fail  as  a  remedy  with  respect  to  Great 
Britain. 


VOL.  i.  38 


SPEECH  OF   FISHER  AMES, 

ON 

MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS. 


DELIVERED    IN    THE    HOUSE  OF    REPRESENTATIVES    OF    THE 
UNITED    STATES,    JANUARY    27,   1794. 


In  the  committee  oi'the  whole,  Mr.  Ames  spoke  as  follows  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

THE  question  lies  within  this  compass  :  is  there  any 
measure  proper  to  be  adopted  by  Congress,  which 
will  have  the  effect  to  put  our  trade  and  navigation  on 
a  better  footing  ?  If  there  is,  it  is  our  undoubted 
right  to  adopt  it,  (if  by  right  is  understood  the  power 
of  self-government,  which  every  independent  nation 
possesses,)  and  our  own  as  completely  as  any  other ;  it 
is  our  duty  also,  for  we  are  the  depositaries  and  the 
guardians  of  the  interests  of  our  constituents,  which, 
on  every  consideration,  ought  to  be  dear  to  us.  I 
make  no  doubt  they  are  so,  and  that  there  is  a  dispo 
sition  sufficiently  ardent  existing  in  this  body,  to  co 
operate  in  any  measures  for  the  advancement  of  the 
common  good.  Indeed,  so  far  as  I  can  judge  from 
any  knowledge  I  have  of  human  nature,  or  of  the  pre 
vailing  spirit  of  public  transactions,  that  sort  of  patri 
otism,  which  makes  us  wish  the  general  prosperity, 
when  our  private  interest  does  not  happen  to  stand  in 
the  way,  is  no  uncommon  sentiment.  In  truth,  it 
is  very  like  self-love,  and  not  much  less  prevalent. 
There  is  little  occasion  to  excite  and  inflame  it.  It  is, 
like  self-love,  more  apt  to  want  intelligence  than  zeal. 


MR.  AMES'  SPEECH,  &c.  29U 

The  danger  is  always,  that  it  will  rush  blindly  into  em 
barrassments,  which  a  prudent  spirit  of  inquiry  might 
have  prevented,  but  from  which  it  will  scarcely  find 
means  to  extricate  us.  While  therefore  the  right,  the 
duty,  and  the  inclination  to  advance  the  trade  and  na 
vigation  of  the  United  States,  are  acknowledged  and 
felt  by  us  all,  the  choice  of  the  proper  means  to  that 
end  is  a  matter  requiring  the  most  circumspect  inqui 
ry,  and  the  most  dispassionate  judgment. 

After  a  debate  has  continued  a  long  time,  the  sub 
ject  very  frequently  becomes  tiresome  before  it  is  ex 
hausted.  Arguments,  however  solid,  urged  by  differ 
ent  speakers,  can  scarcely  fail  to  render  the  discussion 
both  complex  and  diffusive.  Without  pretending  to 
give  to  my  arguments  any  other  merit,  I  shall  aim  at 
simplicity. 

We  hear  it  declared,  that  the  design  of  the  resolu 
tions,  is  to  place  our  trade  and  navigation  on  a  better 
footing.  By  better  footing,  we  are  to  understand  a 
more  profitable  one.  Profit  is  a  plain  word,  that  can 
not  be  misunderstood. 

We  have,  to  speak  in  round  numbers,  twenty  mil 
lion  dollars  of  exports  annually.  To  have  the  trade  of 
exports  on  a  good  footing,  means  nothing  more  than 
to  sell  them  dear ;  and  consequently,  the  trade  of  import 
on  a  good  footing,  is  to  buy  cheap.  To  put  them  both 
on  a  better  footing,  is  to  sell  dearer  and  to  buy  cheap 
er  than  we  do  at  present.  If  the  effect  of  the  resolu 
tions  will  be,  to  cause  our  exports  to  be  sold  cheaper, 
and  our  imports  to  be  bought  dearer,  our  trade  will 
suffer  an  injury. 

It  is  hard  to  compute  how  great  the  injury  would 
prove ;  for  the  first  loss  of  value  in  the  buying  dear, 
and  selling  cheap,  is  only  the  symptom  and  beginning 
of  the  evil,  but  by  no  means  the  measure  of  it;  it  will 
withdraw  a  great  part  of  the  nourishment,  that  now 
supplies  the  wonderful  growth  of  our  industry  and 
opulence.  The  difference  may  not  amount  to  a  great 
proportion  of  the  price  of  the  articles,  but  it  may  reach 


300  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

the  greater  part  of  the  profit  of  the  producer ;  it  may 
have  effects  in  this  way  which  will  be  of  the  worst 
kind,  by  discouraging  the  products  of  our  land  and  in 
dustry.  It  is  to  this  test  I  propose  to  bring  the  reso 
lutions  on  the  table ;  and  if  it  shall  clearly  appear,  that 
they  tend  to  cause  our  exports  to  be  sold  cheaper,  and 
our  imports  to  be  bought  dearer,  they  cannot  escape 
condemnation.  Whatever  specious  show  of  advan 
tage  may  be  given  them,  they  deserve  to  be  called  ag 
gravations  of  any  real  or  supposed  evils  in  our  com 
mercial  system,  and  not  remedies. 

I  have  framed  this  statement  of  the  question  so  as  to 
comprehend  the  whole  subject  of  debate,  and  at  the 
same  time,  I  confess  it  was  my  design  to  exclude  from 
consideration  a  number  of  topics,  which  appear  to  me 
totally  irrelative  to  it. 

The  best  answer  to  many  assertions  we  have  heard 
is,  to  admit  them  without  proof.  We  are  exhorted  to 
assert  our  natural  rights ;  to  put  trade  on  a  respecta 
ble  footing ;  to  dictate  terms  of  trade  to  other  nations ; 
to  engage  in  a  contest  of  self-denial,  and  by  that,  and  by 
shifting  our  commerce  from  one  country  to  another,  to 
make  our  enemies  feel  the  extent  of  our  power.  This 
language,  as  it  respects  the  proper  subject  of  discus 
sion,  means  nothing,  or  what  is  worse.  If  our  trade  is 
already  on  a  profitable  footing,  it  is  on  a  respectable 
one.  Unless  war  be  our  object,  it  is  useless  to  inquire, 
what  are  the  dispositions  of  any  government,  with 
whose  subjects  our  merchants  deal  to  the  best  advan 
tage.  While  they  will  smoke  our  tobacco,  and  eat 
our  provisions,  it  is  very  immaterial,  both  to  the  con 
sumer  and  the  producer,  what  are  the  politics  of  the 
two  countries,  excepting  so  far  as  their  quarrels  may 
disturb  the  benefits  of  their  mutual  intercourse. 

So  far,  therefore,  as  commerce  is  concerned,  the  in 
quiry  is,  have  we  a  good  market  ? 

The  good  or  bad  state  of  our  actual  market  is  the 
question.  The  actual  market  is  every  where  more  or 
less  a  restricted  one,  and  the  natural  order  of  things  is 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  301 

displaced  by  the  artificial.  Most  nations,  for  reasons 
of  which  they  alone  are  the  rightful  judges,  have  regu 
lated  and  restricted  their  intercourse,  according  to 
their  views  of  safety  and  profit.  We  claim  for  our 
selves  the  same  right,  as  the  acts  in  our  statute  book, 
and  the  resolutions  on  the  table  evince,  without  hold 
ing  ourselves  accountable  to  any  other  nation  what 
ever.  The  right,  which  we  properly  claim,  and  which 
we  properly  exercise,  when  we  do  it  prudently  and 
usefully  for  our  nation,  is  as  well  established,  and  has 
been  longer  in  use  in  the  countries  of  which  we  com 
plain,  than  in  our  own.  If  their  right  is  as  good  as 
that  of  Congress,  to  regulate  and  restrict,  why  do  we 
talk  of  a  strenuous  exertion  of  our  force,  and  by  dic 
tating  terms  to  nations,  who  are  fancied  to  be  physi 
cally  dependent  on  America,  to  change  the  policy  of 
nations  ?  It  may  be  very  true,  that  their  policy  is  very 
wise  and  good  for  themselves,  but  not  as  favorable  for 
us  as  we  could  make  it,  if  we  could  legislate  for  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic. 

The  extravagant  despotism  of  this  language  accords 
very  ill  with  our  power  to  give  it  effect,  or  with  the  af 
fectation  of  zeal  for  an  unlimited  freedom  of  com 
merce.  Such  a  state  of  absolute  freedom  of  com 
merce  never  did  exist,  and  it  is  very  much  to  be  doubt 
ed  whether  it  ever  will.  Were  1  invested  with  the 
trust  to  legislate  for  mankind,  it  is  very  probable  the 
first  act  of  my  authority  would  be  to  throw  all  the  re 
strictive  and  prohibitory  laws  of  trade  into  the  fire : 
the  resolutions  on  the  table  would  not  be  spared. 
But  if  1  were  to  do  so,  it  is  probable  I  should  have  a 
quarrel  on  my  hands  with  every  civilized  nation.  The 
Dutch  would  claim  the  monopoly  of  the  spice  trade, 
for  which  their  ancestors  passed  their  whole  lives  in 
warfare.  The  Spaniards  and  Portuguese  would  be  no 
less  obstinate.  If  we  calculate  what  colony  monopo 
lies  have  cost  in  wealth,  in  suffering,  and  in  crimes, 
we  shall  say  they  were  dearly  purchased.  The  Eng 
lish  would  plead  for  their  navigation  act,  not  as  a 


303  MR.   AMES'   SPEECH  ON 

source  of  gain,  but  as  an  essential  means  of  securing 
their  independence.  So  many  interests  would  be  dis 
turbed,  and  so  many  lost,  by  a  violent  change  from  the 
existing  to  an  unknown  order  of  things ;  and  the  mutu 
al  relations  of  nations,  in  respect  to  their  power  and 
wealth,  would  suffer  such  a  shock,  that  the  idea  must 
be  allowed  to  be  perfectly  Utopian  and  wild.  But  for 
this  country  to  form  the  project  of  changing  the  policy 
of  nations,  and  to  begin  the  abolition  of  restrictions  by 
restrictions  of  its  own,  is  equally  ridiculous  and  incon 
sistent. 

Let  every  nation  that  is  really  disposed  to  extend  the 
liberty  of  commerce,  beware  of  rash  and  hasty  schemes 
of  prohibition.  In  the  affairs  of  trade,  as  in  most 
others,  we  make  too  many  laws.  We  follow  experi 
ence  too  little,  and  the  visions  of  theorists  a  great  deal 
too  much.  Instead  of  listening  to  discourses  on  what 
the  market  ought  to  be,  and  what  the  schemes,  which 
always  promise  much  on  paper,  pretend  to  make  it,  let 
us  see  what  is  the  actual  market  for  our  exports  and 
imports.  This  will  bring  vague  assertions  and  san 
guine  opinions  to  the  test  of  experience.  That  rage 
for  theory  and  system, .  which  would  entangle  even 
practical  truth  in  the  web  of  the  brain,  is  the  poison  of 
public  discussion.  One  fact  is  better  than  two  systems. 

The  terms,  on  which  our  exports  are  received  in  the 
British  market,  have  been  accurately  examined  by  a 
gentleman  from  South  Carolina,  (Mr.  Wm.  L.  Smith.) 
Before  his  statement  of  facts  was  made  to  the  com 
mittee,  it  was  urged,  and  with  no  little  warmth,  that 
the  system  of  England  indicated  her  inveteracy  to 
wards  this  country,  while  that  of  France,  springing 
from  disinterested  affection,  constituted  a  claim  for 
gratitude  and  self-denying  measures  of  retribution. 

Since  that  statement,  however,  that  romantic  style, 
which  is  so  ill  adapted  to  the  subject,  has  been  chang 
ed.  We  hear  it  insinuated,  that  the  comparison  of 
the  footing  of  our  exports,  in  the  markets  of  France 
and  England,  is  of  no  importance ;  that  it  is  chiefly 


Mil.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  393 

our  object  to  see  how  we  may  assist  and  extend  our 
commerce.  This  evasion  of  the  force  of  the  state 
ment,  or  rather  this  indirect  admission  of  its  authori 
ty,  establishes  it.  It  will  not  be  pretended,  that  it  has 
been  shaken  during  the  debate. 

It  has  been  made  to  appear,  beyond  contradiction, 
that  the  British  market  for  our  exports,  taken  in  the 
aggregate,  is  a  good  one ;  that  it  is  better  than  the 
French,  and  better  than  any  we  have,  and  for  many  of 
our  products  the  only  one. 

The  whole  amount  of  our  exports  to  the  British  do 
minions,  in  the  year  ending  the  30th  September,  1790, 
was  nine  million,  two  hundred  and  forty-six  thousand, 
six  hundred  and  six  dollars. 

But  it  will  be  more  simple  and  satisfactory  to 
confine  the  inquiry  to  the  articles  following :  bread 
stuff,  tobacco,  rice,  wood,  the  produce  of  the  fisheries, 
fish  oil,  pot  and  pearl  ash,  salted  meats,  indigo,  live 
animals,  flax  seed,  naval  stores  and  iron. 

The  amount  of  the  beforementioned  articles,  export 
ed  in  that  same  year  to  the  British  dominions,  was 
eight  million,  four  hundred  and  fifty-seven  thousand, 
one  hundred  and  seventy-three  dollars. 

We  have  heard  so  much  of  restriction  of  inimical 
and  jealous  prohibitions  to  cramp  our  trade,  it  is  na 
tural  to  scrutinize  the  British  system,  with  the  expecta 
tion  of  finding  little  besides  the  effects  of  her  selfish 
and  angry  policy. 

Yet  of  the  great  sum  of  nearly  eight  millions  and  a 
half,  the  amount  of  the  products  beforementioned  sold 
in  her  markets,  two  articles  only  are  dutied  by  way  of 
restriction.  Bread  stuff  is  dutied  so  high  in  the  mar 
ket  of  Great  Britain  as,  in  times  of  plenty,  to  exclude 
it,  and  this  is  done  from  the  desire  to  favor  her  own 
farmers.  The  mover  of  the  resolutions  justified  the 
exclusion  of  our  bread  stuff  from  the  French  West  In 
dies  by  their  permanent  regulations,  because,  he  said, 
they  were  bound  to  prefer  their  own  products  to  those 
even  of  the  United  States.  It  would  seem  that  the 


304  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

same  apology  would  do  for  England,  in  her  home  mar 
ket.  But  what  will  do  for  the  vindication  of  one  na 
tion  becomes  invective  against  another.  The  criminal 
nation,  however,  receives  our  bread  stuff  in  the  West 
Indies  free,  and  excludes  other  foreign,  so  as  to  give 
our  producers  the  monopoly  of  the  supply.  This  is 
no  merit  in  the  judgment  of  the  mover  of  the  resolu 
tions,  because  it  is  a  fragment  of  her  old  colony  system. 
Notwithstanding  the  nature  of  the  duties  on  bread  stuff 
in  Great  Britain,  it  has  been  clearly  shown,  that  she  is 
a  better  customer  for  that  article,  in  Europe,  than  her 
neighbor,  France.  The  latter,  in  ordinary  times,  is  a 
poor  customer  for  bread  stuff,  for  the  same  reason 
that  our  own  country  is,  because  she  produces  it  her 
self,  and  therefore  France  permits  it  to  be  imported, 
and  the  United  States  do  the  like.  Great  Britain  of 
ten  wants  the  article,  and  then  she  receives  it;  no 
country  can  be  expected  to  buy  what  it  does  not  want. 
The  bread  stuff  sold  in  the  European  dominions  of 
Britain,  in  the  year  1790,  amounted  to  one  million, 
eighty-seven  thousand,  eight  hundred  and  forty  dollars. 

Whale  oil  pays  the  heavy  duty  of  eighteen  pounds 
three  shillings  sterling  per  ton;  yet  spermaceti  oil 
found  a  market  there  to  the  value  of  eighty-one  thou 
sand  and  forty-eight  dollars. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  of  eight  millions  and  a  half, 
sold  to  Great  Britain  and  her  dominions,  only  the 
value  of  one  million,  one  hundred  and  sixty-eight  thou 
sand  dollars  was  under  duty  of  a  restrictive  nature. 
The  bread  stuff  is  hardly  to  be  considered  as  within 
the  description ;  yet,  to  give  the  argument  its  full 
force,  what  is  it  ?  about  one  eighth  part  is  restricted, 
To  proceed  with  the  residue  : 

Indigo  to  the  amount  of  $473,830 

Live  animals  to  the  West  Indies       -  62,415 

Flax-seed  to  Great  Britain  219,924 

Total,    $756,169 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  305 

These  articles  are  received,  duty  free,  which  is  a 
good  foot  to  the  trade.  Yet  we  find,  good  as  it  is,  the 
bulk  of  our  exports  is  received  on  even  better  terms : 

Flour  to  the  British  West  Indies  $858,00<i 

Grain  273,505 

Free — while  other  foreign  flour  and  grain  are  prohibited. 

Tobacco  to  Great  Britain  2,754,493 

Ditto  to  the  West  Indies  22,816 

One  shilling  and  three  pence  sterling,  duty  ;  three  shil 
lings  and  six  pence  on  other  foreign  tobacco. 

In  the  West  Indies,  other  foreign  tobacco  is  prohibited. 

Rice  to  Great  Britain  773,852 

Seven  shillings  and  four  pence  per  cwt.  duty  ;  eight 
shillings  and  ten  pence  on  other  foreign  rice. 

To  West  Indies  -  -  -       180,077 

Other  foreign  rice  prohibited. 

Wood  to  Great  Britain  240,174 

Free — higher  duties  on  other  foreign. 

To  West  Indies  -       382,481 

Free — other  foreign  prohibited. 

Pot  and  pearl  ashes  747,075 

Free — two  shillings  and  three  pence  on  other  foreign, 
equal  to  ten  dollars  per  ton. 

Naval  stores  to  Great  Britain  -       1 90,670 

Higher  duties  on  other  foreign. 

To  West  Indies  6,162 

Free — other  foreign  prohibited. 

Iron  to  Great  Britain  8 1 .6 1  x! 

Free — duties  on  other  foreign. 

g6,510,92i» 


Thus  it  appears,  that  nearly  seven  eighths  of  the  ex 
ports  to  the  British  dominions  are  received  on  terms 
of  positive  favor.  Foreigners,  our  rivals  in  the  sale 
of  these  articles,  are  either  absolutely  shut  out  of  their 
market  by  prohibitions,  or  discouraged  in  their  compe 
tition  with  us  by  higher  duties.  There  is  some  re 
striction,  it  is  admitted,  but  there  is,  to  balance  it,  a 
large  amount  received  duty  free;  and  a  half  goes  to 
the  account  of  privilege  and  favor.  This  is  better 
than  she  treats  any  other  foreign  nation.  It  is  better, 
indeed,  than  she  treats  her  own  subjects,  because  they 

vot.  i.  39 


306  MR.  AMES'    SPEECH   Oft 

are  by  this  means  deprived  of  a  free  and  open  market. 
It  is  better  than  our  footing  with  any  nation,  with  whom 
we  have  treaties.  It  has  been  demonstratively  shown, 
that  it  is  better  than  the  footing  on  which 'France  re 
ceives  either  the  like  articles,  or  the  aggregate  of  our 
products.  The  best  proof  in  the  world  is,  that  they 
are  not  sent  to  France.  The  merchants  will  find  out 
the  best  market  sooner  than  we  shall. 

The  footing  of  our  exports,  under  the  British  system, 
is  better  than  that  of  their  exports  to  the  United  States, 
under  our  system.  Nay,  it  is  better  than  the  freedom 
of  commerce,  which  is  one  of  the  visions  for  which  our 
solid  prosperity  is  to  be  hazarded ;  for,  suppose  we 
could  batter  down  her  system  of  prohibitions  and  re 
strictions,  it  would  be  gaining  a  loss ;  one  eighth  is  re 
stricted,  and  more  than  six  eighths  have  restrictions  in 
their  favor.  It  is  as  plain  as  figures  can  make  it,  that,  if 
a  state  of  freedom  for  our  exports  is  at  par,  the  pre 
sent  system  raises  them,  in  point  of  privilege,  above 
par.  To  suppose  that  we  can  terrify  them  by  these 
resolutions,  to  abolish  their  restrictions,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  maintain  in  our  favor  their  duties,  to  ex 
clude  other  foreigners  from  their  market,  is  too  absurd 
to  be  refuted. 

We  have  heard,  that  the  market  of  France  is  the 
great  centre  of  our  interests ;  we  are  to  look  to  her, 
and  not  to  England,  for  advantages,  being,  as  the  style 
of  theory  is,  our  best  customer  and  best  friend,  show 
ing  to  our  trade  particular  favor  and  privilege ;  while 
England  manifests  in  her  system  such  narrow  and  sel 
fish  views.  It  is  strange  to  remark  such  a  pointed  re 
futation  of  assertions  and  opinions  by  facts.  The 
amount  sent  to  France  herself  is  very  trivial.  Ei 
ther  our  merchants  are  ignorant  of  the  best  markets, 
or  those  which  they  prefer  are  the  best ;  and  if  the 
English  markets,  in  spite  of  the  alleged  ill  usage,  are 
still  preferred  to  the  French,  it  is  a  proof  of  the  supe 
rior  advantages  of  the  former  over  the  latter.  The 
arguments  I  have  adverted  to,  oblige  those  who  urge 


MR.  MADISON'S   RESOLUTIONS.  307 

them  to  make  a  greater  difference  in  favor  of  the  Eng 
lish  than  the  true  state  of  facts  will  warrant.  Indeed, 
if  they  persist  in  their  arguments,  they  are  bound  to 
deny  their  own  conclusions.  They  are  bound  to  ad 
mit  this  position :  if  France  receives  little  of  such  of 
our  products  as  Great  Britain  takes  on  terms  of  privi 
lege  and  favor,  because  of  that  favor,  it  allows  the 
value  of  that  favored  footing.  If  France  takes  little 
of  our  articles,  because  she  does  not  want  them,  it 
shows  the  absurdity  of  looking  to  her  as  the  best 
customer. 

It  may  be  said,  and  truly,  that  Great  Britain  regards 
only  her  own  interest  in  these  arguments ;  so  much 
the  better.  If  it  is  her  interest  to  afford  to  our  com 
merce  more  encouragement  than  France  gives:  if 
she  does  this,  when  she  is  inveterate  against  us,  as  it 
is  alleged,  and  when  we  are  indulging  an  avowed  ha 
tred  towards  her,  and  partiality  towards  France,  it 
shows  that  we  have  very  solid  ground  to  rely  on.  Her 
interest  is,  according  to  this  statement,  stronger  than 
our  passions,  stronger  than  her  own,  and  is  the  more 
to  be  depended  on,  as  it  cannot  be  put  to  any  more 
trying  experiment  in  future.  The  good  will  and  friend 
ship  of  nations  are  hollow  foundations  to  build  our 
systems  upon.  Mutual  interest  is  a  bottom  of  rock : 
the  fervor  of  transient  sentiments  is  not  better  than 
straw  or  stubble.  Some  gentlemen  have  lamented  this 
distrust  of  any  relation  between  nations,  except  an  in 
terested  one ;  but  the  substitution  of  any  other  princi 
ple  could  produce  little  else  than  the  hypocrisy  of  sen 
timent,  and  an  instability  of  affairs.  It  would  be  rely 
ing  on  what  is  not  stable,  instead  of  what  is :  it  would 
introduce  into  politics  the  jargon  of  romance.  It  is  in 
this  sense,  and  this  only,  that  the  word  favor  is  used :  a 
state  of  things,  so  arranged  as  to  produce  our  profit 
and  advantage,  though  intended  by  Great  Britain 
merely  for  her  own.  The  disposition  of  a  nation  is  im 
material  ;  the  fact,  that  we  profit  by  their  system,  can 
not  be  so  to  this  discussion. 


308  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH   OxN 

The  next  point  is,  to  consider  whether  our  imports 
are  on  a  good  footing,  or,  in  other  words,  whether  we 
are  in  a  situation  to  buy  what  we  have  occasion  for  at 
a  cheap  rate.  In  this  view,  the  systems  of  the  com 
mercial  nations  are  not  to  be  complained  of,  as  all  are 
desirous  of  selling  the  products  of  their  labor.  Great 
Britain  is  not  censured  in  this  respect.  The  objection 
is  rather  of  the  opposite  kind,  that  we  buy  too  cheap, 
and  therefore  consume  too  much ;  and  that  we  take 
not  only  as  much  as  we  can  pay  for,  but  to  the  extent 
of  our  credit  also.  There  is  less  freedom  of  importa 
tion,  however,  from  the  West  Indies.  In  this  respect, 
France  is  more  restrictive  than  England ;  for  the  for 
mer  allows  the  exportation  to  us  of  only  rum  and  mo 
lasses,  while  England  admits  that  of  sugar,  coffee  and 
other  principal  West  India  products.  Yet,  even  here, 
when  the  preference  seems  to  be  decidedly  due  to  the 
British  system,  occasion  is  taken  to  extol  that  of  the 
French.  We  are  told,  that  they  sell  us  the  chief  part 
of  the  molasses,  which  is  consumed  or  manufactured 
into  rum  ;  and  that  a  great  and  truly  important  branch, 
the  distillery,  is  kept  up  by  their  liberality  in  furnishing 
the  raw  material.  There  is  at  every  step,  matter  to 
confirm  the  remark,  that  nations  have  framed  their  re 
gulations  to  suit  their  own  interests,  not  ours.  France 
is  a  great  brandy  manufacturer ;  she  will  not  admit 
rum,  therefore,  even  from  her  own  islands,  because  it 
would  supplant  the  consumption  of  brandy.  The  mo 
lasses  was  for  that  reason,  some  years  ago,  of  no  value 
in  her  islands,  and  was  not  even  saved  in  casks.  But 
the  demand  from  our  country  soon  raised  its  value. 
The  policy  of  England  has  been  equally  selfish.  The 
molasses  is  distilled  in  her  islands,  because  she  has  no 
manufacture  of  brandy  to  suffer  by  its  sale. 

A  question  remains  respecting  the  state  of  our  navi 
gation.  If  we  pay  no  regard  to  the  regulations  of 
foreign  nations,  and  ask,  whether  this  valuable  branch 
of  our  industry  and  capital  is  in  a  distressed  and  sickly 
state,  we  shall  find  it  is  in  a  strong  and  flourishing 


MR.   MADISON'S   RESOLUTIONS.  399 

condition.  If  the  quantity  of  shipping  was  declining, 
if  it  was  unemployed,  even  at  low  freight,  I  should  say, 
it  must  be  sustained  and  encouraged.  No  such  thing 
is  asserted.  Seamen's  wages  are  high,  freights  are 
high,  and  American  bottoms  in  full  employment.  But 
the  complaint  is,  our  vessels  are  not  permitted  to  go  to 
the  British  West  Indies.  It  is  even  affirmed,  that  no 
civilized  country  treats  us  so  ill  in  that  respect.  Spain 
and  Portugal  prohibit  the  traffic  to  their  possessions, 
not  only  in  our  vessels,  but  in  their  own,  which,  accord 
ing  to  the  style  of  the  resolutions,  is  worse  treatment 
than  we  meet  with  from  the  British.  It  is  also  assert 
ed,  and  on  as  bad  ground,  that  our  vessels  are  exclud 
ed  from  most  of  the  British  markets. 

This  is  not  true  in  any  sense.  We  are  admitted 
into  the  greater  number  of  her  ports,  in  our  own  ves 
sels  ;  and  by  far  the  greater  value  of  our  exports  is  sold 
in  British  ports,  into  which  our  vessels  are  received, 
not  only  on  a  good  footing,  compared  with  other  for 
eigners,  but  on  terms  of  positive  favor,  on  better  terms 
than  British  vessels  are  admitted  into  our  own  ports. 
We  are  not  subject  to  the  alien  duties ;  and  the  light 
money,  &c.  of  one  shilling  nine  pence  sterling  per  ton 
is  less  than  our  foreign  tonnage  duty,  riot  to  mention 
the  ten  per  centum,  on  the  duties  on  goods  in  foreign 
bottoms. 

But  in  the  port  of  London  our  vessels  are  received 
free.  It  is  for  the  unprejudiced  mind  to  compare  these 
facts  with  the  assertions  we  have  heard  so  confidently 
and  so  feelingly  made  by  the  mover  of  the  resolutions, 
that  we  are  excluded  from  most  of  their  ports,  and 
that  no  civilized  nation  treats  our  vessels  so  ill  as  the 
British. 

The  tonnage  of  the  vessels,  employed  between  Great 
Britain  and  her  dependences  and  the  United  States,  is 
called  two  hundred  and  twenty  thousand;  and  the 
whole  of  this  is  represented  as  our  just  right.  The 
same  gentleman  speaks  of  our  natural  right  to  the  car 
riage  of  our  own  articles,  and  that  we  may  and  ought 


310  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  OK 

to  insist  upon  our  equitable  share.  Yet,  soon  after,  he 
uses  the  language  of  monopoly,  and  represents  the 
whole  carriage  of  imports  and  exports  as  the  proper 
object  of  our  efforts,  and  all  that  others  carry  as  a 
clear  loss  to  us.  If  an  equitable  share  of  the  carriage 
means  half,  we  have  it  already,  and  more,  and  our 
proportion  is  rapidly  increasing.  If  any  thing  is  meant 
by  the  natural  right  of  carriage,  one  would  imagine 
that  it  belongs  to  him,  whoever  he  may  be,  who,  hav 
ing  bought  our  produce,  and  made  himself  the  owner, 
thinks  proper  to  take  it  with  him  to  his  own  country. 
It  is  neither  our  policy  nor  our  design  to  check  the  sale 
of  our  produce.  We  invite  every  description  of  pur 
chasers,  because  we  expect  to  sell  dearest,  when  the 
number  and  competition  of  the  buyers  is  the  greatest. 
For  this  reason,  the  total  exclusion  of  foreigners  and 
their  vessels  from  the  purchase  and  carriage  of  our 
exports,  is  an  advantage,  in  respect  to  navigation,  which 
has  a  disadvantage  to  balance  it,  in  respect  to  the  price 
of  produce.  It  is  with  this  reserve  we  ought  to  receive 
the  remark,  that  the  carriage  of  our  exports  should  be 
our  object,  rather  than  that  of  our  imports.  By  going 
with  our  vessels  into  foreign  ports  we  buy  our  imports 
in  the  best  market.  By  giving  a  steady  and  moderate 
encouragement  to  our  own  shipping,  without  pretend 
ing  violently  to  interrupt  the  course  of  business,  expe 
rience  will  soon  establish  that  order  of  things,  which 
is  most  beneficial  to  the  exporter,  the  importer,  and 
the  ship  owner.  The  best  interest  of  agriculture  is 
the  true  interest  of  trade. 

In  a  trade,  mutually  beneficial,  it  is  strangely  absurd 
to  consider  the  gain  of  others  as  our  loss.  Admitting 
it,  however,  for  argument  sake,  yet  it  should  be  noticed, 
that  the  loss  of  two  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  tons 
of  shipping,  is  computed  according  to  the  apparent  ton 
nage.  Our  vessels  not  being  .allowed  to  go  to  the  Bri 
tish  West  Indies,  their  vessels,  making  frequent  voy 
ages,  appear  in  the  entries  over  and  over  again.  In  the 
trade  to  the  European  dominions  of  Great  Britain,  the 


MR.  MADISON'S   RESOLUTIONS.  3H 

distance  being  greater,  our  vessels  are  not  so  often 
entered.  Both  these  circumstances  give  a  false 
show  to  the  amount  of  British  tonnage,  compared  with 
the  American.  It  is,  however,  very  pleasing  to  the 
mind,  to  see  that  our  tonnage  exceeds  the  British  in 
the  European  trade.  For  various  reasons,  some  of 
which  will  be  mentioned  hereafter,  the  tonnage  in  the 
West  India  trade,  is  not  the  proper  subject  of  calcula 
tion.  In  the  European  comparison,  we  have  more  ton 
nage  in  the  British  than  in  the  French  commerce ;  it  is 
indeed  more  than  four  to  one. 

The  great  quantity  of  British  tonnage  employed  in 
our  trade  is  also,  in  a  great  measure,  owing  to  the 
large  capitals  of  their  merchants,  employed  in  buy 
ing  and  exporting  our  productions.  If  we  would  ban 
ish  the  ships,  we  must  strike  at  the  root,  and  banish 
the  capital.  And  this,  before  we  have  capital  of  our 
own  grown  up  to  replace  it,  would  be  an  operation  of 
no  little  violence  and  injury,  to  our  southern  brethren 
especially. 

Independently  of  this  circumstance,  Great  Britain 
is  an  active  and  intelligent  rival  in  the  navigation  line. 
Her  ships  are  dearer,  and  the  provisioning  of  her  sea 
men  is  perhaps  rather  dearer  than  ours  :  on  the  other 
hand,  the  rate  of  interest  is  lower  in  England,  and  so  are 
seamen's  wages.lt  would  be  improper,  therefore,  to 
consider  the  amount  of  British  tonnage  in  our  trade,  as  a 
proof  of  a  bad  state  of  things,  arising  either  from  the 
restrictions  of  that  government,  or  the  negligence  or 
timidity  of  this.  We  are  to  charge  it  to  causes,  which 
are  more  connected  with  the  natural  competition  of 
capital  and  industry ;  causes,  which  in  fact  retarded 
the  growth  of  our  shipping  more,  when  we  were  colo 
nies  and  our  ships  were  free,  than  since  the  adoption 
of  the  present  government. 

It  has  been  said  with  emphasis,  that  the  constitution 
grew  out  of  the  complaints  of  the  nation  respecting 
commerce,  especially  that  with  the  British  dominions. 
What  was  then  lamented  by  our  patriots  ?  Feebleness 


312  MR.   AMES'  SPEECH   ON 

of  the  public  councils ;  the  shadow  of  union,  and 
scarcely  the  shadow  of  public  credit ;  every  where  des 
pondence,  the  pressure  of  evils,  not  only  great  but 
portentous  of  civil  distractions.  These  were  the 
grievances ;  and  what  more  was  then  desired  than 
their  remedies  ?  Is  it  possible  to  survey  this  prosper 
ous  country  and  to  assert  that  they  have  been  delayed  ? 
Trade  flourishes  on  our  wharves,  although  it  droops 
in  speeches.  Manufactures  have  risen  under  the  shade 
of  protecting  duties,  from  almost  nothing,  to  such  a 
state,  that  we  are  even  told  we  can  depend  on  the  do 
mestic  supply,  if  the  foreign  should  cease.  The  fishe 
ries,  which  we  found  in  decline,  are  in  the  most  vigor 
ous  growth :  the  whale  fishery,  which  our  allies  would 
have  transferred  to  Dunkirk,  now  extends  over  the 
whole  ocean.  To  that  hardy  race  of  men,  the  sea  is 
but  a  park  for  hunting  its  monsters ;  such  is  their  acti 
vity,  the  deepest  abysses  scarcely  afford  to  their  prey 
a  hiding  place.  Look  around,  and  see  how  the  frontier 
circle  widens,  how  the  interior  improves,  and  let  it  be 
repeated  that  the  hopes  of  the  people,  when  they  form 
ed  this  constitution,  have  been  frustrated. 

But  if  it  should  happen,  that  our  prejudices  prove 
stronger  than  our  senses  ;  if  it  should  be  believed,  that 
our  farmers  and  merchants  see  their  products  and 
ships  and  wharves  going  to  decay  together,  and  they 
are  ignorant  or  silent  on  their  own  ruin ;  still  the  public 
documents  would  not  disclose  so  alarming  a  state  of  our 
affairs.  Our  imports  are  obtained  so  plentifully  and 
cheaply,  that  one  of  the  avowed  objects  of  the  resolu 
tions  is,  to  make  them  scarcer  and  dearer.  Our  ex 
ports,  so  far  from  languishing,  have  increased  two  mil 
lions  of  dollars  in  a  year.  Our  navigation  is  found  to 
be  augmented  beyond  the  most  sanguine  expectation. 
We  hear  of  the  vast  advantage  the  English  derived 
from  the  navigation  act :  and  we  are  asked  in  a  tone 
of  accusation,  shall  we  sit  still  and  do  nothing?  Who 
is  bold  enough  to  say,  Congress  has  done  nothing  for 
the  encouragement  of  American  navigation?  To 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  313 

counteract  the  navigation  act,  we  have  laid  on  British, 
a  higher  tonnage  than  our  own  vessels  pay  in  their 
ports ;  and  what  is  much  more  effectual,  we  have  im 
posed  tender  centum  on  the  duties,  when  the  dutied  ar 
ticles  are  borne  in  foreign  bottoms.  We  have  also  made 
the  coasting  trade  a  monopoly  to  our  own  vessels. 
Let  those,  who  have  asserted  that  this  is  nothing,  com 
pare  facts  with  the  regulations  which  produced  them. 

Tonnage.  Tons. 

American,  1789,  297,468     Excess  of  American  tonnage. 

Foreign  265,116 

32,352 

American,  1790,  347,663 

Foreign  258,916 

88,747 

American,  1791  363,810 

Foreign  240,799 

123,011 

American,  1792,  415,330 

Foreign  244,263 

171,067 

Is  not  this  increase  of  American  shipping  rapid 
enough  ?  Many  persons  say  it  is  too  rapid,  and  attracts 
too  much  capital  for  the  circumstances  of  the  country. 
I  cannot  readily  persuade  myself  to  think  so  valuable 
a  branch  of  employment  thrives  too  fast.  But  a  steady 
and  sure  encouragement  is  more  to  be  relied  on  than 
violent  methods  of  forcing  its  growth.  It  is  not  clear, 
that  the  quantity  of  our  navigation,  including  our 
coasting  and  fishing  vessels,  is  less  in  proportion  to 
those  of  that  nation :  in  that  computation  we  shall 
probably  find,  that  we  are  already  more  a  navigating 
people  than  the  English. 

As  this  is  a  growing  country,  we  have  the  most  sta 
ble  ground  of  dependence  on  the  corresponding  growth 
of  our  navigation  :  and  that  the  increasing  demand 
for  shipping  will  rather  fall  to  the  share  of  Americans 
than  foreigners,  is  not  to  be  denied.*  We  did  expect 
this  from  the  nature  of  our  own  laws ;  we  have  been  con 
firmed  in  it  by  experience ;  and  we  know  that  an  Ame 
rican  bottom  is  actually  preferred  to  a  foreign  one* 

VOL.  L  40 


.ill  MR.  AUKS'   SPEECH  Oft 

In  cases  where  one  partner  is  an  American,  and  an 
other  a  foreigner,  the  ship  is  made  an  American  bot 
tom.  A  fact  of  this  kind  overthrows  a  whole  theory 
of  reasoning  on  the  necessity  of  further  restrictions. 
It  shows,  that  the  work  of  restriction  is  already  done. 

If  we  take  the  aggregate  view  of  our  commercial 
interests,  we  shall  find  much  more  occasion  for  satis 
faction,  and  even  exultation,  than  complaint,  and  none 
for  despondence.  It  would  be  too  bold  to  say,  that  our 
condition  is  so  eligible  there  is  nothing  to  be  wished. 
Neither  the  order  of  nature,  nor  the  allotments  of  pro 
vidence,  afford  perfect  content ;  and  it  would  be  absurd 
to  expect  in  our  politics  what  is  denied  in  the  laws  of 
our  being.  The  nations,  with  whom  we  have  inter 
course,  have,  without  exception,  more  or  less  restricted 
their  commerce.  They  have  framed  their  regulations 
to  suit  their  real  or  fancied  interests.  The  code  of 
France  is  as  full  of  restrictions  as  that  of  England. 
We  have  regulations  of  our  own ;  and  they  are  unlike 
those  of  any  other  country.  Inasmuch  as  the  interest 
and  circumstances  of  nations  vary  so  essentially,  the 
project  of  an  exact  reciprocity  on  our  part  is  a  vision. 
What  we  desire  is,  to  have,  not  an  exact  reciprocity, 
but  an  intercourse  of  mutual  benefit  and  convenience. 

It  has  scarcely  been  so  much  as  insinuated,  that  the 
change  contemplated  will  be  a  profitable  one ;  that  it 
will  enable  us  to  sell  dearer  and  to  buy  cheaper :  on 
the  contrary,  we  are  invited  to  submit  to  the  hazards 
and  losses  of  a  conflict  with  our  customers ;  to  engage 
:in  a  contest  of  self-denial.  For  what — to  obtain  better 
markets  ?  No  such  thing ;  but  to  shut  up  forever,  if 
possible,  the  best  market  we  have  for  our  exports,  and 
to  confine  ourselves  to  the  dearest  and  scarcest  mar 
kets  for  our  imports.  And  this  is  to  be  done  for  the 
benefit  of  trade;  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  more  correctly 
said,  for  the  benefit  of  France.  This  language  is  not  a 
little  inconsistent  and  strange  from  those,  who  recom 
mend  a  non-importation  agreement,  and  who  think  we 
.should  even  renounce  the  sea  and  devote  ourselves  to 
agriculture.  Thus,  to  make  our  trade  more  free,  it  is  to 


MR.  MADISON  \S    RESOLUTIONS.  31  o 

be  embarrassed,  and  violently  shifted  from  one  country 
to  another,  not  according  to  the  interest  of  the  mer 
chants,  but  the  visionary  theories  and  capricious  rash 
ness  of  the  legislators.  To  make  trade  better,  it  is  to  be 
made  nothing. 

So  far  as  commerce  and  navigation  are  regarded, 
the  pretences  for  this  contest  are  confined  to  two.  We 
are  not  allowed  to  carry  manufactured  articles  to 
Great  Britain,  nor  any  products,  except  of  our  own 
growth ;  and  we  are  not  permitted  to  go,  with  our  own 
vessels,  to  the  West  Indies.  The  former,  which  is  a 
provision  of  the  navigation  act,  is  of  little  importance 
to  our  interests,  as  our  trade  is  chiefly  a  direct  one,  our 
shipping  not  being  equal  to  the  carrying  for  other  na 
tions  ;  and  our  manufactured  articles  are  not  furnished 
in  quantities  for  exportation,  and  if  they  were,  Great 
Britain  would  not  be  a  customer.  So  far,  therefore, 
the  restriction  is  rather  nominal  than  real. 

The  exclusion  of  our  vessels  from  the  West  Indies 
is  of  more  importance.     When  we  propose  to  make  an 
effort  to  force  a  privilege  from  Great  Britain,  which 
she  is  loath  to  yield  to  us,  it  is  necessary  to  compare  the 
value  of  the  object  with  the  effort,  and  above  all,  to 
calculate  very  warily  the  probability  of  success.     A 
trivial  thing  deserves  not  a  great  exertion ;  much  less 
ought  we  to  stake  a  very  great  good  in  possession,  for 
a  slight  chance  of  a  less  good.     The  carriage  of  one 
half  the  exports  and  imports  to  and  from  the  British 
Wrest  Indies,  is  the  object  to  be  contended  for.     Our 
whole  exports  to  Great  Britain  are  to  be  hazarded. 
We  sell  on  terms  of  privilege,  and  positive  favor,  as  it; 
has  been  abundantly  shown,  near  seven  millions  to  the 
dominions  of  Great  Britain.     We  are  to  risk  the  privi 
lege  in  this  great  amount — for  what  ?     For  the  freight; 
only  of  one  half  the  British  West  India  trade  with  the 
United  States.     It  belongs  to  commercial  men  to  cal 
culate  the  entire  value  of  the  freight  alluded  to.     But 
it  cannot  bear  much  proportion  to  the  amount  of  seven 
millions.    Besides,  if  we  are  denied  the  privilege  of 


316  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

carrying  our  articles  in  our  vessels  to  the  islands,  we 
are  on  a  footing  of  privilege  in  the  sale  of  them.  We 
have  one  privilege,  if  not  two.  It  is  readily  admitted, 
that  it  is  a  desirable  thing,  to  have  our  vessels  allowed 
to  go  to  the  English  islands  ;  but  the  value  of  the  ob 
ject  has  its  limits,  and  we  go  unquestionably  beyond 
them,  when  we  throw  our  whole  exports  into  confusion, 
and  run  the  risk  of  losing  our  best  markets,  for  the  sake 
of  forcing  a  permission  to  carry  our  own  products  to 
one  of  those  markets ;  in  which  too,  it  should  be  notic 
ed,  we  sell  much  less  than  we  do  to  Great  Britain 
herself.  If  to  this  we  add,  that  the  success  of  the  con 
test  is  grounded  on  the  sanguine  and  passionate  hy 
pothesis  of  our  being  able  to  starve  the  islanders, 
which,  on  trial,  may  prove  false,  and  which  our  being 
involved  in  the  war  would  overthrow  at  once,  we  may 
conclude,  without  going  further  into  the  discussion, 
that  prudence  forbids  our  engaging  in  the  hazards  of 
a  commercial  war ;  that  great  things  should  not  be 
staked  against  such  as  are  of  much  less  value ;  that 
what  we  possess  should  not  be  risked  for  what  we  de 
sire,  without  great  odds  in  our  favor ;  still  less,  if  the 
chance  is  infinitely  against  us. 

If  these  considerations  should  fail  of  their  effect,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  go  into  an  examination  of  the 
tendency  of  the  system  of  discrimination,  to  redress  and 
avenge  all  our  wrongs,  and  to  realize  all  our  hopes. 

It  has  been  avowed,  that  we  are  to  look  to  France, 
not  to  England,  for  advantages  in  trade ;  we  are  to 
show  our  spirit,  and  to  manifest  towards  those,  who  are 
called  enemies,  the  spirit  of  enmity,  and  towards  those, 
we  call  friends,  something  more  than  passive  good  will. 
We  are  to  take  active  measures  to  force  trade  out  of 
its  accustomed  channels,  and  to  shift  it  by  such  means 
from  England  to  France.  The  care  of  the  concerns 
of  the  French  manufacturers  may  be,  perhaps,  as 
well  left  in  the  hands  of  the  convention,  as  usurped 
into  our  own.  However  our  zeal  might  engage  us  to 
interpose,  our  duty  to  our  own  immediate  constituents 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  317 

demands  all  our  attention.  To  volunteer  it,  in  order 
to  excite  competition  in  one  foreign  nation  to  supplant 
another,  is  a  very  strange  business ;  and  to  do  it,  as  it 
has  been  irresistibly  proved  it  will  happen,  at  the 
charge  and  cost  of  our  own  citizens,  is  a  thing  equally 
beyond  all  justification  and  all  example.  What  is  it 
but  to  tax  our  own  people  for  a  time,  perhaps  for  a 
long  time,  in  order  that  the  French  may  at  last  sell 
as  cheap  as  the  English  ? — cheaper  they  cannot,  nor  is 
it  so  much  as  pretended.  The  tax  will  be  a  loss  to  us, 
and  the  fancied  tendency  of  it  not  a  gain  to  this  coun 
try  in  the  event,  but  to  France.  We  shall  pay  more 
for  a  time,  and  in  the  end  pay  no  less ;  for  no  object 
but  that  one  nation  may  receive  our  money,  instead  of 
the  other.  If  this  is  generous  towards  France,  it  is 
not  just  to  America.  It  is  sacrificing  what  we  owe  to 
our  constituents,  to  what  we  pretend  to  feel  towards 
strangers.  We  have  indeed  heard  a  very  ardent  pro 
fession  of  gratitude  to  that  nation,  and  infinite  reliance 
seems  to  be  placed  on  her  readiness  to  sacrifice  her 
interest  to  ours.  The  story  of  this  generous  strife 
should  be  left  to  ornament  fiction.  This  is  not  the 
form  nor  the  occasion  to  discharge  our  obligations  of 
any  sort  to  any  foreign  nation :  it  concerns  not  our 
feelings  but  our  interests;  yet  the  debate  has  often 
soared  high  above  the  smoke  of  business  into  the  epic 
region.  The  market  for  tobacco,  tar,  turpentine  and 
pitch,  has  become  matter  of  sentiment ;  and  given  oc 
casion  alternately  to  rouse  our  courage  and  our  gra 
titude. 

If,  instead  of  hexameters,  we  prefer  discussing  our 
relation  to  foreign  nations  in  the  common  language, 
we  shall  not  find,  that  we  are  bound  by  treaty  to  esta 
blish  a  preference  in  favor  of  the  French.  The  treaty 
is  founded  on  a  professed  reciprocity,  favor  for  favor. 
Why  is  the  principle  of  treaty  or  no  treaty  made  so  es 
sential,  when  the  favor,  we  are  going  to  give,  is  an  act 
of  supererogation  ?  It  is  not  expected  by  one  of  the 
nations  in  treaty :  for  Holland  has  declared  in  her  trea- 


318  AIR.  AMES-   SPEECH  ON 

ty  with  us,  that  such  preferences  are  the  fruitful  source 
of  animosity,  embarrassment  and  war.     The  French 
have  set  no  such  example.     They  discriminate,  in  their 
late  navigation  act,  not  as  we  are  exhorted  to  do,  be 
tween  nations  in  treaty  and  not  in  treaty,  but  between 
nations  at  war  and  not  at  war  with  them ;  so  that, 
when  peace  takes  place,  England  will  stand,  by  that 
act,  on  the  same  ground  with  ourselves.     If  we  expect 
by  giving  favor  to  get  favor  in  return,  it  is  improper 
to  make  a  law.     The  business  belongs  to  the  execu 
tive,  in  whose  hands  the  constitution  has  placed  the 
power  of  dealing  with  foreign  nations.     It  is  singular 
to  negotiate  legislatively ;  to  make  by  a  law  half  a  bar 
gain,  expecting  a  French  law  would  make  the  other. 
The  footing  of  treaty  or  no  treaty  is  different  from  the 
ground  taken  by  the  mover  himself  in  supporting  his 
system.     He  has  said,  favor  for  favor  is  principle  : 
nations  not  in  treaty  grant  favors,  those  in  treaty  re 
strict  our  trade.     Yet  the  principle  of  discriminating 
in  favor  of  nations  in  treaty,  is  not  only  inconsistent 
with  the  declared  doctrine  of  the  mover  and  with  facts, 
but  it  is  inconsistent  with  itself.     Nations  not  in  trea 
ty,  are  so  very  unequally  operated  upon  by  the  resolu 
tions,  it  is  absurd  to  refer  them  to  one  principle.     Spain 
and  Portugal  have  no  treaties  with  us,  and  are  not 
disposed  to  have :  Spain  would  not  accede  to  the  trea 
ty  of  commerce  between  us  and  France,  though  she 
was  invited :  Portugal  would  not  sign  a  treaty  after  it 
had  been  discussed  and  signed  on  our  part.     They 
have  few  ships  or  manufactures,  and  do  not  feed  their 
colonies  from  us :  of  course  there  is  little  for  the  discri 
mination  to  operate  upon.     The  operation  on  nations 
in  treaty  is  equally  a  satire  on  the  principle  of  discri 
mination.     In  Sweden,  with  whom  we  have  a  treaty, 
duties  rise  higher  if  borne  in  our  bottoms,  than  in  her 
own.     France  does  the  like,  in  respect  to  tobacco, 
two  and  a  half  livres  the  kentle,  which  in  effect  prohi 
bits  our  vessels  to  freight  tobacco.     The  mover  has, 
somewhat  unluckily,  proposed  to  except  from  this  sys- 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  319 

tern  nations  having  no  navigation  acts ;  in  which  case. 
France  would  become  the  subject  of  unfriendly  discri 
mination,  as  the  house  have  been  informed  since  the 
debate  began,  that  she  has  passed  such  acts. 

1  might  remark  on  the  disposition  of  England  to 
settle  a  commercial  treaty,  and  the  known  desire  of 
the  marquis  of  Lansdown,  fthen  prime  minister,)  in 
1783,  to  form  such  an  one  on  the  most  liberal  principles. 
The  history  of  that  business,  and  the  causes  which 
prevented  its  conclusion,  ought  to  be  made  known  to 
the  public.  The  powers  given  to  our  ministers  were 
revoked,  and  yet  we  hear,  that  no  such  disposition  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain  has  existed.  The  declara 
tion  of  Mr.  Pitt  in  parliament,  in  June,  1792,  as  well  as 
the  correspondence  with  Mr.  Hammond,  shows  a  desire 
to  enter  upon  a  negotiation.  The  statement  of  the 
report  of  the  secretary  of  state,  on.the  privileges  and 
restrictions  of  our  commerce,  that  Great  Britain  has 
.?hown  no  inclination  to  meddle  with  the  subject,  seems 
to  be  incorrect. 

The  expected  operation  of  the  resolutions  on  differ 
ent  nations,  is  obvious,  and  I  need  not  examine  their 
supposed  tendency  to  dispose  Great  Britain  to  settle 
an  equitable  treaty  with  this  country;  but  I  ask, 
whether  those  who  hold  such  language  towards  that 
nation  as  I  have  heard,  can  be  supposed  to  desire  a 
treaty  and  friendly  connexion.  It  seems  to  be  thought 
a  merit  to  express  hatred :  it  is  common  and  natural  to 
desire  to  annoy  and  to  crush  those  whom  we  hate,  but 
it  is  somewhat  singular  to  pretend,  that  the  design  of 
our  anger  is  to  embrace  them. 

The  tendency  of  angry  measures  to  friendly  dispo 
sitions  and  arrangements,  is  not  obvious.  We  affect 
to  believe,  that  we  shall  quarrel  ourselves  into  their 
good  will :  that  we  shall  beat  a  new  path  to  peace  and 
friendship  with  Great  Britain — one  that  is  grown  up 
with  thorns,  and  lined  with  men-traps  and  spring-guns. 
It  should  be  called  the  war  path. 

To  do  justice  to  the  subject,  its  promised  advan- 


320  MR-  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

tages  should  be  examined.  Exciting  the  competition 
of  the  French,  is  to  prove  an  advantage  to  this  country, 
by  opening  a  new  market  with  that  nation.  This  is 
scarcely  intelligible.  If  it  means  any  thing,  it  is  an 
admission,  that  their  market  is  not  a  good  one,  or  that 
they  have  not  taken  measures  to  favor  our  traffic  with 
them.  In  either  case,  our  system  is  absurd.  The 
balance  of  trade  is  against  us,  and  in  favor  of  England. 
But  the  resolutions  can  only  aggravate  that  evil,  for, 
by  compelling  us  to  buy  dearer  and  sell  cheaper,  the 
balance  will  be  turned  still  more  against  our  country. 
Neither  is  the  supply  from  France  less  the  aliment  of 
luxury,  than  that  from  England.  Their  excess  of 
credit  is  an  evil,  which  we  pretend  to  cure  by  checking 
the  natural  growth  of  our  own  capital,  which  is  the  un 
doubted  tendency  of  restraining  trade ;  the  progress 
of  the  remedy  is  thus  delayed.  If  we  will  trade,  there 
must  be  capital.  It  is  best  to  have  it  of  our  own ;  if 
we  have  it  not,  we  must  depend  on  credit.  Wealth 
springs  from  the  profits  of  employment,  and  the  best 
writers  on  the  subject  establish  it,  that  employment  is 
in  proportion  to  the  capital  that  is  to  excite  and  re 
ward  it.  To  strike  off  credit,  which  is  the  substitute 
for  capital,  if  it  were  possible  to  do  it,  would  so  far 
stop  employment.  Fortunately,  it  is  not  possible ;  the 
activity  of  individual  industry  eludes  the  misjudging 
power  of  governments.  The  resolutions  would,  in  e£ 
feet,  increase  the  demand  for  credit,  as  our  products 
selling  for  less  in  a  new  market,  and  our  imports  be 
ing  bought  dearer,  there  would  be  less  money  and 
more  need  of  it.  Necessity  would  produce  credit. 
Where  the  laws  are  strict,  it  will  soon  find  its  proper 
level ;  the  uses  of  credit  will  remain,  and  the  evil  will 
disappear. 

But  the  whole  theory  of  balances  of  trade,  of  help 
ing  it  by  restraint,  and  protecting  it  by  systems  of  pro 
hibition  and  restriction  against  foreign  nations,  as  well 
as  the  remedy  for  credit,  are  among  the  exploded  dog 
mas,  which  are  equally  refuted  by  the  maxims  of 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS. 

science  and  the  authority  of  time.  Many  such  topics 
have  been  advanced,  which  were  known  to  exist  as  pre 
judices,  but  were  not  expected  as  arguments.  It  seems 
to  be  believed,  that  the  liberty  of  commerce  is  of  some 
value.  Although  there  are  restrictions  on  one  side, 
there  will  be  some  liberty  left :  counter  restrictions,  by 
diminishing  that  liberty,  are  in  their  nature  aggrava 
tions  and  not  remedies.  We  complain  of  the  British 
restrictions  as  of  a  millstone :  our  own  system  will  be 
another ;  so  that  our  trade  may  hope  to  be  situated 
between  the  upper  and  the  nether  millstone. 

On  the  whole,  the  resolutions  contain  two  great 
principles — to  control  trade  by  law,  instead  of  leaving 
it  to  the  better  management  of  the  merchants ;  and 
the  principle  of  a  sumptuary  law.  To  play  the  tyrant 
in  the  counting-house,  and  in  directing  the  private  ex 
penses  of  our  citizens,  are  employments  equally  un* 
worthy  of  discussion. 

Besides  the  advantages  of  the  system,  we  have  been 
called  to  another  view  of  it,  which  seems  to  have 
less  connexion  with  the  merits  of  the  discussion.  The 
acts  of  states,  and  the  votes  of  public  bodies,  before 
the  constitution  was  adopted,  and  the  votes  of  the 
house  since,  have  been  stated  as  grounds  for  our  as 
sent  to  this  measure  at  this  time.  To  help  our  own 
trade,  to  repel  any  real  or  supposed  attack  upon  it, 
cannot  fail  to  prepossess  the  mind :  accordingly,  the 
first  feelings  of  every  man  yield  to  this  proposition, 
But  the  sober  judgment,  on  the  tendency  and  reasona 
bleness  of  the  intermeddling  of  government,  often  does, 
and  probably  ought  still  oftener  to  change  our  impres 
sions.  On  a  second  view  of  the  question,  the  man, 
who  voted  formerly  for  restrictions,  may  say,  much  has 
been  done  under  the  new  constitution,  and  the  good 
effects  are  yet  making  progress.  The  necessity  of 
measures  of  counter  restriction  will  appear  to  him 
much  less  urgent,  and  their  efficacy,  in  the  present  tur 
bulent  state  of  Europe,  infinitely  less  to  be  relied  on. 
Far  from  being  inconsistent  in  his  conduct,  consisten- 
VOT,.  r.  41 


322  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

cy  will  forbid  his  pressing  the  experiment  of  his  prin 
ciple  under  circumstances  which  baffle  the  hopes  of  its 
success.  But  if  so  much  stress  is  laid  on  former 
opinions,  in  favor  of  this  measure,  how  happens  it  that 
there  is  so  little  on  that  which  now  appears  against  it  ? 
Not  one  merchant  has  spoken  in  favor  of  it  in  this 
body;  not  one  navigating  or  commercial  state  has 
patronized  it. 

It  is  necessary  to  consider  the  dependence  of  the 
British  West  India  islands  on  our  supplies.     I  admit, 
that  they  cannot  draw  them   so  well,  and  so  cheap, 
from  any  other  quarter ;  but  this  is  not  the  point.     Are 
they  physically  dependent?     Can  we  starve  them — 
and  may  we  reasonably  expect,  thus  to   dictate  to 
Great  Britain  a  free  admission  of  our  vessels  into  her 
islands  ?     A  few  details  will  prove  the  negative. — Beef 
and  pork  sent  from  the  now  United  States  to  the  Bri 
tish  West  Indies,  1773,  fourteen  thousand,  nine  hun 
dred  and  ninety-three  barrels.     In  the  war  time,  1780, 
ditto  from  England,  seventeen  thousand,  seven  hundred 
and  ninety-five:  at  the  end  of  the  war,  1783,  sixteen 
thousand,  five  hundred  and  twenty-six.    Ireland  export 
ed,  on  an  average  of  seven  years  prior  to  1777,  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  barrels.     Salted  fish  the 
English  take  in  abundance,  and  prohibit  its  importation 
from  us.     Butter  and  cheese  from  England  and  Ire 
land  are  but  lately  banished  even  from  our  markets. 
Exports  from  the  now  United  States,  1773 ;  horses,  two 
thousand,  seven  hundred  and  sixty-eight ;   cattle,  one 
thousand,  two  hundred  and  three ;  sheep  and  hogs,  five 
thousand,  three   hundred   and  twenty.      Twenty-two 
years  prior  to  1791,  were  exported  from  England  to 
all  ports,  twenty-nine  thousand,  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
one  horses.     Ireland,  on  an  average  of  seven  years  to 
1777,  exported  four  thousand  and  forty  live  stock,  ex 
clusive  of  hogs.     The  coast  of  Barbary,  the  Cape  de 
Verds,   &c.   supply  sheep  and  cattle.     The  islands, 
since  the  war,  have  increased  their  domestic  supplies 
to  a  great  degree. 


MR.    MADISON'S   RESOLUTIONS.  323 

The  now  United  States  exported  about  one  hundred 
and  thirty  thousand  barrels  of  flour,  in  1773,  to  the 
West  Indies.  Ireland,  by  grazing  less,  could  supply 
wheat ;  England  herself  usually  exports  it ;  she  also 
imports  from  Archangel.  Sicily  and  the  Barbary 
states  furnish  wheat  in  abundance.  We  are  deceived, 
when  we  fancy  we  can  starve  foreign  countries. 
France  is  reckoned  to  consume  grain  at  the  rate  of 
seven  bushels  to  each  soul.  Twenty-six  millions  of 
souls,  the  quantity  one  hundred  and  eighty-two  millions 
of  bushels.  We  export,  to  speak  in  round  numbers, 
five  or  six  millions  of  bushels  to  all  the  different  coun 
tries,  which  we  supply;  a  trifle  this  to  their  wants. 
Frugality  is  a  greater  resource.  Instead  of  seven 
bushels,  perhaps  two  could  be  saved  by  stinting  the 
consumption  of  the  food  of  cattje,  or  by  the  use  of  other 
food.  Two  bushels  saved  to  each  soul  is  fifty-two 
millions  of  bushels,  a  quantity  which  the  whole  trading 
world,  perhaps,  could  not  furnish.  Rice  is  said  to  be 
prohibited  by  Spain  and  Portugal  to  favor  their  own. 
Brazil  could  supply  their  rice  instead  of  ours. 

I  must  warn  you  of  the  danger  of  despising  Canada 
and  Nova  Scotia  too  much  as  rivals  in  the  West  India 
supply  of  lumber,  especially  the  former.  The  de 
pendence,  the  English  had  placed  on  them  some  years 
ago,  failed,  partly  because  we  entered  into  competi 
tion  with  them  on  very  superior  terms,  and  partly  be 
cause  they  were  then  in  an  infant  state.  They  are 
now  supposed  to  have  considerably  more  than  doubled 
their  numbers  since  the  peace ;  and  if,  instead  of  hav 
ing  us  for  competitors  for  the  supply  as  before,  we 
should  shut  ourselves  out  by  refusing  our  supplies,  or 
being  refused  entry  for  them,  those  two  colonies  would 
rise  from  the  ground ;  at  least  we  should  do  more  to 
bring  it  about  than  the  English  ministry  have  been  able 
to  do.  In  1772,  six  hundred  and  seventy-nine  vessels, 
the  actual  tonnage  of  which  was  one  hundred  and 
twenty-eight  thousand,  were  employed  in  the  West 
India  trade  from  Great  Britain.  They  were  supposed, 


324  MR-  AMES'  SPEECH    ON 

on  good  ground,  to  be  but  half  freighted  to  the  islands ; 
they  might  carry  lumber,  and  the  freight  supposed  to 
be  deficient  would  be,  at  forty  shillings  sterling  the 
tori,  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  thousand  pounds 
sterling.  This  sum  would  diminish  the  extra  charge 
of  carrying  lumber  to  the  islands.  But  is  lumber  to  be 
had? — Yes,  in  Germany,  and  from  the  Baltic.  It  is 
even  cheaper  in  Europe  than  our  own:  besides 
which,  the  hard  woods,  used  in  mills,  are  abundant  in 
the  islands. 

We  are  told  they  can  sell  their  rum  only  to  the 
United  States.  This  concerns  not  their  subsistence, 
but  their  profit.  Examine  it,  however.  In  1773,  the 
now  United  States  took  near  three  million  gallons 
of  rum.  The  remaining  British  colonies,  Newfound 
land,  and  the  African  coast,  have  a  considerable 
demand  for  this  article.  The  demand  of  Ireland  is 
very  much  on  the  increase.  It  was,  in  1763,  five  hun 
dred  and  thirty  thousand  gallons;  1770,  one  million, 
five  hundred  and  fifty-eight  thousand  gallons;  1778, 
one  million,  seven  hundred  and  twenty-nine  thousand 
gallons. 

Thus  we  see,  a  total  stoppage  of  the  West  India 
trade  would  not  starve  the  islanders.  It  would  affect 
us  deeply ;  we  should  lose  the  sale  of  our  products,  and, 
of  course,  not  gain  the  carriage  in  our  own  vessels ; 
the  object  of  the  contest  would  be  no  nearer  our  reach 
than  before.  Instead,  however,  of  a  total  stoppage  of 
the  intercourse,  it  might  happen,  that  each  nation 
prohibiting  the  vessels  of  the  other,  some  third  nation 
would  carry  on  the  traffic  in  its  own  bottoms.  While 
this  measure  would  disarm  our  system,  it  would  make 
it  recoil  upon  ourselves.  It  would,  in  effect,  operate 
chiefly  to  obstruct  the  sale  of  our  products.  If  they 
should  remain  unsold,  it  would  be  so  much  dead  loss ; 
or  if  the  effect  should  be  to  raise  the  price  on  the  con 
sumers,  it  would  either  lessen  the  consumption,  or 
raise  up  rivals  in  the  supply.  The  contest,  as  it  re 
spects  the  West  India  trade,  is  in  every  respect  against 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  325 

us.  To  embarrass  the  supply  from  the  United  States, 
supposing  the  worst  as  it  regards  the  planters,  can  do 
no  more  than  enhance  the  price  of  sugar,  coffee  and 
other  products.  The  French  islands  are  now  in  ruins, 
and  the  English  planters  have  an  increased  price  and 
double  demand  in  consequence.  While  Great  Britain 
confined  the  colony  trade  to  herself,  she  gave  to  the 
colonists  in  return  a  monopoly  in  her  consumption  of 
West  India  articles.  The  extra  expense,  arising  from 
the  severest  operation  of  our  system,  is  already  provid 
ed  against,  two  fold ;  like  other  charges  on  the  products 
of  labor  and  capital,  the  burden  will  fall  on  the  con 
sumer.  The  luxurious  and  opulent  consumer  in  Eu 
rope  will  not  regard,  and  perhaps  will  not  know,  the 
increase  of  price  nor  the  cause  of  it.  The  new  settler, 
who  clears  his  land  and  sells  the  lumber,  will  feel  any 
convulsion  in  the  market  more  sensibly,  without  being 
able  to  sustain  it  at  all.  It  is  a  contest  of  wealth 
against  want  of  self-denial,  between  luxury  and  daily 
subsistence,  that  we  provoke  with  so  much  confidence 
of  success.  A  man  of  experience  in  the  West  India 
trade  will  see  this  contrast  more  strongly  than  it  is 
possible  to  represent  it. 

One  of  the  excellences,  for  which  the  measure  is  re 
commended,  is,  that  it  will  affect  our  imports.  What 
is  offered  as  an  argument,  is  really  an  objection.  Who 
will  supply  our  wants  ?  Our  own  manufactures  are 
growing,  and  it  is  a  subject  of  great  satisfaction  that 
they  are.  But  it  would  be  wrong  to  overrate  their 
capacity  to  clothe  us.  The  same  number  of  inhabi 
tants  require  more  and  more,  because  wealth  increases. 
Add  to  this  the  rapid  growth  of  our  numbers,  and  per 
haps  it  will  be  correct  to  estimate  the  progress  of 
manufactures  as  only  keeping  pace  with  that  of  our 
increasing  consumption  and  population.  It  follows, 
that  we  shall  continue  to  demand,  in  future,  to  the 
amount  of  our  present  importation.  It  is  not  intended 
by  the  resolutions,  that  we  shall  import  from  England. 
Holland  and  the  north  of  Europe  do  not  furnish  a  suffi- 


326  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

cient  variety,  or  sufficient  quantity  for  our  consump 
tion.  It  is  in  vain  to  look  to  Spain,  Portugal,  and  the 
Italian  States.  We  are  expected  to  depend  principally 
upon  France :  it  is  impossible  to  examine  the  ground 
of  this  dependence  without  adverting  to  the  present 
situation  of  that  country.  It  is  a  subject,  upon  which 
I  practise  no  disguise ;  but  I  do  not  think  it  proper  to 
introduce  the  politics  of  France  into  this  discussion. 
If  others  can  find  in  the  scenes  that  pass  there,  or  in 
the  principles  and  agents  that  direct  them,  proper  sub 
jects  for  amiable  names,  and  sources  of  joy  and  hope 
in  the  prospect,  I  have  nothing  to  say  to  it :  it  is  an 
amusement,  which  it  is  not  my  intention  either  to 
disturb  or  to  partake  of.  I  turn  from  these  horrors  .to 
examine  the  condition  of  France  in  respect  to  manu 
facturing  capital  and  industry.  In  this  point  of  view, 
whatever  political  improvements  may  be  hoped  for,  it 
cannot  escape  observation,  that  it  presents  only  a  wide 
field  of  waste  and  desolation.  Capital,  which  used  to 
be  food  for  manufactures,  is  become  their  fuel.  What 
once  nourished  industry,  now  lights  the  fires  of  civil 
war,  and  quickens  the  progress  of  destruction.  France 
is  like  a  ship,  with  a  fine  cargo,  burning  to  the  water's 
edge ;  she  may  be  built  upon  anew,  and  freighted  with 
another  cargo,  and  it  will  be  time  enough,  when  that 
shall  be,  to  depend  on  a  part  of  it  for  our  supply  :  at 
present,  and  for  many  years,  she  will  not  be  so  much 
a  furnisher  as  a  consumer.  It  is  therefore  obvious, 
that  we  shall  import  our  supplies  either  directly  or 
indirectly  from  Great  Britain.  Any  obstruction  to  the 
importation  will  raise  the  price  which  we,  who  con 
sume,  must  bear. 

That  part  of  the  argument,  which  rests  on  the  sup 
posed  distress  of  the  British  manufacturers,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  loss  of  our  market,  is  in  every  view  un 
founded.  They  would  not  lose  the  market  in  fact,  and 
if  they  did,  we  prodigiously  exaggerate  the  importance 
of  our  consumption  to  the  British  workmen.  Impor 
tant  it  doubtless  is,  but  a  little  attention  will  expose  the 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  327 

extreme  folly  of  the  opinion,  that  they  would  be  brought 
to  our  feet  by  a  trial  of  our  self-denying  spirit.  Eng 
land  now  supplants  France  in  the  important  Levant 
trade,  in  the  supply  of  manufactured  goods  to  the  East, 
and,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  West  Indies,  to  Spain, 
Portugal,  and  their  dependencies.  Her  trade  with 
Russia  has,  of  late,  vastly  increased ;  and  she  is  treat 
ing  for  a  trade  with  China :  so  that  the  new  demands 
of  English  manufactures,  consequent  upon  the  depres 
sion  of  France  as  a  rival,  has  amounted  to  much  more 
than  the  whole  American  importation,  which  is  not 
three  millions. 

The  ill  effect  of  a  system  of  restriction  and  prohibi 
tion  in  the  West  Indies,  has  been  noticed  already. 
The  privileges  allowed  to  our  exports  to  England  may 
be  withdrawn,  and  prohibitory  or  high  duties  imposed. 

The  system  before  us  is  a  mischief,  that  goes  to  the 
root  of  our  prosperity.  The  merchants  will  suffer  by 
the  schemes  and  projects  of  a  new  theory.  Great 
numbers  were  ruined  by  the  convulsions  of  1775. 
They  are  an  order  of  citizens  deserving  better  of  gov 
ernment,  than  to  be  involved  in  new  confusions.  It  is 
wrong  to  make  our  trade  wage  war  for  our  politics.  It  is 
now  scarcely  said,  that  it  is  a  thing  to  be  sought  for, 
but  a  weapon  to  fight  with.  To  gain  our  approbation 
to  the  system,  we  are  told,  it  is  to  be  gradually  esta 
blished.  In  that  case,  it  will  be  unavailing.  It  should 
be  begun  with  in  all  its  strength,  if  we  think  of  starv 
ing  the  islands.  Drive  them  suddenly  and  by  surprise 
to  extremity,  if  you  would  dictate  terms ;  but  they  will 
prepare  against  a  long  expected  failure  of  our  supplies. 

Our  nation  will  be  tired  of  suffering  loss  and  embar 
rassment  for  the  French.  The  struggle,  so  painful  to 
ourselves,  so  ineffectual  against  England,  will  be  re 
nounced,  and  we  shall  sit  down  with  shame  and  loss, 
with  disappointed  passions  and  aggravated  com 
plaints.  War,  which  would  then  suit  our  feelings, 
would  not  suit  our  weakness.  We  might,  perhaps,  find 


328  MR.   AMES'   SPEECH  Otf 

some  European  power  willing  to  make  war  on  Eng 
land,  and  we  might  be  permitted  by  a  strict  alliance, 
to  partake  the  misery  and  the  dependence  of  being  a 
subaltern  in  the  quarrel.  The  happiness  of  this  situa 
tion  seems  to  be  in  view,  when  the  system  before  us  is 
avowed  to  be  the  instrument  of  avenging  our  political 
resentments.  Those,  who  affect  to  dread  foreign  in 
fluence,  will  do  well  to  avoid  a  partnership  in  Europe 
an  jealousies  and  rivalships.  Courting  the  friendship 
of  the  one,  and  provoking  the  hatred  of  the  other,  is 
dangerous  to  our  real  independence ;  for  it  would  com 
pel  America  to  throw  herself  into  the  arms  of  the  one 
for  protection  against  the  other.  Then  foreign  influ 
ence,  pernicious  as  it  is,  would  be  sought  for;  and 
though  it  should  be  shunned,  it  could  not  be  resisted. 
The  connexions  of  trade  form  ties  between  individuals, 
and  produce  little  control  over  government.  They 
are  the  ties  of  peace,  and  are  neither  corrupt  nor  cor 
rupting. 

We  have  happily  escaped  from  a  state  of  the  most 
imminent  danger  to  our  peace :  a  false  step  would  lose 
all  the  security  for  its  continuance,  which  we  owe  at 
this  moment  to  the  conduct  of  the  president.  What 
is  to  save  us  from  war  ?  Not  our  own  power  which 
inspires  no  terror ;  not  the  gentle  and  forbearing  spi 
rit  of  the  powers  of  Europe  at  this  crisis ;  not  the  weak 
ness  of  England ;  not  her  affection  for  this  country,  if 
we  believe  the  assurances  of  gentlemen  on  the  other 
side.  What  is  it  then  ?  It  is  the  interest  of  Great 
Britain  to  have  America  for  a  customer,  rather  than  an 
enemy  :  and  it  is  precisely  that  interest,  which  gentle 
men  are  so  eager  to  take  away,  and  to  transfer  to 
France.  And  what  is  stranger  still,  they  say,  they 
rely  on  that  operation  as  a  means  of  producing  peace 
with  the  Indians  and  Algerines,  The  wounds,  inflict 
ed  on  Great  Britain  by  our  enmity,  are  expected  to  ex 
cite  her  to  supplicate  our  friendship,  and  to  appease 
us  by  soothing  tjie  animosity  of  our  enemies.  What  is 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  329 

to  produce  effects  so  mystical,  so  opposite  to  nature, 
so  much  exceeding  the  efficacy  of  their  pretended 
causes  ?  This  wonder-working  paper  on  the  table  is 
the  weapon  of  terror  and  destruction  :  like  the  writing 
on  Belshazzer's  wall,  it  is  to  strike  parliaments  and  na 
tions  with  dismay :  it  is  to  be  stronger  than  fleets 
against  pirates,  or  than  armies  against  Indians.  After 
the  examination  it  has  undergone,  credulity  itself  will 
laugh  at  these  pretensions. 

We  pretend  to  expect,  not  by  the  force  of  our  re 
strictions,  but  by  the  mere  show  of  our  spirit,  to  level 
all  the  fences,  that  have  guarded  for  ages  the  monopo 
ly  of  the  colony  trade.  The  repeal  of  the  navigation 
act  of  England,  which  is  cherished  as  the  palladium 
of  her  safety,  which  time  has  rendered  venerable,  and 
prosperity  endeared  to  her  people,  is  to  be  extorted, 
from  her  fears  of  a  weaker  nation.  It  is  not  to  be 
yielded  freely,  but  violently  torn  from  her ;  and  yet  the 
idea  of  a  struggle  to  prevent  indignity  and  loss,  is  con 
sidered  as  a  chimera  too  ridiculous  for  sober  refuta 
tion.  She  will  not  dare,  say  they,  to  resent  it;  and 
gentlemen  have  pledged  themselves  for  the  success  of 
the  attempt :  what  is  treated  as  a  phantom,  is  vouched 
by  fact.  Her  navigation  act  is  known  to  have  caused 
an  immediate  contest  with  the  Dutch,  and  four  despe 
rate  seafights  ensued,  in  consequence,  the  very  year  of 
its  passage. 

How  far  it  is  an  act  of  aggression,  for  a  neutral  na 
tion  to  assist  the  supplies  of  one  neighbor,  and  to  an 
noy  and  distress  another,  at  the  crisis  of  a  contest  be 
tween  the  two,  which  strains  their  strength  to  the  ut 
most,  is  a  question,  which  we  might  not  agree  in  decid 
ing  ;  but  the  tendency  of  such  unseasonable  partiality, 
to  exasperate  the  spirit  of  hostility  against  the  intru 
der,  cannot  be  doubted.  The  language  of  the  French 
government  would  not  sooth  this  spirit.  It  proposes, 
on  the  sole  condition  of  a  political  connexion,  to  ex 
tend  to  us  a  part  of  their  West  India  commerce.  The 

VOL.  i.  42 


330  MR.  AMES'   SPEECH  ON 

coincidence  of  our.  measures  with  their  invitation, 
however  singular,  needs  no  comment.  Of  all  men, 
those  are  least  consistent,  who  believe  in  the  efficacy 
of  the  regulations,  and  yet  affect  to  ridicule  their  hos 
tile  tendency.  In  the  commercial  conflict,  say  they, 
we  shall  surely  prevail  and  effectually  humble  Great 
Britain. 

In  open  war,  we  are  the  weaker,  and  shall  be 
brought  into  danger,  if  not  to  ruin.  It  depends,  there 
fore,  according  to  their  own  reasoning,  on  Great  Bri 
tain  herself,  whether  she  will  persist  in  a  struggle, 
which  will  disgrace  and  weaken  her,  or  turn  it  into  a 
war,  which  will  throw  the  shame  and  ruin  upon  her 
antagonist.  The  topics,  which  furnish  arguments  to 
show  the  danger  to  our  peace  from  the  resolutions, 
are  too  fruitful  to  be  exhausted.  But  without  pur 
suing  them  further,  the  experience  of  mankind  has 
shown,  that  commercial  rivalships,  which  spring  from 
mutual  efforts  for  monopoly,  have  kindled  more 
wars,  and  wasted  the  earth  more,  than  the  spirit 
of  conquest. 

I  hope  we  shall  show  by  our  vote,  that  we  deem  it 
better  policy  to  feed  nations  than  to  starve  them,  and 
that  we  shall  never  be  so  unwise,  as  to  put  our  good 
customers  into  a  situation  to  be  for.ced  to  make  every 
exertion  to  do  without  us.  By  cherishing  the  arts  of 
peace,  we  shall  acquire,  and  we  are  actually  acquiring, 
the  strength  and  resources  for  a  war.  Instead  of  seek 
ing  treaties,  we  ought  to  shun  them ;  for  the  later  they 
shall  be  formed,  the  better  will  be  the  terms :  we  shall 
have  more  to  give,  and  more  to  withhold.  We  have 
not  yet  taken  our  proper  rank,  nor  acquired  that  con 
sideration,  which  will  not  be  refused  us,  if  we  persist 
in  prudent  and  pacific  counsels ;  if  we  give  time  for 
our  strength  to  mature  itself.  Though  America  is 
rising  with  a  giant's  strength,  its  bones  are  yet  but  car 
tilages.  By  delaying  the  beginning  of  a  conflict,  we 
insure  the  victorv. 


MR.  MADISON'S  RESOLUTIONS.  331 

By  voting  out  the  resolutions,  we  shall  show  to  our 
own*  citizens,  and  foreign  nations,  that  our  prudence 
has  prevailed  over  our  prejudices,  that  we  prefer  our 
interests  to  our  resentments.  Let  us  assert  a  genuine 
independence  of  spirit :  we  shall  be  false  to  our  duty 
and  feelings  as  Americans,  if  we  basely  descend  to  a 
servile  dependence  on  France  or  Great  Britain. 


SPEECH  OF  JAMES  MADISON, 

ON 

THE  BRITISH  TREATY, 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES,  APRIL  15,  1796. 


On  the  28th  of  October,  1794,  a  treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  was  concluded,  and  was  subsequently  ratified  by 
the  President.  On  the  1st  of  March,  1796,  the  President  promul 
gated  the  treaty  by  proclamation,  declaring  it  obligatory,  and  on 
the  same  day  communicated  it  to  the  house  of  representatives,  in 
order  that  the  necessary  appropriations  might  be  made  to  carry  it 
into  effect.  In  committee  of  the  whole,  on  the  following  resolu 
tion  :  "  Resolved,  as  the  opinion  of  this  committee,  that  it  is  expe 
dient  to  pass  the  laws  necessary  for  carrying  into  effect  the  treaty 
with  Great  Britain  ;"  Mr.  Madison  spoke  as  follows  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

THE  subject  now  under  the  consideration  of  the 
committee,  is  of  such  vast  extent,  of  such  vital  im 
portance  to  this  country,  and  involves  so  many  topics, 
which  demand  minute  investigation,  that  I  wish,  at 
setting  out,  to  be  understood  as  not  pretending  to  go 
through  all  the  observations  that  may  be  applicable  to 
its  circumstances,  but  as  endeavoring  to  present  it  in 
a  mere  general  view,  persuaded  that  the  omissions  I 
shall  make,  will  be  amply  supplied  by  other  gentlemen 
who  are  to  follow  me  in  the  discussion. 

The  proposition,  sir,  immediately  before  the  com 
mittee,  amounts  to  this,  that  the  treaty  lately  made 
with  Great  Britain  ought  to  be  directly  carried  into 


MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH,  &c.  333 

effect  by  all  such  means  and  provisions,  as  are  pecu 
liarly  within  the  province  and  the  competency  of  the 
house  of  representatives  to  supply.  This,  sir,  is  the  sub 
stance  of  the  point  immediately  in  question :  but  it 
will,  in  examining  it,  be  proper  to  keep  constantly  in 
view  another  proposition  which  was  made  yester 
day,  by  the  gentleman  from  Pennsylvania,*  and  refer 
red  to  the  committee,  and  which  will  be  taken  up  of 
course,  if  the  immediate  question  shall  be  decided  in 
the  negative. 

Sir,  if  the  proposition  for  carrying  the  treaty  into 
effect  be  agreed  to  by  the  house,  it  must  necessarily  be 
upon  some  one  or  other  of  the  three  following  consi 
derations  :  that  the  legislature  is  bound  by  a  constitu 
tional  necessity  to  pass  the  requisite  laws,  without  exa 
mining  the  treaty  or  considering  its  merits — or,  that 
on  due  examination,  the  treaty  is  deemed  to  be  in  itself 
a  good  one — or  that,  apart  from  these  considerations, 
there  shall  appear  extraneous  reasons  of  sufficient 
weight  to  induce  the  house  to  carry  the  treaty  into  ef 
fect,  even  though  it  be  in  itself  a  bad  treaty.  The 
first  of  these  considerations,  however,  is  now  complete 
ly  excluded  by  the  late  decision  of  the  house,  that  they 
have  a  right  to  judge  of  the  expediency  or  inexpedien 
cy  of  passing  laws  relative  to  treaties ;  the  question 
then  first  to  be  examined  by  the  committee,  is  that 
which  relates  to  the  merits  of  the  present  treaty.  I 
will  now,  therefore,  proceed  to  discuss  those  merits, 
and  to  present  them  to  the  committee  under  three  dif 
ferent  aspects.  The  first,  as  it  relates  to  the  execu 
tion  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  made  in  the  year  1783. 
The  second,  as  it  bears  upon  and  determines  the  seve 
ral  points  in  the  law  of  nations  connected  with  it. 
And  the  third,  as  it  infringes  upon,  and  may  be  sup 
posed  to  affect  the  commercial  intercourse  of  the  two 
nations. 

*  Mr.  Maclay,  who  moved  a  resolution  "  that  it  is  not  expedient 
at  this  time  to  concur  in  passing  the  laws  necessary  for  carrying  the 
said  treaty  into  effect." 


334  MR.   MADISON'S   SPEECH  ON 

Sir,  in  animadverting  upon  the  first  of  these,  I  will 
not  take  upon  me  the  invidious  office  of  inquiring, 
which  party  it  is  to  whom  the  censure  may  justly  be 
ascribed  of  having  more  than  the  other  contributed  to 
the  delay  of  its  execution,  though  I  am  far  from  enter 
taining  any  desire  to  shrink  from  the  task,  under  an 
apprehension  that  the  result  might  be  disadvantageous 
to  this  country.  The  present  treaty  has  itself,  in  ex 
press  terms,  waved  this  inquiry,  and  professes,  that  its 
purpose  is  to  adjust  all  controversies  on  the  subjects  of 
which  it  is  conversant,  without  regard  to  the  mutual 
complaints  or  pretensions  of  the  parties.  Naturally, 
therefore,  and  most  justly  it  was  to  be  expected,  that  the 
arrangements  for  carrying  that  treaty  into  effect,  would 
have  been  founded  on  the  most  exact,  scrupulous  arid 
equitable  reciprocity.  But  has  this  been  the  case, 
sir  ?  I  venture  to  say  that  it  has  not,  and  it  grieves  me 
to  add,  what  nevertheless  truth  and  justice  compel  me 
to  declare,  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  arrangements  were 
founded  on  the  grossest  violation  of  this  principle. 
This,  sir,  is  undoubtedly  strong  language,  and  as  such 
I  should  be  one  of  the  last  men  living  to  give  it  utter 
ance,  if  I  were  not  supported  in  it  by  facts  no  less  strong 
and  unequivocal.  There  are  two  articles  in  the  old 
treaty,  for  the  execution  of  which,  no  provision  whatso 
ever  is  made  in  the  new  one.  The  first  is  that  which 
relates  to  the  restitution  of,  or  compensation  for,  the 
negroes  and  other  property  carried  away  by  the  British. 
The  second,  that  which  provides  for  the  surrender  to 
the  United  States  of  the  posts,  so  long  withheld  by  them, 
on  our  territory.  The  article  that  remains  unexe 
cuted  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  is  that  which 
stipulates  for  the  payment  of  all  bonafide  debts  owing 
to  British  creditors ;  and  the  present  treaty  guarantees 
the  carrying  of  this  article  into  the  most  complete  ef 
fect  by  the  United  States,  together  with  all  damages 
sustained  by  the  delay,  even  to  the  most  rigid  extent 
of  exaction,  while  it  contains  no  stipulation  whatever, 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  for  the  faithful  performance 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  335 

of  the  articles  left  unexecuted  by  her.  Look  to  the 
treaty,  sir,  and  you  will  find  nothing  like  it,  nothing  al 
lusive  to  it.  No,  on  the  contrary,  she  is  entirely  and 
formally  absolved  from  her  obligation  to  fulfil  that  arti 
cle,  which  relates  to  the  negroes,  and  is  discharged 
from  making  any  compensation  whatsoever  for  her 
having  delayed  to  fulfil  that,  which  provides  for  the  sur 
render  of  the  posts. 

I  am  aware,  sir,  of  its  being  urged  in  apology,  or  by 
way  of  extenuation  for  these  very  unequal  stipulations, 
that  the  injury  which  may  possibly  be  sustained  by  us 
in  consequence  of  the  detention  of  the  posts  by  the 
British  government,  is  not  susceptible  of  an  accurate 
valuation;  that  between  such  an  injury  and  money 
there  is  no  common  measure,  and  that  therefore,  the 
wrong  is  incapable  of  liquidation,  and  affords  no 
fair  basis  for  a  calculation  of  pecuniary  damages. 
This  apology,  sir,  may  appear  plausible,  but  it  is  by  no 
means  satisfactory.  Commissioners  might  easily  have 
been  appointed,  (as  they  are,  vested  too  with  full  discre 
tion,  for  other  purposes,)  to  take  charge  of  this  sub 
ject,  with  instructions  to  do  what  they  could,  if  unable 
to  do  what  they  ought,  and  if  incapable  of  effecting 
positive  justice,  at  least  to  mitigate  the  injustice  of 
doing  nothing. 

For  the  very  extraordinary  abandonment  of  the  com 
pensation  due  for  the  negroes  and  other  property  car 
ried  off  by  the  British,  apologies  have  also  been  lamely 
attempted;  and  these  apologies  demand  considera 
tion.  It  is  said  to  be  at  least  doubtful  whether  this 
claim  is  authorized  by  the  seventh  article  of  the 
treaty  of  peace,  and  that  Great  Britain  has  uniform 
ly  denied  the  meaning  put  by  the  United  States  on 
that  article.  In  reply  to  these  assertions,  it  is  sufficient 
for  me  to  remark,  that  so  far  from  its  being  true,  that 
Great  Britain  has  uniformly  denied  the  American  con 
struction  of  this  article,  it  is  susceptible  of  positive 
proof,  that  till  very  lately,  Great  Britain  has  uniformly 


336  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

admitted  our  construction  of  it,  and  that  she  has  rejected 
the  claim  on  no  other  ground  than  the  alleged  violation 
of  the  fourth  article  on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 
But  on  the  supposition  that  it  had  been  true,  that 
Great  Britain  had  uniformly  asserted  a  different  con 
struction  of  the  article,  and  refused  to  accede  to  ours, 
I  beg  leave  to  ask  the  house  what  ought  to  have  been 
done  ?  Ought  we  to  have  acceded  at  once  to  her  con 
struction  ?  You  will  anticipate  me,  sir,  in  saying,  assur 
edly  not.  Each  party  had  an  equal  right  to  interpret  the 
compact ;  and  if  they  could  not  agree,  they  ought  to 
have  done  in  this,  what  they  did  in  other  cases,  where 
they  could  not  agree ;  that  is,  have  referred  the  settle 
ment  of  the  meaning  of  the  compact  to  arbitration : 
but,  for  us  to  give  up  the  claim  altogether  because  the 
other  party  to  the  compact  thought  proper  to  disallow 
our  construction  of  it,  was  in  effect  to  admit  nothing 
less  than  that  Great  Britain  had  a  better  right  than  the 
United  States  to  explain  the  point  in  controversy,  or 
that  the  United  States  had  done  something  which  in 
justice  called  for  a  sacrifice  of  one  of  their  essential 
rights. 

From  this  view  of  the  subject,  sir,  I  consider  it  to  be 
evident,  that  the  arrangements  in  this  treaty  which  re 
late  to  the  treaty  of  peace  of  1783,  are  in  several  in 
stances  deficient  both  in  justice  and  reciprocity.  And 
here  a  circumstance  occurs,  that  in  my  opinion 
deserves  the  very  particular  attention  of  the  com 
mittee.  From  the  face  of  the  treaty  generally, 
and  particularly  from  the  order  of  the  articles,  it 
would  seem  that  the  compensation  for  the  spolia 
tions  on  our  trade  have  been  combined  with  the 
execution  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  and  may  therefore 
have  been  viewed  as  a  substitute  for  the  equivalent 
stipulated  for  the  negroes.  If  this  be  really  the  mean 
ing  of  the  instrument,  it  cannot  be  the  less  obnoxious 
to  reasonable  and  fair  judges.  No  man  can  be  more 
firmly  convinced  than  I  myself  am,  of  the  perfect  jus- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  33*7 

tice  on  which  the  claims  of  the  merchants  on  Great 
Britain  are  founded,  nor  can  any  one  be  more  desirous 
to  see  them  fully  indemnified.     But  surely,  sir,  it  will 
not  be  asserted  that  compensation  to  them  is  a  just 
substitute  for  the  compensation  due  to  others.     It  is 
impossible  that  any  claims  can  be  better  founded  than 
those  of  the  sufferers  under  the  seventh  article  of  the 
treaty  of  peace ;  because  they  are  supported  by  posi 
tive  and  acknowledged  stipulation,  as  well  as  by  equity 
and  right.     Just  and  undeniable  as  the  claims  of  the 
merchants  may  be,  and  certainly  are,  the  United  States 
cannot  be  obliged  to  take  more  care  of  them  than  of 
the  claims  equally  just  and  unquestionable  of  other 
citizens ;  much  less  to  sacrifice  the  latter  to  the  for 
mer.     To  set  this  matter  in  a  light,  that  will  exhibit  it 
in  the  clearest  and  most  familiar  way  possible  to  the 
understanding  and  the  bosom  of  every  member  in  this 
house,  I  will  invert  the  case.     Let  us  suppose  for  a  mo 
ment,  that  instead  of  relinquishing  the  claims  for  pro 
perty  wrongfully  carried  off  at  the  close  of  the  war, 
and  obtaining  stipulations  in  favor  of  the  mercantile- 
claims,  the  mercantile  claims  had  been  relinquished, 
and  the  other  claims  provided  for — I  ask,  would  not 
the  complaints  of  the  merchants  have  been  as  univer 
sal  and  as  loud  as  they  would  have  been  just  ? 

Sir,  besides  the  omissions  in  favor  of  Great  Britain, 
which  I  have  already  pointed  out,  as  particularly  con 
nected  with  the  execution  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  the 
committee  will  perceive,  that  there  are  conditions  an 
nexed  to  the  partial  execution  of  it  in  the  surrender  of 
the  western  posts,  which  increase  the  general  inequali 
ty  of  this  part  of  the  treaty,  and  essentially  affect  the 
value  of  those  objects.  I  beseech  the  committee  to 
examine  the  point  with  the  attention,  a  subject  of  so 
very  important  a  character  demands. 

The  value  of  the  posts  to  the  United  States  is  to  be 
estimated  by  the  influence  of  those  posts :  first,  on 
the  trade  with  the  Indians,  and  secondly,  on  the  temper 
and  conduct  of  the  Indians  to  the  United  States. 

VOL.  i..  43 


338  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

Their  influence  on  the  Indian  trade  depends  principal 
ly  on  the  exclusive  command  they  give  to  the  several 
carrying  places    connected  with  the  posts.      These 
places  are  understood  to  be  of  such  importance  in  this 
respect,  that  those,  who  possess  them  exclusively,  will 
have  a  monopoly  of  that  lucrative  intercourse  with  a 
great  part  of  the  savage  nations.     Great  Britain  hav 
ing  exclusively  possessed  those  places,  has  possessed 
all  those   advantages  without   a  rival;    and   it  was 
reasonably  enough  expected,  that  with  the  exclusive 
possession  of  the  posts,  the  exclusive  benefits  of  that 
trade  and  intercourse  would  be  transferred  also :  but 
by  the  treaty  now  under  consideration,  the  carrying 
places  are  to  be  enjoyed  in  common,  arid  it  will  be 
determined  by  the  respective  advantages  under  which 
British  and  American  traders  will  engage  in  the  trade, 
which  of  them  is  to  have  the  larger  share  in  it.     In 
this  point  of  view,  even  if  in  no  other,  I  view  this  regu 
lation  in  the  treaty  as  highly  impolitic  and  injurious  to 
the  interests  of  this  country.     I   need  not  dwell  upon 
the  signal  advantages  the  British  will  have  in  their 
superior  capital,  which  we  shall  have  to  encounter  in 
all  our  commercial  rivalships :  but  there  is  another 
consideration  which  ought  to  have,  and  no  doubt  will 
have  great  weight  with  the  committee  on  this  subject. 
The  goods  imported  for  the  Indian  trade  through  Cana 
da,  pay  no  duties — whilst  those  imported  through  the 
United  States   for  that  trade,  will  have  paid   duties 
from  seven  to  ten  per  centum.     At  the  same  time,  every 
man  must  see  that  a  drawback  is  impracticable,  or 
would  be  attended  with  an  expense,  which  the  business 
would  not  bear.     Whatever  the  value  or  the  impor 
tance,  therefore,  which  the  posts  may  be  supposed  to 
derive  from  those  considerations,  they  are  in  a  great 
measure  stripped  of  them  by  the  condition,  annexed  by 
this  treaty  to  the  surrender  of  the  posts.     Instead  of 
securing,  as  it  ought  to  have  done,  a  monopoly  in  our 
favor,  the  carrying  places  are  made  common  to  both 
countries  under  circumstances,  which  will  in  all  proba- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY. 


339 


bility  throw  a  monopoly  into  the  hands  of  Great  Britain. 
Nor  is  this  a  transient  or  a  temporary  evil,  for  that  arti 
cle  of  the  treaty  is  to  last  forever.  As  to  the  influence 
of  the  posts  on  the  conduct  of  the  Indians,  it  is  well 
known  to  depend  chiefly  upon  their  influence  on  the 
Indian  trade.  In  proportion,  therefore,  as  the  condition 
annexed  to  the  surrender  of  the  posts  affects  the  one,  it 
must  affect  the  other.  So  long  and  in  such  degree,  as 
the  British  continue  to  enjoy  the  Indian  trade,  they 
will  continue  to  influence  the  Indian  conduct ;  and, 
though  that  should  not  be  in  the  same  degree  as  here 
tofore,  it  will  be  at  least  in  a  degree  sufficiently  great 
to  pass  sentence  of  condemnation  on  the  article  in  ques 
tion. 

Another  very  extraordinary  feature  in  this  part  of 
the  treaty,  sir,  is  the  permission  that  it  grants  to  aliens 
to  hold  lands  in  perpetuity.  I  will  not  inquire  how  far 
this  may  be  authorized  by  constitutional  principles,  but 
I  will  always  maintain  that  there  cannot  be  found,  in 
any  treaty  that  ever  was  made,  either  where  territory 
was  ceded,  or  where  it  was  acknowledged  by  one  na 
tion  to  another,  one  other  such  stipulation.  Although 
I  admit,  that  in  such  cases  it  has  been  common,  and 
may  be  right,  to  make  regulations  for  the  conservation 
of  the  property  of  the  inhabitants,  yet  1  believe  it  will  ap 
pear,  that,  in  every  case  of  the  kind  that  has  occurred, 
the  owners  of  landed  property,  when  they  were  so 
favored,  were  either  called  upon  to  swear  allegiance 
to  the  new  sovereign,  or  compelled  to  dispose  of  their 
landed  property  within  a  reasonable  time. 

Sir,  the  stipulation,  by  which  all  the  ports  of  the 
United  States  are  to  open  to  Great  Britain,  as  a  valua 
ble  consideration  for,  or  condition  upon  which  those  of 
one  of  her  unimportant  provinces  are  to  be  opened  to 
us  in  return,  is  marked  with  such  signal  inequality, 
that  it  ought  not  only  to  be  rejected,  but  marked  with 
censure.  Nor  is  the  clause  respecting  the  Mississippi 
less  censurable.  To  me,  indeed,  it  appears  singularly 
reprehensible.  Happy  is  it  for  the  United  States, 


340  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

that  the  adjustment  of  our  claims  with  Spain  has  been 
brought  about,  before  any  evil  operation  of  the  clause  has 
been  experienced.  But  of  the  tendency  of  the  thing,  I 
am  persuaded,  there  can  be  no  doubt.  It  is  the  more 
remarkable  that  this  extension  of  the  privileges  of 
Great  Britain  on  the  Mississippi,  beyond  those  con 
tained  in  the  treaty  of  peace,  should  have  been  admit 
ted  into  the  new  treaty,  because,  by  the  latter  itself,  the 
supposition  is  suggested  that  Great  Britain  may  be 
deprived,  by  her  real  boundary,  of  all  pretensions  to 
a  share  in  the  waters  and  the  banks  of  the  Missis 
sippi. 

And  now,  sir,  to  turn  to  the  second  aspect,  in  which 
I  have  undertaken  to  examine  the  question ;  namely, 
as  it  determines  the  several  points  in  the  law  of  nations 
connected  with  it.  And  here,  I  must  say,  that  the  same 
want  of  real  reciprocity,  and  the  same  sacrifice  of  the 
interests  of  the  United  States,  are  conspicuous.  Sir, 
it  is  well  known  that  the  principle  that  "  FREE  SHIPS 
MAKE  FREE  GOODS,"  has  ever  been  a  great  and  favorite 
object  with  the  United  States ;  they  have  established  this 
principle  in  all  their  treaties ;  they  have  witnessed  with 
anxiety  the  general  effort  and  the  successful  advances 
towards  incorporating  this  principle  in  the  law  of  na 
tions — a  principle  friendly  to  all  neutral  nations,  and 
particularly  interesting  to  the  United  States.  I  know, 
sir,  that  it  has  before  now  been  conceded,  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  that  the  law  of  nations  stands  as 
the  present  treaty  regulates  it ;  but  it  does  not  follow 
that  more  than  acquiescence  in  this  doctrine,  is 
proper.  There  is  an  evident  and  a  material  distinction 
between  silently  acquiescing  in  it,  and  giving  it  the  ad 
ditional  force  and  support  of  a  formal  and  positive 
stipulation.  The  former  is  all  that  could  have 
been  required,  and  the  latter  is  more  than  ought  to 
have  been  unnecessarily  yielded.  The  treaty  is  liable 
to  similar  objections  in  respect  to  the  enumeration  it 
contains  of  contraband  articles,  in  which,  sir,  I  am 
sorry  to  be  obliged  to  remark,  that  the  circumstances 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  341 

and  interests  of  the  United  States,  have  been  made  to 
give  way  to  the  particular  views  of  the  other  party,  while 
the  examples  held  out  in  our  other  treaties  have  been 
disregarded.  Hemp,  tar,  pitch,  turpentine,  &c.,  in> 
portant  staples  of  this  country,  have,  without  even  a 
pretext  of  reciprocity,  been  subjected  to  confiscation* 
No  nation,  which  produces  these  articles,  has,  I  believe, 
any  treaties  at  present,  making  the  same  sacrifice, 
with  the  exception  of  Denmark,  who,  in  the  year  1780, 
by  what  means  I  know  not,  was  induced  to  agree  to 
an  explanation  of  the  treaty  of  1670,  by  which  these 
articles  are  declared  to  be  contraband.  Now,  sir,  it 
appears  to  me,  that  this  same  supplementary  and  ex 
planatory  agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Den 
mark,  has  been  the  model  selected  for  the  contraband 
list  of  the  treaty,  at  present  in  question ;  the  enumera 
tion  in  the  latter  being  transcribed,  word  for  word,  from 
the  former,  with  a  single  exception,  which,  not  only  is 
in  itself,  but  renders  the  whole  transaction  extremely 
remarkable.  The  article  "  HORSES,"  which  stands  as 
one  part  of  the  original,  is  entirely  omitted  in  the  copy; 
and  what  renders  the  omission  more  worthy  of  scruti 
ny,  is,  that  though  the  treaty,  in  general,  seems  to  have 
availed  itself,  wherever  it  readily  could,  of  the  authori 
ty  of  Vattel,  the  omission  of  horses  is  no  less  a 
departure  from  him,  than  from  the  original,  from 
which  that  part  of  the  treaty  was  copied.  Indeed,  the 
whole  of  this  particular  transaction  seems  fraught  with 
singularity  and  just  liability  to  suspicion ;  for,  strange 
as  it  may  appear,  it  is  certainly  true,  that  the  copy 
proceeded  exactly  from  the  original,  till  it  got  as  far  as 
the  purposes  of  Great  Britain  required,  and  at  that 
point  stopped  short.  I  entreat  the  committee  to  pay 
attention  to  this  fact.  After  enumerating  the  articles 
that  are  to  be  deemed  contraband,  the  Danish  article 
goes  on  in  the  words  following,  viz.  "  But  it  is  ex 
pressly  declared,  that  among  contraband  merchandizes, 
shall  not  be  comprehended,  fish  and  meats,  whether 
fresh  or  salted;  wheat,  flour,  corn,  or  other  grain; 


342  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

beans,  oil,  wines,  and  generally  whatever  serves  for 
the  nourishment  and  support  of  life ;  all  of  which  may 
at  all  times  be  sold  and  transported,  like  any  other  mer 
chandizes,  even  to  places  held  by  an  enemy  of  the  two 
crowns,  provided  they  be  not  besieged  or  blockaded." 

This  view  of  the  subject  naturally  leads  me  to  make 
some  observations  on  that  clause  of  the  treaty  which 
relates  to  provisions,  and  which,  to  say  the  least  of  it, 
wears  a  very  ambiguous  and  disagreeable  counte 
nance  ;  or,  to  speak  more  precisely,  seems  to  carry 
with  it  a  necessary  implication  that  provisions,  though 
not  bound  to  besieged  or  blockaded  places,  may  ac 
cording  to  the  law  of  nations,  as  it  now  exists,  be  re 
garded  and  treated  as  contraband.  According  to  the 
genuine  law  of  nations,  no  articles,  which  are  not  ex 
pressly  and  generally  contraband,  are  so,  in  any  particu 
lar  instance,  except  in  the  single  case  of  their  going  to 
a  place  besieged;  yet  it  is  recognized  by  this  treaty, 
that  there  are  other  cases  in  which  provisions  may  be 
deemed  contraband,  from  which  recognition,  implica 
tion  fairly  results,  that  one  of  those  cases  may  be  that 
which  has  been  assumed  and  put  in  force  by  Great 
Britain,  in  relation  to  the  United  States.  Such  trivial 
cases,  as  might  be  devised  by  way  of  appurtenances  to 
the  law,  that  condemns  what  is  bound  to  blockaded 
places,  can  by  no  means  satisfy  the  import  of  the  stipu 
lation  ;  because  such  cases  cannot  be  presumed  to 
have  been  in  contemplation  of  the  parties.  And  if  the 
particular  case,  of  provisions  bound  to  a  country  at  war, 
although  not  to  a  besieged  place,  was  not  meant  to  be 
one  of  the  cases  of  contraband  according  to  the  exist 
ing  law  of  nations,  how  necessary  was  it  to  have  said 
so ;  and  how  easy  and  natural  would  that  course  have 
been,  with  the  Danish  example  on  the  subject  before 
their  eyes. 

On  the  supposition  that  provisions,  in  our  own  ves 
sels,  bound  to*  countries  at  war  with  Great  Britain, 
can  be  now  seized  by  her  for  her  own  use,  on  the  con 
dition  stipulated,  this  feature  of  the  treaty,  sir,  pre- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  343 

seats  itself  in  a  very  serious  light  indeed ;  especially  if 
the  doctrine  be  resorted  to,  that  has  been  laid  down  by 
the  executive  in  the  letter  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  then  se 
cretary  of  state,  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  on  the  7th  of  Sep 
tember,  1793.     This  letter  is  a  comment  on  the  Bri 
tish  instructions  of  June  the  8th,  1793,  for  seizing  neu 
tral  provisions.     After  stating  the  measure  as  a  fla 
grant  breach  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  as  ruinous  to 
our  commerce  and  agriculture,  it  has  the  following 
paragraph.     "  This  act  too,  tends  to  draw  us  from 
that  state  of  peace  in  which  we  are  willing  to  remain. 
It  is  an  essential  character  of  neutrality  to  furnish  no 
aids  not  stipulated  by  treaty" — that  is,  sir,  by  a  trea 
ty  made  prior  to  the  war — "  to  one  party,  which  we 
are  not  equally  ready  to  furnish  to  the  other.     If  we 
permit  corn  to  be  sent  to  Great  Britain  and  her  friends, 
we  are  equally  bound  to  permit  it  to  be  sent  to  France. 
To  restrain  it  would  be  a  partiality  that  must  lead  to 
war ;  and  between  restraining  it  ourselves,  and  permit- 
ing  her  enemies  to  restrain  it  unrightfully,  there  is  no 
difference.     She  would  consider  it  as  a  mere  pretext, 
of  which  she  certainly  would  not  agree  to  be  the  dupe ; 
and  on  what  honorable  ground  could  we  otherwise 
explain  it  ?     Thus  we  should  see  ourselves  plunged,  by 
this  unauthorized  act  of  Great  Britain  into  a  war,  with 
which  we  meddle  not.  and  which  we  wish  to  avoid,  if 
justice  to  all  parties,  and  from  all  parties,  will  enable 
us  to  avoid  it."     Sir,  I  entreat  the  committee  to  give 
this  very  interesting  executive  document  all  the  atten 
tion  which  it  demands,  and  which  they  have  in  their 
power  to  bestow. 

I  am  now,  sir,  come  to  that  article  of  the  treaty  by 
which  the  sequestration  of  British  property  is  prohi 
bited  ;  upon  which  I  must  say,  that  though  I  should,  in 
all  probability,  be  one  of  the  last  men  existing,  to  have 
recourse  to  such  an  expedient  for  redress,  I  cannot  ap 
prove  of  a  perpetual  and  irrevocable  abandonment  of 
a  defensive  weapon,  the  existence  of  which  may  ren 
der  t^ie  use  of  it  unnecessary.  Sir,  there  is  an  extra- 


344  MR.  MADISON'S  SPEECH  ON 

ordinary  peculiarity  in  the  situation  of  this  country,  as 
it  stands  in  its  relations  to  Great  Britain.  As  we  have 
no  fleets  or  armies,  to  command  a  respect  for  our 
rights,  we  ought  to  keep  in  our  own  hands  all  such 
means  as  our  situation  gives  us.  This  article,  sir,  is 
another  instance  of  the  very  little  regard  that  has  been 
paid  to  reciprocity.  It  is  well  known,  that  British  sub 
jects  now  have,  and  are  likely  always  to  have  in  this 
country,  a  vast  quantity  of  property  of  the  kind  made 
sacred.  American  citizens,  it  is  known,  have  little, 
and  are  likely  to  have  little  of  the  kind  in  Great  Bri 
tain.  If  a  real  reciprocity  was  intended,  why  ara 
not  other  kinds  of  private  property,  such  as  ves 
sels  and  their  cargoes,  equally  protected  against  vio 
lation?  These,  even  within  the  jurisdiction  of  Great 
Britain,  are  left  open  to  seizure  and  sequestration,  if 
Great  Britain  shall  find  it  expedient ;  and  why  is  not 
property  on  the  high  seas,  under  the  protection  of  the 
law  of  nations,  which  is  said  to  be  a  part  of  the  law  of 
the  land,  made  secure  by  a  like  stipulation?  This 
would  have  given  a  face  of  equality  and  reciprocity  to 
the  bargain.  But  nothing  of  the  sort  makes  a  part  of 
it.  Where  Great  Britain  has  a  particular  interest  at 
stake,  the  treaty  watchfully  provides  for  it;  when  the 
United  States  have  an  equal  interest  at  stake,  and 
equally  entitled  to  protection,  it  is  abandoned  to  all 
the  dangers  which  it  has  experienced. 

Having  taken  this  brief  review  of  the  positive  evils 
in  this  part  of  the  treaty,  I  might  add  the  various  omis 
sions,  which  are  chargeable  upon  it :  but,  as  I  shall  not 
pretend  to  exhaust  the  subject,  I  will  mention  only  one, 
and  that  is,  the  utterly  neglecting  to  provide  for  the  ex 
hibition  of  sea  papers ;  and,  I  cannot  help  regarding 
this  omission  as  truly  extraordinary,  when  I  observe 
that  in  almost  every  modern  treaty,  and  particularly  in 
all  our  other  treaties,  an  article  on  this  subject  has 
been  regularly  inserted.  Indeed  it  has  become  almost 
an  article  of  course  in  the  treaties  of  the  present 
centurv. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  345 

I  shall  now,  sir,  consider  the  aspect  in  which  the 
commercial  articles  of  this  treaty  present  themselves 
for  consideration.  In  the  free  intercourse  stipulated 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  it  can 
not  be  pretended  that  any  advantage  is  gained  by  the 
former.  A  treaty  is  surely  not  necessary  to  induce 
Great  Britain  to  receive  our  raw  materials  and  to  sell 
us  her  manufactures.  Let  us,  on  the  other  hand,  con 
sider  what  is  given  up  by  the  United  States. 

It  is  well  known  that  when  our  government  came 
into  operation,  the  tonnage  of  America,  employed  in 
the  British  trade,  bore  a  very  inconsiderable  proportion 
to  the  British  tonnage.     There  being  nothing  on  our 
side  to  counteract  the  influence  of  capital  and  other 
circumstances  on  the  British  side,  that  disproportion 
was  the  natural  state  of  things.     As  some  small  ba 
lance  to  the  British  advantages,  and  particularly  that 
of  her  capital,  our  laws  have  made  several  regulations 
in  favor  of  our  shipping,  among  which  is  the  impor 
tant  encouragement  resulting  from  the  difference  of 
ten  per  centum  in  the  duties  paid  by  American  and  for 
eign  vessels.     Under  this  encouragement,  the  Ameri 
can  tonnage  has  increased  in  a  very  respectable  degree 
of  proportion  to  the  British  tonnage.     Great  Britain 
has  never  deemed  it  prudent  to  frustrate  or  diminish 
the  effects  of  this,  by  attempting  any  countervailing 
measures  for  her  shipping ;  being  aware,  no  doubt,  that 
we  could   easily  preserve  the  difference  by  further 
measures  on  our  side :  but  by  this  treaty,  she  has  re 
served  to  herself  the  right  to  take  such  countervailing 
measures  against   our  existing  regulations,  arid  we 
have  surrendered  our  right  to  pursue  further  defensive 
measures  against  the  influence  of  her  capital.    It  is 
justly  to  be  apprehended,  therefore,  that  under  such 
a  restoration  of  things  to  their  former  state,  the  Ame 
rican  tonnage  will  relapse  into  its  former  disproportion 
to  the  British  tonnage. 

Sir,  when  I  turn  my  attention  to  that  branch  of  the 
subject  which  relates  to  the  West  Indies,  I  see  still 
VOL.  i.  44 


346  MR,  MADISON'S   SPEECH  ON 

greater  cause  for  astonishment  and  dissatisfaction. 
As  the  treaty  now  stands,  Great  Britain  is  left  as  free, 
as  she  ever  has  been,  to  continue  to  herself  and  her 
shipping,  the  entire  monopoly  of  the  intercourse.  Re 
collecting,  as  I  do,  and  as  every  member  of  the  com 
mittee  must  do,  the  whole  history  of  this  subject,  from 
the  peace  of  1783,  through  every  subsequent  stage  of 
our  independence,  down  to  the  mission  of  the  late  envoy, 
I  find  it  impossible,  adequately  to  express  my  astonish 
ment,  that  any  treaty  of  commerce  should  ever  have 
been  acceded  to,  that  so  entirely  abandoned  the  very 
object  for  which  alone  such  a  treaty  could  have  been 
contemplated;  I  never  could  have  believed  that  the 
time  was  so  near,  when  all  the  principles,  claims  and 
calculations,  which  have  heretofore  prevailed  among 
all  classes  of  people,  in  every  part  of  the  union,  on 
this  interesting  point,  were  to  be  so  completely  re 
nounced.  A  treaty  of  commerce  with  Great  Britain, 
excluding  a  reciprocity  for  our  vessels  in  the  West  In 
dia  trade,  is  a  phenomenon  which  fills  me  with  more 
surprise  than  I  know  how  to  express. 

I  may  be  told,  perhaps,  that  in  the  first  place, 
Great  Britain  grants  to  no  other  nation  the  privilege 
granted  to  the  United  States  of  trading  at  all  with  her 
West  Indies,  and  that,  in  the  second  place,  this  is  an 
important  relaxation  of  the  colonial  system  establish 
ed  among  the  nations  of  Europe.  To  the  first  of 
these  observations,  I  reply,  that  no  other  nation  bears 
the  same  relation  to  the  West  Indies  as  the  United 
States ;  that  the  supplies  of  the  United  States  are  es 
sential  to  those  islands ;  and  that  the  trade  with  them 
has  been  permitted  purely  on  that  account,  and  not  as 
a  beneficial  privilege  to  the  United  States. 

To  the  second,  I  reply,  that  it  is  not  true,  that  the 
colony  system  requires  an  exclusion  of  foreign  vessels 
from  the  carrying  trade  between  the  colonies  and 
foreign  countries.  On  the  contrary,  the  principle  and 
practice  of  the  colony  system  are,  to  prohibit,  as  much 
as  may  be  convenient,  all  trade  between  the  colonies 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  347 


and  foreign  countries ;  but  when  such  a  trade  is  per 
mitted  at  all,  as  necessary  for  the  colonies,  then  to  al 
low  the  vessels  of  such  foreign  countries  a  reciprocal 
right  of  being  employed  in  the  trade.     Great  Britain 
has  accordingly  restrained  the  trade  of  her  islands  with 
this  country,  as  far  as  her  interest  in  them  will  permit. 
But,  has  she  allowed  our  vessels  the  reciprocal  right 
to  carry  on  the  trade  so  far  as  it  is  not  restrained  ? 
— No  such  thing.     Here  she  enforces  a  monopoly  in  her 
own  favor,  contrary  to  justice,  and  contrary  to  the  colo 
nial  system  of  every  European  nation  that  possesses  any 
colonies ;  none  of  whom,  without  a  single  exception, 
ever  open  a  trade  between  their  colonies  and  other 
countries,  without  opening  it  equally  to  vessels  on  both 
sides.     This  is  evidently  nothing  more  than  strict  jus 
tice.     A  colony  is  a  part  of  an  empire.     If  a  nation 
choose,  she  may  prohibit  all  trade  between  a  colony 
and  a  foreign  country,  as  she  may  between  any  other 
part  of  her  dominions  and  a  foreign  country ;  but  if  she 
permit  such  a  trade  at  all,  it  must  be  free  to  vessels  on 
both  sides,  as  well  in  the  case  of  colonies  as  of  any 
other  part  of  her  dominions.     Great  Britain  has  the 
same  right  to  prohibit  foreign  trade  between  London 
and  the  United  States,  as  between  Jamaica  and  the 
United  States ;  but  if  no  such  prohibition  be  made 
with  respect  to  either,  she  is  equally  bound  to  allow 
foreign  vessels  a  common  right  with  her  own  in  both. 
If  Great  Britain  were  to  say,  that .  no  trade  whatever 
should  be  carried  on  between  London  and  the  United 
States,  she  would  exercise  a  right  of  which  we  could 
not  reasonably  complain.     If  she  were  to  say,  that  no 
American  vessels  should  be  employed  in  the  trade,  it 
would  produce  just  complaints,  and  justify  a  recipro 
cal  regulation  as  to  her  vessels.     The  case  of  the  trade 
from  a  port  in  the  West  Indies  is  precisely  similar. 

In  order  that  the  omission  of  the  treaty  to  provide  a 
reciprocity  for  our  vessels  in  the  West  India  trade, 
may  be  placed  in  its  true  light,  it  will  be  proper  to  at 
tend  to  another  part  of  the  treaty,  which  ties  up  the 


MR.  MADISON'S   SPEECH  ON 

hands  of  this  country  against  every  effort  for  making 
it  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  to  yield  to  our  reasona 
ble  claims.  For  this  end  I  beg  leave  to  point  out  to 
the  committee  the  clause,  which  restrains  the  United 
States  from  imposing  prohibitions  or  duties  on  Great 
Britain,  in  any  case,  which  shall  not  extend  to  all  other 
nations,  and  to  observe,  that  the  clause  makes  it  impos 
sible  to  operate  on  the  unreasonable  policy  of  that 
nation,  without  suspending  our  commerce  at  the  same 
time  with  all  other  nations,  whose  regulations,  with  re 
spect  to  us,  may  be  ever  so  favorable  and  satisfactory. 

The  fifteenth  article,  Mr.  Chairman,  has  another 
extraordinary  feature,  which  I  should  imagine  must 
strike  every  observer.  In  other  treaties,  which  profess 
to  put  the  parties  on  the  footing  of  the  most  favored 
nation,  it  is  stipulated  that  where  new  favors  are  grant 
ed  to  a  particular  nation  in  return  for  favors  received, 
the  party  claiming  the  new  favor  shall  pay  the  price  of 
it.  This  is  just  and  proper  where  the  footing  of  the 
most  favored  nation  is  established  at  all.  But  this  ar 
ticle  gives  to  Great  Britain  the  full  benefit  of  all  privi 
leges  that  may  be  granted  to  any  other  nation,  without 
requiring  from  her  the  same  or  equivalent  privileges, 
with  those  granted  by  such  nation.  Hence  it  will 
happen,  that  if  Spain,  Portugal  or  France  shall  open 
their  colonial  ports  to  the  United  States,  in  considera 
tion  of  certain  privileges  in  our  trade,  the  same  privi 
leges  will  result  gratis  and  ipso  facto  to  Great  Bri 
tain.  This  stipulation,  sir,  I  consider  as  peculiarly  im 
politic,  and  such  an  one  as  cannot  fail  to  form,  in  the 
view  of  the  committee,  a  very  solid  and  weighty  ob 
jection  to  the  treaty. 

I  dare  say,  sir,  that  by  the  advocates  of  the  treaty 
great  stress  will  be  laid  on  the  article  relating  to  the 
East  Indies.  To  those  who  are  better  acquainted 
with  the  subject  than  I  can  pretend  to  be,  I  shall  resign 
the  task  of  examining  and  explaining  that  part  of  the 
subject.  With  two  observations,  however,  I  must 
trouble  the  committee,  before  I  drop  the  subject  of  this 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  349 

article ;  one  is,  that  some  gentlemen,  as  judicious  and 
well  informed,  as  any,  who  can  be  consulted,  declare 
that  they  consider  this  article  as  affording  not  a  sha 
dow  of  advantage  to  the  United  States.  The  other 
is,  that  no  privilege  is  stipulated  in  it,  which  has  not 
heretofore  been  uniformly  granted  without  stipulation ; 
and  as  the  grant  can  have  proceeded  from  no  motive 
but  a  pure  regard  to  the  British  interest  in  that  coun 
try,  there  was  every  reasonable  security  that  the  trade 
would  continue  open  as  it  had  been,  under  the  same 
consideration. 

Such,  Mr.  Chairman,  being  the  character  of  this 
treaty,  with  respect  to  the  execution  of  the  treaty  of 
peace,  the  great  principles  of  the  law  of  nations,  and 
the  regulations  of  commerce,  it  never  can  be  viewed  as 
having  any  claim  to  be  carried  into  effect  on  its  own 
account.     Is  there  then  any  consideration,  extraneous 
to  the  treaty,  that  can  furnish  the  requisite  motives  ? 
On  this  part  of  the  subject  the  house  is  wholly  without 
information.     For  myself,  I  am  ready  to  declare,  that 
I  have  neither  seen,  nor  known,  nor  heard,  of  any  cir 
cumstances  in  the  general  posture  of  affairs,  or  in  the 
particular  relations  of  this  country  to  them,  that  can 
account  for  the  unequal  and  injurious  arrangements, 
which  we  are  now  called  upon  for  laws  to  execute. 
But  there  is  something  further  to  be  taken  into  ac 
count.     The   continuance  of  the  spoliations  on  our 
trade,  and  the  impressment  of  our  seamen,  whether 
to  be  understood  as  practical  comments  on  the  treaty, 
or  as  infractions  of  it,  cannot  but  enforce  on  the  minds 
of  the  committee  the  most  serious  reflections.    And 
here,  sir,  I  beg  leave  to  refer  once  more  to  the  passage 
I  have  already  read,  extracted  from  the  letter  of  Mr. 
Jefferson  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  and  to  ask  if,  as  there  stat 
ed  by  the  executive,  our  neutrality  and  peace  are  to 
be  exposed,  by  permitting  practices  of  that  kind,  what 
must  be  thought  of  our  giving  effect,  in  the  midst  of 
such  practices,  to  a  treaty  from  which  a  countenance 
may  be  derived  by  that  nation  for  going  on  further 
with  them? 


350  MR,  MADISON'S  SPEECH  OK 

I  am  aware  that  the  executive,  notwithstanding  the 
doctrine  and  policy  laid  down  as  above,  has  finally  con 
curred  in  the  treaty  under  all  these  circumstances. 
But  I  do  not  consider  that  as  invalidating  the  reason 
ing  drawn  from  the  present  state  of  things.     I  may  be 
treading  on  delicate  ground,  but  I  cannot  think  it  im 
proper  to  remark,  because  it  is  a  known  fact,  that  the 
executive  paused  for  some  weeks  after  the  concur 
rence  of  the  senate,  before  he  ratified  the  treaty  with 
his  signature ;  and  I  think  it  may  fairly  be  presumed, 
that  the  true  grounds  of  that  pause  were  the  renewal 
of  spoliation,  and  a  recollection  of  the  light  in  which 
they  had  been  represented ;  that,  on  that  supposition, 
he  was  probably  influenced  in  signing  the  treaty  when 
he  did,  by  an  expectation  that  such  a  mark  of  confi 
dence  in  the  British  government  would  produce  an 
abolition  of  the  unlawful  proceeding,  and  consequent 
ly,  if  it  were  foreseen  that  the  spoliations  would  have 
been  continued,  as  we  find  them  to  be,  the  treaty  would 
not  have  been  then  signed,  or  if  it  had  not  been  then 
signed,  it  would  not  be  signed   under  the  circum 
stances  of  the  moment,  when  it  falls  under  our  con 
sideration. 

I  shall  conclude,  Mr.  Chairman,  with  taking  notice 
of  two  considerations,  which  have  been  made  great  use 
of  by  way  of  inducing  Congress  to  carry  the  treaty  into 
effect.     In  the  first  place,  it  has  been  said,  that  the 
greater  part  of  the  treaty  is  to  continue  in  force  for  no 
longer  time  than  two  years  after  the  termination  of 
the  present  war  in  Europe ;  arid  that  no  very  great 
evils  can  grow  out  of  it  in  that  short  period.     To  this 
I  reply,  that  ten  of  the  articles,  containing  very  objec 
tionable  stipulations,  are  perpetual ;  and  that,  in  the 
next  place,  it  will  be  in  the  power  of  Great  Britain,  at 
the  expiration  of  the  other   articles,  to  produce  the 
same  causes  for  the  renewal  of  them,  as  are  now  urg 
ed  in  their  support.     If  we  are  now  to  enforce  the 
treaty,  lest  Great  Britain  should  stir  up  the  Indians,  and 
refuse  to  pay  our  merchants  for  the  property  of  which 
she  has  plundered  them,  can  she  not,  at  the  end  of  two 


THE  BRITISH   TREATY.  351 

or  three  years,  plunder  them  again,  to  the  same  or  a 
greater  amount  ?  Cannot  the  same  apprehensions  be 
revived  with  respect  to  the  Indians,  and  will  not  the  ar 
guments  then  be  as  strong  as  they  are  now,  for  renew 
ing  the  same  treaty,  or  for  making  any  other  equal 
sacrifices  that  her  purposes  may  dictate  ? 

It  has  been  asked — what  will  be  the  consequences 
of  refusing  to  carry  the  treaty  into  effect  ?  I  answer, 
that  the  only  supposable  consequence  is,  that  the  ex 
ecutive,  if  governed  by  the  prudence  and  patriotism, 
which  I  do  not  doubt  will  govern  that  department,  will 
of  course  pursue  the  measures  most  likely  to  obtain 
a  reconsideration  and  remodification  of  the  offensive 
parts  of  the  treaty.  The  idea  of  war  as  a  consequence 
of  refusing  to  give  effect  to  the  treaty,  is  too  visionary 
and  incredible  to  be  admitted  into  the  question.  No 
man  will  say  that  the  United  States,  if  they  be  really 
an  independent  people,  have  not  a  right  to  judge  of  their 
own  interests,  and  to  decline  any  treaty  that  does  riot 
duly  provide  for  them.  A  refusal,  therefore,  in  such 
cases,  can  afford  no  cause,  nor  pretext,  nor  provoca 
tion  for  war,  or  for  any  just  resentment.  But,  apart 
from  this,  is  it  conceivable  that  Great  Britain,  with  all 
the  dangers  and  embarrassments  that  are  thickening 
on  her,  will  wantonly  make  war  on  a  country,  which  is 
the  best  market  she  has  in  the  world  for  her  manufac 
tures,  which  pays  her  an  annual  balance,  in  specie,  of 
ten  or  twelve  millions  of  dollars,  and  whose  supplies, 
moreover,  are  essential  to  an  important  part  of  her 
dominions  ?  Such  a  degree  of  infatuation  ought  not 
to  be  ascribed  to  any  country.  And,  at  the  present 
crisis,  for  reasons  well  known,  an  unprovoked  war  from 
Great  Britain,  on  this  country,  would  argue  a  degree 
of  madness,  greater  than  any  other  circumstances  that 
can  well  be  imagined. 

With  all  the  objections,  therefore,  to  the  treaty, 
which  I  have  stated,  I  hope  it  will  not  now  be  carried 
into  effect,  and  that  an  opportunity  will  take  place  for 
reconsidering  the  subject,  on  principles  more  just  and 
favorable  to  the  United  States. 


•'- 

: 


SPEECH  OF  WILLIAM  B.  GILES. 


ON 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY, 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OP  REPRESENTATIVES  OP  THE  UNITED 
STATES,    APRIL    18,    1796. 


In  committee  of  the  whole  on  the  following  Resolution,  Resolved, 
as  the  opinion  of  this  committee,  that  it  is  expedient  to  pass  the 
laws  necessary  for  carrying  into  effect  the  treaty  with  Great 
Britain :  Mr.  Giles  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

IT  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  all  the  information 
xvhich  could  throw  light  upon  the  subject  of  discussion, 
should  not  be  before  the  committee.  A  sense  of  re 
sponsibility  arising  from  the  peculiarly  delicate  nature 
of  the  question,  has  induced  the  House  to  take  every 
step  with  more  than  a  common  degree  of  caution. 
Before  we  proceeded  to  deliberate  upon  the  expedi 
ency  or  inexpediency  of  providing  for  carrying  the 
treaty  into  effect,  we  made  a  request  to  the  Presi 
dent  for  the  papers  which  attended  the  negociation. 
This  request  has  been  refused ;  not  because  the  call 
itself  contained  any  thing  unconstitutional;  not  be 
cause  the  contents  of  the  papers  called  for  are  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  render  the  disclosure  thereof  at 
this  time  improper — neither  of  these  causes  being  inti 
mated  in  the  message — but  because,  principles  were 
advocated  by  individual  gentlemen  in  the  course  of 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY. 

the  argument  inducing  the  call,  which  the  President 
thought  not  warranted  by  the  constitution.  I  do  not 
propose  to  animadvert  upon  the  conduct  of  the  Execu 
tive,  in  departing  from  the  resolution  itself,  and  in  notic 
ing  the  arguments  of  individual  members ;  nor  upon 
any  other  part  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Executive  rela 
tive  to  the  call  of  the  House  and  his  refusal.  I  only 
mean  to  remark,  that  being  perfectly  convinced  of  the 
propriety  of  the  call  itself,  of  the  utility  of  the  informa 
tion  embraced  by  it ;  and  not  being  satisfied,  by  the 
arguments  of  the  President,  of  the  propriety  of  with 
holding  the  papers  called  for,  I  should  myself  have  been 
willing  to  have  suspended  all  further  proceedings  re 
specting  the  provision  for  the  treaty,  until  the  papers 
should  be  laid  before  the  House.  I  would  have  firmly 
placed  myself  on  that  ground ;  and  in  that  position 
hazarded  my  responsibility.  The  extreme  sensibility 
excited  on  the  public  mind  by  the  agitation  of  the 
treaty  question,  I  had  supposed,  would  have  furnished 
an  irresistible  argument  in  favor  of  complying  with  the 
request  of  the  House;  provided  no  inconvenience 
would  have  attended  the  disclosure ;  and  in  my  opin 
ion,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  House 
would  have  been  completely  justified  in  suspending  all 
further  proceedings  upon  the  question  of  providing  for 
the  treaty,  until  they  received  that  information  which 
they  deemed  necessary,  to  guide  their  deliberations. 
But  as  the  House  has  thought  proper  to  take  a  differ 
ent  course,  and  has  proceeded  to  the  consideration  of 
the  question,  with  such  lights  as  they  possess,  I  will 
explain  the  motives  which  will  probably  finally  influence 
my  vote. 

I  shall  discuss  the  subject  in  two  points  of  view. 
I  will  first  examine  the  contents  of  the  treaty  itself,  and 
then  the  probable  consequences  of  refusing,  or  of  giv 
ing  it  efficacy. 

In  examining  the  contents  of  the  instrument  itself, 
I  propose  to  go  through  it,  article  by  article,  unless  the 
task  prescribed  to  myself  should  exceed  the  bounds 

VOL.  i.  45 


354  MR-  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

usually  allowed  to  members  for  the  delivery  of  their 
sentiments.  1  shall  do  this,  because  I  wish  to  treat 
the  subject  with  the  utmost  candor,  and  to  avoid  any 
possible  imputation  of  intending  to  exhibit  the  bad, 
and  avoid  the  good  parts  of  the  treaty,  if  any  such 
there  are.  I  mean,  however,  to  state  merely  the  pur 
port  of  many  of  the  articles,  without  any  animadver 
sion,  and  to  dwell  only  upon  such  as  appear  to  me  to 
be  the  most  material. 

The  first  object  of  the  negociation  respects  the  in- 
cxecution  of  the  treaty  of  peace. 

The  preamble  professes  to  wave  the  respective  com 
plaints  and  pretensions  of  the  parties,  as  to  the  inexe- 
cution  of  the  former  treaty,  and  of  course  establishes 
a  principle,  as  the  basis  of  the  present  treaty,  that 
either  both  parties  Avere  equally  culpable  or  equally 
blameless,  in  respect  to  the  inexecution  of  the  treaty 
of  peace.  I  do  not  mean  to  remark  upon  the  propriety 
or  impropriety  of  this  admission  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States.  I  will  observe,  however,  and  I  think  with  great 
force,  that  the  stipulations  in  the  present  treaty  do  not 
correspond  with  the  principle  professed  as  its  basis. 

On  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  two  articles  have  been 
unexecuted — the  restoration  of  certain  property  in  pos 
session  of  the  British  at  the  close  of  the  war,  and  the 
surrender  of  the  Western  posts.  On  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  one  article  is  said  to  remain  unfulfilled  ; 
it  respects  the  promise,  that  no  legal  impediments 
should  be  thrown  in  the  way  of  the  recovery  of  debts 
due  to  British  subjects. 

The  claim  of  compensation  for  the  property  carried 
away  in  contravention  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  is  wholly 
abandoned,  and  the  value  of  the  surrender  of  the 
posts  very  much  lessened,  by  the  annexation  of  condi 
tions  which  made  no  part  of  the  stipulations  of  surren 
der  in  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  United  States  are 
more  than  bound  to  fulfil  the  article  heretofore  unfulfill 
ed  by  them;  for,  instead  of  continuing  the  courts  open 
for  the  recoverv  of  debts  in  the  usual  wav.  as  was  the 


THE  BRITISH  TKEATV. 

promise  in  the  treaty  of  peace,  they  are  made  to  as 
sume  the  payment  of  all  debts,  interests  and  damages 
in  cases  of  insolvencies,  and  a  mode  of  adjustment  is 
proposed  for  ascertaining  the  amount,  which  furnishes 
the  greatest  latitude  for  frauds  against  the  United 
States  which  could  be  devised.  This  will  appear  in 
the  further  examination  of  the  subject.  Hence  it  is 
obvious,  that  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  abandon 
the  very  principle  of  adjustment  assumed  by  a  gentle 
man  from  Connecticut,  (Mr.  Swift,)  in  replying  to  a. 
remark  to  this  effect,  made  by  a  gentleman  from  Vir 
ginia  :  he  observed,  that  he  believed  if  an  inquiry 
were  to  be  made  into  the  first  breach  of  the  treaty  of 
peace,  it  would  not  issue  favorably  to  the  United 
States ;  and  he  proceeded  to  argue  upon  the  presump 
tion,  that  the  first  breach  was  properly  imputable  to 
the  United  States.  I  think  it  requires  very  strong  as 
surances  to  justify  an  imputation  of  this  sort  against  the 
United  States,  such  as  I  believe  the  present  occasion 
does  not  afford.  In  the  first  place,  the  treaty  itself 
disavows  the  imputation ;  all  claims  and  pretensions 
arising  from  the  first  breach  are  disclaimed ;  of  course 
it  is  unnecessary,  if  not  improper,  to  defend  the  treaty 
on  a  ground  disclaimed  by  itself. 

But  upon  what  ground  does  the  gentleman  place 
his  admission  of  the  first  breach  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
upon  the  United  States  ?  The  gentleman  denies  the 
uniform  construction,  put  upon  the  article  for  the  re 
storation  of  certain  property  which  was  carried  away 
from  the  United  States  at  the  close  of  the  war,  and 
asserts,  that  the  article  never  was  intended  to  bear 
that  construction.  If  the  gentleman  can  establish  his 
assertion,  and  extend  it  to  the  other  article,  unfulfilled 
by  Great  Britain,  he  may  probably  establish  his  po 
sition. 

I  will  first  premise,  that  if  the  article  does  not  in 
tend  the  restoration  of  property  mentioned  in  it,  the 
insertion  of  it  in  the  treaty  is  not  only  unnecessary, 


356  MR.   GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

but  mischievous ;  as  it  will  necessarily  produce  em 
barrassment  to  the  parties  to  the  instrument. 

The  British  army,  at  the  termination  of  the  war, 
was  at  New- York ;  the  negroes,  which  constitute  the 
species  of  property  in  question,  are  in  the   southern 
states,  so  that  if  the  article  does  not  include  that  spe 
cies  of  property  taken  in  the  course  of  the  war,  and  in 
the  possession  of  the  British  at  the  close  of  it,  it  is 
worse  than  nonsense.     It  never  could  have  been  sup 
posed,  that  upon  the  first  dawn  of  peace,  the  British 
would  have  left  New  York  and  invaded  the  southern 
country,  for  the  purpose  of  plundering  the  inhabitants 
of  their  negroes.     The  peace  article  itself  was  a  suffi 
cient  security  against  this  conduct,  and  of  course  no 
specific  provision  could  have  been  necessary  for  that 
purpose.     This  is  not  only  the  uniform  construction  of 
the  article  by  the  United  States,  but,  as  I  always  have 
understood  and  believed,  Great  Britain  has  acquiesced 
in  the  construction,  until  the  negociation  of  the  pre 
sent  treaty.     As  an  evidence  of  these  facts,  I  will  ob 
serve,  that  American  commissioners  were  permitted 
to  make  a  list  of  the  negroes  in  the  possession  of  the 
British  at  the  close  of  the  war,  by  the  British  com 
mander  ;  that  the  list  was  entered  upon  the  files  of 
Congress;    that  there   are  resolutions   of  Congress 
claiming  compensation  for  the  property  carried  away 
in  contravention  of  that  article  in  the  treaty  of  peace, 
perhaps  without  even  the  intimation  of  a  doubt  as  to 
the  construction:  that  during  the  administration  of 
lord  Carmarthen,  I  have  always  understood,  that  the 
claim  of  compensation  for  property  carried  away,  was 
admitted,    whenever  British  subjects  were   indemni 
fied  for  the  debts  due  to  them  from  citizens  of  the 
United  States.     But  here  I  have  to  regret  the  want  of 
the  papers  called  for  by  this  House,  as  they  contain  all 
the  evidence  upon  which  this  important  fact  depends. 
Hence  it  appears  that  Great  Britain  herself  yield 
ed  her  assent  to  this  construction,  and  ought  not  to 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  357 

have  been  permitted  to  withdraw  it  afterwards.  These 
circumstances  seem  to  me  to  be  conclusive,  and 
ingenuity  itself  would  pause  for  arguments  against 
facts  so  stubborn  and  irresistible. 

The  gentleman  from  Connecticut,  has  said,  that  he 
thinks  the  present  treaty  as  good  an  one,  as  the  United 
States  had  any  right  to  expect.  If  the  United  States 
were  as  flagitious  with  respect  to  the  inexecution  of 
the  treaty  of  peace,  as  the  gentleman  supposes,  and 
Great  Britain  as  blameless,  I  would  acknowledge  that 
the  mode  of  adjustment  has  inflicted  upon  them  a  just 
punishment  for  their  criminal  conduct.  This,  howev 
er,  is  but  a  negative  compliment  to  the  treaty,  and  can 
be  gratifying  only  to  those  who  concur  with  the  gen 
tleman  in  the  imputation  thrown  upon  the  United 
States.  But  it  can  afford  no  consolation  to  those, 
who  contend,  that  Great  Britain  has  been  at  least  as 
culpable  as  the  United  States,  and  particularly  when 
they  reflect  that  the  present  treaty  itself  professes  to 
disavow  the  imputation. 

But  even  if  the  imputation  is  conceded,  it  would 
have  been  but  reasonable,  to  have  confined  the  pun 
ishment  to  the  new  adjustment  of  the  articles  unfulfill 
ed,  without  extending  it  to  a  train  of  humiliating  and 
imperious  commercial  concessions,  which  are  alto 
gether  unconnected  with  the  subject,  and  not  war 
ranted  by  necessity. 

The  first  article  of  the  treaty,  is  declaratory  of  peace, 
&c.  between  the  two  countries,  which  is  a  very  desira 
ble  thing,  provided  it  can  be  established  upon  princi 
ples  compatible  with  the  national  honor  and  the  na 
tional  interests.  The  second  and  third  articles  con 
tain  the  stipulations  for  the  surrender  of  the  western 
posts,  and  the  conditions  accompanying  the  surrender. 

The  surrender  of  the  western  posts,  would  be  an 
extremely  desirable  object,  if  conformably  with  the 
treaty  of  peace,  it  were  unattended  with  any  conditions. 

I  am  desirous  of  giving  credit  to  every  part  of  the 
instrument  which  will  admit  of  it,  and  am  not  dispos- 


358  MR.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

ed  to  exaggerate  its  imperfections.  I  am  willing  to 
admit,  that  the  surrender  of  the  posts,  even  with  the 
conditions  annexed,  is  of  some  importance ;  but  I  will 
assert,  that  the  surrender  loses  a  great  portion  of  its 
value  to  the  United  States,  in  consequence  of  the  con 
ditions  attached  to  it.  Two  objects  of  primary  impor 
tance  were  to  be  effected  by  the  unqualified  surrender 
of  the  posts.  The  one  was  to  obtain  the  influence 
over  the  Indians  in  their  neighborhood,  which  the  Bri 
tish  now  possess.  The  other,  the  participation,  at 
least,  in  the  fur  trade  carried  on  with  those  Indians. 
The  conditions  accompanying  the  surrender,  will,  in 
my  opinion,  very  much  impede  the  one,  and  complete 
ly  defeat  the  other  object. 

The  stipulation  in  the  second  article,  which  autho 
rizes  British  subjects,  now  living  within  the  precincts 
or  jurisdiction  of  the  posts,  still  to  continue  to  reside 
there,  with  the  free  use  of  their  property,  and  to  elect 
either  to  remain  British  subjects,  or  become  American 
citizens  at  pleasure,  will,  in  my  opinion,  very  much  im 
pede,  if  not  wholly  obstruct,  the  salutary  influence  of 
the  United  States,  over  the  numerous  tribes  of  Indians 
in  that  quarter ;  which  is  one  great  object  hoped  for 
from  the  possession  of  those  posts.  The  effects  of  this 
stipulation  will  appear  more  obvious,  when  it  is  com 
pared  with  the  stipulations  in  the  next  article,  by  which 
the  trade  with  the  Indians  is  regulated.  The  second 
object,  to  wit,  the  participation  in  the  fur  trade,  I  be 
lieve  will  be  completely  defeated  by  the  regulation  of 
that  trade  in  the  third  article.  That  article  stipulates 
an  equality  of  duties  between  American  citizens  and 
British  subjects,  a  free  communication  through  that 
country,  upon  an  equality  of  portages  and  ferriages. 
These  conditions,  in  my  opinion,  will  secure  a  com 
plete  monopoly  of  the  fur  trade  to  Great  Britain ;  be 
cause  the  superiority  of  the  British  capital  employed 
in  that  trade,  and  the  inferiority  of  duties,  paid  upon 
goods  imported  for  that  trade  into  Canada,  will,  in  my 
judgment,  wholly  exclude  American  citizens  from  a 


THE  BRITISH  TREAT!',  359 

participation  in  that  trade  through  any  channel  in  the 
United  States.  The  United  States  have  no  mode  left 
to  counteract  this  monopoly,  but  by  a  system  of  draw 
backs,  which  appear  to  me,  from  the  nature  of  the 
trade  and  country,  to  be  almost  impracticable ;  or  if 
not  absolutely  impracticable,  it  will  compel  us  to  pur 
chase  the  trade  at  a  price  greater  than  it  is  worth.  It 
appears  to  me,  that  Great  Britain  foresaw  these  con 
sequences,  and  that  these  articles  are  as  well  calculat 
ed  to  produce  them,  and  to  obstruct  the  views  of  the 
United  States,  as  sagacity  itself  could  have  devised. 
Hence  it  appears  to  me,  that  the  value  of  an  unquali 
fied  surrender  of  the  posts,  is  very  much  lessened  by 
the  accompanying  conditions.  The  gentleman  from 
Connecticut,  observed,  that  tho  surrender  of  the  posts 
was  absolute,  and  that  no  conditions  were  annexed  to 
it.  It  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  say,  that  his  observa 
tion  is  a  mere  criticism  upon  terms.  If  they  be  not 
conditions  of  the  surrender,  they  are  accompanying 
engagements,  and  are  to  be  executed,  with  good  faith, 
by  the  United  States. 

The  fourth  and  fifth  articles  relate  merely  to  the  as 
certainment  of  the  boundary  line,  and  therefore  I  shall 
pass  over  them  without  comment. 

The  sixth  article  is,  in  my  judgment,  highly  objec 
tionable.  This  article  assumes  the  payment  of  all 
debts,  interests  and  damages,  due  from  American  citi 
zens  to  British  subjects,  previous  to  the  revolution,  in 
all  cases  where  insolvencies  have  ensued,  and  where 
legal  impediments  to  the  recovery  of  the  debts  have 
existed.  I  will  remark,  that  this  is  an  assumption  of 
debt  by  the  public,  which  they  do  not  owe,  and  never 
promised  to  pay,  and  that  it  is  bettering  the  condition 
of  the  British  creditor  under  the  treaty  of  peace,  with 
out  any  obligation  on  the  United  States  to  do  so.  As 
amongst  the  fashionable  calumnies  of  the  day,  this 
article  has  been  a  fertile  source  of  misrepresenta 
tion  against  the  state  I  have  the  honor  to  represent, 
J  am  anxious  to  place  this  subject  in  its  true  light : 


360  MR.  GILES*  SPEECH  ON 

and  as  I  profess  to  be  well  acquainted  with  it,  I  hope 
to  be  indulged  with  some  minutice  of  explanation. 
This  subject  presents  two  aspects  to  the  public ;  the 
one,  as  it  respects  states,  the  other,  as  it  respects  the 
individuals  of  the  United  States.  As  to  the  first,  1  ad 
mit,  that  if  a  greater  proportion  of  debts  of  this  de 
scription  are  due  from  Virginia  than  from  other  states, 
(which  has  not,  however,  been  ascertained,  and  which, 
I  doubt,)  in  the  same  proportion  as  a  state,  Virginia 
would  receive  an  advantage  over  the  rest  of  the  states, 
by  a  common  assumption  of  the  debts ;  but  as  it  re 
spects  the  individuals  of  that  state,  who  are  not  debt 
ors,  they  stand  precisely  upon  the  same  footing  with 
individuals  in  the  other  states,  because  they  are,  in 
common  with  others,  to  contribute  to  the  payment  of 
debts  which  they  never  owed.  It  is  of  very  little  con 
solation  to  them,  that  they  live  in  the  neighborhood  of 
those,  whose  debts  they  are  to  contribute  to  pay ;  for 
propinquity  or  distance  can  make  no  difference  in  the 
state  of  interest  between  the  individuals,  who  do  not 
owe,  but  who  are  to  contribute  to  pay.  As  a  very 
small  proportion  of  the  inhabitants  of  Virginia  come 
under  this  description  of  debtors,  the  phenomenon  of 
an  opposition  of  that  state  to  this  particular  article,  is 
thus  explained. 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  this  article  contains  no 
limits  as  to  the  amount  of  debts  assumed  by  it,  nor 
are  there  any  precise  data  furnished  for  calculation. 
But  it  has  been  said,  that  if  the  debts  be  due,  they 
ought  to  be  paid,  be  the  amount  what  it  may.  Gen 
tlemen  should  reflect,  that  the  amount  will  depend 
very  much  upon  the  mode  of  adjustment,  and  that  the 
mode  adopted  by  the  treaty,  is  the  most  objectionable 
that  can  be  devised. 

The  principle  established  for  the  adjustment  of  the 
debts,  instead  of  preserving  the  conflicting  interests  of 
debtor  and  creditor,  will  produce  a  complete  union  of 
interests;  and  of  course,  will  furnish  the  greatest 
temptations  to  frauds  against  the  United  States  from 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  361 

both  debtor  and  creditor.  Hence  the  amount  of  debts 
assumed  by  the  United  States,  will  probably  be  great 
ly  increased  beyond  what  would  be  the  amount,  if  the 
debtor  and  creditor  were  left  to  the  ordinary  course  of 
judicial  proceedings  to  adjust  their  own  differences 
under  the  principle  of  opposing  interests.  To  entitle 
the  creditor  to  a  claim  upon  the  United  States,  it  is  ne 
cessary  for  him  first  to  establish  his  demand  against 
his  debtor,  and  then  to  show  that  his  debtor  was  sol 
vent  at  the  commencement  of  the  late  war,  has  since 
become  insolvent,  and  that  some  legal  impediment  has 
intervened  to  prevent  the  recovery  of  the  debt.  Hence 
it  becomes  the  interest  of  both  debtor  and  creditor,  to 
establish  these  facts ;  because  the  debtor  will  be  reliev 
ed  from  his  debt,  by  the  assumption  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  claim  of  the  creditor  will  be  transferred 
from  the  individual  to  the  United  States,  which  he 
will  in  all  cases  prefer,  particularly  as  the  assistance 
of  the  debtor  will  often  become  necessary  to  facilitate 
the  establishment  of  the  debt.  This  is  the  natural 
operation  of  the  union  of  interest,  produced  by  the  as 
sumption  of  the  debts  by  the  United  States,  and  there 
is  more  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  it,  from  the 
impossibility  of  checking  it  by  any  vigilance  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States,  and  from  the  peculiar  cir 
cumstances  attending  these  debts. 

The  greatest  proportion  of  debts  remaining  unpaid* 
I  believe,  stand  upon  open  accounts.  In  many  cases, 
when  the  debts  were  evidenced  by  specialties,  pay 
ments  have  been  obtained,  either  by  the  usual  course 
of  judicial  process,  or  by  compromise  between  the  par 
ties.  There  are  two  circumstances,  attending  the 
open  accounts,  which  will  give  great  scope  to  frau 
dulent  combinations  between  the  debtor  and  creditor. 
The  one  respects  the  evidence,  the  other  the  substan 
tial  causes  of  difference  in  the  accounts  of  the  creditor 
and  debtor.  In  the  reign  of  George  the  II.,  an  act 
was  passed  for  the  more  easy  recovery  of  debts  due  to 
his  majesty's  subjects,  from  his  majesty's  plantations 

VOL.  i,  46 


362  MR.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

in  America.  This  act  authorized  the  merchant,  resid 
ing  in  Great  Britain,  to  establish  his  debt  against  a  co 
lonist,  by  affidavits,  taken  before  the  commencement 
of  the  suit,  and  authenticated  in  the  usual  mode.  This 
deprived  the  defendant  of  all  opportunity  of  cross  exa 
mination,  so  essential  to  the  discovery  of  truth,  and 
the  jury  of  all  knowledge  of  the  character  and  credibili 
ty  of  the  deponent. 

In  Virginia,  the  affidavits,  taken  in  pursuance  of  this 
act,  have  been  deemed  incompetent  to  the  establish 
ment  of  the  debt,  because  the  act  itself  destroys  the 
very  nature  and  properties  of  evidence.  Hence,  in  all 
disputed  claims,  founded  upon  this  act,  judgments 
have  been  rendered  for  the  defendants.  If  this  should 
be  deemed  a  legal  impediment  to  the  recovery,  this 
whole  description  of  debts  will  probably  come  under 
the  description  of  debts  assumed.  The  words  used  in 
the  treaty  were  calculated,  in  my  opinion,  with  a  view 
to  this  construction,  and  must  have  been  dictated  by 
persons,  better  informed  of  the  nature  of  this  business 
than  I  presume  the  envoy  extraordinary  of  the  United 
States  could  have  been.  The  words  alluded  to  are  the 
following :  "  The  said  commissioners,  in  examining 
the  complaints  and  applications  so  preferred  to  them, 
are  empowered  and  required,  in  pursuance  of  the  true 
intent  and  meaning  of  this  article,  to  take  into  their 
consideration  all  claims,  whether  of  principal  or  in 
terest,  or  balance  of  principal  and  interest,  and 
to  determine  the  same  respectively,  according  to 
the  merits  of  the  several  cases,  due  regard  being 
had  to  all  the  circumstances  thereof,  and  as  equity 
and  justice  shall  appear  to  them  to  require.  And  the 
said  commissioners  shall  have  power  to  examine  all 
such  persons,  as  shall  come  before  them,  on  oath  or  af 
firmation,  touching  the  premises ;  and  also  to  receive 
in  evidence,  according  as  they  may  think  most  consis 
tent  with  equity  and  justice,  all  written  depositions,  or 
books,  or  papers,  or  copies,  or  extracts  thereof,  every 
such  deposition,  book,  or  paper,  or  copy,  or  extract. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  3(33 

being  duly  authenticated,  either  according  to  the  legal 
forms  now  respectively  existing  in  the  two  countries, 
or  in  such  other  manner  as  the  said  commissioners 
shall  see  cause  to  require  or  allow." 

The  other  circumstances  arise  from  the  nature  of 
the  remittances.  These  are  generally  made  in  tobac 
co.  The  sales  of  this  article  are  entrusted  solely  to 
the  merchant,  residing  in  Great  Britain ;  and  the  Ame 
rican  shipper  has  no  check  whatever  upon  the  mer 
chant,  making  the  sale.  Upon  rendering  these  ac 
counts,  the  tobacco  is  often  set  down  at  a  price  very 
inferior  to  the  average  price  of  that  article  in  Europe, 
at  the  time  of  making  the  sale.  A  great  number  of  con 
troversies  have  taken  place  upon  this  ground,  which 
remain  unsettled ;  but,  if  the  United  States  shall  as 
sume  the  debts  of  the  individuals  thus  circumstanced, 
they  will  have  no  inducement  to  contest  these  ac 
counts  in  a  course  of  judicial  proceedings,  and  the  pro 
mise  of  exoneration  from  the  creditor,  will  often  in 
duce  the  debtor  to  facilitate  the  establishment  of  the 
claims  against  the  United  States.  I  have  not  overlook 
ed  the  clause  in  this  article  of  the  treaty,  which  compels 
an  assignment  of  the  claim  from  the  creditor  to  the 
United  States ;  but  that  will  have  little  or  no  operation 
to  check  the  practice  invited  by  this  article,  because, 
the  debtor  is  presumed  to  be  insolvent  before  the  as 
signment  is  to  be  made,  and  I  believe  the  United 
States  will  be  but  unsuccessful  collectors  from  insol 
vent  debtors. 

From  these  circumstances  I  conclude,  that  this  as 
sumption  of  debt,  without  any  obligation  for  so  doing, 
is  extremely  improper,  particularly  when  it  is  recol 
lected,  that  this  article  sweeps  away  all  acts  of  limita 
tion,  and  relates  to  the  whole  extensive  scene  of  busi 
ness,  carried  on  in  the  United  States,  from  the  ex 
tremes  of  New  Hampshire  to  the  extremes  of  Georgia, 
for  an  unlimited  time  before  the  revolution.  If  I  were 
to  make  a  conjecture  as  to  the  amount,  it  would  be  a 
loose  one,  but  if  I  were  to  choose  between  indemnifica- 


364  MR.  GILES'   SPEECH  ON 

tion  to  the  American  merchants  for  recent  spoliations, 
committed  upon  their  commerce,  or  the  payment  of 
these  debts,  I  should  not  hesitate  to  prefer  the  first 
alternative ;  because,  to  that  there  are  known  limits  ; 
to  the  other,  there  are  not,  nor  any  data  for  calculation 
under  the  mode  of  adjustment  prescribed  by  the  treaty. 
I  therefore  caution  gentlemen  against  the  assumption 
of  this  unascertained  debt ;  for  I  believe  it  will  be  at 
tended  with  a  responsibility,  which  they  cannot  answer 
to  their  constituents,  nor  will  the  responsibility  be  al 
leviated  by  the  recollection  of  the  merits  of  the  indi 
viduals  for  whose  benefit  it  is  made.  The  increase  of 
the  debt  of  the  United  States,  by  these  artificial  means, 
without  any  obligation  to  do  so,  I  think  highly  ob 
jectionable. 

The  seventh  article  of  the  treaty  promises  compen 
sation  for  the  spoliations,  committed  upon  American 
commerce,  in  the  course  of  the  present  war.  This 
would  be  a  very  desirable  object,  if  it  could  be  obtain 
ed  ;  but,  when  I  observe,  that  before  compensation  is 
to  be  obtained,  a  process  is  to  be  had  in  the  admiralty 
courts  of  Great  Britain,  and  that  the  amount  will  de 
pend  very  much  upon  the  temper  of  those  courts,  I 
doubt  whether  this  boasted  article  will  not  dwindle 
down  into  very  little  importance.  I  shall  only  observe 
further,  that  the  merchants,  for  whose  benefit  this  ar 
ticle  was  more  immediately  intended,  and  who  have 
petitioned  Congress  to  make  provision  for  carrying 
the  treaty  into  effect,  seem  not  to  rely  implicitly  upon 
the  provision  upon  this  subject ;  because,  in  every  me 
morial,  they  have  held  up  the  expectation  of  ultimate 
indemnification  from  the  United  States. 

The  eighth  article  points  out  the  mode  of  paying  the 
commissioners,  to  be  appointed  under  the  treaty — to 
which  I  have  no  objection. 

The  phraseology  of  the  ninth  article  is  somewhat 
curious,  and  the  object  I  cannot  perfectly  understand. 
It  is  in  the  following  words  : 

"  It  is  agreed,  that  British  subjects,  who  now  hold 


; 

THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  365 

lands  in  the  territories  of  the  United  States,  and  Ameri 
can  citizens,  who  now  hold  lands  in  the  dominions  of  his 
majesty,  shall  continue  to  hold  them  according  to  the 
nature  and  tenure  of  their  respective  estates  and  titles 
therein ;  and  may  grant,  sell,  or  devise  the  same  to 
whom  they  please,  in  like  manner  as  if  they  were  na 
tives  ;  and  that  neither  they  nor  their  heirs  or  assigns 
shall,  so  far  as  may  respect  the  said  lands  and  the  legal 
remedies  incident  thereto,  be  regarded  as  aliens." 

If  it  be  the  object  of  this  article  to  vary  the  existing 
laws  upon  the  subject  of  landed  estates,  it  is  wholly 
improper.  If  not,  it  is  wholly  unnecessary.  I  do  not 
know  how  far  this  article  may  affect  the  proprietory 
estates.  If  it  be  intended  to  give  any  new  impulse  to 
those  estates,  it  may  be  attended  with  serious  effects. 
Pennsylvania  is  the  only  state  which  has  regularly  ex 
tinguished  the  proprietory  claim.  If  a  latitude  of  con 
struction  should  be  given  to  this  article,  it  might  ma 
terially  affect  the  states  of  Delaware,  North  Carolina 
and  Virginia.  I  will  not  pretend  to  say,  that  it  will 
bear  the  interpretation  I  have  hinted  at,  but,  as  an  in 
dividual,!  would  rather  it  had  been  omitted.  There  is 
a  semblance  of  reciprocity  assumed  by  this  article ; 
but  no  reciprocity  in  fact. 

The  tenth  article  is  of  a  very  extraordinary  complex 
ion.  It  is  remarkable,  both  as  to  the  matter  it  con 
tains,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  expressed.  It  is 
in  the  following  words : 

"  Neither  the  debts,  due  from  individuals  of  the  one 
nation  to  individuals  of  the  other,  nor  shares,  nor 
monies,  which  they  may  have  in  the  public  funds,  or  in 
the  public  or  private  banks,  shall  ever,  in  any  event  of 
war  or  national  differences,  be  sequestered  or  confiscat 
ed,  it  being  unjust  and  impolitic,  that  debts  and  engage 
ments,  contracted  and  made  by  individuals  having  con 
fidence  in  each  other,  and  in  their  respective  govern 
ments,  should  ever  be  destroyed  or  impaired  by  na 
tional  authority,  on  account  of  national  differences  and 
discontents." 


366  MR.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

This  article  also  assumes  the  semblance  of  recipro 
city  ;  but  no  reciprocity  in  fact. 

British  subjects  have  great  sums,  both  in  public  and 

Erivate  funds,  in  the  United  States ;  American  citizens 
ave  little  or  no  property  in  public  or  private  funds  in 
Great  Britain.  Hence  the  evident  and  substantial 
inequality  of  this  reciprocal  stipulation.  On  the  other 
hand,  American  citizens  have  a  great  share  of  proper 
ty  on  the  water,  with  very  little  naval  protection,  and 
of  course  subject  to  the  naval  superiority  of  Great 
Britain. 

If,  therefore,  Great  Britain  had  stipulated,  in  case  of 
war,  that  in  consideration  of  a  refusal,  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States,  to  sequestrate  property  of  British  sub 
jects  upon  land,  she  would  not  molest  the  property  of 
American  citizens  upon  water,  there  would  then  have 
been  a  substantial,  instead  of  a  nominal  reciprocity : 
as  the  article  now  stands,  there  is  an  important  right 
conceded,  and  no  compensation  obtained. 

This  article,  however,  has  been  highly  applauded, 
by  a  particular  description  of  persons  interested  in  it, 
in  consequence  of  the  affectation  of  morality  professed 
by  it. 

It  has  been  said  to  be  dishonest  and  immoral,  to  take 
the  property  of  individuals  for  the  purpose  of  compen 
sating  national  wrongs.  I  can  see  no  difference  be 
tween  the  morality  of  taking  the  property  of  individuals 
upon  water,  and  the  property  of  individuals  upon  land. 
The  difference  of  the  element  can  make  no  difference 
in  the  morality  of  the  act.  However  strongly,  there 
fore,  this  moral  impulse  was  operating  upon  the  Ame 
rican  envoy,  whilst  engaged  in  the  construction  of  this 
article,  it  had  entirely  dissipated  before  he  arrived  at 
the  twenty-fifth  article :  for,  in  that  article,  the  princi 
ple  of  privateering  is  not  only  admitted,  but  its  opera 
tion  facilitated ;  so  that,  unless  the  interest  of  Great 
Britain  is  to  be  the  criterion  of  the  envoy's  morality, 
what  he  has  gained  by  the  morality  of  the  tenth  ar- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  367 

ticle,  must  be  at  least  balanced  by  the  immorality  of 
the  twenty-fifth.  Sequestration  is  always  admitted  as 
part  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  hence  I  presume  it  is 
not  immoral,  under  certain  circumstances.  It  appears 
to  be  the  opinion  of  some,  that  where  the  property  of 
an  individual  has  been  sequestered  on  account  of  the  act 
of  his  nation,  the  individual  is  to  sustain  the  loss  ; 
but  this  is  not  the  case.  The  sequestration  itself  im 
poses  upon  the  government,  to  which  the  individual 
belongs,  an  obligation  of  reimbursement.  Hence  the 
sequestration  does  not  ultimately  rest  upon  the  indi 
vidual,  but  upon  the  government  for  whose  wrong  the 
property  was  taken.  This  is  also  conformable  to  the 
laws  of  nations.  It  is  the  course  pursued  by  Great 
Britain  for  all  sequestrations  made  during  the  Ameri 
can  war,  and  is  the  course  which  will  be  pursued  by 
all  nations. 

War  itself  is  immoral  in  most  cases ;  and  justifiable, 
in  my  opinion,  only  in  the  case  of  self-defence  ;  but,  if 
a  stipulation  had  been  inserted  in  this  treaty  which 
prohibited  the  United  States  from  declaring  war,  it 
would  have  been  justly  and  universally  reprobated. 
The  present  article  prohibits  the  United  States  from 
resorting  to  the  best  means,  not  only  of  preventing  wary 
but  the  most  efficacious  means  of  supporting  it.  Hence 
the  surrender  of  the  right  is  a  most  impolitic  con 
cession,  and  is  infinitely  aggravated  by  its  being  a 
voluntary  concession ;  no  equivalent  being  received  in 
return.  It  is  dishonorable  to  the  United  States,  be 
cause  it  evidences  a  want  of  confidence  in  the  discretion 
of  the  constituted  authorities.  The  right  of  sequestra 
tion  is  admitted  to  be  essential  to  national  sovereign 
ty;  but  lest  it  should  be  indiscreetly  used  by  the 
United  States,  its  guardianship  is  transferred  to  Great 
Britain.  I  view  sequestration  as  an  extraordinary  re 
medy,  to  be  resorted  to  only  on  extraordinary  occa 
sions.  And  although  I  admit  that  but  few  cases  will 
justify  a  resort  to  it,  yet  it  is  one  of  our  best  instru 
ments  of  defence,  considering  our  relationship  to 


I 

368  MR.  GILES*  SPEECH  ON 

Great  Britain,  and  ought  not,  therefore,  to  have  been 
surrendered.  This  restraint  is  imposed  upon  the 
United  States  for  an  unlimited  time,  and  is  the  more 
objectionable,  as  it  is  a  species  of  legislation  against 
the  discretion  of  legislation. 

But,  whatever  may  be  the  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
the  matter  of  this  article,  the  most  partial  admirer  of 
this  treaty  must  be  unwilling  to  defend  the  very  extra 
ordinary  envoy  of  the  United  States  for  the  manner 
of  expression.  This  measure  was  proposed  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  as  one  of  the  means  of  self- 
protection  against  British  depredations.  This  cir 
cumstance  was  known  to  the  envoy,  yet  he  not  only  bar 
tered  away  the  measure,  but,  in  doing  so,  branded  the 
proposition,  then  depending  before  the  House  of  Re 
presentatives,  with  the  terms  "impolitic  and  unjust." 
This  was  an  unnecessary  imputation,  which  no  minis 
ter  could  have  been  justifiable  in  applying  to  his  gov 
ernment.  Suppose  our  envoy  had  insisted,  and  the 
British  minister  had  agreed,  that  the  order  of  the  6th  of 
November,  for  taking  neutral  vessels  for  adjudication, 
was  piratical,  and  ought  not  to  be  renewed  :  I  will  not 
pretend  to  say  how  far  the  order  would  justify  the  epi 
thet  ;  but  what  would  have  been  the  fate  of  a  British 
minister  under  such  circumstances  ?  Utter  disgrace 
would  have  been  one  inevitable  consequence ;  but,  an 
American  minister  is  not  only  tolerated  for  a  similar 
conduct,  but  by  some,  who  even  affect  to  be  Ameri 
cans,  applauded.  In  the  present  agitation  of  the  pub 
lic  mind,  truth  seems  to  be  obscured  by  party  irrita 
tions,  and  personal  partialities ;  but  I  am  convinced, 
that  whenever  it  may  be  so  far  collected  as  to  take  a 
calm  review  of  this  transaction,  there  will  exist  one 
universal  voice  of  condemnation. 

The  eleventh  article  contains  a  general  stipulation 
for  the  liberty  of  navigation  and  commerce  between  the 
two  countries. 

The  twelfth  article  is  the  first  of  the  commercial 
articles.  This  article  is  suspended ;  but  the  want  of 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  ;j(jij 

a  substitute  will  justify  a  few  remarks.  1  am  not 
practically  acquainted  with  commercial  detail,  and  of 
course  shall  not  go  much  into  detail  upon  the  com 
mercial  articles ;  there  are,  however,  some  grand 
principles  which  apply  to  commerce,  as  well  as  to 
every  other  business  or  science,  which  will  guide  me 
in  a  few  remarks  upon  this  subject.  The  twelfth  arti 
cle  is  intended  to  regulate  the  trade  between  the 
United  States  and  the  British  West  India  Islands;  so 
far,  therefore,  as  it  permits  that  trade  to  be  carried  on. 
it  is  intended  as  a  concession  to  the  United  States ; 
the  rigid  restrictions  accompanying  the  concession, 
however,  render  it  so  paltry,  that  the  Senate  rejected 
the  concession,  although  the  envoy  had  accepted  it. 
But,  in  what  situation  has  the  rejection  left  the  United 
States  ?  They  are  now  engaged  in  a  commercial 
treaty  with  Great  Britain,  in  which  they  have  surren 
dered  almost  every  commercial  advantage  they  had  to 
bestow,  and  are  still  wholly  excluded  from  the  West 
India  trade.  I  have  always  understood  that  the  West 
India  trade  was  the  great  object  of  commercial  nego- 
ciation  with  Great  Britain,  but  now  that  is  formally  relin 
quished.  It  may  be  said,  that  further  negociations  upon 
this  subject  are  promised ;  but  what  inducement  will 
Great  Britain  have  to  relax  her  colonial  regulations, 
provided  this  treaty  should  be  carried  into  effect? 
She  has  already,  without  this  relaxation,  placed  the 
commerce  between  the  two  countries  precisely  upon 
the  footing  she  wished;  and  the  United  States  have 
yielded  every  commercial  advantage  which  might 
nave  been  exchanged  for  that  relaxation  ;  of  course. 
Great  Britain  will  have  no  inducement  to  make,  as 
the  United  States  have  nothing  to  offer  for,  the  re 
laxation. 

The  gentleman  from  Connecticut,  (Mr.  Swift,)  justi 
fied  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  with  respect  to  the 
West  Indies,  upon  the  ground  of  her  colonial  rights. 
He  observed  that  Great  Britain  had  a  right  to  prevent, 
the  trade  to  the  West  Indies  altogether.  This  is  true : 

VOL.  i.  4.7 


370  -MR.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

and  she  has  a  right  to  prevent  the  trade  to  London,  and 
the  United  States  have  a  right  to  interdict  her  trade 
to  this  country.  But  I  would  ask,  if  there  be  no  relaxa 
tion  of  these  rights,  of  what  advantage  is  the  treaty  ? 
The  very  object  of  a  commercial  treaty  is  a  reciprocal 
indulgence  in  the  exercise  of  these  rights ;  and  the  pecu 
liar  dependence  of  those  islands  upon  the  United  States 
for  their  very  subsistence,  would  command  a  participa 
tion  in  that  trade,  if  properly  used. 

The  resort  to  the  United  States  for  supplies  to  facili 
tate  the  present  operations  in  the  West  Indies,  is  a 
striking  evidence  of  the  importance  of  the  United 
States  to  their  existence. 

It  has  been  observed,  that  the  Spanish  treaty  has 
not  opened  the  Spanish  islands  to  the  United  States. 
This  is  true,  and  it  would  have  been  a  desirable  thing 
if  it  had  effected  this  object.  But  it  should  be  recol 
lected,  that  the  United  States  have  made  no  commer 
cial  concessions  to  Spain,  and  that  the  treaty  does 
not  profess  to  contain  any  material  commercial  regula 
tions. 

The  thirteenth  article  contains  regulations  for  the 
East  India  trade.  This  article  has  been  held  up  as  an 
apology  for  all  the  commercial  defects  of  the  treaty. 
I  do  not  pretend  to  be  perfectly  acquainted  with  the 
nature  of  this  trade  ;  but  as  far  as  I  understand  the  ex 
planation  of  the  advantages  of  this  article,  I  cannot 
concur  in  the  result.  The  common  remark  is,  that  this 
article  secures  to  the  United  States  a  right  which  be 
fore  was  a  courtesy.  This  remark  possesses  some 
plausibility,  but  no  substance  ;  what  is  called  courtesy, 
is  a  trade  founded  upon  the  interest  of  the  parties.  I 
believe  that  a  courtesy  in  trade,  the  basis  of  which  is 
the  interest  of  the  party  granting  it,  is  a  better  securi 
ty  than  forced  regulations  by  treaty,  without  the  basis 
of  interest  for  their  support.  It  is  admitted,  that  the 
trade  to  the  East  Indies,  before  this  treaty,  was  ex 
tremely  lucrative,  and  of  course  cannot  be  the  effect 
of  the  treaty.  But  the  restrictive  and  monopolizing 


THE  BRITISH  TKEATV.  371 

hand  of  Great  Britain,  is  seen  to  extend  itself  even  to 
this  branch  of  commerce,  in  the  prohibition  of  the  ex 
portation  of  East  India  articles  to  an  European  market 
in  American  bottoms ;  which  is  a  restriction  that 
does  not  now  exist,  and  is  another  restriction  upon  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  trading  thence,  which,  in 
my  opinion,  will  lessen  very  much  the  boasted  security 
of  right  under  this  article,  whenever  the  interest  of  the 
East  India  company  will  justify  the  prohibition  of 
that  trade.  The  restrictions  alluded  to  are  in  the  fol 
lowing  words.  "  Neither  is  this  article  to  be  construed 
to  allow  the  citizens  of  the  said  States  to  settle  or  re 
side  within  the  said  territories,  or  to  go  into  the  interi 
or  parts  thereof,  without  the  permission  of  the  British 
government  established  there ;  and  if  any  transgression 
should  be  attempted  against  the  regulations  of  the 
British  government  in  this  respect,  the  observance  of 
the  same  shall  and  may  be  enforced  against  the  citi 
zens  of  America  in  the  same  manner  as  against  British 
subjects  or  others  transgressing  the  same  rule.  And 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  whenever  they  arrive 
in  any  port  or  harbor  in  the  said  territories,  or  if  they 
should  be  permitted  in  manner  aforesaid,  to  go  to  any 
other  place  therein,  shall  always  be  subject  to  the  laws, 
government  and  jurisdiction,  of  whatever  nature  estab 
lished,  in  such  harbor,  port  or  place,  according  as  the 
same  may  be.  The  citizens  of  the  United  States,  may 
also  touch  for  refreshment  at  the  island  of  St.  Helena, 
but  subject  in  all  respects  to  such  regulations,  as  the 
British  government  may  from  time  to  time  establish 
there." 

The  fourteenth  article  relates  to  the  commerce  and 
navigation  of  the  two  countries  generally,  and  will  be 
passed  over  without  remark. 

The  fifteenth  article  is,  in  my  judgment,  highly  ob 
jectionable. 

This  article  restrains  the  United  States  from  impos 
ing  upon  British  goods  higher  duties,  &c.  than  upon 
those  of  other  foreign  nations.  It  authorizes  Great 


3*72  MR.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

Britain  to  equalize  the  existing  unequal  duties,  between 
the  American  and  British  bottoms,  and  restrains  the 
United  States  from  reviving  the  existing  inequality. 
One  objection  to  this  article  is,  that  it  abandons, 
without  an  equivalent,  the  advantages  resulting  from 
the  peculiar  nature  of  the  trade  carried  on  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain.  This  trade  consists, 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  mostly  of  raw  mate 
rials,  which  employ  the  artizans  of  Britain,  and  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain,  of  the  manufactures  of  artizans 
in  the  most  finished  state ;  and  in  addition,  there  is 
always  a  large  specie  balance  against  the  United 
States  and  in  favor  of  Great  Britain.  It  is  calculated, 
that  the  United  States  furnish  a  market  for  at  least  one 
third  of  the  whole  surplus  manufactures  of  Great 
Britain,  and  for  this  the  most  suitable  returns  for  the 
British  market  are  made.  The  loss  of  so  valuable  a 
market  could  not  be  supplied  in  any  part  of  the  world. 
It  would  naturally  be  supposed,  that  a  trade  so  favora 
ble  would  be  entitled  to  some  indulgence  on  the  part 
of  the  nation  receiving  the  favor,  and  would  command 
some  respect  to  the  nation  affording  it ;  provided  it  had 
energy  enough  to  avail  itself  of  the  advantage ;  but  by 
this  article  it  is  abandoned  with  a  nominal,  but  no  real 
equivalent.  This  consideration  is  greatly  strengthened 
by  extending  it  to  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  trade  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  the  West  Indies,  which 
has  been  already  remarked  upon. 

Upon  this  ground  the  discrimination  in  favor  of 
American  over  British  bottoms,  has  been  built ;  and 
the  growth  of  American  shipping  has  very  considera 
bly  increased,  in  consequence  of  this  policy.  Our  ex 
perience,  therefore,  is  bartered  away  without  even  the 
probable  calculation  of  a  countervailing  advantage. 

The  apology,  made  for  this  article,  that  the  United 
States  have  granted  no  right  to  Britain,  which  she  did 
not  possess  before,  is  entirely  delusive.  It  may  be  true, 
that  no  new  right  of  sovereignty  is  granted  to  Great 
Britain ;  but  she  is  now  left  at  liberty  to  exercise  a 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  373 

right,  without  hazard,  by  a  restriction  imposed  upon  the 
United  States ;  and  which  she  had  failed  to  exercise 
until  this  restriction  was  imposed.  It  is  remarkable, 
from  the  whole  complexion  of  the  treaty,  that  the  ad 
vantages,  gained  by  Great  Britain,  consist  in  restric 
tions  imposed  upon  the  United  States,  as  if  her  object 
was  to  restrain  the  United  States  in  the  exercise  of 
their  rights  of  sovereignty. 

The  sixteenth  article  relates  only  to  the  appointment 
of  consuls,  and  does  not  require  notice. 

The  seventeenth  article  is,  in  my  opinion,  objec 
tionable  in  many  respects.  It  yields  a  formal  assent 
to  the  seizure  and  condemnation  of  an  enemy's  property 
on  board  of  American  vessels.  I  expected  to  have 
heard  this  article  apologized  for  and  not  justified.  But 
I  was  surprised  to  hear  it  asserted,  that  it  was  pro 
blematical,  whether  the  admission  of  this  principle 
would  be  for  the  advantage  or  disadvantage  of  the 
United  States.  This  is  throwing  the  article  into  a 
problem,  without  attempting  to  solve  it.  It  is  discard 
ing  the  exercise  of  the  reasoning  faculty.  From  the 
peculiar  situation  of  the  United  States  in  their  rela 
tions  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  the  establishment  of  the 
principle,  that  neutral  vessels  shall  give  freedom  to 
their  cargoes,  is  to  them  of  primary  importance ;  of 
course  the  United  States  have  sedulously  exerted 
themselves,  in  all  their  foreign  negociations,  to  have  that 
principle  formally  admitted  as  the  law  of  nations.  In 
every  other  treaty,  entered  into  by  the  United  States, 
this  principle  has  been  carefully  inserted.  A  formal 
assent  to  the  contrary  doctrine,  will  probably  produce 
a  retrograde  effort  upon  all  former  exertions,  which 
will  require  a  great  length  of  time  to  counteract.  In 
the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  the  principle  is  peculiarly  important.  Great 
Britain  possesses  the  most  formidable  fleet  in  exist 
ence,  and  is  at  least  one  half  her  time  at  war.  The 
United  States  have  an  extended  commerce  without 
the  protection  of  a  fleet,  and  from  her  remote  situa- 


374  MR.  GILES'   SPEECH  ON 

tion  from  Europe,  the  great  scene  of  war,  as  well  as 
from  the  genius  of  the  American  people,  are  not  like 
ly  to  be  involved  in  European  contests.  Hence  the 
disadvantage  to  the  United  States  from  this  stipula 
tion,  will  be  in  proportion  to  the  greater  probability  of 
their  remaining  free  from  war,  than  Great  Britain,  and 
in  proportion  to  their  more  defenceless  state  of  com 
merce.  There  exists  another  forcible  reason,  which 
ought  to  have  prevented  this  stipulation — its  necessa 
ry  operation  upon  the  present  belligerent  powers. 

Under  this  article,  French  goods,  in  American  bot 
toms,  are  made  subject  to  British  seizure  and  con 
demnation  ;  but  British  goods,  in  American  bottoms, 
are  free  from  French  seizure  and  condemnation. 
This  is  an  evident  partiality  in  favor  of  Britain  against 
France,  which,  in  my  opinion,  can  hardly  be  warrant 
ed  by  the  species  of  neutrality,  proclaimed  by  the  Ex 
ecutive  as  the  existing  state  of  the  nation.  It  is  not 
only  a  neutrality,  but  an  impartial  neutrality.  If  a  de 
viation  from  the  strict  line  of  impartial  neutrality  can 
be  in  one  case  justifiable,  I  think  every  American  feel 
ing  will  incline  to  favor  the  cause  of  liberty,  and  not 
the  cause  of  despotism. 

It  is  no  apology  for  this  article,  to  say  that  an  arti 
cle  upon  the  opposite  principle  could  not  be  obtained  : 
then  let  none  be  obtained.  It  is  the  assent  to  the  prin 
ciple,  which  constitutes  the  disgrace  and  the  injury  to 
the  United  States.  If  other  terms  could  not  have  been 
procured,  French  property,  in  American  bottoms, 
might  have  been  left  to  the  ordinary  operation  of  the 
laws  of  nations,  without  an  explicit  and  invidious  stipu 
lation  for  its  seizure  and  condemnation. 

The  eighteenth  article  defines  contraband  goods : 
there  is  a  common,  but  just  objection,  made  to  this 
article,  to  wit,  that  the  contraband  list  is  extended, 
and  that  several  articles  are  added,  which  were  never 
before  admitted  to  be  contraband.  It  is  to  be  observ 
ed,  that  all  these  additional  articles  are  amongst  the 
exports  of  the  United  States,  whilst  most,  or  perhaps 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  375 

all  of  them,  are  amongst  the  imports  of  Great  Britain. 
This  circumstance  proves,  that  the  reciprocity,  assum 
ed  by  this  article,  is  delusive,  and  that  the  advantage 
is  wholly  in  favor  of  Great  Britain.  This  article  con 
tains  also  some  regulations,  respecting  the  seizure  of 
provisions  in  American  vessels  under  certain  circum 
stances,  which  are  extremely  equivocal  and  suspicious. 
I  presume  this  article  furnished  the  pretext  to  Great 
Britain,  for  issuing  the  late  order  for  seizing  American 
vessels,  bound  with  provisions  to  France.  I  will  not 
pretend  to  say.  that  the  article  justifies  a  construction 
which  might  give  rise  to  the  order ;  but  the  existence 
of  such  an  order  since  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  is 
universally  admitted :  but  I  will  assert,  that  whether 
the  order  is  to  be  considered  as  the  practical  construc 
tion  of  this  article,  or  an  infraction  of  it,  or  an  infrac 
tion  of  the  neutrality  of  the  United  States  in  any  re 
spect,  it  may  be  attended  with  the  most  serious  con 
sequences.  If  this  invasion  of  neutral  rights  is  to  be 
the  first  fruits  of  the  treaty,  the  most  alarming  results 
may  be  expected  from  its  further  operation.  The  ex 
ecutive  of  the  United  States  has  declared,  that  even 
the  permission  of  this  conduct,  by  one  of  the  bellige 
rent  powers,  is  a  breach  of  neutrality  against  the  other ; 
and,  of  course,  a  just  cause  of  war  from  the  injur 
ed  nation.  This  doctrine  is  so  clearly  established  in  a 
letter  from  Mr.  Jefferson,  written  by  order  of  the  Pre 
sident  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  dated  7th  September,  1793, 
that  I  beg  the  indulgence  of  the  committee  in  reading 
two  or  three  paragraphs  from  the  letter :  it  is  in  the  fol 
lowing  words : 

"  This  act,  too,  tends  directly  to  draw  us  from  that 
state  of  peace  in  which  we  are  wishing  to  remain.  It 
is  an  essential  character  of  neutrality,  to  furnish  no 
aids,  (not  stipulated  by  treaty,)  to  one  party,  which  we 
are  not  equally  ready  to  furnish  to  the  other.  If  we 
permit  corn  to  be  sent  to  Great  Britain  and  her 
friends,  we  are  equally  bound  to  permit  it  to  France. 
To  restrain  it  would  be  a  partiality,  which  might  lead 


376  MR.  GILES*  SPEECH  ON 

to  war  with  France ;  and,  between  restraining  it  our 
selves,  and  permitting  her  enemies  to  restrain  it  un 
rightfully,  there  is  no  difference.  She  would  consider  this 
as  a  mere  pretext,  of  which  she  would  not  be  the  dupe, 
and  on  what  honorable  ground  could  we  otherwise  ex 
plain  it  ?  Thus  we  should  see  ourselves  plunged,  by 
this  unauthorized  act  of  Great  Britain,  into  a  war, 
with  which  we  meddle  not,  and  which  we  wish  to 
avoid,  if  justice  to  all  parties,  and  from  all  parties  will 
enable  us  to  avoid  it.  In  the  case,  where  we  found 
ourselves  obliged  by  treaty,  to  withhold  from  the  ene 
mies  of  France,  the  right  of  arming  in  our  ports,  we 
thought  ourselves  in  justice  bound  to  withhold  the 
same  right  from  France  also ;  and  we  did  it.  Were 
we  to  withhold  from  her  supplies  of  provisions,  we 
should,  in  like  manner,  be  bound  to  withhold  them 
from  her  enemies  also ;  and  thus  shut  against  ourselves 
all  the  ports  of  Europe,  where  corn  is  in  demand,  or  make 
ourselves  parties  in  the  war.  This  is  a  dilemma, 
which  Great  Britain  has  no  right  to  force  upon  us,  and 
for  which  no  pretext  can  be  found  in  any  part  of  our 
conduct.  She  may,  indeed,  feel  the  desire  of  starving 
an  enemy  nation ;  but  she  can  give  no  right  of  doing  it 
at  our  loss,  nor  of  making  us  the  instrument  of  it." 

After  this  unequivocal  declaration,  made  by  the  Ex 
ecutive  of  the  United  States,  what  plea  can  be  made 
to  the  French  government,  to  justify  an  acquiescence 
in  this  conduct  of  Great  Britain  ?  Whether  it  be  the 
result  of  the  construction  of  the  treaty,  or  an  infraction 
of  it,  what  apology  can  this  house  make  for  giving  ef 
ficacy  to  the  treaty  before  some  satisfactory  explana 
tion  is  made  upon  this  subject  ?  Suppose  the  republic 
of  France  were  to  approach  the  Executive  of  the  Unit 
ed  States  with  this  letter  in  their  hand,  and  sav, "  Here 


is  your  own  declaration  of  your  own  principles  of  neu 
trality  !  You  have  unkindly  departed  from  the  princi 
ples  avowed  by  yourself,  in  favor  of  my  enemy.  You 
seem  to  have  concurred  in  a  scheme  of  distressing  a 
whole  nation  by  withholding  supplies  of  provisions, 


I 
THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  377 

when  a  better  office  might  have  been  expected  from 
the  United  States."  Suppose  a  similar  appeal  were  to 
be  made  to  this  House,  whilst  deliberating  upon  the 
expediency  or  inexpediency  of  giving  efficacy  to  the 
very  treaty  which  is  used  by  Great  Britain  to  sanctify 
her  conduct ;  what  reply  could  be  made  in  either  case  ? 
Is  any  gentleman,  who  is  disposed  to  carry  the  treaty 
into  effect,  prepared  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to 
so  just  and  so  interesting  a  complaint  ?  According 
to  the  very  principles  avowed  by  the  Executive,  rather 
than  give  no  cause  of  umbrage  to  Great  Britain,  we 
give  just  cause  of  war  to  France.  Yet  it  has  been 
said,  that  it  would  be  disgraceful  to  the  nation  not  to 
give  efficacy  to  an  instrument  containing  this  disgrace 
ful  concession.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  say,  that  the  re 
public  of  France  will  not  avail  herself  of  this  breach  of 
neutrality,  and  enter  into  hostilities  against  the  United 
States.  It  is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  United  States, 
by  the  execution  of  this  treaty,  under  this  construc 
tion,  will  furnish  just  cause  for  such  a  conduct ;  and. 
if  this  be  not  the  just  interpretation  of  the  instrument, 
no  disgrace  can  be  greater  than  to  execute  a  treaty 
with  a  nation  at  the  very  moment  she  is  engaged  in 
its  infraction. 

The  nineteenth  article  contains  some  regulations 
respecting  privateers,  which  require  no  comment. 

The  twentieth  article  respects  the  punishment  of 
pirates,  which  is  not  material. 

The  twenty-first  article  prohibits  American  citizens 
from  entering  into  any  foreign  service  against  Great 
Britain,  and  defines  piracies.  There  is  an  existing 
law  in  the  United  States  upon  this  subject,  which  ope 
rates  equally  towards  all  the  belligerent  powers.  This 
act  extends  no  farther  than  to  prohibit  American  citi 
zens  from  entering  into  foreign  service  within  the  Unit 
ed  States,  and  applies  equally  to  all  foreign  powers. 
But  Great  Britain,  not  content  with  this  fair  and  just 
regulation,  has  extended  this  provision,  so  far  as  re 
gards  herself,  beyond  the  limits  or  jurisdiction  of  tin* 

VOL,  i.  48 


378  MR.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

United  States,  and  entirely  destroys  the  impartiality 
and  neutrality  of  the  existing  legal  provision.  What 
is  the  operation  of  this  article  upon  the  belligerent 
powers  ?  It  is  this.  An  American  citizen  entering 
into  the  French  service  against  Great  Britain,  out 
of  the  limits  or  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  is 
punishable.  An  American  citizen  entering  into  the 
British  service  under  the  same  circumstances,  is  not 
punishable.  Besides,  it  is  a  prohibition  upon  Ameri 
can  citizens,  which  has  never  been  imposed  upon  the 
subjects  or  citizens  of  any  nation,  as  far  as  I  can  recol 
lect.  But  the  practice  of  entering  into  foreign  service 
has,  at  all  times,  been  resorted  to  as  affording  the  best 
military  education.  When  it  is  recollected,  that  this 
article  is  to  continue  in  force  for  only  two  years  after 
the  termination  of  the  present  European  war ;  that 
there  is  no  probability  of  the  United  States  being,  dur 
ing  that  time,  engaged  in  an  European  war ;  and  that 
this  article  is,  in  no  respect,  connected  with  the  pro 
fessed  objects  of  negociation — has  not  the  stipulation 
too  much  the  appearance,  as  well  as  the  effect,  of  in 
terfering  in  the  present  European  quarrel,  and  evincing 
a  partiality  for  the  interests  of  Great  Britain,  in  viola 
tion  of  our  professions  of  an  impartial  neutrality? 
And  can  this  conduct  be  justified,  either  from  the  na 
ture  of  the  cause  in  which  France  is  engaged,  or  from 
the  good  offices  rendered  by  that  great  nation  to  the 
United  States? 

The  twenty-second  article  stipulates,  that  notice 
shall  be  given  before  acts  of  reprisal,  &c.  shall  be  au 
thorized  by  either  of  the  contracting  parties,  which  is 
very  proper. 

The  twenty-third  article  is  that,  in  which  I  expected 
to  have  found  some  provisions  for  the  protection  of 
American  seamen  against  British  impressments:  in 
stead  of  this  humane  and  salutary  provision,  I  found 
that  the  officers  and  crews  of  those  very  ships  of  war, 
&c.  engaged  in  the  unauthorized  impressments,  are  to 
J>e  hospitably  received  in  the  ports  of  the  United  States, 


I 

THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  3f  9 

and  a  proper  respect  to  be  paid  to  those  officers,  ac 
cording  to  their  respective  ranks.  Strange  substitute 
this  for  the  protection  of  American  seamen !  This  ar 
ticle  is  rendered  more  aggravating  by  the  practice  of 
the  British  in  impressing  American  seamen  since  the 
signing  this  very  treaty.  Whilst  the  table  of  the  House 
is  almost  laboring  with  evidence  of  this  fact — whilst  the 
fact  is  riot  denied  by  any  gentleman  on  this  floor — in 
the  very  same  breath  in  which  a  bill  has  been  passed 
for  the  protection  and  relief  of  this  valuable  class  of 
citizens,  is  the  House  called  upon  to  make  provision 
for  effectuating  a  treaty  of  amity,  &c.  with  a  nation 
committing  these  wrongs — with  a  nation  refusing  to 
respect  any  evidence  of  protection  which  can  be  af 
forded  to  this  description  of  citizens  by  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States ;  and  an  alarm  and  wonder 
is  excited,  because  the  House,  under  these  circum 
stances,  should  deliberate  upon  making  the  provision. 

The  twenty-fourth  article  prohibits  the  arming  of 
ships,  by  other  foreign  nations,  in  the  ports  of  the 
United  States,  and  selling  their  prizes ;  and  restrains 
the  United  States  from  selling  them  more  provisions 
than  may  be  necessary  to  carry  them  to  the  next  port 
of  the  nation  to  which  they  belong.  Although  I  can 
see  no  propriety  in  these  stipulations,  particularly  at 
this  time,  I  will  pass  them  over  without  remark. 

The  twenty-fifth  article  deserves  two  remarks — the 
first  is,  that  it  accommodates  Great  Britain  in  her 
scheme  of  privateering  against  France,  and  evidences 
the  same  temper  with  several  other  articles  towards 
the  belligerent  powers,  which  has  been  remarked  upon. 
The  other  grows  out  of  the  general  clause  of  reserva 
tion  which  it  contains.  The  clause  I  allude  to  is  in 
the  following  words : 

"  Nothing  in  this  treaty  contained,  shall,  however, 
be  construed  or  operate  contrary  to  former  and  exist 
ing  public  treaties  with  other  sovereigns  or  states. 
But  the  two  parties  agree,  that  while  they  continue  i» 
amity,  neither  of  them  will  in  future  make  any  treaty 


380  3111.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

that  shall  be  inconsistent  with  this  or  the  preceding 
article." 

From  this  reservation  it  is  evident,  that  all  the  arti 
cles,  which  affect  the  present  belligerent  powers,  are 
intended  as  constructive  of  the  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  France ;  and  the  construction  is 
so  made,  as  to  operate  most  injuriously  to  France, 
and  most  advantageously  to  Great  Britain.  Indeed, 
this  construction  seems  to  have  bound  so  hard  upon 
the  French  treaty,  in  the  opinion  of  both  negociators, 
that  they,  probably  apprehending  that  it  might,  in  some 
respect,  be  deemed  by  the  United  States  a  positive  in 
fraction  of  that  treaty,  thought  it  necessary  to  insert 
this  sovereign  clause.  The  whole  of  the  stipulations, 
which  affect  the  present  belligerent  powers,  are  the 
most  reprehensible  interferences  in  the  European  quar 
rel,  for  the  following  reasons :  first,  they  are  wholly 
unnecessary,  because  they  are  totally  disconnected 
with  the  objects  of  negociation  between  the  two  coun 
tries,  and  with  the  usual  and  natural  order  of  com 
merce  ;  and  of  course,  must  be  deemed  voluntary  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States.  Second,  the  interest  of 
the  United  States  could  not  have  been  contemplated, 
because,  there  is  no  probability  of  their  being  engaged 
in  a  naval  war  in  two  years  after  the  termination  of  the 
present  war ;  at  which  time  these  stipulations  are  to 
cease;  of  course  the  accommodation  was  intended  for 
the  present  war,  in  which  the  United  States  are  not  en 
gaged,  and  not  for  a  future  war,  in  which  they  may  be 
engaged.  Third,  because  it  is  a  dishonorable  devia 
tion  from  that  impartial  neutrality,  professed  by  the 
United  States  in  favor  of  a  nation  the  least  of  all  others 
entitled  to  the  accommodations  of  the  United  States, 
and  against  a  nation  the  most  of  all  others  entitled  to 
them.  Fourth,  it  voluntarily  hazards  the  resentment 
and  hostility  of  a  nation,  which,  if  exerted,  might  pro 
duce  to  the  United  States  the  most  serious  calamities. 

The  twenty-sixth  article  provides,  that  in  case  of  war 
between  the  two  countries,  the  merchants  and  others 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  381 

of  each  of  the  two  countries,  residing  in  the  other, 
shall  have  time  to  remove  with  their  effects,  &c.  which 
is  in  every  respect  proper. 

The  twenty-seventh  article  provides  for  reciprocal 
ly  giving  up  certain  fugitives  from  justice,  which  is  not 
objectionable. 

The  twenty-eighth  article  respects  the  time  of  the 
duration  of  the  treaty. 

Having  examined  the  treaty  at  large,  with  candor, 
and  with  the  best  judgment  I  possess,  I  find  in  it  so 
much  to  condemn,  and  so  little  to  applaud,  and  some 
of  the  objectionable  parts  are  so  formidable  in  them 
selves,  that  it  is  wonderful  to  me,  that  the  treaty 
should  have  found  an  advocate  upon  its  merits,  in  the 
United  States.  Viewing  the  subject  as  I  do,  and  be 
lieving  it  my  duty  to  exercise  my  discretion  upon  it, 
nothing,  contained  in  it,  can  justify  me  in  giving  my 
vote  for  the  necessary  provisions  to  give  it  efficacy. 

[Mr.  Giles,  after  apologizing  for  the  time  he  had  al 
ready  consumed,  proceeded  to  consider  the  probable 
consequences  of  refusing,  or  giving  efficacy  to  the 
treaty.] 

Gentlemen  in  favor  of  making  the  provision  have  sug 
gested  two  consequences  resulting  from  a  refusal,  of  a 
very  serious  nature.  The  one,  what  is  termed  by  them 
the  hostility  of  departments  of  government,  which 
would  necessarily  eventuate  in  a  total  dissolution  of 
the  government  itself.  The  other,  a  war  with  Great 
Britain.  If  either  of  these  consequences  would  result, 
I  would  vote  for  the  necessary  provisions,  although 
the  vote  would  be  more  against  my  feelings  than  any 
vote  I  ever  before  gave.  Whether  either  of  these 
consequences  will  result,  cannot  be  positively  ascer 
tained,  but  by  experiment.  The  subject,  however, 
like  all  others,  is  susceptible  of  a  certain  degree  of 
reasoning  and  calculation. 

It  should  be  recollected,  that  the  House  is  now  en 
gaged  in  the  exercise  of  its  constitutional  rights.  It 
is  called  upon  to  make  provision  for  carrying  into  ef- 


382  MR.  GILES'   SPEECH '  ON 

feet  the  British  treaty.  Two  things  naturally  present 
themselves  to  its  consideration.  The  one,  the  expe 
diency  of  the  object  of  expenditure  itself,  for  which  the 
appropriation  is  required ;  the  second,  the  ways  and 
means  of  raising  the  money.  It  has  been  settled  by 
the  House,  that  both  are  within  the  constitutional  dis 
cretion  of  the  House.  The  President  would  deprive 
the  House  of  the  right  of  judging  of  the  expediency  of 
the  expenditure,  and  limit  its  discretion  to  the  ways 
and  means  of  furnishing  the  supplies.  This  point  be 
ing  previously  settled,  I  shall  not  enlarge  upon  it.  I  pro 
pose  to  give  the  history  of  the  rise  and  progress  of  the 
treaty.  I  will  be  correct  as  to  facts,  and  precise  as  to 
dates.  Very  shortly  after  Great  Britain  became  a 
party  to  the  war  against  France,  the  President  pro 
claimed  the  United  States  to  be  in  a  state  of  impartial 
neutrality.  The  proclamation  was  dated  22d  of  April, 
1793.  An  attempt  had  been  made,  and  was  at  that 
time  continued,  to  terminate  the  differences,  which 
subsisted  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Bri 
tain,  growing  out  of  the  inexecution  of  the  treaty  of 
peace.  This  attempt  proved  unsuccessful.  On  the 
1 6th  of  June,  1793,  Great  Britain  issued  an  order, 
which  affected  the  rights  of  neutral  vessels.  This  or 
der,  and  the  acts  committed  under  it,  served  to  in 
crease  the  causes  of  dispute  between  the  two  countries. 
On  the  meeting  of  Congress,  in  the  succeeding  fall, 
the  President  communicated  to  them  all  the  negocia- 
tions  which  had  taken  place  between  the  two  coun 
tries,  intimated,  that  negociation  did  not  promise  a 
favorable  issue,  and  that  it  was  left  with  Congress  to 
say,  what  further  was  to  be  done.  In  this  critical  situa 
tion  of  affairs,  Congress  took  the  subject  into  conside 
ration.  Great  Britain  was,  at  that  time  at  least,  consi 
dered  as  the  aggressing  nation.  The  first  measure  of 
self-protection  proposed,  was  a  restriction  of  the  com 
merce  of  Great  Britain  with  the  United  States :  this 
measure  was  objected  to,  as  being  too  strong  as  a 
commercial  measure,  and  too  weak  as  a  political  one. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  3g3 

As  far,  however,  as  a  vote  was  taken  upon  it,  a  majori 
ty  of  the  house  appeared  in  favor  of  that  proceeding. 
On  the  6th  of  November,  1793,  an  additional  order 
was  issued,  the  purport  of  which  was,  to  take  and 
bring  to  legal  adjudication  all  neutral  vessels  bound  to 
French  ports.  This  additional  evidence  of  hostility 
gave  rise  to  three  other  measures ;  the  one  was  an 
embargo  for  a  limited  time,  which  was  effected;  the 
second  was  the  suspension  of  commercial  intercourse 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain;  the 
third,  a  sequestration,  or  rather  the  arrestation  of  debts 
due  to  British  subjects.  The  proposition  for  the  ar 
restation  of  debts,  was  moved  the  27th  of  March : 
the  proposition  for  the  suspension  of  intercourse,  7th 
of  April,  1794.  On  the  4th  of  April,  1794,  the  Presi 
dent  laid  before  the  House  a  communication  from  Mr. 
Pinckney,  minister  from  the  United  States  to  Great 
Britain,  containing  a  conversation  between  Mr.  Pinck 
ney  and  Lord  Grenville,  of  a  very  extraordinary  nature, 
which  always  appeared  to  me  to  be  the  ground  work 
of  the  change,  which  shortly  afterwards  took  place  in 
the  conduct  of  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  to 
wards  the  House  of  Representatives. 

The  part  of  the  communication  alluded  to,  is  in  the 
following  words. — Extract  of  a  letter  from  Mr.  Pinck 
ney  to  the  secretary  of  state,  dated  9th  of  January,  1794. 

"  Lord  Grenville  answered,  that  the  only  reason  for 
renewing  them  was,  lest  the  present  instruction,  being 
a  revocation  of  that  of  the  6th  of  November,  might 
also  be  deemed  to  revoke  the  articles  which  were 
connected  with  it.  His  lordship  then  explained  the 
motives  which  had  induced  this  government  to  issue 
the  present  instruction.  The  first,  he  said  was  the 
sincere  desire  of  administration  to  maintain  the  best 
understanding  and  harmony  with  the  United  States. 
The  second  was,  what  he  could  not  mention  to  me 
officially,  but  what  he  still  thought  it  right,  I  should  be 
apprized  of,  that  no  misconception  of  their  motives 
might  be  entertained:  that  he  was  aware  of  the  delica- 


384  MR.  GILES'   SPEECH  ON 

cy  of  speaking  to  a  foreign  minister  concerning  the  in 
ternal  state  of  his  country,  neither  could  he  expect  an 
answer  from  me  on  the  subject ;  but  that  their  second 
reason  was,  by  this  conduct,  to  take  away  every  pre 
text,  from  evil  disposed  persons  among  us,  who  accord 
ing  to  the  intelligence  he  had  received,  were  endeavor 
ing  to  irritate  our  people  against  Great  Britain,  as  well 
as  to  oppose  the  measures  of  our  own  government, 
and,  in  short,  to  reduce  us  to  the  present  situation  of 
France ;  a  misfortune,  which  they  deprecated,  as  well 
for  our  sakes,  as  for  the  common  welfare  and  tranquilli 
ty  of  mankind.  He  further  took  occasion  to  observe, 
with  respect  to  the  conduct  of  our  government,  in 
maintaining  our  neutrality,  that  although  there  were 
some  matters,  with  which  this  government  was  not 
perfectly  satisfied,  (and  to  which,  for  the  same  reason, 
they  refrained  from  giving  that  opposition  they  thought 
they  would  be  justified  in  doing,)  yet,  from  the  general 
tenor  of  the  conduct  of  our  government,  they  were  con 
vinced,  it  was  their  desire  to  maintain  a  full  neutrality, 
which  was  an  additional  motive  for  their  present  con 
duct." 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  on  the  8th  of  January, 
the  revocation  of  the  hostile  order  of  the  6th  of  No 
vember  took  place,  and  on  the  next  day,  after  an  apolo 
gy  for  the  acknowledged  indelicacy  of  interfering  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  a  foreign  government,  Lord 
Grenville  modestly  undertakes  to  intermeddle  with  the 
affairs  of  the  United  States.  It  has  always  been  mat 
ter  of  surprise  to  me,  that  the  American  minister  should 
have  listened  to  such  a  communication,  and  still  more 
surprising,  that  it  should  have  met  with  a  favorable  re 
ception  in  the  United  States.  But  the  fact  is,  that  on 
the  19th  of  April,  1794,  the  chief  justice  was  taken 
from  the  exercise  of  his  judicial  duties,  and  nominated 
envoy  extraordinary  to  Great  Britain,  during  the  pen 
dency  of  two  of  the  beforementioned  propositions  in 
the  House  of  Representatives.  The  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  proceeded  to  pass  the  bill  for  the  suspension 


THE  BRITISH  TKEATV.  385 

of  commercial  intercourse  on  the  25th  of  April,  by  an 
uncommonly  large  majority,  and  on  the  27th  of  April,  the 
bill  was  negatived  by  the  senate%upon  the  casting  vote 
of  the  vice-president.  The  effect  of  this  vote  was  a 
discontinuance  of  the  embargo,  and  an  abandonment 
of  all  the  other  measures  proposed  for  self-protectioo. 
In  these  acts  will  be  seen,  the  commencement  of  what 
gentlemen  call  the  hostility  of  departments ;  but  what 
I  shall  term  the  due  exercise  of  the  checks,  provided  by 
the  constitution.  And,  if  it  is  to  be  traced  to  this  source, 
the  House  of  Representatives  will  evidently  appear  not 
to  be  the  aggressor.  The  House,  viewing  their  mea 
sures  defeated  by  the  constitutional  check,  acquiesced 
in  the  decision  without  a  murmur.  Now  we  are  told* 
if  the  House  should  exercise  its  constitutional  check,  a 
dissolution  of  the  government  would  necessarily  ensue. 
This  conclusion  seems  to  me  without  foundation,  and 
ought  not  to  be  brought  into  calculation,  in  estimating 
the  present  question. 

The  treaty  itself  was  concluded  on  the  28th  of  Octo 
ber,  1794.  It  was  communicated  to  this  House,  the 
1st  of  March,  1796,  having  on  the  same  day  been  pro 
mulgated  by  proclamation  declaring  it  to  be  obligatory. 

The  treaty  originated  from  an  intimation  of 
lord  Grenville,  which  has  always  excited  my  appre 
hension  ;  it  was  commenced  against  the  known  sense  of 
the  House  of  Representatives,  and  every  step  of  its 
progression  seems  to  have  been  marked  with  peculiar 
coercion. 

When  a  British  minister  undertakes  to  declare,  that 
the  motive  for  the  revocation  of  a  hostile  order  was, 
to  take  away  every  pretext  from  evil  disposed  persons 
among  us,  who,  according  to  the  intelligence  he  had  re 
ceived,  were  endeavoring  to  irritate  our  own  people 
against  Griat  Britain,  as  well  as  to  oppose  the  measures 
of  our  own  government,  &c.,  and  to  assign  the  same 
reason,  for  refraining  from  giving  that  opposition  to 
some  exceptionable  measures  of  our  government, 
which  he  otherwise  might  have  done;  and  when  the 

VOL,  i.  49 


386  MK.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

United  States  so  far  listen  to  this  language,  as 
immediately  to  enter  into  negociation  upon  the  sub 
ject,  my  apprehensions  of  British  interference,  of 
British  influence,  are  strongly  excited,  particularly 
when  the  British  minister  seems  to  make  a  common 
cause  between  the  two  governments  against  what  he 
is  pleased  to  call  evil  disposed  persons.  I  will  here 
incidentally  remark,  that  as  far  as  these  "  evil  disposed 
persons"  have  produced  the  revocation  of  the  hostile 
order  of  November,  and  a  relaxation  of  British  hostili 
ty  in  other  respects,  they  are  certainly  entitled  to  ap 
plause  from  the  United  States,  whatever  epithets  may 
have  been  bestowed  upon  them  by  a  British  minister. 

The  contents  of  the  treaty  have  very  much  confirm 
ed  my  original  apprehensions.  Gentlemen  have  often 
said,  show  us  the  danger  of  British  interference,  of 
British  influence.  To  my  mind,  the  treaty  itself  con 
tains  the  evidence.  The  treaty  itself  corresponds 
with  what  I  consider  as  the  object  of  the  British  mi 
nister  in  giving  the  invitation  to  it. 

I  find  it  in  the  following  particular  instances.  Be 
fore  the  treaty,  the  right  of  laying  a  special,  as  well  as 
a  general  embargo  existed  in  the  United  States  :  the 
right  of  laying  a  special  embargo  upon  British  vessels, 
is  surrendered.  Before  the  treaty,  the  right  of  seques 
tration  existed,  and  the  exercise  of  it  was  proposed. 
This  right,  so  far  as  it  respects  Great  Britain,  is  for 
ever  surrendered.  Before  the  treaty,  the  right  of  dis 
criminating  against  British  goods,  in  favor  of  those  of 
other  nations,  existed,  and  the  exercise  of  it  was  pro 
posed.  This  right  is  surrendered.  Before  the  treaty, 
the  right  of  suspending  commercial  intercourse  with 
Great  Britain  existed,  and  was  proposed  to  be  exer 
cised  ;  the  exercise  of  that  right  is  stipulated  against 
for  a  limited  time,  &c.  All  these  are  restrictions  of 
the  exercise  of  the  rights  of  national  sovereignty,  and 
seem  to  me  complete  evidence  of  British  interference. 

These  circumstances  furnish  two  reflections.     The 
one  is.  that  the  British  cabinet  deem  the  measures 


THE  BRITISH   TREATY.  387 

proposed,  to  be  more  efficacious,  than  they  have  ge 
nerally  been  represented  to  be  in  the  United  States ;  and 
hence,  the  extreme  caution  to  stipulate  against  the 
future  exercise  of  them.  The  other  is,  that  party  sen 
sations  must  have  had  great  influence  upon  the  extra 
ordinary  envoy  of  the  United  States,  to  induce  his 
consent  to  these  great  abridgments  of  the  rights  of 
national  sovereignty.  The  treaty  not  only  contains 
abridgments  of  the  national  rights,  but  changes  the 
municipal  regulations  of  the  United  States :  and  how 
have  these  things  been  effected  ? — By  the  substi 
tution  of  a  foreign  power  in  the  place  of  the  House 
of  Representatives.  If  the  treaty-making  power  be 
thus  extensive,  and  if  it  be  so  absolutely  obligatory, 
as.  to  deprive  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
right  of  judging  as  to  the  expediency  of  making  the 
provisions  for  its  complete  effectuation,  of  what  use  is 
the  House  of  Representatives  as  a  distinct  branch  of 
the  government  ?  Will  it  not  be  a  mere  formal,  and 
not  an  efficient  branch  of  the  government  ?  An  entire 
new  system  of  jurisprudence  may  thus  be  introduced 
by  treaty,  and  become  obligatory  upon  the  House 
of  Representatives — obligatory  upon  the  nation. 

Whenever  the  question,  which  necessarily  results 
from  the  unlimited  scope  given  to  the  treaty-making 
power,  shall  be  presented  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  to  wit : — Shall  the  House  of  Representatives 
become  a  formal,  or  remain  an  efficient,  branch  of  the 
government;  they  will  pause,  before  they  will  decide 
upon  its  annihilation.  Their  love  of  liberty,  their  love 
of  their  own  interests,  will  check,  for  a  moment,  per 
sonal  affections,  or  antipathies :  party  sensations,  state 
jealousies  will  be  disarmed,  and  the  people  will  be 
found  right  in  their  decision. 

Even  in  the  midst  of  the  clamor  of  war  and  disunion, 
which  has  been  momentarily  excited  for  a  particular 
object,  the  people  cannot  be  led  to  such  fatal  extremi 
ties,  as  the  doctrine  contended  for  would  necessarily 
produce.  Much  less  will  this  be  the  case  after  they 


M*R.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON7 

shall  have  been  relieved  from  these  causeless  appre 
hensions. 

If  therefore,  the  House  should  exercise  a  constitu 
tional  right  of  judging  of  the  propriety  of  the  object  of 
expenditure,  and  a  refusal  should  be  the  result  of  their 
judgment,  I  do  not  believe  that  it  will  produce  that 
fatal  hostility  of  departments  which  would  eventuate  in 
a  total  dissolution  of  the  government ;  but  will  be  an 
exercise  of  one  of  the  salutary  checks,  provided  in  the 
constitution,  which,  in  my  opinion,  constitute  its 
merit,  and  not  its  reproach. 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  consider,  whether  a  war  with 
Great  Britain  will  be  the  probable  consequence  of  a 
refusal  to  make  the  necessary  provision  for  carrying 
the  British  treaty  into  effect.  To  my  mind,  there  does 
not  appear  to  be  the  least  ground  for  the  clamor,  which 
has  been  excited  from  this  suggestion.  I  believe  that 
Great  Britain  will  make  war  upon  the  United  States 
whenever  she  deems  it  her  interest  to  do  so ;  and  that 
the  treaty  would  impose  no  restraint  upon  her,  if  she 
thought  her  interest  would  justify  the  conduct.  I  also 
believe,  that  if  there  should  be  no  treaty  with  Great 
Britain,  she  would  not  go  to  war  with  the  United 
States,  unless  her  interest  should  dictate  the  measure. 
In  short,  I  believe,  that  Great  Britain,  like  all  other 
nations,  will  make  her  interest  the  criterion  of  her 
conduct  in  every  question  of  peace  or  war. 

If  this  opinion  be  well  formed,  the  probability  of 
war  may  be  tested  by  this  question.  Is  it  the  interest 
of  Great  Britain  to  make  war  upon  the  United  States 
in  the  relative  situation  of  the  two  countries  ?  Great 
Britain  is  now  engaged  in  a  war  in  which  the  govern 
ment  hazards  every  thing.  She  is  at  this  moment  en 
gaged  in  an  important  enterprize  against  the  French 
West  Indies.  She  is  under  the  necessity  of  resorting 
to  the  United  States  for  sundry  supplies  for  facilitating 
the  enterprize.  The  United  States  are  the  best  com 
mercial  customer  she  has  in  the  world.  Under  these 
circumstances,  what  would  be  her  inducement  for 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY,  3(J9 

war  ?  What  would  be  her  inducements  to  avoid  it  ? 
These  questions  furnish  their  own  answers.  The  argu 
ment  of  war  is  an  argument  of  dependence.  It  is  also 
an  argument  which  will  last  forever.  If  the  fear  of  war 
is  now  to  influence  our  conduct  against  our  judgments, 
will  not  the  same  argument  apply  with  double  force 
two  years  after  the  expiration  of  the  present  war,  to  in 
duce  a  continuance  of  the  treaty  upon  its  present  inju 
rious  conditions  ? 

As  the  argument  of  war  is  the  chief  instrument,  by 
which  the  treaty  is  pressed  upon  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  1  beg  the  indulgence  of  the  committee 
in  taking  a  retrospective  view  of  this  subject,  and  in 
examining  it  with  some  minuteness.  Whatever  may 
have  been  my  opinion  at  the  time  of  receiving  the  in 
formation  of  the  hostile  order  of  the  6th  of  November, 
I  am  now  of  opinion,  that  at  that  time,  Great  Britain 
did  meditate  war  against  the  United  States,  although 
I  believe  there  is  no  danger  of  it  at  present. 

I  believe  too,  that  the  neutrality,  proclaimed  by  the 
United  States,  does  not  in  the  smallest  degree,  influ 
ence  the  conduct  or  disposition  of  Great  Britain  to 
wards  the  United  States  in  regard  to  war  or  peace, 
but  that  the  true  explanation  of  her  disposition  will  be 
found  in  the  course  of  events  in  Europe.  On  the 
1st  of  February,  1793,  France  declared  war  against 
the  king  of  England,  and  the  stadtholder  of  Holland, 
and  on  the  7th  of  the  same  month  against  Spain. 
France  was  then  at  war  with  the  emperor  of  Germany, 
and  the  king  of  Prussia,  &c.  A  combination  of  most 
of  the  despots  of  Europe  had  previously  been  formed, 
(it  is  generally  believed  on  the  21st  July,  1791,  at 
Pilnitz,)  for  the  purpose  of  crushing  the  revolutionary 
spirit,  which  had  appeared  in  France.  The  accession 
of  Great  Britain,  Spain,  Holland,  Portugal  and  some 
of  the  Italian  States  to  the  combination  already  form 
ed,  made  it  the  most  formidable  which  has  ever  ap 
peared  in  the  history  of  modern  times.  The  most 
desperate  and  bloody  war.  of  course,  ensued,  and  im- 


390  MR.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

mediately  succeeded  the  declaration  of  war  against 
Great  Britain ;  a  series  of  successes  took  place,  which 
threatened  the  absolute  subjugation  of  France. 

On  the  1st  of  March,  the  French  sustained  a  consi 
derable  loss  by  the  surprise  of  the  vanguard  of  their 
army,  on  the  river  Roer ;  on  the  13th,  the  rebellion  of 
La  Vendee  commenced;  on  the  18th,  Dumourier  was 
defeated ;  on  the  20th,  he  abandoned  his  army ;  on  the 
3d  of  April,  his  army  retreated  into  France ;  on  the  4th, 
Dumourier  himself  was  outlawed;  on  the  13th,  France 
made  a  declaration  against  all  interference  with  for 
eign  governments ;  on  the  22d  of  April,  the  President 
issued  the  proclamation  of  neutrality;  on  the  3d  of 
May,  the  rebellion  of  Corsica  commenced ;  29th,  the 
rebellion  of  the  department  of  Loire ;  30th,  the  rebel 
lion  of  the  city  of  Lyons ;  June  2d,  thirty-two  deputies 
of  the  convention,  generally  called  the  Brissotines, 
were  arrested.  About  the  same  time,  a  rebellion  com 
menced  in  the  departments  ofBouches  du  Rhone,  Cal 
vados  and  Eure ;  June  the  8th,  the  first  order  by  Great 
Britain  for  seizure  of  neutral  vessels  bound  to  France, 
with  provisions,  was  issued.  It  is  here  to  be  remark 
ed,  that  the  impartial  state  of  neutrality  proclaimed  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  on  the  22d  of  the 
preceding  April,  was  probably  known  to  the  British 
cabinet;  but,  whilst  flushed  with  these  successes 
in  her  crusade  against  liberty,  the  neutrality  of  the 
United  States  could  not  protect  them  from  the  inva 
sion  of  their  neutral  rights.  On  the  10th  of  July,  Con- 
de  surrendered  to  the  Combined  Armies ;  on  the  27th, 
Mayence,  &c. ;  on  the  28th,  Valenciennes ;  at  the  end 
of  July,  the  Spaniards  were  in  possession  of  Bellegrade, 
Collioure,  St.  Elme,  &c.  and  of  the  whole  department 
of  the  eastern  Pyrenees,  and  part  of  the  lower  Pyre 
nees.  The  Prussians  and  Austrians  were  possessed 
of  the  lines  of  Weisemburg,  Fort  Vauban,  £c.  and 
had  blockaded  Landau.  The  Piedmontese  and  Ha 
noverians  had  made  successful  inroads  into  other 
parts  of  France ;  the  royalists  of  La  Vendee  were  in 
possession  of  four  departments. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  391 

The  royalists  of  the  fourth  were  in  possession  of 
Lyons,  Marseilles,  Toulon,  and  the  departments  of 
Vaucluse  and  Rhone.  On  the  28th  of  August,  all 
Frenchmen  were  put  in  requisition ;  on  the  28th,  Tou 
lon  surrendered  to  lord  Hood,  by  the  royalists ;  on  the 
9th  of  September,  the  duke  of  York  was  defeated ;  on 
the  llth,  Lyons  was  subdued;  on  the  30th  of  October, 
the  Brissotines  were  executed.  This  was  nearly  the 
state  of  the  war  upon  the  European  continent,  at  the 
time  of  issuing  the  hostile  order  of  the  6th  of  November. 
In  this  chronological  statement  of  facts,  may  be  found 
the  hostile  disposition  of  Great  Britain,  widened  by 
that  order  against  the  United  States.  France,  convuls 
ed  with  intestine  divisions,  which  extended  to  the  very 
heart  of  the  convention,  laboring  under  the  most  for 
midable  external  pressure,  was  supposed  to  be  an  easy 
prey  to  this  terrible  combination  of  despots :  the  com 
bination  having  in  view,  as  I  believe,  the  total  de 
struction  of  liberty.  Great  Britain,  possessed  of  the 
most  triumphant  and  formidable  fleet,  and  guiding  al 
most  implicitly  the  movements  of  this  great  combina- 
nation,  already  anticipated  the  destruction  of  liberty  in 
France,  and  began  to  turn  her  attention  towards  the 
same  object  in  the  United  States.  Hence,  the  order  of 
the  6th  of  November ;  hence,  the  truce  between  Portu 
gal  and  Algiers ;  hence,  the  talk  between  lord  Dor 
chester  and  the  Indians.  These  were  all  acts  of  hos 
tility,  and  evidently  produced  by  the  state  of  things  be 
fore  described.  But  what  events  followed  these  acts 
of  hostility  ? 

A  complete  reverse  of  fortune  immediately  succeed 
ed.  The  duke  of  York  had  been  already  defeated. 
On  the  17th  of  December,  Toulon  was  retaken  by  the 
French ;  on  the  22d,  the  Austrian  fortified  camp  near 
Werth,  was  attacked  and  carried ;  on  the  24th  and 
25th,  the  army  under  the  command  of  the  duke  of 
Brunswick  was  defeated  at  Kellsburg,  and  the  Austrian 
army  at  Geisberg ;  on  the  26th,  the  lines  of  Weisem- 
burg  were  forced,  and  the  Austrian  army  defeated, 


392  MR.  GILES'  SPEECH  ON 

On  the  8th  of  January,  the  hostile  order  for  seizing 
neutral  vessels   was   revoked,  and  on  the   9th,  lord 
Grenville  informed  the  American  minister,  that  the 
revocation  of  the  order  was  to  take  away  all  pretext 
from  evil  disposed  persons  amongst  us,  for  indulging 
their  resentment  against  Great  Britain.     But,  however 
strongly  this  motive  may  have  operated  on  the  British 
cabinet,  it  certainly  was  very  strongly  enforced  by  the 
state  of  things  upon  the  European  continent,  which 
was   not  only  changed,  but  completely  reversed  be 
tween  the  6th  of  November,  1793,  and  the  8th  of  Janua 
ry,  1794.     It  is  remarkable,  that  notwithstanding  the 
several  changes  in  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain,  to 
wards  the  United  States,  they  have  been  uniform  in 
their  impartial  neutrality  towards  Great  Britain;  of 
course,  the  uniform  disposition  of  the  United  States 
towards  Great  Britain,  could  not  have  produced  the 
fluctuating  disposition  of  Great  Britain  towards  the 
United    States.     Great  Britain,    in    all    probability, 
supposed,  that,  in  the  intoxication  of  the  combined 
powers,    from  their   early   successes,    her  influence 
might  unite  them  in  a  war  against  the  United  States, 
and  perhaps,  in  the  height  of  her  presumption,  she 
might  even  have  indulged  the  impious  hope  of  regain 
ing  her  dominion  over  them :  but  this  sudden  reverse 
of  fortune  checked  her  ambitious  enterprize.    Proba 
bly  anticipating  a  speedy  dissolution  of  the  combina 
tion,  and  having  abandoned  all  prospects  of  engaging 
them  in  her  iniquitous  project,  and  being  unwilling  to 
add  a  new  and  formidable  enemy  to  the  one  she  al 
ready  had  encountered,  and  even  fearing  the  effects  of 
her  previous  hostilities,  a  sudden  revolution  is  produc 
ed  in  her  conduct  towards  the  United  States:  it  is 
then  she  is  desirous  of  taking  away  all  pretext  from 
"  evil  disposed  persons,"  to  indulge  their  resentment 
against  her:  it  is  then  the  order  of  revocation  is  seen. 
If,  then,  Great  Britain  was  unwilling  to  encounter  a 
new  enemy,  in  her  then  situation,  will  any  change  of 
circumstances  justify,  at  this  time,  the  supposition  of  a 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  393 

change  of  disposition  in  Great  Britain,  respecting  war 
with  the  United  States  ?  I  believe  not.  Peace  seems 
to  be  more  important  to  Great  Britain,  at  this  moment, 
than  at  any  time  previously,  during  the  whole  period 
of  the  war.  The  nation  is  desirous  of  peace,  and  dis 
tressed  for  provisions.  The  combination,  which  in 
dulged  her  presumptuous  hopes,  crumbled  into  dust. 

Prussia  is  at  peace  with  France,  and  almost  at  war 
with  Great  Britain.  Spain  is  at  peace  with  France, 
and  hardly  at  peace  with  Great  Britain.  Holland  is 
at  peace  and  in  alliance  with  France,  and  at  war  with 
Great  Britain.  Austria  herself  is  almost  exhausted, 
and  desirous  of  peace ;  and  the  continuation  of 
French  exertions  and  successes  has  excited  the  admi 
ration  and  astonishment  of  the  world.  Are  these  the 
circumstances  which  would  justify  apprehensions  of 
war  from  Great  Britain  ?  And  are  the  United  States 
to  tremble  at  the  sound  of  war  from  a  nation  thus  cir 
cumstanced  ?  I  trust  not.  And  for  what  cause  is  this 
war  to  be  produced  ?  Because  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  may  deem  it  inexpedient  to  become  the  in 
strument  of  giving  efficacy  to  a  bad  bargain. 

I  verily  believe,  that  the  alarm  of  war  is  not  serious. 
I  verily  believe  it  is  resorted  to  as  an  artificial  instru 
ment  to  effect  a  favorite  object.  For  my  part,  I  be 
lieve  the  hazard  so  small,  as  not  to  constitute  an  item 
in  estimating  the  present  question. 

I  believe,  that  Great  Britain  considers  the  United 
States  as  a  more  important  commercial  connexion, 
(particularly  as  it  respects  her  views  in  the  West  In- 
aies,)  than  some  gentlemen  seem  to  admit ;  and  I  be 
lieve  also,  that  she  views  the  United  States  more  for 
midable  as  an  enemy.  I  infer  these  opinions  from 
the  avidity  with  which  this  treaty  seems  to  have  been 
received  in  that  country,  and  particularly  from  an  ex 
pression  in  the  speech  of  the  king  at  the  late  meeting 
of  parliament.  Two  reflections  were  strongly  im 
pressed  upon  my  mind  from  that  speech.  The  one, 
that  the  treaty  is  deemed  a  very  advantageous  one  to 
1.  50 


394  MR,   GILES'   SPEECH  ON 

Great  Britain,  the  other,  that  Great  Britain  has  no  ap 
petite  for  war  against  the  United  States,  in  her  present 
situation. 

Hence,  I  cannot  believe,  that  there  is  the  least  pos 
sible  foundation  for  the  suggestion  of  the  fatal  hostili 
ty  of  departments  of  government,  or  of  war  with  Great 
Britain,  as  amongst  the  consequences  resulting  from  a 
refusal  to  make  the  necessary  provisions  for  giving  ef 
ficacy  to  the  treaty. 

As  the  present  treaty  is  incomplete,  and  as  further 
negociations  are  stipulated  in  the  treaty  itself,  and  in 
the  event  of  a  decision  either  way,  are  expected ;  I 
think  the  most  important  consequences  of  the  vote 
will  be  these.  If  the  House  should  refuse  to  make  the 
provisions  for  carrying  the  treaty  into  effect,  the  new 
negociations  will  commence  without  the  concessions 
contained  in  the  present  treaty.  If  the  provisions  are 
made,  the  further  negociations  will  proceed  under  the 
weight  of  the  concessions  already  made,  arid  very  little 
melioration  of  the  present  conditions  can  be  expect 
ed,  as  the  United  States  will  have  very  little  left  to  in 
duce  the  melioration.  And  if  no  final  adjustment  of 
differences  ensues,  the  United  States  will  at  least  con 
tinue  to  possess  all  the  rights  attached  to  national 
sovereignty. 

Much  has  been  said,  and  much  unnecessarily  said, 
about  intemperance  and  heats.  I  will  appeal  to  the 
recollection  of  the  committee,  whether  there  ever  was 
a  more  harmonious  session  than  the  present,  until  this 
treaty  was  introduced  into  the  House ;  and,  then, 
whether  its  opponents  have  not  discovered  at  least  as 
much  coolness  and  deliberation  as  its  advocates. 

The  treaty  itself  is  the  torch  of  discord,  which  has 
been  unfortunately  thrown  into  the  United  States,  and 
it  is  extraordinary  to  observe,  that  those  who  have  been 
most  instrumental  in  introducing  it,  impute  intemper 
ance  to  others  for  a  firm  and  decisive  opposition  to  it. 
It  is  too  much  to  suppose  that  the  absolute  sacrifice  of 
opinion  is  an  obligation  due  to  the  embarrassments, 
into  which  this  treaty  has  thrown  the  United  States. 


THE  BRITISH   TREATY.  395 

Upon  the  whole,  I  conscientiously  believe  the  treaty 
to  be  a  bad  one.  I  believe  it  contains  the  completes! 
evidence  of  British  interference  in  our  internal  affairs, 
and  has  laid  the  foundation  for  the  further  extension  of 
British  influence.  It  has  restricted  the  exercise  of 
some  of  the  important  rights  of  national  sovereignty. 
It  has  voluntarily  hazarded  the  neutrality  of  the  United 
States  in  the  present  European  war,  and  destroyed  all 
pretensions  to  its  character  of  impartiality.  It  has 
not  afforded  protection  to  our  neutral  rights,  which  is 
amongst  its  great  objects ;  and,  in  the  adjustment  of 
the  differences  resulting  from  the  inexecution  of  the 
treaty  of  peace,  it  is  unequal  and  unjust.  All  these  im 
portant  circumstances  considered,  and  when  it  is  also 
considered,  that  the  British  persevere  in  impressing 
our  seamen  and  seizing  our  vessels  in  violation  of  the 
clearest  rights  of  neutral  nations,  even  since  the  signing 
'of  the  treaty,  I  cannot  consent  to  be  the  instrument  of 
giving  it  efficacy.  I  believe,  that  it  is  one  of  those  ex 
traordinary  cases,  which  justify  strong  and  extraordina 
ry  resistance. 


SPEECH  OF  ALBERT  GALLATIN, 

ON 

THE  BRITISH  TREATY, 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES,  APRIL  26,  1796. 


In  committee  of  the  whole  on  the  following  Resolution,  Resolved) 
as  the  opinion  of  this  committee,  that  it  is  expedient  to  pass  the 
laws  necessary  for  carrying  into  effect  the  treaty  with  Great 
Britain  :  Mr.  Gallatin  spoke  as  follows  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

I  WILL  not  follow  some  of  the  gentlemen,  who  have 
preceded  me,  by  dwelling  upon  the  discretion  of  the 
legislature;  a  question  which  has  already  been  the 
subject  of  our  deliberations,  and  been  decided  by  a  so 
lemn  vote.  Gentlemen,  who  were  in  the  minority  on 
that  question,  may  give  any  construction  they  please 
to  the  declaratory  resolution  of  the  House ;  they  may 
again  repeat,  that  to  refuse  to  carry  the  treaty  into  ef 
fect,  is  a  breach  of  the  public  faith,  which  they  con 
ceive  as  being  pledged  by  the  President  and  senate. 
This  has  been  the  ground  on  which  a  difference  of 
opinion  has  existed  since  the  beginning  of  the  discus 
sion.  It  is  because  the  House  thinks  that  the  faith  of 
the  nation  cannot,  on  those  subjects  submitted  to  the 
power  of  Congress,  be  pledged  by  any  constituted  au 
thority  other  than  the  legislature,  that  they  resolved, 
that,  in  all  such  cases,  it  is  their  right  and  duty  to  con- 


MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH,  &c.  397 

aider  the  expediency  of  carrying  a  treaty  into  effect. 
If  the  House  think  the  faith  of  the  nation  already  pledg 
ed,  they  cannot  claim  any  discretion ;  there  is  no 
room  left  to  deliberate  upon  the  expediency  of  the 
thing.  The  resolution  now  under  consideration,  is 
merely  "  that  it  is  expedient  to  carry  the  British  treaty 
into  effect,"  and  not  whether  we  are  bound  by  nation- 
al  faith  to  do  it.  I  will,  therefore,  consider  the  question 
of  expediency  alone ;  and  thinking,  as  I  do,  that  the 
House  has  full  discretion  on  this  subject,  I  conceive 
that  there  is  as  much  responsibility  in  deciding  in  the 
affirmative,  as  in  rejecting  the  resolution,  and  that  we 
shall  be  equally  answerable  for  the  consequences  that 
may  follow  from  either. 

It  is,  however,  true,  that  there  was  a  great  differ 
ence  between  the  situation  of  this  country,  in  the  year 
1794,  when  a  negociator  was  appointed,  and  that  ia 
which  we  are  at  present ;  and  that  consequences  will 
follow  the  refusal  to  carry  into  effect  the  treaty  in  its 
present  stage,  which  would  not  have  attended  a  refu 
sal  to  negociate,  and  to  enter  -  into  such  a  treaty. 
The  question  of  expediency,  therefore,  assumes  before 
us  a  different  and  more  complex  shape,  than  when  be 
fore  the  negociator,«tfre  senate,  or  the  President.  The 
treaty,  in  itself  and  abstractedly  considered,  may  be 
injurious;  it  may  be  such  an  instrument  as,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  House,  ought  not  to  have  been  adopted 
by  the  Executive ;  and  yet,  such  as  it  is,  we  may  think 
it  expedient,  under  the  present  circumstances,  to  car 
ry  it  into  effect.  I  will,  therefore,  first  take  a  view  of 
the  provisions  of  the  treaty  itself,  and  in  the  next  place, 
supposing  it  is  injurious,  consider,  in  case  it  is  not  car^ 
ried  into  effect,  what  will  be  the  natural  consequence 
of  such  refusal. 

The  provisions  of  the  treaty  relate  either  to  the  ad 
justment  of  past  differences,  or  to  the  future  inter 
course  of  the  two  nations.  The  differences,  now  ex 
isting  between  Great  Britain  and  this  country,  arose 
either  from  non-execution  of  some  articles  qf  the  tyea- 


398  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  ON 

ty  of  peace,  or  from  the  effects  of  the  present  Europe 
an  war.  The  complaints  of  Great  Britain,  in  relation 
to  the  treaty  of  1783,  were  confined  to  the  legal  impe 
diments,  thrown  by  the  several  states  in  the  way  of  the 
recovery  of  British  debts.  The  late  treaty  provides 
adequate  remedy  on  that  subject ;  the  United  States 
are  bound  to  make  full  and  complete  compensation 
for  any  losses  arising  from  that  source,  and  every 
ground  of  complaint  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  is 
removed. 

Having  thus  done  full  justice  to  the  other  nation, 
America  has  a  right  to  expect  that  equal  attention 
shall  be  paid  to  her  claims  arising  from  infractions  of 
the  treaty  of  peace,  viz.  compensation  for  the  negroes 
carried  away  by  the  British ;  restoration  of  the  western 
posts,  and  indemnification  for  their  detention. 

On  the  subject  of  the  first  claim  which  has  been  ob 
jected  to  as  groundless,  I  will  observe,  that  I  am  not  satis 
fied  that  the  construction  given  by  the  British  govern 
ment  to  that  article  of  the  treaty,  is  justified  even  by 
the  letter  of  the  article.  That  construction  rests  on 
the  supposition  that  slaves  come  under  the  general 
denomination  of  booty,  and  are  alienated  the  moment 
they  fall  into  the  possession  of  ah.  enemy,  so  that  all 
those  who  were  in  the  hands  of  the  British  when  the 
treaty  of  peace  was  signed,  must  be  considered  as 
British,  and  not  as  American  property,  and  are  not  in 
cluded  in  the  article.  It  will,  however,  appear,  by  re 
curring  to  Vattel  when  speaking  of  the  right  of  Postli- 
minium,  that  slaves  cannot  be  considered  as  part  of 
the  booty  which  is  alienated  by  the  act  of  capture, 
and  that  they  are  to  be  ranked  rather  with  real  pro 
perty,  to  the  profits  of  which  only  the  captors  are  en 
titled.  Be  that  as  it  may,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
construction  given  by  America,  is  that  which  was  un 
derstood  by  the  parties  at  the  time  of  making  the  trea 
ty.  The  journals  of  Mr.  Adams,  quoted  by  a  gentle 
man  from  Connecticut,  (Mr.  Coit,)  prove  this  fully ; 
for  when  he  says,  that  the  insertion  of  this  article  was 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  399 

alone  worth  the  journey  of  Mr.  Laurens  from  London, 
can  it  be  supposed  that  he  would  have  laid  so  much 
stress  on  a  clause,  which,  according  to  the  new  con 
struction,  now  attempted  to  be  given,  means  only  that 
the  British  would  commit  no  new  act  of  hostility — 
would  not  carry  away  slaves,  at  that  time  in  posses 
sion  of  Americans  ?  Congress  recognized  that  con 
struction  by  adopting  the  resolution  which  has  been 
already  quoted,  and  which  was  introduced  upon  the 
motion  of  Mr.  Alexander  Hamilton;  and  it  has  not 
been  denied  that  the  British  ministry,  during  Mr. 
Adams'  embassy,  also  agreed  to  it. 

But  when  our  negociator  had,  for  the  sake  of  peace, 
waved  that  claim ;  when  he  had  also  abandoned  the 
right  which  America  had  to  demand  an  indemnifica 
tion  for  the  detention  of  the  posts,  although  he  had 
conceded  the  right  of  a  similar  nature,  which  Great 
Britain  had  for  the  detention  of  debts ;  when  he  had 
thus  given  up  every  thing  which  might  be  supposed  to 
be  of  a  doubtful  nature,  it  might  have  been  hoped  that 
our  last  claim — a  claim  on  which  there  was  not,  and 
there  never  had  been  any  dispute — the  western  posts 
should  have  been  restored  according  to  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  of  peace.  Upon  what  ground  the  British 
insisted,  and  our  negociator  conceded,  that  this 
late  restitution  should  be  saddled  with  new  conditions, 
which  made  no  part  of  the  original  contract,  1  am  at 
a  loss  to  know.  British  traders  are  allowed,  by  the 
new  treaty,  to  remain  within  the  posts,  without  becom 
ing  citizens  of  the  United  States;  and  to  carry  on 
trade  and  commerce  with  the  Indians  living  within  our 
boundaries,  without  being  subject  to  any  control  from 
our  government.  In  vain  is  it  said,  that  if  that  clause 
had  not  been  inserted,  we  would  have  found  it  our  in 
terest  to  effect  it  by  our  own  laws.  Of  this  we  are 
alone  competent  judges  ;  if  that  condition  is  harmless 
at  present,  it  is  not  possible  to  foresee  whether,  under 
future  circumstances,  it  will  not  prove  highly  injurious ; 
and  whether  harmless  or  not,  it  is  not  less  a  perma- 


400  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  ON 

nent  and  new  condition  imposed  upon  us.  But  the 
fact  is,  that  by  the  introduction  of  that  clause,  by 
obliging  us  to  keep  within  our  jurisdiction,  as  British 
subjects,  the  very  men,  who  have  been  the  instruments 
used  by  Great  Britain  to  promote  Indian  wars  on  our 
frontiers ;  by  obliging  us  to  suffer  those  men  to  con 
tinue  their  commerce  with  the  Indians  living  in  our 
territory,  uncontrolled  by  those  regulations,  which  we 
have  thought  necessary  in  order  to  restrain  our  own 
citizens  in  their  intercourse  with  these  tribes,  Great 
Britain  has  preserved  her  full  influence  with  the  Indian 
nations.  By  a  restoration  of  the  posts  under  that  con 
dition,  we  have  lost  the  greatest  advantage  that  was 
expected  from  their  possession,  viz.  future  security 
against  the  Indians.  In  the  same  manner  have  the 
British  preserved  the  commercial  advantages,  which 
result  from  the  occupancy  of  those  posts,  by  stipulat 
ing  as  a  permanent  condition,  a  free  passage  for  their 
goods  across  our  portages,  without  paying  any  duty. 
Another  article  of  the  new  treaty,  which  is  connect 
ed  with  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  1783,  deserves 
consideration  ;  I  mean  what  relates  to  the  Mississippi, 
At  the  time  when  the  navigation  of  that  river  to  its 
mouth,  was,  by  the  treaty  of  peace,  declared  to  be 
common  to  both  nations,  Great  Britain  communicated 
to  America  a  right,  which  she  held  by  virtue  of  the 
treaty  of  1763,  and  as  owner  of  the  Floridas ;  but  since 
that  cession  to  the  United  States,  England  has  ceded  to 
Spain  her  claim  on  the  Floridas,  and  does  not  own,  at 
the  present  time,  an  inch  of  ground,  either  on  the 
mouth  or  on  any  part  of  that  river.  Spain  now  stands 
in  the  place  of  Great  Britain,  and  by  virtue  of  the 
treaty  of  1783,  it  is  to  Spain  and  America,  and  not  to 
England  and  America  that  the  navigation  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  is  at  present  to  be  common.  Yet,  notwith 
standing  this  change  of  circumstances,  we  have  re 
peated  that  article  of  the  former  treaty  in  the  late  one, 
and  have  granted  to  Great  Britain  the  additional  privi 
lege  of  using  our  ports  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  river. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  40i 

without  which,  as  they  own  no  land  thereon,  they 
could  not  have  navigated  it.  Nor  is  this  all.  Upon  a 
supposition  that  the  Mississippi  does  not  extend  so 
far  northward  as  to  be  intersected  by  a  line  drawn  due 
west  from  the  Lake  of  the  Wood,  or,  in  other  words, 
upon  a  supposition  that  Great  Britain  has  not  a  claim 
even  to  touch  the  Mississippi,  we  have  agreed,  not 
upon  what  will  be  the  boundary  line,  but  that  we  will 
hereafter  negociate  to  settle  that  line.  Thus  leaving 
to  future  negociation  what  should  have  been  finally 
settled  by  the  treaty  itself,  in  the  same  manner  as  all 
other  differences  were,  is  calculated  for  the  sole  pur 
pose,  either  of  laying  the  foundation  of  future  disputes, 
or  of  recognizing  a  claim  in  Great  Britain  on  the  waters 
of  the  Mississippi,  even  if  their  boundary  line  leaves  to 
the  southward  the  sources  of  that  river.  Had  not  that 
been  the  intention  of  Great  Britain,  the  line  would  have 
been  settled  at  once  by  the  treaty,  according  to  either 
of  the  two  only  rational  ways  of  doing  it  in  conformity  to 
the  treaty  of  1783,  that  is  to  say,  by  agreeing  that  the 
line  should  run  from  the  northernmost  sources  of  the 
Mississippi,  either  directly  to  the  western  extremity  of 
the  Lake  of  the  Wood,  or  northwardly  till  it  intersect 
ed  the  line  to  be  drawn  due  west  from  that  lake.  But,  by 
repeating  the  article  of  the  treaty  of  1783 ;  by  conced 
ing  the  free  use  of  our  ports  on  the  river,  and  by  the 
insertion  of  the  fourth  article,  we  have  admitted,  that 
Great  Britain,  in  all  possible  events,  has  still  a  right 
to  navigate  that  river  from  its  source  to  its  mouth. 
What  may  be  the  future  effects  of  these  provisions, 
especially  as  they  regard  our  intercourse  with  Spain,  it 
is  impossible  at  present  to  say ;  but  although  they  can 
bring  us  no  advantage,  they  may  embroil  us  with  that 
nation ;  and  we  have  already  felt  the  effect  of  it  in  our 
late  treaty  with  Spain,  since  we  were  obliged,  on  ac 
count  of  that  clause  of  the  British  treaty,  to  accept  as 
a  gift  and  a  favor  the  navigation  of  that  river  whieh  we 
had  till  then  claimed  as  a  right. 

The  seventh  article  of  the  treaty  is  intended  to  ad- 

VOL.  i.  51 


402  MR.  GALLATIN'S   SPEECH  ON 

just  those  differences  which  arose  from  the  effects  of 
the  present  European  war.  On  that  article  it  may  also 
be  observed,  that  whilst  it  provides  a  full  compensation 
for  the  claims  of  the  British,  it  is  worded  in  such  a 
manner,  when  speaking  of  the  indemnification  for 
spoliations  committed  on  .the  American  commerce,  as 
will  render  it  liable  to  a  construction  very  unfavorable 
to  our  just  claims  on  that  ground.  The  commissioners, 
to  be  appointed  by  virtue  of  that  article,  are  to  take 
cognizance  and  to  grant  redress  only  in  those  cases 
where,  by  reason  of  irregular  or  illegal  captures  or  con 
demnations,  made  under  color  of  authority  or  commis 
sions  from  the  king  of  Great  Britain,  losses  have  been 
incurred,  and  where  adequate  compensation  cannot 
now  be  actually  obtained  by  the  ordinary  course  of 
judicial  proceedings.  If  Great  Britain  should  insist 
that,  since  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  they  had,  by  ad 
mitting  appeals  to  their  superior  courts,  afforded  a 
redress  by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings; 
if  those  courts  were  to  declare,  that  the  captures, 
complained  of,  were  neither  illegal,  nor  made  under 
color,  but  by  virtue  of  authority  or  commissions  from 
the  king,  and  if  that  construction  should  prevail  with 
the  commissioners ;  the  indemnification  which  our 
plundered  merchants  would  actually  receive,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  provisions  of  this  article,  wrould  fall  very 
short  of  their  expectations  and  of  their  just  claims. 
Yet  this  article,  considering  the  relative  situation  of 
the  two  countries,  at  the  time  when  the  negociation 
took  place,  is  as  much  as  could  reasonably  have 
been  expected  by  America.  When  a  weak  nation  has 
to  contend  with  a  powerful  one,  it  is  gaining  a  great 
deal,  if  the  national  honor  is  saved  even  by  the  shadow 
of  an  indemnification,  and  by  an  apparent  concession 
on  the  part  of  the  aggressor ;  and  however  objectiona 
ble  the  article  might  appear  at  first  view,  I  am,  on  the 
whole,  satisfied  with  it. 

The  remaining  provisions  of  the  treaty  have  no  con 
nexion  with  past  differences ;  they  make  no  part  of 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY. 

the  convention  which  was  the  avowed  object  of  Mr. 
Jay's  mission:  they  apply  solely  to  the  future  inter 
course  of  the  two  nations  as  relating  to  commerce  and 
navigation ;  and  had  they  been  entirely  omitted,  our 
differences  would  have  been  nevertheless  adjusted. 
It  is  agreed  on  all  hands,  that,  so  far  as  relates  to  our 
commerce  with  Great  Britain,  we  want  no  treaty.  The 
intercourse,  although  useful  perhaps  to  both  parties, 
is  more  immediately  necessary  to  England,  and  her 
own  interest  is  a  sufficient  pledge  of  her  granting  us  at 
all  times  a  perfect  liberty  of  commerce  to  her  Europe 
an  ports.  If  we  want  to  treat  with  her,  it  must  be  in 
order  to  obtain  some  intercourse  with  her  colonies,  and 
some  general  security  in  our  navigation. 

The  twelfth  and  thirteenth  articles  were  obtained 
by  our  negociator  with  a  view  to  the  first  object.  The 
twelfth  article,  however,  which  relates  to  our  inter 
course  with  the  West  Indies,  is  found,  upon  examina 
tion,  to  be  accompanied  by  a  restriction  of  such  na 
ture,  that  what  was  granted  by  Great  Britain  as  a  fa 
vor,  has  been  rejected  by  the  senate  as  highly  injuri 
ous.  The  thirteenth  article,  which  relates  to  the  East 
Indies,  and  remains  a  part  of  the  treaty,  is,  like  the 
twelfth,  conferring  a  favor  limited  by  restrictions,  and 
so  far  as  I  can  depend  on  the  opinion  of  the  best  inform 
ed  judges  on  this  subject,  these  restrictions  put  the 
trade  in  a  more  disadvantageous  situation  than  it  was 
before  the  treaty.  As  the  West  India  article  declares, 
that  wre  shall  not  re-export  any  produce  of  those  isl 
ands  to  Europe,  so  the  East  India  article,  at  the  same 
time  that  it  grants  us  the  privilege,  which  we  enjoyed 
before,  and  which  we  enjoyed  because  it  was  the  in 
terest  of  the  East  India  company  to  grant  it  to  us — that 
of  being  admitted  into  the  British  sea-ports  there — 
prohibits  our  carrying  any  articles  from  thence  to  any 
place  except  to  America ;  which  regulation  amounts 
to  a  total  prohibition  to  export  East  India  articles  to 
China,  or  to  obtain  freights  back  to  Europe ;  and  upon 
the  whole,  I  cannot  help  thinking,  from  what  has  fallen 


404  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  ON 

on  this  floor,  and  what  I  have  heard  elsewhere,  from 
gentlemen  of  great  commercial  knowledge,  that  if  the 
East  India  commerce  had  been  as  generally  understood 
in  America  as  the  West  India  trade,  that  so  much 
boasted  of  article  would  have  met  the  same  fate  in 
the  senate  with  the  twelfth  article. 

But  if,  leaving  commercial  regulations,  we  shall  seek 
in  the  treaty  for  some  provisions  securing  to  us  the 
free  navigation  of  the  ocean  against  any  future  ag- 

fressions  on  our  trade,  where  are  they  to  be  found  ? 
can  add  nothing  to  what  has  been  said  on  the  sub 
ject  of  contraband  articles  :  it  is,  indeed,  self-evident, 
that,  connecting  our  treaty  with  England  on  that  sub 
ject  with  those  we  have  made  with  other  nations,  it 
amounts  to  a  positive  compact  to  supply  that  nation, 
exclusively,  with  naval  stores,  whenever  they  may  be 
at  war.  Had  the  list  of  contraband  articles  been  re 
duced — had  naval  stores  and  provisions,  our  two 
great  staple  commodities,  been  declared  not  to  be 
contraband,  security  would  have  been  given  to  the 
free  exportation  of  our  produce ;  but  instead  of  any 
provision  being  made  on  that  head,  an  article  of  a 
most  doubtful  nature,  and  on  which  I  will  remark  here 
after,  has  been  introduced.  But  I  mean,  for  the  pre 
sent,  to  confine  my  observations  to  the  important  ques 
tion  of  free  bottoms  making  free  goods.  It  was  with 
the  utmost  astonishment  that  I  heard  the  doctrine  ad 
vanced  on  this  floor,  that  such  a  provision,  if  admitted, 
would  prove  injurious  to  America,  inasmuch  as,  in 
case  of  war  between  this  country  and  any  other  na 
tion,  the  goods  of  that  nation  might  be  protected  by  the 
English  flag.  It  is  not  to  a  state  of  war  that  the  bene 
fits  of  this  provision  would  extend ;  but  it  is  the  only 
security  which  neutral  nations  can  have  against  the 
legal  plundering  on  the  high  seas,  so  often  committed 
by  belligerent  powers.  It  is  not  for  the  sake  of  pro 
tecting  an  enemy's  property;  it  is  not  for  the  sake  of 
securing  an  advantageous  carrying  trade ;  but  it  is  in 
order  effectually  to  secure  ourselves  against  sea  ag- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY. 

gressions,  that  this  provision  is  necessary.  Spolia 
tions  may  arise  from  unjust  orders,  given  by  the  gov 
ernment  of  a  belligerent  nation  to  their  officers  and 
cruizers,  and  these  may  be  redressed  by  application 
to,  and  negociation  with,  that  order.  But  no  com 
plaints,  no  negociations,  no  orders  of  government  it 
self,  can  give  redress,  when  those  spoliations  are 
grounded  on  a  supposition,  that  the  vessels  of  the 
neutral  nation  have  an  enemy's  property  on  board,  as 
long  as  such  property  is  not  protected  by  the  flag  of 
the  neutral  nation ;  as  long  as  it  is  liable  to  be  cap 
tured,  it  is  not  sufficient,  in  order  to  avoid  detention 
and  capture,  to  have  no  such  property  on  board. 
Every  privateer,  under  pretence  that  he  suspects  an 
enemy's  goods  to  be  part  of  a  cargo,  may  search,  vex 
arid  capture  a  vessel ;  and  if  in  any  corner  of  the  do 
minions  of  the  belligerent  power,  a  single  judge  can 
be  found  inclined,  if  riot  determined,  to  condemn,  at 
all  events,  before  his  tribunal ;  all  vessels  so  captured 
will  be  brought  there,  arid  the  same  pretence  which 
caused  the  capture  will  justify  a  condemnation.  The 
only  nation  who  persists  in  the  support  of  this  doctrine, 
as  making  part  of  the  law  of  nations,  is  the  first  mari 
time  power  of  Europe,  whom  their  interest,  as  they  are 
the  strongest,  and  as  there  is  hardly  a  maritime  war 
in  which  they  are  not  involved,  leads  to  wish  for  a  con 
tinuation  of  a  custom,  which  gives  additional  strength 
to  their  overbearing  dominion  over  the  seas.  All  the 
other  nations  have  different  sentiments  and  a  different 
interest.  During  the  American  war,  in  the  year  1780, 
so  fully  convinced  were  the  neutral  nations,  of  the  ne 
cessity  of  introducing  that  doctrine  of  free  bottoms 
making  free  goods,  that  all  of  them,  excepting  Portu 
gal,  who  was  in  a  state  of  vassallage  to,  and  a  mere 
appendage  of  Great  Britain,  united  in  order  to  es 
tablish  the  principle,  and  formed  for  that  purpose  the 
alliance  known  by  the  name  of  the  armed  neutrality. 
All  the  belligerent  powers,  except  England,  recognized 
and  agreed  to  the  doctrine.  England  itselfl  was 


406  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  OK 

obliged,  in  some  measure,  to  give  for  a  while,  a  tacit 
acquiescence.  America,  at  the  time,  fully  admitted 
the  principle,  although  then  at  war.  (Mr.  Gallatin 
quoted,  on  this  subject,  the  journals  of  Congress  of  the 
year  1780,  page  210,  and  of  the  year  1781,  page  80,) 
It  has  been  introduced  into  every  other  treaty  we 
have  concluded  since  our  existence  as  a  nation.  Since 
the  year  1780,  every  nation,  so  far  as  my  knowledge 
goes,  has  refused  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  commerce 
with  England,  unless  that  provision  was  inserted. 
Russia,  for  that  reason,  would  not  renew  their  treaty, 
which  had  expired  in  1786 ;  although  I  believe,  that 
during  the  present  war,  and  in  order  to  answer  the  ends 
of  the  war,  they  formed  a  temporary  convention,  which 
I  have  not  seen,  but  which,  perhaps,  does  not  include 
that  provision.  England  consented  to  it,  in  her  trea 
ty  with  France,  in  1788,  and  we  are  the  first  neutral 
nation  who  has  abandoned  the  common  cause,  given 
up  the  claim,  and  by  a  positive  declaration,  inserted  in 
our  treaty,  recognized  the  contrary  doctrine.  It  has 
been  said,  that  under  the  present  circumstances,  it 
could  not  be  expected  that  Great  Britain  would  give 
up  the  point;  perhaps  so ;  but  the  objection  is  not,  that 
our  negociator  has  not  been  able  to  obtain  that  prin 
ciple,  but  that  he  has  consented  to  enter  into  a  treaty 
of  commerce,  (which  we  do  not  want,  and  which  has 
no  connexion  with  an  adjustment  of  our  differences 
with  Great  Britain,)  without  the  principle  contended 
for,  making  part  of  that  treaty.  Unless  we  can  obtain 
security  for  our  navigation,  we  want  no  treaty ;  and 
the  only  provision  which  can  give  us  that  security, 
should  have  been  the  sine  qua  non  of  a  treaty.  On  the 
contrary,  we  have  disgusted  all  the  other  neutral  na 
tions  of  Europe,  without  whose  concert  arid  assistance 
there  is  but  little  hope  that  we  shall  ever  obtain  that 
point ;  and  we  have  taught  Great  Britain,  that  we  are 
disposed  to  form  the  most  intimate  connexions  with 
her,  even  at  the  expense  of  recognizing  a  principle  the 
most  fatal  to  the  liberty  of  commerce,  and  to  the  secu 
rity  of  our  navigation. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY,  407 

But,  if  we  could  not  obtain  any  thing  which  might 
secure  us  against  future  aggressions,  should  we  have 
parted,  without  receiving  any  equivalent,  with  those 
weapons  of  self-defence,  which,  although  they  could 
not  repel,  might,  in  some  degree,  prevent  any  gross  at 
tacks  upon  our  trade — any  gross  violation  of  our  rights 
as  a  neutral  nation?  We  have  no  fleet  to  oppose  or 
to  punish  the  insults  of  Great  Britain ;  but,  from  our 
commercial  relative  situation,  we  have  it  in  our  power 
to  restrain  her  aggressions,  by  restrictions  on  her 
trade,  by  a  total  prohibition  of  her  manufactures,  or  by 
a  sequestration  of  the  debts  due  to  her.  By  the 
treaty,  not  satisfied  with  receiving  nothing,  not  satis 
fied  with  obtaining  no  security  for  the  future,  we  have, 
of  our  own  accord,  surrendered  those  defensive  arms, 
for  fear  they  might  be  abused  by  ourselves.  We  have 
given  up  the  two  first,  for  the  whole  time  during  which 
we  might  want  them  most,  the  period  of  the  present 
war;  and  the  last,  the  power  of  sequestration,  we  have 
abandoned  forever :  every  other  article  of  the  treaty  of 
commerce  is  temporary ;  this  perpetual. 

I  shall  not  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  immorality 
of  sequestering  private  property.  What  can  be  more 
immoral  than  war ;  or  plundering  on  the  high  seas, 
legalized  under  the  name  of  privateering  ?  Yet  self- 
defence  justifies  the  first,  and  the  necessity  of  the  case 
may,  at  least,  in  some  instances,  and  where  it  is  the 
only  practicable  mode  of  warfare  left  to  a  nation,  apo 
logize  even  for  the  last.  In  the  same  manner,  the 
power  of  sequestration  may  be  resorted  to,  as  the  last 
weapon  of  self-defence,  rather  than  to  seek  redress  by 
an  appeal  to  arms.  It  is  the  last  peace  measure  that 
can  be  taken  by  a  nation ;  but  the  treaty,  by  declaring, 
that  in  case  of  national  differences  it  shall  not  be  re 
sorted  to,  has  deprived  us  of  the  power  of  judging  of 
its  propriety,  has  rendered  it  an  act  of  hostility,  and 
has  effectually  taken  off  that  restraint,  which  a  fear  of 
its  exercise  laid  upon  Great  Britain. 

Thus  it  appears,  that,  by  the  treaty,  we  have  promis- 


408  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  ON 

ed  full  compensation  to  England  for  every  possible 
claim  they  may  have  against  us,  that  we  have  aban 
doned  every  claim  of  a  doubtful  nature,  and  that  we 
have  consented  to  receive  the  posts,  our  claim  to 
which  was  not  disputed,  under  new  conditions  and  re 
strictions  never  before  contemplated — that  after 
having  obtained,  by  those  concessions,  an  adjustment 
of  past  differences,  we  have  entered  into  a  new  agree 
ment,  unconnected  with  those  objects,  which  have 
heretofore  been  subjects  of  discussion  between  the  two 
nations ;  and  that,  by  this  treaty  of  commerce  and  na 
vigation,  we  have  obtained  no  commercial  advantage, 
which  we  did  not  enjoy  before,  we  have  obtained 
no  security  against  future  aggressions,  no  security  in 
favor  of  the  freedom  of  our  navigation,  and  we  have 
parted  with  every  pledge  we  had  in  our  hands,  with 
every  power  of  restriction,  with  every  weapon  of  self- 
defence  which  is  calculated  to  give  us  any  security. 

There  is  yet  another  article  which  stands  by  itself, 
unconnected  either  with  adjustment  of  past  disputes, 
or  with  commercial  regulations ;  I  mean  the  ninth  ar 
ticle,  which  provides  that  British  subjects  now  holding 
lands  in  the  United  States,  shall  continue  to  hold  them, 
and  may  sell  or  devise  the  same ;  and  that  neither  they, 
nor  their  heirs  or  assigns  shall,  so  far  as  may  respect 
the  said  lands,  and  the  legal  remedies  incident  thereto, 
be  regarded  as  aliens.  I  am  not  a  lawyer,  and,  in 
expressing  an  opinion,  I  mean  nothing  more  than  to 
communicate  my  doubts,  and  ask  for  an  explanation. 
There  would  be  no  difficulty  in  finding  the  meaning  of 
the  article,  did  it  apply  only  to  those  British  subjects, 
who  have  acquired  lands  under  the  laws  of  the  states  ; 
but  the  former  connexion  of  this  country  with  England, 
renders  the  subject  difficult  to  be  explained,  even  by 
men  of  legal  abilities ;  for  its  explanation  must  depend 
on  the  consequences  of  a  principle  unknown  to  the 
laws  of  England.  The  principle  of  the  English  law  is, 
that  no  subject  can  shake  his  allegiance,  that  is  to 
say,  that  no  man  who  was  once  a  citizen,  can  become 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  409 

an  alien.     Yet,  by  the  effect  of  the  revolution,  British 
subjects,  who,  before  1776,  had  a  right  to  hold  lands  in 
America,  as  part  of  the  British  empire,  have  become 
aliens  in  the  United  States,  and  the  effect  of  that  alien 
age  upon  their  titles  to  such  lands,  and  how  far  that, 
effect  is  changed  by  the  operation  of  the  treaty,  seem 
to  me  to  be  questions  of  a  very  nice  nature.     I  will, 
however,  beg  leave  to  suggest  what  to  me  appears  to 
be  the  effect  of  the  treaty.     So  far  as  lands  have  been 
confiscated  by  the  laws  of  any  state,  and  those  laws 
carried  into  effect,  and  so  far  as  such  lands  having 
been  considered  as   escheated,  an  office  has   been 
found,  and  the  escheat  been  completed,  I  conceive 
the  treaty  will  create  no  alteration;  but  where  the 
lands  have  not  been  confiscated,  either  because  no 
laws  had  been  passed  for  that  purpose,  or  because 
they  had  not  been  carried  into  effect  before  the  trea 
ty  of  1783,  and  where  the  legal  formalities  of  finding 
an  office,  &c.  necessary  to  complete  an  escheat  have 
been  neglected,  it  seems  to  me  the  treaty  may  operate 
in  three  ways.     Firstly,  it  will  prevent  any  state  from 
completing  an  escheat  by  finding  an  office,  &c.  when 
they  have  neglected  doing  it.     Secondly,  it  will  ena 
ble  the  British  subjects  to  sell  or  devise,  and  therefore 
to  convert  their  life  estate  into  a  fee-simple  for  ever. 
And  thirdly,  it  will  enable  those  subjects  to  institute 
suits  in  courts  for  the  recovery  of  those  lands,  provid 
ing  them  with  a  legal  remedy,  they  had  not  before, 
since  their  alienage  would  have  been  a  sufficient  bar 
against  bringing  real  actions.     If  the  treaty  may  be 
supposed  to  have  that  effect,  its  tendency  so  far  as  re 
lates,  not  to  private  estates,  but  to  the  former  pro 
prietary  estates,  may  prove  vexatious  and  injurious  to 
several  of  the  states.     It  will  strengthen  the  proprie 
tary  claims  of  the  Penn  family,  not  in  Pennsylvania, 
but  in  the  state  of  Delaware.     It  may  have  some  ef 
fect  on  the  decision  of  the  Fairfax  claim  in  Virginia, 
and  even  on  such  parts  of  the  lands  of  Maryland, 
VOL.  i.  52 


410  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  ON 

which  have  been  sold,  although  formerly  the  property 
of  the  Baltimore  family,  as  vacant  lands  and  not  as 
confiscated  lands.  In  North  Carolina,  the  proprieta 
ry  claim  of  the  Grandville  family,  which  includes  the 
best  half  of  that  state  and  of  the  southwestern  territo 
ry,  may  be  revived  by  the  treaty ;  for  although  a  law 
has  passed  in  that  state  to  confiscate  the  lands  of  all 
the  British  subjects  who  should  be  absent  on  a  certain 
day,  yet  the  proprietary  lands  were  not  meant  to  be 
comprehended  within  that  provision ;  the  commission 
ers,  who  were  to  sell  the  confiscated  property,  never 
disposed  of  a  single  acre  of  the  lands,  which  were 
granted  by  another  law  of  the  state  as  vacant  and  not 
as  confiscated  lands,  without  having  been  actually  es 
cheated  to  the  state  by  an  office  being  found  or  any 
other  formality  whatever ;  and  they  are  even  express 
ly  distinguished  from  land  to  be  confiscated  by  the 
very  act  passed  for  the  purpose  of  confiscating.  (Mr. 
Gallatin  here  read  the  clause  of  the  act  he  alluded 
to.)  Supposing,  however,  every  thing  I  have  said  on 
this  subject  as  very  doubtful,  it  is  not  less  true  that 
this  article,  under  an  appearance  of  reciprocity,  grants 
a  positive  advantage  to  Great  Britain  without  any 
equivalent  being  given — is,  if  not  an  infraction,  at  least 
a  restriction  over  the  legislative  powers,  and  an  excep 
tion  to  the  laws  of  the  different  states  on  a  subject  of 
a  delicate  nature — may  involve  not  only  some  of  our 
citizens,  but  even  several  of  the  states  in  complex  law 
suits  and  serious  embarrassment,  and  although  it  may 
thus  create  much  mischief,  can  give  us  no  possible 
benefit. 

From  the  review  I  have  taken  of  the  treaty,  and  the 
opinions  I  have  expressed,  it  is  hardly  necessary  for 
me  to  add,  that  I  look  upon  the  instrument  as  highly 
injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  that 
I  earnestly  wish  it  never  had  been  made ;  but  whether 
in  its  present  stage,  the  House  ought  to  refuse  to  car 
ry  it  into  effect,  and  what  will  be  the  probable  conse- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  411 

quences  of  a  refusal,  is  a  question  which  requires  the 
most  serious  attention,  and  which  I  will  now  attempt 
to  investigate. 

Should  the  treaty  be  finally  defeated,  either  new  ne- 
gociations  will  be  more  successful,  or  Great  Britain 
will  refuse  to  make  a  new  arrangement,  and  leave 
things  in  the  situation  in  which  they  now  are,  or  war 
will  be  the  consequence.     I  will,  in  the  course  of  my 
observations,  make  some  remarks  on  the  last  suppo 
sition.     I  do  not  think  that  the  first  will  be  very  pro 
bable  at  present,  and  I  am  of  opinion,  that  under  the 
present  circumstances,  and  until  some  change  takes 
place  in  our  own  or  in  the  relative  political  situation 
of  the  European  nations,  it  is  to  be  apprehended,  that, 
in  such  a  case,  new  negociations  will  either  be  reject 
ed,  or  prove  unsuccessful.     Such  an  event  might  have 
perhaps  followed  a  rejection  of  the  treaty  even  by  the 
senate  or  by  the  President.     After  the  negociator,  em 
ployed  by  the  United  States,  had  once  affixed  his  sig 
nature,  it  must  have  become  very  problematical,  un 
less  he  had  exceeded  his  powers,  whether  a  refusal 
to  sanction  the   contract   he  had  made,  would  not 
eventually  defeat,  at  least  for  a  time,  the  prospect  of  a 
new  treaty.     I  conceive  that  the  hopes  of  obtaining 
better  conditions,  by  a  new  negociation,  are  much 
less  in  the  present  stage  of  the  business  than  they 
were,  when  the  treaty  was  in  its  inchoate  form  before 
the  Executive  ;  and  in  order  to  form  a  just  idea  of  the 
consequences  of  a  rejection  at  present,  I  will  contem 
plate  them  upon  this  supposition,  which  appears  to  me 
most  probable,  to  wit,  that  no  new  treaty  will  take 
place  for  a  certain  period  of  time. 

In  mentioning  my  objections  to  the  treaty  itself,  I 
have  already  stated  the  advantages  which,  in  my  opin 
ion,  would  result  to  the  United  States  from  the  non- 
existence  of  that  instrument ;  I  will  not  repeat ;  but 
proceed  at  once  to  examine  what  losses  may  accrue, 
that  can  be  set  off  against  those  advantages. 

As  I  am  not  sensible  that  a  single  commercial  ad- 


412  MR.  GALLATiiVS  SPEECH  ON 

vantage  has  been  obtained  by  the  treaty,  I  cannot 
mention  the  loss  of  any,  as  a  mischief  that  may  at 
tend  its  rejection.  If,  however,  the  East  India  article 
is  supposed  to  be  beneficial,  it  must,  on  the  other 
hand,  be  conceded,  that  we  have  enjoyed  every  bene 
fit  arising  from  it  for  a  number  of  years,  without  trea 
ty,  and  consequently  because  it  was  the  interest  of  the 
East  India  company  that  we  should  enjoy  them,  and 
that  it  is  not  probable,  that  circumstances  will  so  far 
change  there,  during  the  short  period  to  which  this  ar 
ticle  is  limited,  as  to  induce  that  company  to  adopt  a 
different  policy  towards  us. 

The  indemnification,  to  be  obtained  from  Great  Bri 
tain  for  spoliations  on  our  trade,  if  considered  as  a 
national  reparation  for  a  national  aggression,  is  cer 
tainly,  as  I  have  already  stated  it,  an  important  object 
gained  by  the  treaty.  But,  if  it  is  to  be  viewed  as  a 
money  transaction,  and  its  loss  as  a  national  loss  of 
money,  it  will  be  well  to  examine,  whether  in  this  point 
of  view,  viz.  of  money,  we  should  not  be  gainers,  on 
the  whole,  by  not  carrying  the  treaty  into  effect.  I 
have  made  no  objections  to  that  article  of  the  treaty 
which  relates  to  British  debts.  Whatever  the  amount 
may  be,  if  it  is  just  that  we  should  pay  them,  it  must 
be  just  to  pay  that  amount ;  but  when  we  are  examin 
ing  the  situation  in  which  we  should  be,  if  we  had  no 
treaty,  when  we  are  calculating  the  losses  we  are  to 
experience  by  obtaining  no  compensation  for  our 
claims,  it  is  right  to  consider  the  amount  of  those 
claims,  and  to  compare  it  with  the  probable  amount 
of  the  claims  of  the  other  party,  and  of  the  sums  of 
money  which  a  non-execution  of  the  treaty,  and  a  re 
fusal  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  do  us  justice,  to 
indemnify  us  for  our  own  losses  and  to  enter  into  new 
negociations,  would  justify  us  in  withholding.  That 
subject  has  already  undergone  a  full  discussion,  and  I 
will  recall  the  attention  of  the  committee  only  to  the 
demand  of  Great  Britain  for  interest  on  the  British 
debts.  It  is  well  known  that  our  courts  have  uniformly 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  413 

refused  to  allow  to  the  British  creditors  the  interest 
which  has  accrued  on  their  demands  during  the  late 
war,  that  is  to  say,  during  eight  years.  Although  we 
have  contended  that  those  decisions  cannot  be  con 
sidered  as  legal  impediments,  yet  it  has  been  insisted 
by  Great  Britain  that  they  are.  The  two  govern 
ments  have  come  to  issue  on  this  point,  as  may  be 
seen  by  recurring  to  the  printed  correspondence  of  Mr. 
Jefferson.  It  is  one  of  the  points  to  which  the  juris 
diction  of  the  commissioners  must  extend,  since,  on  ac 
count  of  the  decisions  of  our  courts,  it  is  one  of  the 
cases  where  compensation  could  not  be  obtained,  and 
has  been  refused  by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial 
proceedings  ;  and  for  greater  security,  the  commission 
ers  are,  by  the  treaty,  empowered  to  take  into  their 
consideration  all  claims,  whether  of  principal  or  inter 
est,  or  balances  of  principal  or  interest.  These  com 
missioners  must  be  considered  less  as  judges,  than  as 
political  agents,  who  will  come  with  a  determination  to 
support  the  claims,  contended  for  by  their  respective 
nations.  They  will,  therefore,  disagree  on  the  subject 
of  war  interest,  and  it  will  be  left  solely  to  the  fifth 
commissioner,  that  is  to  say,  to  lot,  to  decide  whether 
that  interest  shall  be  paid  by  the  United  States,  or  not. 
Eight  years  interest  amounts  to  one  half  of  the  whole 
amount  of  debts  due  by  America  to  Great  Britain  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war ;  for  it  must  be  remarked, 
that  this  claim  extends  to  all  debts  whether  good  or 
bad,  because  it  has  been  refused  on  all,  and  can  be 
recovered,  by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceed 
ings,  on  none.  What  those  debts  amount  to,  is  very 
uncertain.  I  have  seen  a  variety  of  calculations  on 
this  subject.  If  they  are  estimated,  as  they  have  been 
by  some,  at  five  millions  sterling,  one  half  of  them  will 
amount  to  more  than  twelve  millions  of  dollars ;  and 
when  we  take  into  consideration  the  amount  of  princi 
pal  we  shall  have  to  pay,  on  the  principles  stated  by  a 
gentleman  from  Virginia,  (Mr.  Nicholas,)  his  calcula 
tion  of  near  fifteen  millions  of  dollars  in  the  whole. 


- 


1J4  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  ON 

will  not  seem  exaggerated.  But  even  taking  the 
amount  of  those  debts  at  the  lowest  estimate,  the 
amount  of  war  interest,  and  of  the  principal  we  shall 
have  to  pay,  far  exceeds  the  amount,  which  the  most 
sanguine  among  us  expected  to  recover  from  the  gov 
ernment  of  Great  Britain,  by  virtue  of  the  treaty,  on 
account  of  the  spoliations  committed  on  our  trade. 

The  only  positive  loss,  therefore,  which,  in  my  opin 
ion,  will  arise  from  our  having  no  treaty,  is  that  of  the 
western  posts.  I  have  already  stated,  that,  surrendered 
in  the  manner  settled  by  the  treaty,  I  conceive  them  to 
be  of  very  insignificant  value  in  a  commercial  point  of 
view,  and  of  very  little  use,  if  any,  as  a  security  against 
the  Indians ;  for  it  must  be  remembered,  that  our  own 
laws,  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  peace  with  those 
tribes,  have  enacted,  under  severe  penalties,  that  our 
own  citizens  shall,  on  no  account  whatever,  cross  over 
the  boundary  line  between  them  and  ourselves,  although 
within  the  territory  ceded  to  us  by  Great  Britain,  unless 
they  have  special  licenses  from  our  government.  It  is, 
therefore,  our  own  opinion,  that  peace  cannot  be  pre 
served  with  the  Indians,  if  ever  our  own  citizens  have 
a  free  and  uncontrolled  intercourse  with  them.  And 
yet  it  is  a  positive  condition  of  the  treaty,  that  the 
British  traders,  settled  at  Detroit  and  in  the  other 
posts — men,  who  from  habit,  are  attached  to  Great  Bri 
tain,  and  inimical  to  the  United  States ;  who  have  given 
repeated  proofs  of  that  enmity ;  who  possess  an  un 
bounded  influence  amongst  the  Indians,  and  have  been 
the  chief  promoters  of  the  Indian  war — that  these  men 
may  remain  there  as  British  subjects,  and  that  they  and 
all  other  British  subjects  may  have  the  privilege  for 
ever  to  pass  over  that  line,  which  we  have  forbidden 
our  citizens  to  cross,  and  may  continue  to  carry  on  with 
the  Indians  living  within  our  territory,  a  free  trade  and 
commerce  uncontrolled  by  our  laws  and  by  those  re 
gulations,  which  we  have  imposed,  or  may  impose  on 
our  citizens ;  in  other  words,  we  have  agreed  that  these 
men  may  preserve  their  baneful  influence  over  the  Indi- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY, 

ans,  and  their  allegiance  to  Great  Britain;  and  we 
may,  therefore,  expect  that  influence  to  be  exerted 
which  suits  the  interest,  and  will  be  in  conformity  to 
the  directions  of  their  sovereign.  I  must,  therefore, 
repeat,  that  as  I  think  that  at  any  time  since  1789,  we 
might  have  had  the  posts  without  these  conditions, 
provided  we  had  then  agreed,  as  we  have  by  the  late 
treaty,  to  make  a  compensation  for  the  British  debts, 
I  had  much  rather  that  we  could  again  be  placed  in  the 
situation  in  which  we  were  two  years  ago ;  and  I  will 
not  hesitate  to  declare  that,  in  my  opinion,  our  claim 
to  the  posts,  and  the  chance  we  had  to  obtain  them,  by 
negociation,  in  the  year  1793,  was  better  than  their 
possession  upon  the  terms  of  the  treaty.  But  as  the 
question  now  is  not  what  would  be  best  to  be  done,  if 
no  treaty  had  been  made ;  as  the  negociator  has  put  us 
in  a  worse  situation  than  we  were  before  that  treaty ; 
as  the  subject  of  the  present  examination  is  the  con 
sequences  that  will  follow,  if  no  treaty  at  all*  is  made ; 
and  as  one  of  those  consequences  will  undoubtedly  be 
a  further  detention  of  the  posts,  and  less  hope  to  obtain 
them  in  future,  I  will  certainly  agree  that  it  is  better 
to  have  them,  even  encumbered  with  these  conditions, 
than  not  to  have  them  at  all.  For  although  they  may 
not  be  of  an  immediate  advantage,  either  as  a  com 
mercial  object  or  as  giving  security  against  the  Indi 
ans,  their  possession  will  enable  us  to  prevent  a  further 
extension  of  the  British  settlements  within  our  terri 
tory,  and  by  forming  settlements  of  our  own,  to  acquire 
by  degrees  sufficient  strength  in  that  quarter,  to  have 
nothing  to  fear  either  from  the  British  or  from  the 
Indians. 

The  further  detention  of  the  posts,  the  national 
stain  that  will  result  from  receiving  no  reparation  for 
the  spoliations  on  our  trade,  and  the  uncertainty  of  a 
final  adjustment  of  our  differences  with  Great  Britain, 
are  the  three  evils  which  strike  me  as  resulting  from  a 
rejection  of  the  treaty ;  and  when  to  those  considera 
tions  I  add  that  of  the  present  situation  of  this  country. 


416  MR.  GALLATIN'S   SPEECH  ON 

of  the  agitation  of  the  public  mind,  and  of  the  advan 
tages  that  will  arise  from  union  of  sentiments,  however 
injurious  and  unequal  I  conceive  the  treaty  to  be,  how 
ever  repugnant  it  may  be  to  my  feelings,  and  perhaps 
to  my  prejudices,  I  feel  induced  to  vote  for  it,  and  will 
not  give  my  assent  to  any  proposition  which  will  imply 
its  rejection.  But  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain,  since 
the  treaty  was  signed,  the  impressment  of  our  seamen, 
and  their  uninterrupted  spoliations  on  our  trade,  espe 
cially  by  seizing  our  vessels  laden  with  provisions,  a 
proceeding  which  they  may,  perhaps,  justify  by  one  of 
the  articles  of  the  treaty,  are  such  circumstances  as 
may  induce  us  to  pause  a  while,  in  order  to  examine 
whether  it  is  proper,  immediately  and  without  having 
obtained  any  explanation  thereon,  to  adopt  the  resolu 
tion  on  the  table,  and  to  pass,  at  present,  all  the  laws 
necessary  to  carry  the  treaty  into  effect. 

The  eighteenth  article  of  the  treaty,  the  provision 
article,  as  it  is  called,  has  already  been  fully  investi 
gated  by  a  gentleman  from  Virginia,  (Mr.  Nicholas,) 
and  I  have  been  astonished,  that  those  gentlemen  who 
have  spoken  in  favor  of  the  treaty,  have  given  no  di 
rect  answer  to  his  remarks  on  that  point.  The  second 
clause  of  that  article  declares,  that,  "  whenever  pro 
visions,  becoming  contraband  according  to  the  exist 
ing  laws  of  nations,  shall  for  that  reason  be  seized ; 
the  same  shall  not  be  confiscated,  but  the  owners  in 
demnified."  This  clause  of  the  article  does  not  con 
template  provisions,  or  other  articles  not  generally 
contraband,  when  attempted  to  be  carried  to  a  besieg 
ed  place ;  for  the  third  clause  of  the  same  article  pro 
vides  for  the  last  mentioned  case,  and  declares,  "  that  a 
vessel  thus  laden  and  sailing  for  a  besieged  place  shall 
not  be  detained,  nor  her  cargo,  if  not  contraband,  con 
fiscated,  unless  after  notice  she  shall  again  attempt  to 
enter;"  which  implies,  that,  in  case  of  notice  thus 
given,  provisions  may  be  confiscated,  whilst  the  pro 
visions  contemplated  in  the  second  clause  are  not  to 
be  confiscated.  It  is,  therefore,  admitted  by  that  arti- 


THE  BRITISH  TREAT  k".  JIT 

cle,  that  there  are  cases,  other  than  that  of  provisions 
and  other  articles  not  generally  contraband,  carried 
to  a  besieged  place,  in  which  those  provisions  and  ar 
ticles  may  be  regarded  as  contraband.  It  is  admitting 
a  principle  unknown  to  the  laws  of  nations,  infringing 
our  neutrality,  destructive  of  our  trade,  and  liable  to 
every  misconstruction.  The  British  have  shown,  what 
they  meant  by  provisions  becoming  contraband  ac 
cording  to  the  existing  laws  of  nations,  when  they  have 
taken  our  vessels  laden  with  provisions,  and  given  us 
an  indemnification  of  tender  centum.  So  immediately 
connected  is  that  proceeding  of  the  British,  with  this 
article,  that  even  the  gentleman  from,  Connecticut, 
(Mr.  Hillhouse,)  could  not  separate  them  in  his  own 
mind ;  and  wherl  speaking  of  the  indemnification,  we 
are  to  obtain  in  such  cases,  as  are  contemplated  by 
the  article,  he  repeatedly  called  it  "  ten  per  centum  ;" 
thinking  only  of  the  compensation,  given  by  the  British 
in  the  case  beforementioned,  as  one  contemplated  in 
the  article,  since  the  words  ten  per  centum  are  not  to 
be  found  in  the  clause  itself.  It  is  not,  however,  mate 
rial  at  present  to  decide,  whether  a  fair  construction 
of  the  article  justifies  the  conduct  of  the  British  or  not. 
The  fact  is  uncontroverted ;  they  still  continue  to  im 
press  our  seamen  and  to  capture  our  vessels.  If  they 
pretend  to  justify  this  conduct  by  the  treaty,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  obtain  an  explanation  of  the  doubtful  ar 
ticles  ;  if  there  is  nothing  in  the  treaty  to  justify  it, 
their  acts  are  acts  of  hostility,  and  an  infraction  of  the 
treaty ;  and,  even  according  to  the  doctrine  of  those 
gentlemen,  who  think,  that,  in  common  cases,  the 
House  has  no  discretion,  the  treaty  once  broken  by 
one  party,  is  no  longer  binding  on  the  other ;  and  it  is 
the  right  as  well  as  the  duty  of  this  House,  not  to  pro 
ceed  to  pass  the  laws  necessary  to  carry  it  into  effect, 
until  satisfactory  assurances  are  obtained,  that  these 
acts  shall  cease,  arid  until  Great  Britain  has  evinced  a 
friendly  disposition  towards  us. 

Whatever  evils  may  follow  a  rejection  of  the  treaty, 

VOL.  r.  53 


418  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  ON 

they  will  not  attend  a  postponement.  To  suspend  our 
proceedings,  will  not  throw  us  into  a  situation,  which 
will  require  new  negociations,  new  arrangements  on  the 
points  already  settled  and  well  understood  by  both  par 
ties.  It  will  be  merely  a  delay,  until  an  explanation  of 
the  late  conduct  of  the  British  towards  us  may  be  ob 
tained,  or  until  that  conduct  may  be  altered.  If,  on  the 
contrary,  we  consent  to  carry  the  treaty  into  effect,  under 
the  present  circumstances,  what  will  be  our  situation  in 
future  ?  It  is  by  committing  the  most  wanton  and  the 
most  unprovoked  aggressions  on  our  trade ;  it  is,  by  sei 
zing  a  large  amount  of  our  property  as  a  pledge  for  our 
good  behaviour,  that  Great  Britain  has  forced  the  nation 
into  the  present  treaty.  If  by  threatening  new  hostili 
ties,  or  rather  by  continuing  her  aggressions,  even 
after  the  treaty  is  made,  she  can  force  us  also,  to  carry 
it  into  effect,  our  acquiescence  will  be  tantamount  to  a 
declaration,  that  we  mean  to  submit  in  proportion  to 
the  insults  that  are  offered  to  us ;  and  this  disposition 
being  once  known,  what  security  have  we  against 
new  insults,  new  aggressions,  new  spoliations,  which 
probably  will  lay  the  foundation  of  some  additional  de 
mands  on  the  part  of  the  aggressor,  and  of  some  ad 
ditional  sacrifices  on  ours?  It  has  been  said,  and 
said  with  truth,  that  to  put  up  with  the  indignities  we 
have  received,  without  obtaining  any  reparation, 
which  will  probably  be  the  effect  of  defeating  the  trea 
ty,  is  highly  dishonorable  to  the  nation.  In  my  opin 
ion,  it  is  still  more  so,  not  only  tamely  to  submit  to  a 
continuation  of  these  national  insults,  but  while  they 
thus  continue  uninterrupted,  to  carry  into  effect  the 
instrument  we  have  consented  to  accept  as  a  repara 
tion  for  former  ones.  When  the  general  conduct  of 
Great  Britain  towards  us,  from  the  beginning  of  the 
present  war,  is  considered;  when  the  means, by  which 
she  has  produced  the  treaty,  are  reflected  on ;  a  final 
compliance  on  our  part,  while  she  still  persists  in  that 
conduct,  whilst  the  chastening  rod  of  that  nation  is 
still  held  over  us,  is.  in  my  opinion,  a  dereliction  of  na- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  419 

lional  interest,  of  national  honor,  of  national  inde 
pendence. 

But  it  is  said,  that  war  must  be  the  consequence  of 
our  delaying  to  carry  the  treaty  into  effect.  Do  the 
gentlemen  mean,  that  if  we  reject  the  treaty,  if  we  do 
not  accept  the  reparation  there  given  to  us,  in  order 
to  obtain  redress,  we  have  no  alternative  left  but  war  ? 
If  we  must  go  to  war  in  order  to  obtain  reparation  for 
insults  and  spoliations  on  our  trade,  we  must  do  it, 
even  if  we  carry  the  present  treaty  into  effect;  for  this 
treaty  gives  us  no  reparation  for  the  aggressions  com 
mitted  since  it  was  ratified,  has  not  produced  a  dis 
continuance  of  those  acts  of  hostility,  and  gives  us  no 
security  that  they  shall  be  discontinued.  But  the  ar 
guments  of  those  gentlemen,  who  suppose  that  America 
must  go  to  war,  apply  to  a  final  rejection  of  the  treaty, 
and  not  to  a  delay.  I  do  not  propose  to  refuse  the  re 
paration  offered  by  the  treaty,  and  to  put  up  with  the 
aggressions  committed;  I  have  agreed,  that  that  repa 
ration,  such  as  it  is,  is  a  valuable  article  of  the  treaty ; 
I  have  agreed,  that,  under  the  present  circumstances,  a 
greater  evil  will  follow  a  total  rejection  of,  than  an  ac 
quiescence  in  the  treaty.  The  only  measure,  which 
has  been  mentioned,  in  preference  of  the  one  now  un 
der  discussion,  is  a  suspension,  a  postponement  whilst 
the  present  spoliations  continue,  in  hopes  to  obtain 
for  them  a  similar  reparation,  and  assurances  that  they 
shall  cease. 

But  is  it  meant  to  insinuate  that  it  is  the  final  inten 
tion  of  those,  who  pretend  to  wish  only  for  a  postpone 
ment,  to  involve  this  country  in  a  war  ?  There  has  been 
no  period  during  the  present  European  war,  at  which  it 
would  not  have  been  equally  weak  and  wicked  to  adopt 
such  measures,  as  must  involve  America  in  the  contest, 
unless  forced  into  it  for  the  sake  of  self-defence ;  but,  at 
this  time,  to  think  of  it  would  fall  but  little  short  of 
madness.  The  whole  American  nation  would  rise  in 
opposition  to  the  idea ;  and  it  might,  at  least  have 
been  recollected,  that  war  cannot  be  declared,  except 


120  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH   OS 

by  Congress,  and  that  two  of  the  branches  of  govern 
ment  are  sufficient  to  check  the  other  in  any  supposed 
attempt  of  this  kind. 

If  there  is  no  necessity  imposed  upon  America  to  go 
to  war,  if  there  is  no  apprehension  she  will,  by  her  own 
conduct,  involve  herself  in  one,  the  danger  must  arise 
from  Great  Britain,  and  the  threat  is,  that  she  will  make 
war  against  us  if  we  do  not  comply.  Gentlemen  first 
tell  us  that  we  have  made  the  best  possible  bargain 
with  that  nation ;  that  she  has  conceded  every  thing, 
without  receiving  a  single  iota  in  return,  and  yet  they 
would  persuade  us,  that  she  will  make  war  against  us 
in  order  to  force  us  to  accept  that  contract  so  advanta 
geous  to  us,  and  so  injurious  to  herself.  It  will  not  be 
contended,  that  a  delay,  until  an  amicable  explanation 
is  obtained,  could  afford  even  a  pretence  to  Great  Bri 
tain  for  going  to  war ;  and  we  all  know  that  her  own 
interest  would  prevent  her.  If  another  campaign  takes 
place,  it  is  acknowledged,  that  all  her  efforts  are  to  be 
exerted  against  the  West  Indies.  She  has  proclaimed 
her  own  scarcity  of  provisions  at  home,  and  she  must 
depend  on  our  supplies  to  support  her  armament.  It 
depends  upon  us  to  defeat  her  whole  scheme,  and  this 
is  a  sufficient  pledge  against  open  hostility,  if  the  Eu 
ropean  war  continues.  If  peace  takes  place,  there 
will  not  be  even  the  appearance  of  danger ;  the  mo 
ment,  when  a  nation  is  happy  enough  to  emerge  from 
one  of  the  most  expensive,  bloody  and  dangerous  wars, 
in  which  she  ever  has  been  involved,  will  be  the 
last,  she  would  choose  to  plunge  afresh  into  a  similar 
calamity. 

But  to  the  cry  of  war,  the  alarmists  do  not  fail  to 
add  that  of  confusion ;  and  they  have  declared,  even 
on  this  floor,  that  if  the  resolution  is  not  adopted,  gov 
ernment  will  be  dissolved.  Government  dissolved  in 
case  a  postponement  takes  place !  The  idea  is  too 
absurd  to  deserve  a  direct  answer.  But  I  will  ask 
those  gentlemen,  by  whom  government  is  to  be  dis 
solved  ?  Certainly  not  by  those  who  may  vote  against 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY,  421 

the  resolution;  for  although  they  are  not  perhaps  for 
tunate  enough  to  have  obtained  the  confidence  of  the 
gentlemen  who  voted  against  them,  still  it  must  be 
agreed,  that  those  who  succeed  in  their  wishes,  who 
defeat  a  measure  they  dislike,  will  not  wish  to  destroy 
that  government,  which  they  hold  so  far  in  their  hands, 
as  to  be  able  to  carry  their  own  measures.  For  them 
to  dissolve  government,  would  be  to  dissolve  their  own 
power.  By  whom,  then,  I  again  ask,  is  the  govern 
ment  to  be  dissolved  ?  The  gentlemen  must  answer — 
by  themselves — or  they  must  declare,  that  they  mean 
nothing  but  to  alarm.  Is  it  really  the  language  of 
those  men,  who  profess  to  be,  who  distinguish  them 
selves  by  the  self-assumed  appellation  of  friends  to 
order,  that  if  they  do  not  succeed  in  all  their  mea 
sures,  they  will  overset  government — and  have  all  their 
professions  been  only  a  veil  to  hide  their  love  of  pow 
er,  a  pretence  to  cover  their  ambition?  Do  they 
mean,  that  the  first  event,  which  shall  put  an  end  to 
their  own  authority,  shall  be  the  last  act  of  govern 
ment  ?  As  to  myself,  I  do  not  believe  that  they  have 
such  intentions;  I  have  too  good  an  opinion  of  their 
patriotism  to  allow  myself  to  admit  such  an  idea  a 
single  moment ;  but  I  think  myself  justifiable  in  enter 
taining  a  belief,  that  some  amongst  them,  in  order  to 
carry  a  favorite,  and  what  they  think  to  be  an  advan 
tageous  measure,  mean  to  spread  an  alarm  which  they 
do  not  feel;  and  I  have  no  doubt,  that  many  have  con 
tracted  such  a  habit  of  carrying  every  measure  of  gov 
ernment  as  they  please,  that  they  really  think  that  eve 
ry  thing  must  be  thrown  into  confusion,  the  moment 
they  are  thwarted  in  a  matter  of  importance.  I  hope, 
that  experience  will  in  future  cure  their  fears.  But,  at 
all  events,  be  the  wishes  and  intentions  of  the  members 
of  this  House  what  they  may,  it  is  not  in  their  power 
to  dissolve  the  government.  The  people  of  the  -United 
States,  from  one  end  of  the  continent  to  the  other,  are 
strongly  attached  to  their  constitution;  they  would 
restrain  and  punish  the  excesses  of  any  party,  of  any 


422  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH  ON 

set  of  men  in  government,  who  would  be  guilty  of  the 
attempt;  and  on  them  I  will  rest  as  a  full  security 
against  every  endeavor  to  destroy  our  union,  our  con 
stitution,  or  our  government. 

But  although  I  am  not  afraid  of  a  dissolution,  I  feel 
how  highly  desirable  is  a  more  general  union  of  senti 
ment  ;  I  feel  the  importance  of  an  agreement  of  opin 
ion  between  the  different  branches  of  government,  and 
even  between  the  members  of  the  same  branch.  I 
would  sacrifice  much  to  obtain  that  object ;  it  has 
been  one  of  the  most  urging  motives  with  me  to  be  in 
favor,  not  of  a  rejection,  but  only  of  a  suspension,  of  a 
delay.  But  even,  as  a  matter  of  opinion,  it  is  difficult 
to  say,  which  mode  of  proceeding  in  this  House,  will 
best  accord  with  the  general  sentiments  of  the  people. 
So  far  as  relates  to  the  petitions  before  us,  the  number 
of  signatures  against  the  treaty,  exceeds,  at  the  mo 
ment  I  am  speaking,  the  number  of  those  in  favor  of 
the  treaty.  Amongst  the  last,  some  have  come  from 
one  part  of  the  union,  where,  it  seems,  both  from  the 
expressions  in  the  petition  itself,  and  from  the  proceed 
ings  there,  that  a  great  inducement  in  the  petitioners 
to  sign,  was  a  wish  to  carry  the  treaty  with  Spain  into  ef 
fect,  as  they  appear  to  suppose  that  its  fate  depends 
upon  that  of  the  British  treaty.  How  they  would  act 
upon  the  British  treaty  alone,  and  unconnected  with 
the  other,  I  do  not  know,  nor  have  I  any  evidence 
which  enables  me  to  form  an  opinion  thereon.  All  I 
know  is,  that,  until  the  Spanish  treaty  was  made,  they 
were  perfectly  silent  on  the  subject  of  the  other  treaty, 
and  never  expressed  an  opinion  upon  it  alone. 

True  it  is,  that  an  alarm,  which  has  produced  a  com 
bination,  has  lately  taken  place  amongst  the  merchants 
of  this  and  some  other  sea-ports.  What  effect  it  will 
have,  and  how  successful  they  will  eventually  be,  in 
spreading  this  alarm  amongst  the  people  at  large,  I 
cannot  tell ;  but  there  are  circumstances  accompany 
ing  their  petition,  which,  in  my  opinion,  much  diminish 
the  weight  they  otherwise  might  have  had.  They 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  423 

have  undoubtedly  a  right  to  petition  upon  every  public 
measure,  where  they  think  themselves  interested,  and 
their  petitions  deserve  equal  regard  with  those  of  their 
fellow-citizens,  throughout  the  United  States.  But, 
on  this  occasion,  in  order  to  create  an  alarm,  in  order 
to  induce  the  people  to  join  them,  in  order  to  force 
the  House  to  pass  the  laws  relative  to  the  treaty,  they 
have  formed  a  dangerous  combination,  and  affected 
to  cease  insuring  vessels,  purchasing  produce,  and 
transacting  any  business.  A  gentleman  from  New 
York,  (Mr.  Williams,)  has  been  so  much  alarmed 
himself,  that  he  has  predicted  a  fall  in  the  price  of  eve 
ry  kind  of  produce,  and  seems  indeed  to  have  supposed 
that  the  clamors  of  a  few  individuals  here,  would  ei 
ther  put  an  end  to,  or  satisfy  the  wants  of  those  na 
tions,  which  depend  on  us  for  supplies  of  provisions. 
Yet,  it  has  so  happened,  and  it  is  a  complete  proof 
that  the  whole  is  only  an  alarm,  that  whilst  we  have 
been  debating,  the  price  of  flour,  which  was  of  very 
dull  sale  two  weeks  ago,  has  risen  in  equal  proportion 
with  the  supposed  fears  of  the  purchasers.  I  cannot 
help  considering  the  cry  of  war,  the  threats  of  a  disso 
lution  of  government,  and  the  present  alarm,  as  design 
ed  for  the  same  purpose,  that  of  making  an  impression 
on  the  fears  of  this  House.  It  was  through  the  fear  of 
being  involved  in  a  war,  that  the  negociation  with 
Great  Britain  originated;  under  the  impression  of 
fear,  the  treaty  has  been  negociated  and  signed ;  a 
fear  of  the  same  danger,  that  of  war,  has  promoted  its 
ratification ;  and  now,  every  imaginary  mischief,  which 
can  alarm  our  fears,  is  conjured  up,  in  order  to  de 
prive  us  of  that  discretion,  which  this  House  thinks 
they  have  a  right  to  exercise,  and  in  order  to  force  us 
to  carry  the  treaty  into  effect. 

If  the  people  of  the  United  States  wish  this  House  to 
carry  the  treaty  into  effect  immediately,  and  notwith 
standing  the  continued  aggressions  of  the  British,  if 
their  will  was  fairly  and  fully  expressed,  I  would  imme 
diately  acquiesce;  but  since  an  appeal  has  been  made 


424  MR.  GALLATIN'S  SPEECH,  &c. 

to  them,  it  is  reasonable  to  suspend  a  decision  until 
their  sentiments  are  known.  Till  then  I  must  follow 
my  own  judgment ;  and  as  I  cannot  see  that  any  pos 
sible  evils  will  follow  a  delay,  I  shall  vote  against  the 
resolution  before  the  committee,  in  order  to  make 
room,  either  for  that  proposed  by  my  colleague,  (Mr. 
M'Clay,)  or  for  any  other,  expressed  in  any  manner 
whatever,  provided  it  embraces  the  object  I  have  in 
view,  to  wit,  the  suspension  of  the  final  vote — a  post 
ponement  of  the  laws  necessary  to  carry  the  treaty 
into  effect,  until  satisfactory  assurances  are  obtained, 
that  Great  Britain  means,  in  future,  to  show  us  that 
friendly  disposition,  which  it  is  my  earnest  wish,  may 
at  all  times,  be  cultivated  by  America  towards  all 
other  nations. 


SPEECH  OF   FISHER  AMES, 

ON 

THE  BRITISH  TREATY, 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES,  APRIL  28,  1796. 


In  committee  of  the  whole  on  the  following  Resolution,  Resolved,  as 
the  opinion  of  this  committee,  that  it  is  expedient  to  pass  the  laws 
necessary  for  carrying  into  effect  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain ; 
Mr.  Ames  spoke  as  follows  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

I  ENTERTAIN  the  hope,  perhaps  a  rash  one,  that  my 
strength  will  hold  me  out  to  speak  a  few  minutes. 

In  my  judgment,  a  right  decision  will  depend  more 
on  the  temper  and  manner,  with  which  we  may  prevail 
upon  ourselves  to  contemplate  the  subject,  than  upon 
the  developement  of  any  profound  political  principles, 
or  any  remarkable  skill  in  the  application  of  them.  If 
we  could  succeed  to  neutralize  our  inclinations,  we 
should  find  less  difficulty  than  we  have  to  apprehend  in 
surmounting  all  our  objections. 

The  suggestion,  a  few  days  ago,  that  the  House 
manifested  symptoms  of  heat  and  irritation,  was  made 
and  retorted  as  if  the  charge  ought  to  create  surprise, 
and  would  convey  reproach.  Let  us  be  more  just  to 
ourselves,  and  to  the  occasion.  Let  us  not  affect  to 
deny  the  existence  and  the  intrusion  of  some  portion 
of  prejudice  and  feeling  into  the  debate,  when,  from  the 
very  structure  of  our  nature,  we  ought  to  anticipate  the 

VOL,  i.  54 


,> 


426  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 


circumstance  as  a  probability,  and  when  we  are  ad 
monished  by  the  evidence  of  our  senses  that  it  is  the 
fact. 

How  can  we  make  professions  for  ourselves,  and 
offer  exhortations  to  the  House,  that  no  influence 
should  be  felt  but  that  of  duty,  and  no  guide  respected 
but  that  of  the  understanding,  while  the  peal  to  rally 
every  passion  of  man  is  continually  ringing  in  our  ears. 

Our  understandings  have  been  addressed,  it  is  true, 
and  with  ability  and  effect ;  but,  I  demand,  has  any 
corner  of  the  heart  been  left  unexplored  ?  It  has  been 
ransacked  to  find  auxiliary  arguments,  and,  when  that 
attempt  failed,  to  awaken  the  sensibilities  that  would 
require  none.  Every  prejudice  and  feeling  has  been 
summoned  to  listen  to  some  peculiar  style  of  address : 
and  yet  we  seem  to  believe,  and  to  consider  a  doubt 
as  an  affront,  that  we  are  strangers  to  any  influence 
but  that  of  unbiassed  reason. 

It  would  be  strange,  that  a  subject,  which  has  roused 
in  turn  all  the  passions  of  the  country,  should  be  dis 
cussed  without  the  interference  of  any  of  our  own. 
We  are  men,  and  therefore  not  exempt  from  those 
passions :  as  citizens  and  representatives,  we  feel  the 
interests  that  must  excite  them.  The  hazard  of  great 
interests  cannot  fail  to  agitate  strong  passions.  We 
are  not  disinterested;  it  is  impossible  we  should  be 
dispassionate.  The  warmth  of  such  feelings  may  be 
cloud  the  judgment,  and,  for  a  time,  pervert  the  under 
standing.  But  the  public  sensibility,  and  our  own,  has 
sharpened  the  spirit  of  inquiry,  and  given  an  animation 
to  the  debate.  The  public  attention  has  been  quick 
ened  to  mark  the  progress  of  the  discussion,  and  its 
judgment,  often  hasty  and  erroneous  on  first  impres 
sions,  has  become  solid  and  enlightened  at  last.  Our 
result  will,  I  hope,  on  that  account,  be  the  safer  and 
more  mature,  as  well  as  more  accordant  with  that  of 
the  nation.  The  only  constant  agents  in  political  af 
fairs  are  the  passions  of  men.  Shall  we  complain  of 
our  nature — shall  we  say  that  man  ought  to  have  been 


• 

I 

THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  427 

made  otherwise  ?  It  is  right  already,  because  HE,  from 
whom  we  derive  our  nature,  ordained  it  so ;  and  be 
cause  thus  made  and  thus  acting,  the  cause  of  truth 
and  the  public  good  is  the  more  surely  promoted. 

But  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  produce  an  influ 
ence  of  a  nature  more  stubborn,  and  more  unfriendly 
to  truth.  It  is  very  unfairly  pretended,  that  the  con 
stitutional  right  of  this  House  is  at  stake,  and  to  be 
asserted  and  preserved  only  by  a  vote  in  the  negative. 
We  hear  it  said,  that  this  is  a  struggle  for  liberty,  a 
manly  resistance  against  the  design  to  nullify  this  as 
sembly,  and  to  make  it  a  cypher  in  the  government : 
that  the  President  and  senate,  the  numerous  meet 
ings  in  the  cities,  and  the  influence  of  the  general 
alarm  of  the  country,  are  the  agents  and  instruments  of 
a  scheme  of  coercion  and  terror,  to  force  the  treaty 
down  our  throats,  though  we  loathe  it,  and  in  spite  of 
the  clearest  convictions  of  duty  and  conscience. 

It  is  necessary  to  pause  here  and  inquire,  whether 
suggestions  of  this  kind  be  not  unfair  in  their  very 
texture  and  fabric,  and  pernicious  in  all  their  in 
fluences.  They  oppose  an  obstacle  in  the  path  of  in 
quiry,  not  simply  discouraging,  but  absolutely  insur 
mountable.  They  will  not  yield  to  argument ;  for  as 
they  were  not  reasoned  up,  they  cannot  be  reasoned 
down.  They  are  higher  than  a  Chinese  wall  in 
truth's  way,  and  built  of  materials  that  are  indestruc 
tible.  While  this  remains,  it  is  vain  to  argue ;  it  is 
vain  to  say  to  this  mountain,  be  thou  cast  into  the  sea. 
For,  I  ask  of  the  men  of  knowledge  of  the  world, 
whether  they  would  not  hold  him  for  a  blockhead,  that 
should  hope  to  prevail  in  an  argument,  whose  scope  and 
object  is  to  mortify  the  self-love  of  the  expected  prose 
lyte  ?  I  ask  further,  when  such  attempts  have  been 
made,  have  they  not  failed  of  success  ?  The  indig 
nant  heart  repels  a  conviction  that  is  believed  to  de 
base  it. 

The  self-love  of  an  individual  is  not  warmer  in  its 
sense,  nor  more  constant  in  its  action,  than  what  is 


420  3IR.   AMES'    SPEECH  ON 

called  in  French,  V  esprit  du  corps,  or  the  self-love 
of  an  assembly ;  that  jealous  affection  which  a  body 
of  men  is  always  found  to  bear  towards  its  own  pre 
rogatives  and  power.  I  will  not  condemn  this  passion. 
Why  should  we  urge  an  unmeaning  censure,  or  yield 
to  groundless  fears  that  truth  and  duty  will  be  aban 
doned,  because  men  in  a  public  assembly  are  still 
men,  and  feel  that  esprit  du  corps  which  is  one  of  the 
laws  of  their  nature  ?  Still  less  should  we  despond  or 
complain,  if  we  reflect,  that  this  very  spirit  is  a  guar 
dian  instinct,  that  watches  over  the  life  of  this  assem 
bly.  It  cherishes  the  principle  of  self-preservation, 
and  without  its  existence,  and  its  existence  with  all 
the  strength  we  see  it  possess,  the  privileges  of  the 
representatives  of  the  people,  and  mediately  the  liber 
ties  of  the  people,  would  not  be  guarded,  as  they  are, 
with  a  vigilance  that  never  sleeps,  and  an  unrelaxing 
constancy  and  courage. 

If  the  consequences,  most  unfairly  attributed  to  the 
vote  in  the  affirmative,  were  not  chimerical,  and 
worse,  for  they  are  deceptive,  I  should  think  it  a  re 
proach  to  be  found  even  moderate  in  my  zeal,  to  as 
sert  the  constitutional  powers  of  this  assembly;  and 
whenever  they  shall  be  in  real  danger,  the  present  oc 
casion  affords  proof,  that  there  will  be  no  want  of  ad 
vocates  and  champions. 

Indeed,  so  prompt  are  these  feelings,  and  when 
once  roused,  so  difficult  to  pacify,  that  if  we  could 
prove  the  alarm  was  groundless,  the  prejudice  against 
the  appropriations  may  remain  on  the  mind,  and  it 
may  even  pass  for  an  act  of  prudence  and  duty  to 
negative  a  measure,  which  was  lately  believed  by  our 
selves,  and  may  hereafter  be  misconceived  by  others, 
to  encroach  upon  the  powers  of  the  House.  Princi 
ples  that  bear  a  remote  affinity  with  usurpation  on 
those  powers  will  be  rejected,  not  merely  as  errors, 
but  as  wrongs.  Our  sensibilities  will  shrink  from  a 
post,  where  it  is  possible  they  may  be  wounded,  and  be 
inflamed  by  the  slightest  suspicion  of  an  assault. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  429 

While  these  prepossessions  remain,  all  argument  is 
useless.  It  may  be  heard  with  the  ceremony  of  at 
tention,  and  lavish  its  own  resources,  and  the  patience 
it  wearies  to  no  manner  of  purpose.  The  ears  may 
be  open,  but  the  mind  will  remain  locked  up,  and  eve 
ry  pass  to  the  understanding  guarded. 

Unless,  therefore,  this  jealous  and  repulsive  fear 
for  the  rights  of  the  House  can  be  allayed,  I  will  not 
ask  a  hearing. 

I  cannot  press  this  topic  too  far ;  I  cannot  address 
myself  with  too  much  emphasis  to  the  magnanimity 
and  candor  of  those  who  sit  here,  to  suspect  their  own 
feelings,  and,  while  they  do,  to  examine  the  grounds 
of  their  alarm.  I  repeat  it,  we  must  conquer  our  per 
suasion,  that  this  body  has  an  interest  in  one  side  of 
the  question  more  than  the  other,  before  we  attempt 
to  surmount  our  objections.  On  most  subjects,  and 
solemn  ones  too,  perhaps  in  the  most  solemn  of  all, 
we  form  our  creed  more  from  inclination  than  evi 
dence. 

Let  me  expostulate  with  gentlemen  to  admit,  if  it 
be  only  by  way  of  supposition,  and  for  a  moment,  that 
it  is  barely  possible  they  have  yielded  too  suddenly  to 
their  alarms  for  the  powers  of  this  House ;  that  the 
addresses,  which  have  been  made  with  such  variety  of 
forms,  and  with  so  great  dexterity  in  some  of  them,  to 
all  that  is  prejudice  and  passion  in  the  heart,  are  either 
the  effects  or  the  instruments  of  artifice  and  decep 
tion,  and  then  let  them  see  the  subject  once  more  in  its 
singleness  and  simplicity. 

It  will  be  impossible,  on  taking  a  fair  review  of  the 
subject,  to  justify  the  passionate  appeals  that  have 
been  made  to  us  to  struggle  for  our  liberties  and  rights, 
and  the  solemn  exhortations  to  reject  the  proposition, 
said  to  be  concealed  in  that  on  your  table,  to  surren 
der  them  forever.  In  spite  of  this  mock  solemnity, 
I  demand,  if  the  House  will  not  concur  in  the  measure 
to  execute  the  treaty,  what  other  course  shall  we  take  ? 
How  many  ways  of  proceeding  lie  open  before  us  ? 


130  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

In  the  nature  of  things  there  are  but  three ;  we  are 
either  to  make  the  treaty,  to  observe  it,  or  break  it. 
It  would  be  absurd  to  say  we  will  do  neither.  If  I  may 
repeat  a  phrase  already  so  much  abused,  we  are  under 
coercion  to  do  one  of  them,  and  we  have  no  power,  by 
the  exercise  of  our  discretion,  to  prevent  the  conse 
quences  of  a  choice. 

By  refusing  to  act,  we  choose.  The  treaty  will  be 
broken  and  fall  to  the  ground.  Where  is  the  fitness 
then,  of  replying  to  those  who  urge  upon  the  House  the 
topics  of  duty  and  policy,  that  they  attempt  to  force 
the  treaty  down,  and  to  compel  this  assembly  to  re 
nounce  its  discretion  and  to  degrade  itself  to  the  rank 
of  a  blind  and  passive  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the 
treaty-making  power  ?  In  case  we  reject  the  appropria 
tion,  we  do  not  secure  any  greater  liberty  of  action, 
we  gain  no  safer  shelter  than  before  from  the  conse 
quences  of  the  decision.  Indeed  they  are  not  to  be 
evaded.  It  is  neither  just  nor  manly  to  complain  that 
the  treaty-making  power  has  produced  this  coercion 
to  act.  It  is  not  the  art  or  the  despotism  of  that  pow 
er,  it  is  the  nature  of  things  that  compels.  Shall 
we,  dreading  to  become  the  blind  instruments  of  pow 
er,  yield  ourselves  the  blinder  dupes  of  mere  sounds 
of  imposture  ?  Yet  that  word,  that  empty  word,  coer 
cion,  has  given  scope  to  an  eloquence,  that,  one  would 
imagine,  could  not  be  tired,  and  did  not  choose  to  be 
quieted. 

Let  us  examine  still  more  in  detail  the  alternatives 
that  are  before  us,  and  we  shall  scarcely  fail  to  see,  in 
still  stronger  lights,  the  futility  of  our  apprehensions 
for  the  power  and  liberty  of  the  House. 

If,  as  some  have  suggested,  the  thing  called  a  treaty, 
is  incomplete,  if  it  has  no  binding  force  or  obliga 
tion,  the  first  question  is,  will  this  House  complete  the 
instrument,  and,  by  concurring,  impart  to  it  that  force 
which  it  wants. 

The  doctrine  has  been  avowed,  that  the  treaty, 
though  formally  ratified  by  the  executive  power  of  both 


THE  BRITISH    TREATY.  431 

nations,  though  published  as  a  law  for  our  own  by  the 
President's  proclamation,  is  still  a  mere  proposition 
submitted  to  this  assembly,  no  way  distinguishable  in 
point  of  authority  or  obligation,  from  a  motion  for  leave 
to  bring  in  a  bill,  or  any  other  original  act  of  ordinary 
legislation.  This  doctrine,  so  novel  in  our  country,  yet  so 
dear  to  many,  precisely  for  the  reason,  that  in  the  con 
tention  for  power,  victory  is  always  dear,  is  obviously 
repugnant  to  the  very  terms  as  well  as  the  fair  interpre 
tation  of  our  own  resolutions — (Mr.  Blount's.)  We 
declare,  that  the  treaty-making  power  is  exclusively 
vested  in  the  President  and  senate,  and  not  in  this 
House.  Need  I  say,  that  we  fly  in  the  face  of  that 
resolution,  when  we  pretend,  that  the  acts  of  that  power 
are  not  valid  until  we  have  concurred  in  them?  It 
would  be  nonsense,  or  worse,  to  use  the  language  of  the 
most  glaring  contradiction,  and  to  claim  a  share  in  a 
power,  which  we  at  the  same  time  disclaim  as  exclusive 
ly  vested  in  other  departments. 

What  can  be  more  strange  than  to  say,  that  the 
compacts  of  the  President  and  senate  with  foreign 
nations  are  treaties,  without  our  agency,  and  yet  those 
compacts  want  all  power  and  obligation,  until  they  are 
sanctioned  by  our  concurrence  ?  It  is  not  my  design 
in  this  place,  if  at  all,  to  go  into  the  discussion  of  this 
part  of  the  subject.  I  will,  at  least  for  the  present,  take 
it  for  granted,  that  this  monstrous  opinion  stands  in 
little  need  of  remark,  and  if  it  does,  lies  almost  out  of 
the  reach  of  refutation. 

But,  say  those,  who  hide  the  absurdity  under  the 
cover  of  ambiguous  phrases ;  have  we  no  discretion? 
and  if  we  have,  are  we  not  to  make  use  of  it  in  judg 
ing  of  the  expediency  or  inexpediency  of  the  treaty  ? 
Our  resolution  claims  that  privilege,  and  we  cannot 
surrender  it  without  equal  inconsistency  and  breach  of 
duty. 

If  there  be  any  inconsistency  in  the  case,  it  lies,  not 
in  making  the  appropriations  for  the  treaty,  but  in  the 
resolution  itself — (Mr.  Blount's.)  Let  us  examine  it 


432  MH.   AMES'   SPEECH  ON 

more  nearly.     A  treaty  is  a  bargain  between  nations, 
binding  in  good  faith ;  and  what  makes  a  bargain  ? 
The  assent  of  the  contracting  parties.     We  allow  that 
the  treaty  power  is  not  in  this  House;  this  House  has 
no  share  in  contracting,  and  is  not  a  party :  of  con 
sequence,  the  President  and  senate  alone,  may  make 
a  treaty  that  is  binding  in  good  faith.    We  claim,  how 
ever,  say  the  gentlemen,  a  right  to  judge  of  the  expedi 
ency  of  treaties ;  that  is  the  constitutional  province  of 
our  discretion.     Be  it  so.     What  follows  ?     Treaties, 
when  adjudged  by  us  to  be  inexpedient,  fall  to  the 
ground,  and  the  public  faith  is  not  hurt.     This,  incredi 
ble  and  extravagant  as  it  may  seem,  is  asserted.     The 
amount  of  it,  in  plainer  language,  is  this — the  Presi 
dent   and  senate  are  to  make  national  bargains,  and 
this  House  has  nothing  to  do  in  making  them.  But  bad 
bargains  do  not  bind  this  House,  and,  of  inevitable 
consequence,  do  not  bind  the  nation.    When  a  national 
bargain,  called  a  treaty,  is  made,  its  binding  force  does 
not  depend  upon  the  making,  but  upon  our  opinion 
that  it  is  good.     As  our  opinion  on  the  matter  can  be 
known  and  declared  only  by  ourselves,  when  sitting  in 
our  legislative  capacity,  the  treaty,  though  ratified, 
and,  as  we  choose  to  term  it,  made,  is  hung  up  in  sus 
pense,  till  our  sense  is  ascertained.     We  condemn  the 
bargain,  and  it  falls,  though,  as  we  say,  our  faith  does 
not.    We  approve  a  bargain  as  expedient,  and  it  stands 
firm,  and  binds  the  nation.     Yet,  even  in  this  latter 
case,  its  force  is  plainly  not  derived  from  the  ratifica 
tion  by  the  treaty-making  power,  but  from  our  appro 
bation.     Who  will  trace  these  inferences,  and  pretend 
that  we  have  no  share,  according  to  the  argument,  in 
the. treaty-making  power  ?     These  opinions,  neverthe 
less,  have  been  advocated  with  infinite  zeal  and  perse 
verance.     Is  it  possible  that  any  man   can  be  hardy 
enough  to  avow  them,  and  their   ridiculous   conse 
quences  ? 

Let  me  hasten  to  suppose  the  treaty  is  considered 
as  already  made,  and  then  the  alternative  is  fairly  pre- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY,  433 

settled  to  the  mind,  whether  we  will  observe  the  treaty 
or  break  it.     This,  in  fact,  is  the  naked  question. 

If  we  choose  to  observe  it  with  good  faith,  our  course 
is  obvious.  Whatever  is  stipulated  to  be  done  by  the 
nation,  must  be  complied  with.  Our  agency,  if  it 
should  be  requisite,  cannot  be  properly  refused.  And 
I  do  not  see  why  it  is  not  as  obligatory  a  rule  of  con 
duct  for  the  legislative  as  for  the  courts  of  law. 

I  cannot  lose  this  opportunity  to  remark,  that  the 
coercion,  so  much  dreaded  and  declaimed  against,  ap 
pears  at  length  to  be  no  more  than  the  authority  of 
principles,  the  despotism  of  duty.  Gentlemen  com 
plain  we  are  forced  to  act  in  this  way,  we  are  forced 
to  swallow  the  treaty.  It  is  very  true,  unless  we  claim 
the  liberty  of  abuse,  the  right  to  act  as  we  ought  not. 
There  is  but  one  right  way  open  for  us,  the  laws  of 
morality  and  good  faith  have  fenced  up  every  other. 
What  sort  of  liberty  is  that,  which  we  presume  to  exer 
cise  against  the  authority  of  those  laws  ?  It  is  for 
tyrants  to  complain,  that  principles  are  restraints,  and 
that  they  have  no  liberty,  so  long  as  their  despotism 
has  limits.  These  principles  will  be  unfolded  by 
examining  the  remaining  question  : 

SHALL  WE  BREAK  THE  TREATY? 

The  treaty  is  bad,  fatally  bad,  is  the  cry.  It  sacri 
fices  the  interest,  the  honor,  the  independence  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  faith  of  our  engagements  to 
France.  If  we  listen  to  the  clamor  of  party  intemper 
ance,  the  evils  are  of  a  number  not  to  be  counted,  and 
of  a  nature  not  to  be  borne,  even  in  idea.  The  lan 
guage  of  passion  and  exaggeration  may  silence  that 
of  sober  reason  in  other  places,  it  has  not  done  it 
here.  The  question  here  is,  whether  the  treaty  be  re 
ally  so  very  fatal  as  to  oblige  the  nation  to  break  its 
faith.  I  admit  that  such  a  treaty  ought  not  to  be  exe 
cuted.  I  admit  that  self-preservation  is  the  first  law  of 
society,  as  well  as  of  individuals.  It  would,  perhaps, 
be  deemed  an  abuse  of  terms  to  call  that  a  treaty, 
which  violates  such  a  principle.  I  wave  also,  for  the 

VOL.  i.  55 


434  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

present,  any  inquiry,  what  departments  shall  represent 
the  nation,  and  annul  the  stipulations  of  a  treaty.  I 
content  myself  with  pursuing  the  inquiry,  whether  the 
nature  of  this  compact  be  such  as  to  justify  our  refusal 
to  carry  it  into  effect.  A  treaty  is  the  promise  of  a 
nation.  Now,  promises  do  not  always  bind  him  that 
makes  them. 

But  I  lay  down  two  rules,  which  ought  to  guide  us  in 
this  case.  The  treaty  must  appear  to  be  bad,  not 
merely  in  the  petty  details,  but  in  its  character,  princi 
ple  and  mass.  And  in  the  next  place,  this  ought  to  be 
ascertained  by  the  decided  and  general  concurrence 
of  the  enlightened  public.  I  confess  there  seems  to 
me  something  very  like  ridicule  thrown  over  the  debate 
by  the  discussion  of  the  articles  in  detail. 

The  undecided  point  is,  shall  we  break  our  faith  ? 
And  while  our  country  and  enlightened  Europe,  await 
the  issue  with  more  than  curiosity,  we  are  employed 
to  gather  piecemeal,  and  article  by  article,  from  the 
instrument,  a  justification  for  the  deed  by  trivial  calcu 
lations  of  commercial  profit  and  loss.  This  is  little 
worthy  of  the  subject,  of  this  body,  or  of  the  nation.  If 
the  treaty  is  bad,  it  will  appear  to  be  so  in  its  mass. 
Evil  to  a  fatal  extreme,  if  that  be  its  tendency,  requires 
no  proof;  it  brings  it.  Extremes  speak  for  themselves 
arid  make  their  own  law.  What  if  the  direct  voyage 
of  American  ships  to  Jamaica  with  horses  or  lumber, 
might  net  one  or  two  per  centum  more  than  the  present 
trade  to  Surinam ;  would  the  proof  of  the  fact  avail  any 
thing  in  so  grave  a  question  as  the  violation  of  the 
public  engagements? 

It  is  in  vain  to  allege,  that  our  faith,  plighted  to 
France,  is  violated  by  this  new  treaty.  Our  prior  trea 
ties  are  expressly  saved  from  the  operation  of  the  Bri 
tish  treaty.  And  what  do  those  mean  who  say,  that 
our  honor  was  forfeited  by  treating  at  all,  and  especial 
ly  by  such  a  treaty  ?  Justice,  the  laws  and  practice 
of  nations,  a  just  regard  for  peace  as  a  duty  to  man 
kind,  and  the  known  wish  of  our  citizens,  as  well  as  that 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  435 

self-respect  which  required  it  of  the  nation  to  act  with 
dignity  and  moderation,  all  these  forbade  an  appeal  to 
arms,  before  we  had  tried  the  effect  of  negociation. 
The  honor  of  the  United  States  was  saved,  not  forfeit 
ed,  by  treating.  The  treaty  itself,  by  its  stipulations 
for  the  posts,  for  indemnity,  and  for  a  due  observation 
of  our  neutral  rights,  has  justly  raised  the  character  of 
the  nation.  Never  did  the  name  of  America  appear  in 
Europe  with  more  lustre  than  upon  the  event  of  ratify 
ing  this  instrument.  The  fact  is  of  a  nature  to  over 
come  all  contradiction. 

But  the  independence  of  the  country — we  are  co 
lonists  again.  This  is  the  cry  of  the  very  men  who  tell 
us,  that  France  will  resent  our  exercise  of  the  rights  of 
an  independent  nation  to  adjust  our  wrongs  with  an 
aggressor,  without  giving  her  the  opportunity  to  say, 
those  wrongs  shall  subsist  and  shall  not  be  adjusted. 
This  is  an  admirable  specimen  of  the  spirit  of  inde 
pendence.  The  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  it  cannoi 
be  denied,  is  unfavorable  to  this  strange  sort  of  in 
dependence. 

Few  men  of  any  reputation  for  sense,  among  those 
who  say  the  treaty  is  bad,  will  put  that  reputation  so 
much  at  hazard  as  to  pretend  that  it  is  so  extremely  bad 
as  to  warrant  and  require  a  violation  of  the  public 
faith.  The  proper  ground  of  the  controversy,  there 
fore,  is  really  unoccupied  by  the  opposers  of  the  trea 
ty  ;  as  the  very  hinge  of  the  debate  is  on  the  point,  not 
of  its  being  good  or  otherwise,  but  whether  it  is  intole 
rably  and  fatally  pernicious.  If  loose  and  ignorant 
declaimers  have  any  where  asserted  the  latter  idea,  it 
is  too  extravagant,  and  too  solidly  refuted,  to  be  re 
peated  here.  Instead  of  any  attempt  to  expose  it  still 
further,  I  will  say,  and  I  appeal  with  confidence  to  the 
candor  of  many  opposers  of  the  treaty  to  acknow 
ledge,  that  if  it  had  been  permitted  to  go  into  opera 
tion  silently,  like  our  other  treaties,  so  little  alteration 
of  any  sort  would  be  made  by  it  in  the  great  mass  of 
our  commercial  and  agricultural  concerns,  that  it 


436  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

would  not  be  generally  discovered  by  its  effects  to  be 
in  force,  during  the  term  for  which  it  was  contracted. 
I  place  considerable  reliance  on  the  weight  men  of 
candor  will  give  to  this  remark,  because  I  believe  it  to 
be  true,  and  little  short  of  undeniable.  When  the 
panic  dread  of  the  treaty  shall  cease,  as  it  certainly 
must,  it  will  be  seen  through  another  medium.  Those, 
who  shall  make  search  into  the  articles  for  the  cause 
of  their  alarms,  will  be  so  far  from  finding  stipulations 
that  will  operate  fatally,  they  will  discover  few  of  them 
that  will  have-  any  lasting  operation  at  all.  Those, 
which  relate  to  the  disputes  between  the  two  coun 
tries,  will  spend  their  force  upon  the  subjects  in  dispute, 
and  extinguish  them.  The  commercial  articles  are 
more  of  a  nature  to  confirm  the  existing  state  of 
things,  than  to  change  it.  The  treaty  alarm  was 
purely  an  address  to  the  imagination  and  prejudices  of 
the  citizens,  and  not  on  that  account  the  less  formida 
ble.  Objections  that  proceed  upon  error,  in  fact  or 
calculation,  may  be  traced  arid  exposed ;  but  such  as 
are  drawn  from  the  imagination  or  addressed  to  it, 
elude  definition,  and  return  to  domineer  over  the  mind, 
after  having  been  banished  from  it  by  truth. 

I  will  not  so  far  abuse  the  momentary  strength  that 
is  lent  to  me  by  the  zeal  of  the  occasion,  as  to  enlarge 
upon  the  commercial  operation  of  the  treaty.  I  pro 
ceed  to  the  second  proposition,  which  I  have  stated  as 
indispensably  requisite  to  a  refusal  of  the  performance 
of  a  treaty — will  the  state  of  public  opinion  justify  the 
deed  ? 

No  government,  not  even  a  despotism,  will  break  its 
faith  without  some  pretext,  and  it  must  be  plausible,  it 
must  be  such  as  will  carry  the  public  opinion  along 
with  it.  Reasons  of  policy,  if  not  of  morality,  dissuade 
even  Turkey  and  Algiers  from  breaches  of  treaty  in 
mere  wantonness  of  perfidy,  in  open  contempt  of  the 
reproaches  of  their  subjects.  Surely,  a  popular  gov 
ernment  will  not  proceed  more  arbitrarily,  as  it  is  more 
free ;  nor  with  less  shame  or  scruple  in  proportion  as  it 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  437 

has  better  morals.  It  will  not  proceed  against  the 
faith  of  treaties  at  all,  unless  the  strong  and  decided 
sense  of  the  nation  shall  pronounce,  not  simply  that  the 
treaty  is  not  advantageous,  but  that  it  ought  to  be  broken 
and  annulled.  Such  a  plain  manifestation  of  the  sense 
of  the  citizens  is  indispensably  requisite ;  first,  because 
if  the  popular  apprehensions  be  not  an  infallible  crite 
rion  of  the  disadvantages  of  the  instrument,  their  ac 
quiescence  in  the  operation  of  it  is  an  irrefragable 
proof,  that  the  extreme  case  does  not  exist,  which  alone 
could  justify  our  setting  it  aside. 

In  the  next  place,  this  approving  opinion  of  the  citi 
zens  is  requisite,  as  the  best  preventive  of  the  ill  conse 
quences  of  a  measure  always  so  delicate,  and  often  so 
hazardous.  Individuals  would,  in  that  case  at  least, 
attempt  to  repel  the  opprobrium  that  would  be  thrown 
upon  Congress  by  those  who  will  charge  it  with  per 
fidy.  They  would  give  weight  to  the  testimony  of 
facts,  and  the  authority  of  principles,  on  which  the 
government  would  rest  its  vindication.  And  if  war 
should  ensue  upon  the  violation,  our  citizens  would 
not  be  divided  from  their  government,  nor  the  ardor  of 
their  courage  be  chilled  by  the  consciousness  of  injus 
tice,  and  the  sense  of  humiliation,  that  sense  which 
makes  those  despicable  who  know  they  are  despised. 

I  add  a  third  reason,  and  with  me  it  has  a  force  that 
no  words  of  mine  can  augment,  that  a  government, 
wantonly  refusing  to  fulfil  its  engagements,  is  the  cor- 
rupter  of  its  citizens.  Will  the  laws  continue  to  pre 
vail  in  the  hearts  of  the  people,  when  the  respect  that 
gives  them  efficacy  is  withdrawn  from  the  legislators  ? 
How  shall  we  punish  vice  while  we  practise  it  ?  We 
have  not  force,  and  vain  will  be  our  reliance,  when  we 
have  forfeited  the  resources  of  opinion.  To  weaken 
government  and  to  corrupt  morals  are  effects  of  a 
breach  of  faith  not  to  be  prevented ;  and  from  effects 
they  become  causes,  producing,  with  augmented  ac 
tivity,  more  disorder  and  more  corruption ;  order  will 
be  disturbed  and  the  life  of  the  public  liberty  shortened. 


438  MR.  AMES*  SPEECH  ON 

And  who,  I  would  inquire,  is  hardy  enough  to  pre 
tend,  that  the  public  voice  demands  the  violation  of 
the  treaty  ?  The  evidence  of  the  sense  of  the  great 
mass  of  the  nation  is  often  equivocal ;  but  when  was 
it  ever  manifested  with  more  energy  and  precision 
than  at  the  present  moment  ?  The  voice  of  the  peo 
ple  is  raised  against  the  measure  of  refusing  the  ap 
propriations.  If  gentlemen  should  urge,  nevertheless, 
that  all  this  sound  of  alarm  is  a  counterfeit  expression 
of  the  sense  of  the  public,  I  will  proceed  to  other  proofs. 
If  the  treaty  is  ruinous  to  our  commerce,  what  has 
blinded  the  eyes  of  the  merchants  and  traders  ? 
Surely  they  are  not  enemies  to  trade,  or  ignorant  of 
their  own  interests.  Their  sense  is  not  so  liable  to  be 
mistaken  as  .that  of  a  nation,  and  they  are  almost 
unanimous.  The  articles,  stipulating  the  redress  of 
our  injuries  by  captures  on  the  sea,  are  said  to  be  de 
lusive.  By  whom  is  this  said  ?  The  very  men,  whose 
fortunes  are  staked  upon  the  competency  of  that  redress, 
say  no  such  thing.  They  wait  with  anxious  fear  lest 
you  should  annul  that  compact  on  which  all  their 
hopes  are  rested. 

Thus  we  offer  proof,  little  short  of  absolute  demon 
stration,  that  the  voice  of  our  country  is  raised  not  to 
sanction,  but  to  deprecate  the  non-performance  of  our 
engagements.  It  is  not  the  nation,  it  is  one,  and  but 
one  branch  of  the  government  that  proposes  to  reject 
them.  With  this  aspect  of  things,  to  reject  is  an  act 
of  desperation. 

I  shall  be  asked,  why  a  treaty  so  good  in  some  ar 
ticles,  and  so  harmless  in  others,  has  met  with  such 
unrelenting  opposition ;  and  how  the  clamors  against 
it  from  New  Hampshire  to  Georgia,  can  be  accounted 
for  ?  The  apprehensions  so  extensively  diffused,  on 
its  first  publication,  will  be  vouched  as  proof,  that  the 
treaty  is  bad,  and  that  the  people  hold  it  in  abhorrence. 

I  am  not  embarrassed  to  find  the  answer  to  this  in 
sinuation.  Certainly  a  foresight  of  its  pernicious  ope 
ration?  could  not  have  created  all  the  fears  that  were 


THE  BRITISH   TREATY.  439 

felt  or  affected.  The  alarm  spread  faster  than  the 
publication  of  the  treaty.  There  were  more  critics 
than  readers.  Besides,  as  the  subject  was  examined, 
those  fears  have  subsided. 

The  movements  of  passion  are  quicker  than  those 
of  the  understanding.  We  are  to  search  for  the 
causes  of  first  impressions,  not  in  the  articles  of  this 
obnoxious  and  misrepresented  instrument,  but  in  the 
state  of  the  public  feeling. 

The  fervor  of  the  revolution  war  had  not  entirely 
cooled,  nor  its  controversies  ceased,  before  the  sensi 
bilities  of  our  citizens  were  quickened  with  a  tenfold 
vivacity,  by  a  new  and  extraordinary  subject  of  irrita 
tion.  One  of  the  two  great  nations  of  Europe  under 
went  a  change  which  has  attracted  all  our  wonder, 
and  interested  all  our  sympathies.  Whatever  they 
did,  the  zeal  of  many  went  with  them,  and  often  went 
to  excess.  These  impressions  met  with  much  to  in 
flame,  and  nothing  to  restrain  them.  In  our  newspa 
pers,  in  our  feasts,  and  some  of  our  elections,  enthusi 
asm  was  admitted  a  merit,  a  test  of  patriotism,  and 
that  made  it  contagious.  In  the  opinion  of  party,  we 
could  not  love  or  hate  enough.  I  dare  say,  in  spite  of 
all  the  obloquy  it  may  provoke,  we  were  extravagant 
in  both.  It  is  my  right  to  avow  that  passions  so  impe 
tuous,  enthusiasm  so  wild,  could  not  subsist  without 
disturbing  the  sober  exercise  of  reason,  without  putting 
at  risk  the  peace  and  precious  interests  of  our  coun 
try.  They  were  hazarded.  I  will  not  exhaust  the 
little  breath  I  have  left,  to  say  how  much,  nor  by 
whom,  or  by  what  means  they  were  rescued  from  the 
sacrifice.  Shall  I  be  called  upon  to  offer  my  proofs  ? 
They  are  here,  they  are  every  where.  No  one  has 
forgotten  the  proceedings  of  1794.  No  one  has  for 
gotten  the  captures  of  our  vessels,  and  the  imminent 
danger  of  war.  The  nation  thirsted  not  merely  for 
reparation,  but  vengeance.  Suffering  such  wrongs, 
and  agitated  by  such  resentments,  was  it  in  the  power 
of  any  words  of  compact,  or  could  any  parchment  with 


440  MR.  AMES'    SPEECH  ON 

its  seals  prevail  at  once  to  tranquillize  the  people  ?  It 
was  impossible.  Treaties  in  England  are  seldom 
popular,  and  least  of  all  when  the  stipulations  of  amity 
succeed  to  the  bitterness  of  hatred.  Even  the  best 
treaty,  though  nothing  be  refused,  will  choke  re 
sentment,  but  not  satisfy  it.  Every  treaty  is  as  sure 
to  disappoint  extravagant  expectations  as  to  disarm 
extravagant  passions.  Of  the  latter,  hatred  is  one 
that  takes  no  bribes.  They,  who  are  animated  by  the 
spirit  of  revenge,  will  not  be  quieted  by  the  possibility 
of  profit. 

Why  do  they  complain,  that  the  West  Indies  are  not 
laid  open  ?  Why  do  they  lament,  that  any  restriction 
is  stipulated  on  the  commerce  of  the  East  Indies  ? 
Why  do  they  pretend,  that  if  they  reject  this,  and  insist 
upon  more,  more  will  be  accomplished  ?  Let  us  be 
explicit — more  would  not  satisfy.  If  all  was  granted, 
would  riot  a  treaty  of  amity  with  Great  Britain,  still  be 
obnoxious  ?  Have  we  not  this  instant  heard  it  urged 
against  our  envoy,  that  he  was  not  ardent  enough  in 
his  hatred  of  Great  Britain  ?  A  treaty  of  amity  is  con 
demned  because  it  was  not  made  by  a  foe,  and  in  the 
spirit  of  one.  The  same  gentleman,  at  the  same  instant, 
repeats  a  very  prevailing  objection,  that  no  treaty  should 
be  made  with  the  enemy  of  France.  No  treaty,  ex 
claim  others,  should  be  made  with  a  monarch  or  a 
despot :  there  will  be  no  naval  security  while  those 
sea-robbers  domineer  on  the  ocean :  their  den  must 
be  destroyed  :  that  nation  must  be  extirpated. 

I  like  this,  sir,  because  it  is  sincerity.  With  feelings 
such  as  these,  we  do  not  pant  for  treaties.  Such  pas 
sions  seek  nothing,  and  will  be  content  with  nothing, 
but  the  destruction  of  their  object.  If  a  treaty  left 
king  George  his  island,  it  would  not  answer ;  not  if  he 
stipulated  to  pay  rent  for  it.  It  has  been  said,  the 
world  ought  to  rejoice  if  Britain  was  sunk  in  the  sea ; 
if  where  there  are  now  men  and  wealth  and  laws  and 
liberty,  there  was  no  more  than  a  sand  bank  for  the 
sea-monsters  to  fatten  on ;  a  space  for  the  storms  of 
the  ocean  to  mingle  in  conflict. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  441 

1  object  nothing  to  the  good  sense  or  humanity  of  all 
this.  I  yield  the  point,  that  this  is  a  proof  that  the  age 
of  reason  is  in  progress.  Let  it  be  philanthropy,  let 
it  be  patriotism,  if  you  will,  but  it  is  no  indication  that 
any  treaty  would  be  approved.  The  difficulty  is  not 
to  overcome  the  objections  to  the  terms ;  it  is  to  re- 
strain  the  repugnance  to  any  stipulations  of  amity  with 
the  party. 

Having  alluded  to  the  rival  of  Great  Britain,  I  am, 
not  unwilling  to  explain  myself;  I  affect  no  conceal 
ment,  and  I  have  practised  none.  While  those  two 
great  nations  agitate  all  Europe  with  their  quarrels, 
they  will  both  equally  desire,  arid  with  any  chance  of 
success,  equally  endeavor  to  create  an  influence  in 
America.  Each  will  exert  all  its  arts  to  range  our 
strength  on  its  own  side.  How  is  this  to  be  effected  ? 
Our  government  is  a  democratical  republic.  It  will 
not  be  disposed  to  pursue  a  system  of  politics,  in  sub 
servience  to  either  France  or  England,  in  opposition 
to  the  general  wishes  of  the  citizens :  and,  if  Congress 
should  adopt  such  measures,  they  would  not  be  pur 
sued  long,  nor  with  much  success.  From  the  nature 
of  our  government,  popularity  is  the  instrument  of  for 
eign  influence.  Without  it,  all  is  labor  and  disap 
pointment.  With  that  mighty  auxiliary,  foreign  in 
trigue  finds  agents,  not  only  volunteers,  but  competi 
tors  for  employment,  and  any  thing  like  reluctance  is 
understood  to  be  a  crime.  Has  Britain  this  means  of 
influence  ?  Certainly  not.  If  her  gold  could  buy  ad 
herents,  their  becoming  such  would  deprive  them  of 
all  political  power  and  importance.  They  would  not 
wield  popularity  as  a 'weapon,  but  would  fall  under  it. 
Britain  has  no  influence,  and  for  the  reasons  just  given 
can  have  none.  She  has  enough ;  and  God  forbid  she 
ever  should  have  more.  France,  possessed  of  popular 
enthusiasm,  of  party  attachments,  has  had,  and  still 
has  too  much  influence  on  our  politics — any  foreign 
influence  is  too  much,  and  ought  to  be  destroyed.  I 
detest  the  man  and  disdain  the  spirit,  that  can  bend  to 

VOL.  i.  56 


442  MK.  AMES'  SPEECH  O!s 

a  mean  subserviency  to  the  views  of  any  nation.  It  is 
enough  to  be  Americans.  That  character  compre 
hends  our  duties,  and  ought  to  engross  our  attach 
ments. 

But  I  would  not  be  misunderstood.  I  would  not 
break  the  alliance  with  France ;  I  would  not  have 
the  connexion  between  the  two  countries  even  a  cold 
one.  It  should  be  cordial  and  sincere ;  but  I  would 
banish  that  influence,  which,  by  acting  on  the  passions 
of  the  citizens,  may  acquire  a  power  over  the  govern 
ment. 

It  is  no  bad  proof  of  the  merit  of  the  treaty,  that,  un 
der  all  these  unfavorable  circumstances,  it  should  be 
so  well  approved.  In  spite  of  first  impressions,  in  spite 
of  misrepresentation  and  party  clamor,  inquiry  has 
multiplied  its  advocates ;  and  at  last  the  public  senti 
ment  appears  to  me  clearly  preponderating  to  its  side. 

On  the  most  careful  review  of  the  several  branches 
of  the  treaty,  those  which  respect  political  arrange 
ments,  the  spoliations  on  our  trade,  and  the  regula 
tion  of  commerce,  there  is  little  to  be  apprehended. 
The  evil,  aggravated  as  it  is  by  party,  is  little  in  de 
gree,  and  short  in  duration ;  two  years  from  the  end 
of  the  European  war.  I  ask,  and  I  would  ask  the 
question  significantly,  what  are  the  inducements  to 
reject  the  treaty  ?  What  great  object  is  to  be  gained, 
and  fairly  gained  by  it  ?  If,  however,  as  to  the  merits 
of  the  treaty,  candor  should  suspend  its  approbation, 
what  is  there  to  hold  patriotism  a  moment  in  balance, 
as  to  the  violation  of  it  ?  Nothing ;  I  repeat  confident 
ly,  nothing.  There  is  nothing  before  us  in  that  event 
but  confusion  and  dishonor. 

But  before  I  attempt  to  develope  those  conse 
quences,  I  must  put  myself  at  ease  by  some  explanation. 

Nothing  is  worse  received  among  men  than  the 
confutation  of  their  opinions ;  and,  of  these,  none  are 
more  dear  or  more  vulnerable  than  their  political  opin 
ions.  To  say  that  a  proposition  leads  to  shame  and 
ruin,  is  almost  equivalent  to  a  charge  that  the  support- 


THE  BRITISH  TREAT*.  U'J 

ers  of  it  intend  to  produce  them.  I  throw  myself  upon 
the  -magnanimity  and  candor  of  those  who  hear  me. 
I  cannot  do  justice  to  my  subject  without  exposing,  as 
forcibly  as  I  can,  all  the  evils  in  prospect.  I  readily 
admit,  that  in  every  science,  and  most  of  all  in  politics, 
error  springs  from  other  sources  than  the  want  of  sense 
or  integrity.  I  despise  indiscriminate  professions  of 
candor  and  respect.  There  are  individuals  opposed  to 
me  of  whom  I  am  not  bound  to  say  any  thing.  But  of 
many,  perhaps  of  a  majority  of  the  opposers  of  the  appro 
priations,  it  gives  me  pleasure  to  declare,  they  possess 
my  confidence  and  regard.  There  are  among  them 
individuals  for  whom  I  entertain  a  cordial  affection. 

The  consequences  of  refusing  to  make  provision  for 
the  treaty  are  not  all  to  be  foreseen.  By  rejecting,  vast 
interests  are  committed  to  the  sport  of  the  winds. 
Chance  becomes  the  arbiter  of  events,  and  it  is  forbidden 
to  human  foresight  to  count  their  number,  or  measure 
their  extent.  Before  we  resolve  to  leap  into  this  abyss, 
so  dark  and  so  profound,  it  becomes  us  to  pause  and  re 
flect  upon  such  of  the  dangers  as  are  obvious  and  inevi 
table.  If  this  assembly  should  be  wrought  into  a  tem 
per  to  defy  these  consequences,  it  is  vain,  it  is  decep 
tive,  to  pretend  that  we  can  escape  them.  It  is  worse 
than  weakness  to  say,  that  as  to  public  faith  our  vote 
has  already  settled  the  question.  Another  tribunal 
than  our  own  is  already  erected.  The  public  opinion, 
not  merely  of  our  own  country,  but  of  the  enlightened 
world,  will  pronounce  a  judgment  that  we  cannot  resist, 
that  we  dare  not  even  affect  to  despise. 

Well  may  I  urge  it  to  men,  who  know  the  worth  of 
character,  that  it  is  no  trivial  calamity  to  have  it  con 
tested.  Refusing  to  do  what  the  treaty  stipulates  shall 
be  done,  opens  the  controversy.  Even  if  we  should 
stand  justified  at  last,  a  character,  that  is  vindicated,  is 
something  worse  than  it  stood  before,  unquestioned 
and  unquestionable.  Like  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  of 
slander,  we  recover  a  reputation  disfigured  by  invective, 
and  even  tarnished  by  too  much  handling.  In  the 


J4i  JJR.  AMES'  SPEECH  O\ 

combat  tor  the  honor  of  the  nation,  it  may  receive  some 
wounds,  which,  though  they  should  heal,  will  leave  scars. 
I  need  not  say,  for  surely  the  feelings  of  every  bosom 
have  anticipated,  that  we  cannot  guard  this  sense  of 
national  honor,  this  everlasting  fire  which  alone  keeps 
patriotism  warm  in  the  heart,  with  a  sensibility  too 
vigilant  and  jealous. 

If,  by  executing  the  treaty,  there  is  no  possibility  of 
dishonor,  and  if,  by  rejecting,  there  is  some  foundation 
for  doubt,  and  for  reproach,  it  is  not  for  me  to  measure, 
it  is  for  your  own  feelings  to  estimate  the  vast  distance, 
that  divides  the  one  side  of  the  alternative  from  the 
other. 

If  therefore,  we  should  enter  on  the  examination 
of  the  question  of  duty  and  obligation  with  some 
feelings  of  prepossession,  1  do  not  hesitate  to  say,  they 
are  such  as  we  ought  to  have :  it  is  an  after  inquiry  to 
determine  whether  they  are  such  as  ought  finally  to  be 
resisted. 

The  resolution  (Mr.  Blount's)  is  less  explicit  than 
(he  constitution.  Its  patrons  should  have  made  it 
more  so,  if  possible,  if  they  had  any  doubts,  or  meant 
the  public  should  entertain  none.  Is  it  the  sense  of 
that  vote,  as  some  have  insinuated,  that  we  claim  a 
right,  for  any  cause  or  no  cause  at  all  but  our  own 
•sovereign  will  and  pleasure,  to  refuse  to  execute,  and 
thereby  to  annul  the  stipulations  of  a  treaty — that 
we  have  nothing  to  regard  but  the  expediency  or  inex 
pediency  of  the  measure,  being  absolutely  free  from 
all  obligation  by  compact  to  give  it  our  sanction  ?  A 
doctrine  so  monstrous,  so  shameless,  is  refuted  by 
being  avowed.  There  are  no  words,  you  could  express 
it  in,  that  would  not  convey  both  confutation  and  re 
proach.  It  would  outrage  the  ignorance  of  the  tenth 
century  to  believe,  it  would  baffle  the  casuistry  of  a 
papal  council  to  vindicate.  I  venture  to  say  it  is  im 
possible  :  no  less  impossible  than  that  we  should  desire 
to  assert  the  scandalous  privilege  of  being  free  after 
we  have  pledged  our  honor. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  .j  1;, 

It  is  doing  injustice  to  the  resolution  of  the  House, 
(which  I  dislike  on  many  accounts)  to  strain  the  in 
terpretation  of  it  to  this  extravagance.  The  treaty- 
making  power  is  declared  by  it  to  be  vested  exclusive 
ly  in  the  President  and  senate.  Will  any  man  in  his 
senses  affirm,  that  it  can  be  a  treaty  before  it  has  any 
binding  force  or  obligation  ?  If  it  has  no  binding  force 
upon  us,  it  has  none  upon  Great  Britain.  Let  candor 
answer,  is  Great  Britain  free  from  any  obligation  to  de 
liver  the  posts  in  June,  and  are  we  willing  to  signify  to 
her  that  we  think  so  ?  Is  it  with  that  nation  a  question 
of  mere  expediency  or  inexpediency  to  do  it,  and  that 
too,  even  after  we  have  done  all  that  depends  upon  us 
to  give  the  treaty  effect  ?  No  sober  man  believes  this. 
No  one,  who  would  not  join  in  condemning  the  faithless 
proceedings  of  that  nation,  if  such  a  doctrine  should 
be  avowed  and  carried  into  practice — and  why  com 
plain,  if  Great  Britain  is  not  bound?  There  can 
be  no  breach  of  faith  where  none  is  plighted.  I  shall 
be  told  that  she  is  bound.  Surely  it  follows,  that  if  she  is 
bound  to  performance,  our  nation  is  under  a  similar 
obligation ;  if  both  parties  be  not  obliged,  neither  is 
obliged,  it  is  no  compact,  no  treaty.  This  is  a  dictate 
of  law  and  common  sense,  and  every  jury  in  the  coun 
try  has  sanctioned  it  on  oath. 

It  cannot  be  a  treaty  and  yet  no  treaty,  a  bargain 
yet  no  promise ;  if  it  is  a  promise,  I  am  not  to  read  a 
lecture  to  show  why  an  honest  man  will  keep  his  pro 
mise. 

The  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  words  of  the  reso 
lution  of  the  House,  imply,  that  the  United  States  en 
gage  their  good  faith  in  a  treaty.  We  disclaim,  say 
the  majority,  the  treaty-making  power ;  we  of  course 
disclaim  (they  ought  to  say,)  every  doctrine,  that  would 
put  a  negative  upon  the  doings  of  that  power.  It  is  the 
prerogative  of  folly  alone  to  maintain  both  sides  of  a 
proposition. 

Will  any  man  affirm,  the  American  nation  is  engag 
ed  by  good  faith  to  the  British  nation ;  but  that  en- 


MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

gagement  is  nothing  to  this  House  ?  Such  a  man  is 
not  to  be  reasoned  with.  Such  a  doctrine  is  a  coat  of 
mail,  that  would  turn  the  edge  of  all  the  weapons  of 
argument,  if  they  were  sharper  than  a  sword.  Will  it 
be  imagined,  the  king  of  Great  Britain  and  the  Presi 
dent  are  mutually  bound  by  the  treaty,  but  the  two  na 
tions  are  free  ? 

It  is  one  thing  for  this  House  to  stand  in  a  position 
that  presents  an  opportunity  to  break  the  faith  of 
America,  and  another  to  establish  a  principle  that  will 
justify  the  deed. 

We  feel  less  repugnance  to  believe  that  any  other 
body  is  bound  by  obligation  than  our  own.  There  is 
not  a  man  here  who  does  riot  say  that  Great  Britain 
is  bound  by  treaty.  Bring  it  nearer  home.  Is  the  se 
nate  bound  ?  Just  as  much  as  the  House  and  no  more. 
Suppose  the  senate,  as  part  of  the  treaty  power,  by 
ratifying  a  treaty  on  Monday,  pledges  the  public  faith 
to  do  a  certain  act.  Then,  in  their  ordinary  capacity 
as  a  branch  of  the  legislature,  the  senate  is  called 
upon  on  Tuesday  to  perform  that  act,  for  example,  an 
appropriation  of  money — is  the  senate,  (so  lately  un 
der  obligation,)  now  free  to  agree  or  disagree  to  the 
act  ?  If  the  twenty  ratifying  senators  should  rise  up 
and  avow  this  principle,  saying,  we  struggle  for  liberty, 
we  will  not  be  cyphers,  mere  puppets,  and  give  their 
votes  accordingly,  would  not  shame  blister  their 
tongues,  would  not  infamy  tingle  in  their  ears — would 
not  their  country,  which  they  had  insulted  and  dis 
honored,  though  it  should  be  silent  and  forgiving,  be  a 
revolutionary  tribunal,  a  rack  on  which  their  own  re 
flections  would  stretch  them  ? 

This,  sir,  is  a  cause  that  would  be  dishonored  and 
betrayed,  if  I  contented  myself  with  appealing  only  to 
the  understanding.  It  is  too  cold,  and  its  processes  are 
too  slow  for  the  occasion.  I  desire  to  thank  God, 
that  since  he  has  given  me  an  intellect  so  fallible,  he 
has  impressed  upon  me  an  instinct  that  is  sure.  On  a 
question  of  shame  and  honor,  reasoning  is  sometimes 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY,  447 


useless,  and  worse.  I  feel  the  decision  in  my  pulse — if 
it  throws  no  light  upon  the  brain,  it  kindles  a  fire  at  the 
heart. 

It  is  not  easy  to  deny,  it  is  impossible  to  doubt,  that 
a  treaty  imposes  an  obligation  on  the  American  na 
tion.  It  would  be  childish  to  consider  the  President 
and  senate  obliged,  and  the  nation  and  the  House  free. 
What  is  the  obligation—perfect  or  imperfect  ?  If 
perfect,  the  debate  is  brought  to  a  conclusion.  If  im 
perfect,  how  large  a  part  of  our  faith  is  pawned  ?  Is 
half  our  honor  put  at  risk,  and  is  that  half  too  cheap 
to  be  redeemed?  How  long  has  this  hair-splitting 
subdivision  of  good  faith  been  discovered,  and  why 
has  it  escaped  the  researches  of  the  writers  on  the  law 
of  nations  ?  Shall  we  add  a  new  chapter  to  that  law, 
or  insert  this  doctrine  as  a  supplement  to,  or  more  pro 
perly  a  repeal  of  the  ten  commandments  ? 

The  principles  and  the  example  of  the  British  par 
liament  have  been  alleged  to  coincide  with  the  doc 
trine  of  those  who  deny  the  obligation  of  the  treaty. 
1  have  not  had  the  health  to  make  very  laborious  re 
searches  into  this  subject.  I  will,  however,  sketch  my 
view  of  it.  Several  instances  have  been  noticed,  but 
the  treaty  of  Utrecht  is  the  only  one  that  seems  to  be 
at  all  applicable.  It  has  been  answered,  that  the  con 
duct  of  parliament  in  that  celebrated  example,  affords 
no  sanction  to  our  refusal  to  carry  the  treaty  into  ef 
fect.  The  obligation  of  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  has  been 
understood  to  depend  on  the  concurrence  of  parlia 
ment,  as  a  condition  to  its  becoming  of  force.  If  that 
opinion  should,  however,  appear  incorrect,  still  the 
precedent  proves,  not  that  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  want 
ed  obligation,  but  that  parliament  disregarded  it ;  a 
proof,  not  of  the  construction  of  the  treaty-making 
power,  but  of  the  violation  of  a  national  engagement. 
Admitting  still  further,  that  the  parliament  claimed  and 
exercised  its  power,  not  as  a  breach  of  faith,  but  as  a 
matter  of  constitutional  right,  I  reply,  that  the  analogy 
between  parliament  and  Congress  totally  fails.  The 


448  MR.  AMESJ  SPEECH  ON 

nature  of  the  British  government  may  require  and 
justify  a  course  of  proceeding  in  respect  to  treaties,  that 
is  unwarrantable  here. 

The  British  government  is  a  mixed  one.  The  king, 
at  the  head  of  the  army,  of  the  hierarchy,  with  an  am 
ple  civil  list,  hereditary,  unresponsible,  and  possessing 
the  prerogative  of  peace  and  war,  may  be  properly  ob 
served  with  some  jealousy  in  respect  to  the  exercise  of 
the  treaty-making  power.  It  seems,  and  perhaps  from 
a  spirit  of  caution  on  this  account,  to  be  their  doctrine, 
that  treaties  bind  the  nation,  but  are  not  to  be  regard 
ed  by  the  courts  of  law,  until  laws  have  been  passed 
conformably  to  them.  Our  concurrence  has  expressly 
regulated  the  matter  differently.  The  concurrence  of 
parliament  is  necessary  to  treaties  becoming  laws  in 
England,  gentlemen  say ;  and  here  the  senate,  repre 
senting  the  states,  must  concur  in  treaties.  The  con 
stitution  and  the  reason  of  the  case,  make  the  concur 
rence  of  the  senate  as  effectual  as  the  sanction  of  par 
liament,  and  why  not?  The  senate  is  an  elective 
body,  and  the  approbation  of  a  majority  of  the  states 
affords  the  nation  as  ample  security  against  the  abuse 
of  the  treaty-making  power,  as  the  British  nation  can 
enjoy  in  the  control  of  parliament. 

Whatever  doubt  there  may  be  as  to  the  parliamenta 
ry  doctrine  of  the  obligation  of  treaties  in  Great  Bri 
tain,  (and  perhaps  there  is  some,)  there  is  none  in 
their  books,  or  their  modern  practice.  Blackstone 
represents  treaties  as  of  the  highest  obligation,  when 
ratified  by  the  king ;  and  for  almost  a  century,  there 
has  been  no  instance  of  opposition  by  parliament  to 
this  doctrine.  Their  treaties  have  been  uniformly 
carried  into  effect,  although  many  have  been  ratified, 
of  a  nature  most  obnoxious  to  party,  and  have  produc 
ed  louder  clamor  than  we  have  lately  witnessed.  The 
example  of  England,  therefore,  fairly  examined,  does 
not  warrant,  it  dissuades  us  from  a  negative  vote. 

Gentlemen  have  said,  with  spirit,  whatever  the  true 
doctrine  of  our  constitution  may  be.  Great  Britain  has  no 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  449 

right  to  complain  or  to  dictate  an  interpretation.  The 
sense  of  the  American  nation  as  to  the  treaty  power, 
is  to  be  received  by  all  foreign  nations.  This  is  very 
true  as  a  maxim ;  but  the  fact  is  against  those  who 
vouch  it.  The  sense  of  the  American  nation  is  not  as 
the  vote  of  the  House  has  declared  it.  Our  claim  to 
some  agency  in  giving  force  and  obligation  to  treaties, 
is  beyond  all  kind  of  controversy  novel.  The  sense  of 
the  nation  is  probably  against  it.  The  sense  of  the 
government  certainly  is.  The  President  denies  it  on 
constitutional  grounds,  and  therefore  cannot  ever 
accede  to  our  interpretation.  The  senate  ratified  the 
treaty,  and  cannot  without  dishonor  adopt  it,  as  I  have 
attempted  to  show.  Where  then  do  they  find  the  proof, 
that  this  is  the  American  sense  of  the  treaty-making 
power,  which  is  to  silence  the  murmurs  of  Great  Bri 
tain  ?  Is  it  because  a  majority  of  two  or  three,  or  at 
most  of  four  or  five  of  this  House,  will  reject  the  treaty  ? 
Is  it  thus,  the  sense  of  our  nation  is  to  be  recognized  ? 
Our  government  may  thus  be  stopped  in  its  move 
ments — a  struggle  for  power  may  thus  commence,  and 
the  event  of  the  conflict  may  decide  who  is  the  victor, 
and  the  quiet  possessor  of  the  treaty  power.  But, 
at  present,  it  is  beyond  all  credibility,  that  our  vote,  by 
a  bare  majority,  should  be  believed  to  do  any  thing 
better  than  to  embitter  our  divisions,  and  to  tear  up  the 
settled  foundations  of  our  departments. 

If  the  obligation  of  a  treaty  be  complete,  I  am  aware 
that  cases  sometimes  exist  which  will  justify  a  nation 
in  refusing  a  compliance.  Are  our  liberties,  gentle 
men  demand,  to  be  bartered  away  by  a  treaty, — and 
is  there  no  remedy  ?  There  is.  Extremes  are  not  to  be 
supposed,  but  when  they  happen,  they  make  the  law 
for  themselves.  No  such  extreme  can  be  pretended 
in  this  instance,  and  if  it  existed,  the  authority  it 
would  confer  to  throw  off  the  obligation,  would  rest 
where  the  obligation  itself  resides — in  the  nation.  This 
House  is  not  the  nation — it  is  not  the  whole  delegated 
authority  of  the  nation.  Being  only  a  part  of  that  au- 

VOL.  i.  57 


450  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

thority,  its  right  to  act  for  the  whole  society  obviously 
depends  on  the  concurrence  of  the  other  two  branches. 
If  they  refuse  to  concur,  a  treaty,  once  made,  remains  in 
full  force,  although  a  breach  on  the  part  of  a  foreign 
nation  would  confer  upon  our  own,  a  right  to  forbear 
the  execution.  I  repeat  it,  even  in  that  case  the  act  of 
this  House  cannot  be  admitted  as  the  act  of  the  nation, 
and  if  the  President  and  senate  should  not  concur, 
the  treaty  would  be  obligatory. 

I  put  a  case  that  will  not  fail  to  produce  conviction. 
Our  treaty  with  France  engages  that  free  bottoms 
shall  make  free  goods,  and  how  has  it  been  kept  ?  As 
such  engagements  will  ever  be  in  time  of  war.  France 
has  set  it  aside,  and  pleads  imperious  necessity.  We 
have  no  navy  to  enforce  the  observance  of  such  arti 
cles,  and  paper  barriers  are  weak  against  the  violence 
of  those,  who  are  on  the  scramble  for  enemies'  goods 
on  the  high  seas.  The  breach  of  any  article  of  a  treaty 
by  one  nation  gives  an  undoubted  right  to  the  other  to 
renounce  the  whole  treaty.  But  has  one  branch  of  the 
government  that  right,  or  must  it  reside  with  the  whole 
authority  of  the  nation  ?  What  if  the  senate  should 
resolve,  that  the  French  treaty  is  broken,  and  there 
fore  null  and  of  no  effect.  The  answer  is  obvious,  you 
would  deny  their  sole  authority.  That  branch  of  the 
legislature  has  equal  power  in  this  regard  with  the 
House  of  Representatives.  One  branch  alone  cannot 
express  the  will  of  the  nation. 

A  right  to  annul  a  treaty,  because  a  foreign  nation 
has  broken  its  articles,  is  only  like  the  case  of  a  suffi 
cient  cause  to  repeal  a  law.  In  both  cases  the  branches 
of  our  government  must  concur  in  the  orderly  way,  or 
the  law  and  the  treaty  will  remain. 

The  very  cases,  supposed  by  my  adversaries  in  this 
argument,  conclude  against  themselves.  They  will 
persist  in  confounding  ideas  that  should  be  kept  dis 
tinct,  they  will  suppose  that  the  House  of  Representa 
tives  has  no  power  unless  it  has  all  power.  The  House 
is  nothing  if  it  be  not  the  whole  government — the  na 
tion, 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  451 

On  every  hypothesis,  therefore,  the  conclusion  is  not 
to  be  resisted ;  we  are  either  to  execute  this  treaty,  or 
break  our  faith. 

To  expatiate  on  the  value  of  public  faith  may  pass 
with  some  men  for  declamation — to  such  men  I  have 
nothing  to  say.  To  others  I  will  urge — can  any  cir 
cumstance  mark  upon  a  people  more  turpitude  and 
debasement  ?  Can  any  thing  tend  more  to  make  men 
think  themselves  mean,  or  degrade  to  a  lower  point 
their  estimation  of  virtue,  and  their  standard  of  action  ? 

It  would  not  merely  demoralize  mankind,  it  tends  to 
break  all  the  ligaments  of  society,  to  dissolve  that  mys 
terious  charm  which  attracts  individuals  to  the  nation, 
and  to  inspire  in  its  stead  a  repulsive  sense  of  shame 
and  disgust. 

What  is  patriotism  ?  Is  it  a  narrow  affection  for 
the  spot  where  a  man  was  born  ?  Are  the  very  clods 
where  we  tread  entitled  to  this  ardent  preference  be 
cause  they  are  greener  ?  No,  sir,  this  is  not  the  cha 
racter  of  the  virtue,  and  it  soars  higher  for  its  object. 
It  is  an  extended  self-love,  mingling  with  all  the  enjoy 
ments  of  life,  and  twisting  itself  with  the  minutest  fila 
ments  of  the  heart.  It  is  thus  we  obey  the  laws  of  so 
ciety,  because  they  are  the  laws  of  virtue.  In  their 
authority  we  see,  not  the  array  of  force  and  terror, 
but  the  venerable  image  of  our  country's  honor.  Every 
good  citizen  makes  that  honor  his  own,  and  cherishes 
it  not  only  as  precious,  but  as  sacred.  He  is  willing  to 
risk  his  life  in  its  defence,  and  is  conscious  that  he 
gains  protection  while  he  gives  it.  For,  what  rights  of 
a  citizen  will  be  deemed  inviolable  when  a  state  re 
nounces  the  principles  that  constitute  their  security  ? 
Or  if  his  life  should  not  be  invaded,  what  would  its 
enjoyments  be  in  a  country  odious  in  the  eyes  of  stran 
gers  and  dishonored  in  his  own  ?  Could  he  look  with 
affection  and  veneration  to  such  a  country  as  his 
parent  ?  The  sense  of  having  one  would  die  within 
him ;  he  would  blush  for  his  patriotism,  if  he  retained 
any,  and  justly,  for  it  would  be  a  vice.  He  would  be  a 
banished  man  in  his  native  land. 


452  3IR.  AMES"  SPEECH   ON 

I  see  ncTexception  to  the  respect,  that  is  paid  among 
nations  to  the  law  of  good  faith.  If  there  are  cases 
in  this  enlightened  period,  when  it  is  violated,  there 
are  none  when  it  is  decried.  It  is  the  philosophy  of 
politics,  the  religion  of  governments.  It  is  observed 
by  barbarians — a  whiff  of  tobacco  smoke,  or  a  string 
of  beads,  gives  not  merely  binding  force,  but  sanctity 
to  treaties.  Even  in  Algiers,  a  truce  may  be  bought 
for  money,  but  when  ratified,  even  Algiers  is  too  wise, 
or  too  just,  to  disown  and  annul  its  obligation.  Thus 
we  see,  neither  the  ignorance  of  savages,  nor  the  prin 
ciples  of  an  association  for  piracy  and  rapine,  permit  a 
nation  to  despise  its  engagements.  If,  sir,  there  could 
be  a  resurrection  from  the  foot  of  the  gallows,  if  the  vic 
tims  of  justice  could  live  again,  collect  together  and 
form  a  society,  they  would,  however  loath,  soon  find 
themselves  obliged  to  make  justice,  that  justice  under 
which  they  fell,  the  fundamental  law  of  their  state. 
They  would  perceive,  it  was  their  interest  to  make 
others  respect,  and  they  would  therefore  soon  pay 
some  respect  themselves  to  the  obligations  of  good 
faith. 

It  is  painful,  I  hope  it  is  superfluous,  to  make  even 
the  supposition,  that  America  should  furnish  the  occa 
sion  of  this  opprobrium.  No,  let  me  not  even  ima 
gine,  that  a  republican  government,  sprung,  as  our  own 
is,  from  a  people  enlightened  and  uncorrupted,  a  gov 
ernment  whose  origin  is  right,  and  whose  daily  disci 
pline  is  duty,  can,  upon  solemn  debate,  make  its  option 
to  be  faithless — can  dare  to  act  what  despots  dare  not 
avow,  what  our  own  example  evinces,  the  states  of  Bar- 
bary  are  unsuspected  of.  No,  let  me  rather  make 
the  supposition,  that  Great  Britain  refuses  to  execute 
the  treaty,  after  we  have  done  every  thing  to  carry  it 
into  effect.  Is  there  any  language  of  reproach  pun 
gent  enough  to  express  your  commentary  on  the  fact  ? 
What  would  you  say,  or  rather  what  would  you  not 
say  ?  Would  you  not  tell  them,  wherever  an  English 
man  might  travel,  shame  would  stick  to  him — he  would 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  453 

disown  his  country.  You  would  exclaim,  England, 
proud  of  your  wealth,  and  arrogant  in  the  possession 
of  power — blush  for  these  distinctions,  which  become 
the  vehicles  of  your  dishonor.  Such  a  nation  might 
truly  say  to  corruption,  thou  art  my  father,  and  to  the 
worm,  thou  art  my  mother  and  my  sister.  We  should 
say  of  such  a  race  of  men,  their  name  is  a  heavier  bur 
den  than  their  debt. 

I  can  scarcely  persuade  myself  to  believe,  that  the 
consideration  I  have  suggested  requires  the  aid  of  any 
auxiliary.  But,  unfortunately,  auxiliary  arguments 
are  at  hand.  Five  millions  of  dollars,  and  probably 
more,  on  the  score  of  spoliations  committed  on  our 
commerce,  depend  upon  the  treaty.  The  treaty  offers 
the  only  prospect  of  indemnity.  Such  redress  is  pro 
mised  as  the  merchants  place  some  confidence  in. 
Will  you  interpose  and  frustrate  that  hope ;  leaving  to 
many  families  nothing  but  beggary  and  despair  ?  It 
is  a  smooth  proceeding  to  take  a  vote  in  this  body  : 
it  takes  less  than  half  an  hour  to  call  the  yeas  and 
nays  and  reject  the  treaty.  But  what  is  the  effect  of 
it  ?  What,  but  this ;  the  very  men,  formerly  so  loud 
for  redress ;  such  fierce  champions,  that  even  to  ask 
for  justice  was  too  mean  and  too  slow,  now  turn  their 
capricious  fury  upon  the  sufferers,  and  say,  by  their 
vote,  to  them  and  their  families,  no  longer  eat  bread  ; 
petitioners  go  home  and  starve,  we  cannot  satisfy  your 
wrongs  and  our  resentments. 

Will  you  pay  the  sufferers  out  of  the  treasury  ?  No. 
The  answer  was  given  two  years  ago,  and  appears  on 
our  journals.  Will  you  give  them  letters  of  marque 
and  reprisal  to  pay  themselves  by  force  ?  No,  that  is 
war.  Besides,  it  would  be  an  opportunity  for  those 
who  have  already  lost  much  to  lose  more.  Will  you 
go  to  war  to  avenge  their  injury  ?  If  you  do,  the  war 
will  leave  you  no  money  to  indemnify  them.  If  it 
should  be  unsuccessful,  you  will  aggravate  existing 
evils ;  if  successful,  your  enemy  will  have  no  treasure 
left  to  give  our  merchants ;  the  first  losses  -will  be  con- 


454  MK.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

founded  with  much  greater  and  be  forgotten.  At 
the  end  of  a  war  there  must  be  a  negociation,  which 
is  the  very  point  we  have  already  gained ;  and  why 
relinquish  it  ?  And  who  will  be  confident  that  the 
terms  of  the  negociation,  after  a  desolating  war,  would 
be  more  acceptable  to  another  House  of  Representa 
tives,  than  the  treaty  before  us.  Members  and  opin 
ions  may  be  so  changed,  that  the  treaty  would  then  be 
rejected  for  being  what  the  present  majority  say  it 
should  be.  Whether  we  shall  go  on  making  treaties 
and  refusing  to  execute  them,  I  know  not.  Of  this  I 
am  certain,  it  will  be  very  difficult  to  exercise  the 
treaty-making  power  on  the  new  principles,  with  much 
reputation  or  advantage  to  the  country. 

The  refusal  of  the  posts,  (inevitable  if  we  reject  the 
treaty,)  is  a  measure  too  decisive  in  its  nature  to  be 
neutral  in  its  consequences.  From  great  causes  we 
are  to  look  for  great  effects.  A  plain  arid  obvious  one 
will  be,  the  price  of  the  western  lands  will  fall.  Set 
tlers  will  not  choose  to  fix  their  habitation  on  a  field  of 
battle.  Those  who  talk  so  much  of  the  interest  of  the 
United  States,  should  calculate  how  deeply  it  will  be 
affected  by  rejecting  the  treaty ;  how  vast  a  tract  of 
wild  land  will  almost  cease  to  be  property.  This  loss, 
let  it  be  observed,  will  fall  upon  a  fund  expressly  de 
voted  to  sink  the  national  debt.  What  then  are  we 
called  upon  to  do  ?  However  the  form  of  the  vote 
and  the  protestations  of  many  may  disguise  the  pro 
ceeding,  our  resolution  is  in  substance,  and  it  deserves 
to  wear  the  title  of  a  resolution  to  prevent  the  sale  of 
the  western  lands  and  the  discharge  of  the  public  debt. 

Will  the  tendency  to  Indian  hostilities  be  contested 
by  any  one  ?  Experience  gives  the  answer.  The 
frontiers  were  scourged  with  war  till  the  negociation 
with  great  Britain  was  far  advanced,  and  then  the  state 
of  hostility  ceased.  Perhaps  the  public  agents  of  both 
nations  are  innocent  of  fomenting  the  Indian  war,  and 
perhaps  they  are  not.  We  ought  not,  however,  to  ex 
pect  that  neighboring  nations,  highly  irritated  against 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  455 

each  other,  will  neglect  the  friendship  of  the  savages ; 
the  traders  will  gain  an  influence  and  will  abuse  it ; 
and  who  is  ignorant  that  their  passions  are  easily 
raised,  and  hardly  restrained  from  violence  ?  Their 
situation  will  oblige  them  to  choose  between  this 
country  and  Great  Britain,  in  case  the  treaty  should  be 
rejected.  They  will  not  be  pur  friends,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  friends  of  our  enemies. 

But  am  I  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  proving  this 
point  ?  Certainly  the  very  men  who  charged  the  In 
dian  war  on  the  detention  of  the  posts,  will  call  for  no 
other  proof  than  the  recital  of  their  own  speeches.  It 
is  remembered  with  what  emphasis,  with  what  acrimo 
ny,  they  expatiated  on  the  burden  of  taxes,  and  the 
drain  of  blood  and  treasure  into  the  western  country,  in 
consequence  of  Britain's  holding  the  posts.  Until  the 
posts  are  restored,  they  exclaimed,  the  treasury  and 
the  frontiers  must  bleed. 

If  any,  against  all  these  proofs,  should  maintain  that 
the  peace  with  the  Indians  will  be  stable  without  the 
posts,  to  them  I  will  urge  another  reply.  From  argu 
ments  calculated  to  produce  conviction,  I  will  appeal 
directly  to  the  hearts  of  those  who  hear  me,  and  ask, 
whether  it  is  not  already  planted  there  ?  I  resort  especial 
ly  to  the  convictions  of  the  western  gentlemen,  whether, 
supposing  no  posts  and  no  treaty,  the  settlers  will  remain 
in  security  ?  Can  they  take  it  upon  them  to  say,  that 
an  Indian  peace,  under  these  circumstances,  will  prove 
firm  ?  No,  sir,  it  will  not  be  peace,  but  a  sword  :  it 
will  be  no  better  than  a  lure  to  draw  victims  within  the 
reach  of  the  tomahawk. 

On  this  theme,  my  emotions  are  unutterable.  If  I 
could  find  words  for  them,  if  my  powers  bore  any  pro 
portion  to  my  zeal,  I  would  swell  my  voice  to  such  a 
note  of  remonstrance,  it  should  reach  every  log-house 
beyond  the  mountains.  I  would  say  to  the  inhabitants, 
wake  from  your  false  security :  your  cruel  dangers, 
your  more  cruel  apprehensions  are  soon  to  be  renew 
ed:  the  wounds,  yet.  unhealed,  are  to  be  torn  open 


456  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

again :  in  the  day  time,  your  path  through  the  woods 
will  be  ambushed :  the  darkness  of  midnight  will 
glitter  with  the  blaze  of  your  dwellings.  You  are  a 
father — the  blood  of  your  sons  shall  fatten  your  corn 
field  :  you  are  a  mother — the  war-whoop  shall  wake 
the  sleep  of  the  cradle. 

On  this  subject  you  need  not  suspect  any  deception 
on  your  feelings.  It  is  a  spectacle  of  horror,  which 
cannot  be  overdrawn.  If  you  have  nature  in  your 
hearts,  it  will  speak  a  language,  compared  with  which 
all  I  have  said  or  can  say  will  be  poor  and  frigid. 

Will  it  be  whispered  that  the  treaty  has  made  me  a 
new  champion  for  the  protection  of  the  frontiers  ?  It 
is  known  that  my  voice  as  well  as  vote  have  been  uni 
formly  given  in  conformity  with  the  ideas  I  have  ex 
pressed.  Protection  is  the  right  of  the  frontiers ;  it  is 
our  duty  to  give  it. 

Who  will  accuse  me  of  wandering  out  of  the  sub 
ject  ?  Who  will  say  that  I  exaggerate  the  tendencies 
of  our  measures  ?  Will  any  one  answer  by  a  sneer, 
that  all  this  is  idle  preaching  ?  Will  any  one  deny,  that 
we  are  bound,  and  I  would  hope  to  good  purpose,  by 
the  most  solemn  sanctions  of  duty  for  the  vote  we 
give  ?  Are  despots  alone  to  be  reproached  for  un 
feeling  indifference  to  the  tears  and  blood  of  their 
subjects  ?  Are  republicans  unresponsible  ?  Have  the 
principles,  on  which  you  ground  the  reproach  upon 
cabinets  and  kings,  no  practical  influence,  no  binding 
force  ?  Are  they  merely  themes  of  idle  declamation, 
introduced  to  decorate  the  morality  of  &  newspaper 
essay,  or  to  furnish  pretty  topics  of  harangue  from  the 
windows  of  that  state-house  ?  I  trust  it  is  neither  too 
presumptuous  nor  too  late  to  ask ;  can  you  put  the 
dearest  interest  of  society  at  risk  without  guilt,  and 
without  remorse  ? 

It  is  vain  to  offer  as  an  excuse,  that  public  men  are 
not  to  be  reproached  for  the  evils  that  may  happen  to 
ensue  from  their  measures.  This  is  very  true,  where 
they  are  unforeseen  or  inevitable.  Those  I  have  de- 


jj  THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  457 

picted  are  not  unforeseen ;  they  are  so  far  from  inevi 
table,  we  are  going  to  bring  them  into  being  by  our 
vote.  We  choose  the  consequences,  and  become  as 
justly  answerable  for  them  as  for  the  measure  that  we 
know  will  produce  them. 

By  rejecting  the  posts,  we  light  the  savage  fires,  we 
bind  the  victims.  This  day  we  undertake  to  render 
account  to  the  widows  and  orphans  whom  our  deci 
sion  will  make,  to  the  wretches  that  will  be  roasted  at 
the  stake,  to  our  country,  and  I  do  not  deem  it  too  se 
rious  to  say,  to  conscience  and  to  God.  We  are  an 
swerable,  and  if  duty  be  any  thing  more  than  a  word  of 
imposture,  if  conscience  be  not  a  bugbear,  we  are  pre 
paring  to  make  ourselves  as  wretched  as  our  country. 

There  is  no  mistake  in  this  case,  there  can  be  none. 
Experience  has  already  been  the  prophet  of  events,  and 
the  cries  of  our  future  victims  have  already  reached 
us.  The  western  inhabitants  are  not  a  silent  and  un 
complaining  sacrifice.  The  voice  of  humanity  issues 
from  the  shade  of  their  wilderness.  It  exclaims,  that 
while  one  hand  is  held  up  to  reject  this  treaty,  the 
other  grasps  a  tomahawk.  It  summons  our  imagination 
to  the  scenes  that  will  open.  It  is  no  great  effort  of 
the  imagination  to  conceive,  that  events  so  near  are 
already  begun.  I  can  fancy  that  I  listen  to  the  yells  of 
savage  vengeance,  and  the  shrieks. of  torture.  Alrea 
dy  they  seem  to  sigh  in  the  west  wind — already  they 
mingle  with  every  echo  from  the  mountains. 

It  is  not  the  part  of  prudence  to  be  inattentive  to 
the  tendencies  of  measures.  Where  there  is  any 
ground  to  fear  that  these  will  be  pernicious,  wisdom 
and  duty  forbid  that  we  should  underrate  them.  If 
we  reject  the  treaty,  will  our  peace  be  as  safe  as  if  we 
executed  it  with  good  faith  ?  I  do  honor  to  the  intre 
pid  spirit  of  those  who  say  it  will.  It  was  formerly  un 
derstood  to  constitute  the  excellence  of  a  man's  faith 
to  believe  without  evidence  and  against  it. 

But   as  opinions  on  this  article  are  changed,  and 
We  are  called  to  act  for  our  country,  it  becomes  us  to 

VOL.  i.  58 


458  MR.  AMES'  SPEECH  ON 

explore  the  dangers  that  will  attend  its  peace,  and  to 
avoid  them  if  we  can. 

Few  of  us  here,  and  fewer  still  in  proportion  of  our 
constituents,  will  doubt,  that,  by  rejecting,  all  those 
dangers  will  be  aggravated. 

The  idea  of  war  is  treated  as  a  bugbear.  This 
levity  is  at  least  unseasonable,  and  most  of  all  unbe 
coming  some  who  resort  to  it. 

Who  has  forgotten  the  philippics  of  1794?  The 
cry  then  was  reparation — no  envoy — no  treaty — no  te 
dious  delays.  Now,  it  seems,  the  passion  subsides,  or 
at  least  the  hurry  to  satisfy  it.  Great  Britain,  say 
they,  will  not  wage  war  upon  us. 

In  1794,  it  was  urged  by  those,  who  now  say,  no  war, 
that  if  we  built  frigates,  or  resisted  the  piracies  of  Al 
giers,  we  could  not  expect  peace.  Now  they  give  ex 
cellent  comfort  truly.  Great  Britain  has  seized  our  ves 
sels  and  cargoes  to  the  amount  of  millions ;  she  holds  the 
posts ;  she  interrupts  our  trade,  say  they,  as  a  neutral 
nation ;  and  these  gentlemen,  formerly  so  fierce  for 
redress,  assure  us,  in  terms  of  the  sweetest  consola 
tion,  Great  Britain  will  bear  all  this  patiently.  But  let 
me  ask  the  late  champions  of  our  rights,  will  our  nation 
bear  it  ?  Let  others  exult  because  the  aggressor  will 
let  our  wrongs  sleep  forever.  Will  it  add,  it  is  my 
duty  to  ask,  to  the  patience  and  quiet  of  our  citizens 
to  see  their  rights  abandoned  ?  Will  not  the  disap 
pointment  of  their  hopes,  so  long  patronized  by  the 
government,  now  in  the  crisis  of  their  being  realized, 
convert  all  their  passions  into  fury  and  despair  ? 

Are  the  posts  to  remain  forever  in  the  possession  of 
Great  Britain  ?  Let  those  who  reject  them,  when  the 
treaty  offers  them  to  our  hands,  say,  if  they  choose, 
they  are  of  no  importance.  If  they  are,  will  they  take 
them  by  force  ?  The  argument  I  am  urging,  would 
then  come  to  a  point.  To  use  force  is  war.  To  talk 
of  treaty  again  is  too  absurd.  Posts  and  redress  must 
come  from  voluntary  good  will,  treaty  or  war. 

The  conclusion  is  plain,  if  the  state  of  peace  shall 
continue,  so  will  the  British  possession  of  the  posts. 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  459 

Look  again  at  this  state  of  things.  On  the  sea- 
coast,  vast  losses  uncompensated :  on  the  frontier, 
Indian  war,  actual  encroachment  on  our  territory: 
every  where  discontent — resentments  tenfold  more 
fierce  because  they  will  be  impotent  and  humbled : 
national  scorn  and  abasement. 

The  disputes  of  the  old  treaty  of  1783,  being  left  to 
rankle,  will  revive  the  almost  extinguished  animosi 
ties  of  that  period.  Wars,  in  all  countries,  and  most 
of  all  in  such  as  are  free,  arise  from  the  impetuosity  of 
the  public  feelings.  The  despotism  of  Turkey  is  of 
ten  obliged  by  clamor,  to  unsheath  the  sword.  War 
might  perhaps  be  delayed,  but  could  not  be  prevented. 
The  causes  of  it  would  remain,  would  be  aggravated, 
would  be  multiplied,  and  soon  become  intolerable. 
More  captures,  more  impressments  would  swell  the 
list  of  our  wrongs,  and  the  current  of  our  rage.  I  make 
no  calculation  of  the  arts  of  those,  whose  employment 
it  has  been,  on  former  occasions,  to  fan  the  fire.  I 
say  nothing  of  the  foreign  money  and  emissaries  that 
might  foment  the  spirit  of  hostility,  because  the  state 
of  things  will  naturally  run  to  violence.  With  less 
than  their  former  exertion,  they  would  be  successful. 

Will  our  government  be  able  to  temper  and  restrain 
the  turbulence  of  such  a  crisis  ?  The  government, 
alas,  will  be  in  no  capacity  to  govern.  A  divided  peo 
ple — and  divided  councils  !  Shall  we  cherish  the 
spirit  of  peace  or  show  the  energies  of  war  ?  Shall 
we  make  our  adversary  afraid  of  our  strength,  or  dis 
pose  him,  by  the  measures  of  resentment  and  broken 
faith,  to  respect  our  rights  ?  Do  gentlemen  rely  on  the 
state  of  peace  because  both  nations  will  be  worse  dis 
posed  to  keep  it;  because  injuries,  and  insults  still 
harder  to  endure,  will  be  mutually  offered  ? 

Such  a  state  of  things  will  exist,  if  we  should  long 
avoid  war,  as  will  be  worse  than  war.  Peace  without 
security,  accumulation  of  injury  without  redress,  or 
the  hope  of  it,  resentment  against  the  aggressor,  con 
tempt  for  ourselves,  intestine  discord  and  anarchy. 


460  MK.  AIDES'  SPEECH  ON 

Worse  than  this  need  not  be  apprehended,  for  if  worse 
could  happen,  anarchy  would  bring  it.  Is  this  the 
peace,  gentlemen  undertake  with  such  fearless  confi 
dence  to  maintain  ?  Is  this  the  station  of  American 
dignity,  which  the  high-spirited  champions  of  our  na 
tional  independence  and  honor  could  endure — nay, 
which  they  are  anxious  and  almost  violent  to  seize  for 
the  country  ?  What  is  there  in  the  treaty,  that  could 
humble  us  so  low?  Are  they  the  men  to  swallow 
their  resentments,  who  so  lately  were  choaking  with 
them.  If  in  the  case  contemplated  by  them,  it  should 
be  peace,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  declare  it  ought  not  M 
be  peace. 

Is  there  any  thing  in  the  prospect  of  the  interior 
state  of  the  country,  to  encourage  us  to  aggravate  the 
dangers  of  a  war  ?  Would  not  the  shock  of  that  evil 
produce  another,  and  shake  down  the  feeble  and  then 
unbraced  structure  of  our  government?  Is  this  a 
chimera  ?  Is  it  going  off  the  ground  of  matter  of  fact 
to  say,  the  rejection  of  the  appropriation  proceeds 
upon  the  doctrine  of  a  civil  war  of  the  departments  ? 
Two  branches  have  ratified  a  treaty,  and  we  are  going 
to  set  it  aside.  How  is  this  disorder  in  the  machine 
to  be  rectified  ?  While  it  exists,  its  movements  must 
stop,  and  when  we  talk  of  a  remedy,  is  that  any  other 
than  the  formidable  one  of  a  revolutionary  interposi 
tion  of  the  people  ?  And  is  this,  in  the  judgment  even 
of  my  opposers,  to  execute,  to  preserve  the  constitu 
tion  and  the  public  order  ?  Is  this  the  state  of  ha 
zard,  if  not  of  convulsion,  which  they  can  have  the 
courage  to  contemplate  and  to  brave,  or  beyond  which 
their  penetration  can  reach  and  see  the  issue  ?  They 
seem  to  believe,  arid  they  act  as  if  they  believed,  that 
our  union,  our  peace,  our  liberty  are  invulnerable  and 
immortal — as  if  our  happy  state  was  not  to  be  disturb 
ed  by  our  dissensions,  and  that  we  are  not  capable  of 
falling  from  it  by  our  unworthiness.  Some  of  them 
have  no  doubt  better  nerves  and  better  discernment 
than  mine.  They  can  see  the  bright  aspects  and  hap- 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  461 

py  consequences  of  all  this  array  of  horrors.  They 
can  see  intestine  discords,  our  government  disorganiz 
ed,  our  wrongs  aggravated,  multiplied  and  unredress- 
ed,  peace  with  dishonor,  or  war  without  justice,  union 
or  resources,  in  "  the  calm  lights  of  mild  philosophy." 

But  whatever  they  may  anticipate  as  the  next  mea 
sure  of  prudence  and  safety,  they  have  explained  no 
thing  to  the  House.  After  rejecting  the  treaty,  what 
is  to  be  the  next  step  ?  They  must  have  foreseen  what 
ought  to  be  done,  they  have  doubtless  resolved  what 
to  propose.  Why  then  are  they  silent  ?  Dare  they 
not  avow  their  plan  of  conduct,  or  do  they  wait  till  our 
progress  towards  confusion  shall  guide  them  in  form 
ing  it  ? 

Let  me  cheer  the  mind,  weary  no  doubt  and  ready 
to  despond  on  this  prospect,  by  presenting  another, 
which  it  is  yet  in  our  power  to  realize.  Is  it  possible 
for  a  real  American  to  look  at  the  prosperity  of  this 
country  without  some  desire  for  its  continuance,  with 
out  some  respect  for  the  measures  which,  many  will 
say,  produced,  and  all  will  confess,  have  preserved  it  ? 
Will  he  not  feel  some  dread,  that  a  change  of  system 
will  reverse  the  scene  ?  The  well  grounded  fears  of 
our  citizens  in  1794,  were  removed  by  the  treaty,  but 
are  not  forgotten.  Then  they  deemed  war  nearly  in 
evitable,  and  would  not  this  adjustment  have  been  con 
sidered,  at  that  day,  as  a  happy  escape  from  the  cala 
mity  ?  The  great  interest  and  the  general  desire  of 
our  people,  was  to  enjoy  the  advantages  of  neutrali 
ty.  This  instrument,  however  misrepresented,  af 
fords  America  that  inestimable  security.  The  causes 
of  our  disputes  are  either  cut  up  by  the  roots,  or  re 
ferred  to  a  new  negociation  after  the  end  of  the  Euro 
pean  war.  This  was  gaining  every  thing,  because  it 
confirmed  our  neutrality,  by  which  our  citizens  are 
gaining  every  thing.  This  alone  would  justify  the  en 
gagements  of  the  government.  For,  when  the  fiery 
vapors  of  the  war  lowered  in  the  skirts  of  our  hori 
zon,  all  our  wishes  were  concentred  in  this  one,  that 


462  fift.  AMES'  SPEECH   ON 

we  might  escape  the  desolation  of  the  storm.  This 
treaty,  like  a  rainbow  on  the  edge  of  the  cloud,  mark 
ed  to  our  eyes  the  space  where  it  was  raging,  and  af 
forded,  at  the  same  time,  the  sure  prognostic  of  fair 
weather.  If  we  reject  it,  the  vivid  colors  will  grow 
pale,  it  will  be  a  baleful  meteor  portending  tempest 
and  war. 

Let  us  not  hesitate  then,  to  agree  to  the  appropria 
tion  to  carry  it  into  faithful  execution.  Thus  we  shall 
save  the  faith  of  our  nation,  secure  its  peace,  and  dif 
fuse  the  spirit  of  confidence  and  enterprize,  that  will 
augment  its  prosperity.  The  progress  of  wealth  and 
improvement  is  wonderful,  and  some  will  think,  too 
rapid.  The  field  for  exertion  is  fruitful  and  vast,  and 
if  peace  and  good  government  should  be  preserved, 
the  acquisitions  of  our  citizens  are  not  so  pleasing  as 
the  proofs  of  their  industry,  as  the  instruments  of  their 
future  success.  The  rewards  of  exertion  go  to  aug 
ment  its  power.  Profit  is  every  hour  becoming  capital. 
The  vast  crop  of  our  neutrality  is  all  seed-wheat,  and  is 
sown  again  to  swell,  almost  beyond  calculation,  the 
future  harvest  of  prosperity.  And  in  this  progress, 
what  seems  to  be  fiction  is  found  to  fall  short  of  ex 
perience. 

I  rose  to  speak  under  impressions,  that  I  would  have 
resisted  if  I  could.  Those  who  see  me  will  believe, 
that  the  reduced  state  of  my  health  has  unfitted  me. 
almost  equally,  for  much  exertion  of  body  or  mind. 
Unprepared  for  debate,  by  careful  reflection  in  my  re 
tirement,  or  by  long  attention  here,  I  thought  the  reso 
lution  I  had  taken  to  sit  silent,  was  imposed  by  necessi 
ty,  and  would  cost  me  no  effort  to  maintain.  With  a 
mind  thus  vacant  of  ideas,  and  sinking,  as  I  really  am, 
under  a  sense  of  weakness,  I  imagined  the  very  desire 
of  speaking  was  extinguished  by  the  persuasion  that  I 
had  nothing  to  say.  Yet  when  I  come  to  the  moment 
of  deciding  the  vote,  I  start  back  with  dread  from  the 
edge  of  the  pit  into  which  we  are  plunging.  In  my 
view,  even  the  minutes  I  have  spent  in  expostulation, 


THE  BRITISH  TREATY.  463 

have  their  value,  because  they  protract  the  crisis,  and 
the  short  period  in  which  alone  we  may  resolve  to 
escape  it. 

I  have  thus  been  led,  by  my  feelings,  to  speak  more 
at  length  than  I  had  intended.  Yet  I  have,  perhaps,  as 
little  personal  interest  in  the  event  as  anyone  here. 
There  is,  I  believe,  no  member  who  will  not  think  his 
chance  to  be  a  witness  of  the  consequences  greater 
than  mine.  If,  however,  the  vote  should  pass  to  reject, 
and  a  spirit  should  rise,  as  it  will,  with  the  public  dis 
orders,  to  make  confusion  worse 'confounded,  even  I? 
slender  and  almost  broken  as  my  hold  upon  life  is,  may 
autlive  the  government  and  constitution  of  my  country. 


INAUGURAL  ADDRESS 

OF 

JOHN  ADAMS, 
PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

DELIVERED    MARCH    4,    J  797. 


WHEN  it  was  first-  perceived,  in  early  times,  that  no 
middle  course  for  America  remained,  between  unlimit 
ed  submission  to  a  foreign  legislature  and  a  total  in 
dependence  of  its  claims  ;  men  of  reflection  were  less 
apprehensive  of  danger  from  the  formidable  power  of 
fleets  and  armies  they  must  determine  to  resist, 
than  from  those  contests  and  dissensions,  which  would 
certainly  arise,  concerning  the  forms  of  government  to 
be  instituted  over  the  whole,  and  over  the  parts  of  this 
extensive  country.  Relying,  however,  on  the  purity  of 
their  intentions,  the  justice  of  their  cause,  and  the  in 
tegrity  and  intelligence  of  the  people,  under  an  over 
ruling  Providence,  which  had  so  signally  protected 
this  country  from  the  first  ;  the  representatives  of  this 
nation,  then  consisting  of  little  more  than  half  its  pre 
sent  numbers,  not  only  broke  to  pieces  the  chains 
which  were  forging,  and  the  rod  of  iron  that  was  lifted 
up,  and  frankly  cut  asunder  the  ties  which  had  bound 
them,  and  launched  into  an  ocean  of  uncertainty. 

The  zeal  and  ardor  of  the  people  during  the  revolution 
ary  war,  supplying  the  place  of  government,  command 
ed  a  degree  of  order,  sufficient  at  least  for  the  tempo 
rary  preservation  of  society.  The  confederation, 
which  was  early  felt  to  be  necessary,  was  prepared 
from  the  models  of  the  Batavian  and  Helvetic  confede 
racies,  the  only  examples  which  remain,  with  any  de 
tail  and  precision,  in  history,  and  certainly  the  only 
ones,  which  the  people  at  large  had  ever  considered. 
But,  reflecting  on  the  striking  difference,  in  so  many 
particulars,  between  this  country  and  those,  where  a 


TNAUGURAL  ADDRESS.  465 

courier  may  go  from  the  seat  of  government  to  the 
frontier  in  a  single  day,  it  was  then  certainly  foreseen 
by  some,  who  assisted  in  Congress  at  the  formation  of 
it,  that  it  could  not  be  durable. 

Negligence  of  its  regulations,  inattention  to  its  re 
commendations,  if  not  disobedience  to  its  authority, 
not  only  in  individuals,  but  in  states,  soon  appeared 
with  their  melancholy  consequences;  universal  lan 
guor,  jealousies,  rivalries  of  states ;  decline  of  navi 
gation  and  commerce ;  discouragement  of  necessary 
manufactures ;  universal  fall  in  the  value  of  lands  and 
their  produce  ;  contempt  of  public  and  private  faith : 
loss  of  consideration  and  credit  with  foreign  nations ; 
and,  at  length,  in  discontents,  animosities,  combina 
tions,  partial  conventions,  and  insurrection,  threat 
ening  some  great  national  calamity. 

In  this  dangerous  crisis,  the  people  of  America  were 
not  abandoned  by  their  usual  good  sense,  presence  of 
mind,  resolution,  or  integrity.  Measures  were  pursu 
ed  to  concert  a  plan,  to  form  a  more  perfect  union,  es 
tablish  justice,  ensure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide 
for  the  common  defence,  promote  the  general  welfare, 
and  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty.  The  public  dis 
quisition,  discussions,  and  deliberations  issued  in  the 
present  happy  constitution  of  government. 

Employed  in  the  service  of  my  country  abroad  dur 
ing  the  whole  course  of  these  transactions,  I  first  saw 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States  in  a  foreign 
country.  Irritated  by  no  literary  altercation,  animated 
by  no  public  debate,  heated  by  no  party  animosity,  I 
read  it  with  great  satisfaction,  as  the  result  of  good 
heads,  prompted  by  good  hearts ;  as  an  experiment, 
better  adapted  to  the  genius,  character,  situation,  and 
relations  of  this  nation  and  country,  than  any,  which 
had  ever  been  proposed  or  suggested.  In  its  general 
principles  and  great  outlines,  it  was  conformable  to 
such  a  system  of  government  as  I  had  ever  most  es 
teemed  ;  and  in  some  states,  my  own  native  state  in 
particular,  had  contributed  to  establish^  Claiming  a 
right  of  suffrage  in  common  with  my  fellow-citizens 
VOL.  i.  59 


466  PRESIDENT  J.  ADAMSr 

in  the  adoption  or  rejection  of  a  constitution,  which 
was  to  rule  me  and  my  posterity,  as  well  as  them  and 
theirs,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  express  my  approbation  of 
it  on  all  occasions,  in  public  and  in  private.  It  was 
not  then  nor  has  been  since  any  objection  to  it,  in  my 
mind,  that  the  executive  and  senate  were  not  more 
permanent.  Nor  have  I  entertained  a  thought  of  pro 
moting  any  alteration  in  it,  but  such  as  the  people 
themselves,  in  the  course  of  their  experience,  should 
see  and  feel  to  be  necessary  or  expedient,  and  by  their 
representatives  in  Congress  and  the  state  legislatures, 
according  to  the  constitution  itself,  adopt  and  ordain. 

Returning  to  the  bosom  of  my  country,  after  a  pain 
ful  separation  from  it  for  ten  years,  I  had  the  honor  to 
be  elected  to  a  station  under  the  new  order  of  things, 
and  I  have  repeatedly  laid  myself  under  the  most  seri 
ous  obligations  to  support  the  constitution.  The  ope 
ration  of  it  has  equalled  the  most  sanguine  expecta 
tions  of  its  friends ;  and  from  an  habitual  attention  to 
it,  satisfaction  in  its  administration,  and  delight  in  its 
effects  upon  the  peace,  order,  prosperity  and  happi 
ness  of  the  nation,  I  have  acquired  an  habitual  attach 
ment  to  it,  and  veneration  for  it. 

What  other  form  of  government,  indeed,  can  so  well 
deserve  our  esteem  and  love  ? 

There  may  be  little  solidity  in  an  ancient  idea,  that 
congregations  of  men  into  cities  and  nations  are  the 
most  pleasing  objects  in  the  sight  of  superior  intelli- 
gencies :  but  this  is  very  certain,  that  to  a  benevolent 
human  mind  there  can  be  no  spectacle  presented  by 
any  nation,  more  pleasing,  more  noble,  majestic,  or 
august,  than  an  assembly  like  that,  which  has  so  often 
been  seen  in  this  and  the  other  chamber  of  Congress— 
of  a  government,  in  which  the  executive  authority,  as 
well  as  that  of  all  the  branches  of  the  legislature,  are 
exercised  by  citizens  selected  at  regular  periods  by 
their  neighbors,  to  make  and  execute  laws  for  the 
general  good.  Can  any  thing  essential,  any  thing  more 
than  mere  ornament  and  decoration,  be  added  to 
fhis  by  robes  or  diamonds  ?  Can  authority  be  more 


. 


. 

INAUGURAL  ADDRESS.  467 


amiable  or  respectable,  when  it  descends  from  acci 
dents  or  institutions  established  in  remote  antiquity, 
than  when  it  springs  fresh  from  the  hearts  and  judg 
ments  of  an  honest  and  enlightened  people  ?  For,  it 
is  the  people  only  that  are  represented :  it  is  their  pow 
er  and  majesty  that  is  reflected,  and  only  for  their 
good,  in  every  legitimate  government,  under  whatever 
form  it  may  appear.  The  existence  of  such  a  govern 
ment  as  ours  for  any  length  of  time,  is  a  full  proof 
of  a  general  dissemination  of  knowledge  and  virtue 
throughout  the  whole  body  of  the  people.  And 
what  object  of  consideration,  more  pleasing  than  this, 
can  be  presented  to  the  human  mind  ?  If  national 
pride  is  ever  justifiable  or  excusable,  it  is  when  it 
springs,  not  from  power  or  riches,  grandeur  or  glory, 
but  from  conviction  of  national  innocence,  information 
and  benevolence. 

In  the  midst  of  these  pleasing  ideas,  we  should  be 
unfaithful  to  ourselves,  if  we  should  ever  lose  sight  of 
the  danger  to  our  liberties,  if  any  thing  partial  or  ex 
traneous  should  infect  the  purity  of  our  free,  fair,  virtu 
ous  and  independent  elections.  If  an  election  is  to  be 
determined  by  a  majority  of  a  single  vote,  and  that  can 
be  procured  by  a  party  through  artifice,  or  corruption, 
the  government  may  be  the  choice  of  a  party,  for  its 
own  ends,  not  of  the  nation  for  the  national  good.  If 
that  solitary  suffrage  can  be  obtained  by  foreign  na 
tions,  by  flattery  or  menaces,  by  fraud  or  violence,  by 
terror,  intrigue,  or  venality ;  the  government  may  not 
be  the  choice  of  the  American  people,  but  of  foreign 
nations.  It  may  be  foreign  nations  who  govern  us, 
and  not  we,  the  people,  who  govern  ourselves :  and 
candid  men  will  acknowledge,  that  in  such  cases 
choice  would  have  little  advantage  to  boast  of,  over  lot 
or  chance. 

Such  is  the  amiable  and  interesting  system  of  gov 
ernment,  (and  such  are  some  of  the  abuses  to  which  it 
may  be  exposed,)  which  the  people  of  America  have 
exhibited  to  the  admiration  and  anxiety  of  the  wise 
and  virtuous  of  all  nations  for  eight  years  5  under  the 


468  PRESIDENT  J.  ADAMS' 

administration  of  a  citizen,  who,  by  a  long  course  of 
great  actions,  regulated  by  prudence,  justice,  temper 
ance,  and  fortitude,  conducting  a  people,  inspired  with 
the  same  virtues,  and  animated  with  the  same  ardent 
patriotism  and  love  of  liberty,  to  independence  and 
peace,  to  increasing  wealth  and  unexampled  prosperi 
ty,  has  merited  the  gratitude  of  his  fellow-citizens, 
commanded  the  highest  praises  of  foreign  nations,  and 
secured  immortal  glory  with  posterity. 

In  that  retirement,  which  is  his  voluntary  choice,  may 
he  long  live  to  enjoy  the  delicious  recollection  of  his 
services,  the  gratitude  of  mankind;  the  happy  fruits  of 
them  to  himself  and  the  world,  which  are  daily  increas 
ing,  and  that  splendid  prospect  of  the  future  fortunes  of 
his  country,  which  is  opening  from  year  to  year.  His 
name  may  be  still  a  rampart,  and  the  knowledge  that 
he  lives,  a  bulwark  against  all  open  or  secret  enemies 
of  his  country's  peace. 

This  example  has  been  recommended  to  the  imita 
tion  of  his  successors,  by  both  Houses  of  Congress, 
and  by  the  voice  of  the  legislatures  and  the  people, 
throughout  the  nation. 

On  this  subject  it  might  become  me  better  to  be 
silent,  or  to  speak  with  diffidence;  but,  as  something 
may  be  expected,  the  occasion,  I  hope,  will  be  admit 
ted  as  an  apology,  if  I  venture  to  say,  that — if  a  pre 
ference,  upon  principle,  of  a  free  republican  govern 
ment,  formed  upon  long  and  serious  reflection,  after  a 
diligent  and  impartial  inquiry  after  truth ;  if  an  attach 
ment  to  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  a 
conscientious  determination  to  support  it,  until  it  shall 
be  altered  by  the  judgments  and  wishes  of  the  people, 
expressed  in  the  mode  prescribed  in  it ;  if  a  respectful 
attention  to  the  constitutions  of  the  individual  states, 
and  a  constant  caution  and  delicacy  towards  the  state 
governments ;  if  an  equal  and  impartial  regard  to  the 
rights,  interests,  honor,  and  happiness  of  all  the  states 
in  the  union,  without  preference  or  regard  to  a  nor 
thern  or  southern,  eastern  or  western  position,  their 
various  political  opinions  on  essential  points,  or  their 


INAUGURAL  ADDRESS.  469 

personal  attachments ;  if  a  love  of  virtuous  men  of  all 
parties  and  denominations ;  if  a  love  of  science  and 
letters,  and  a  wish  to  patronize  every  rational  effort  to 
encourage  schools,  colleges,  universities,  academies, 
and  every  institution  for  propagating  knowledge,  vir 
tue  and  religion  among  all  classes  of  the  people,  not 
only  for  their  benign  influence  on  the  happiness  of  life, 
in  all  its  stages  and  classes,  and  of  society  in  all  its 
forms,  but,  as  the  only  means  of  preserving  our  consti 
tution  from  its  natural  enemies,  the  spirit  of  sophistry, 
the  spirit  of  party,  the  spirit  of  intrigue,  profligacy, 
and  corruption,  and  the  pestilence  of  foreign  influence, 
which  is  the  angel  of  destruction  to  elective  govern 
ments  ;  if  a  love  of  equal  laws,  of  justice  and  humani 
ty,  in  the  interior  administration ;  if  an  inclination  to 
improve  agriculture,  commerce,  and  manufactures  for 
necessity,  convenience,  and  defence ;  if  a  spirit  of  equi 
ty  and  humanity  towards  the  aboriginal  nations  of 
America,  and  a  disposition  to  meliorate  their  condi 
tion,  by  inclining  them  to  be  more  friendly  to  us,  and 
our  citizens  to  be  more  friendly  to  them :  if  an  inflexi 
ble  determination  to  maintain  peace  and  inviolable 
faith  with  all  nations,  and  that  system  of  neutrality  and 
impartiality  among  the  belligerent  powers  of  Europe, 
which  has  been  adopted  by  the  government,  and  so 
solemnly  sanctioned  by  both  Houses  of  Congress,  and 
applauded  by  the  legislatures  of  the  states  and  the 
public  opinion,  until  it  shall  be  otherwise  ordained  by 
Congress;  if  a  personal  esteem  for  the  French  nation, 
formed  in  a  residence  of  seven  years  chiefly  among 
them,  and  a  sincere  desire  to  preserve  the  friendship, 
which  has  been  so  much  for  the  honor  and  interest  of 
both  nations;  if,  while  the  conscious  honor  and  integrity 
of  the  people  of  America,  and  the  internal  sentiment  of 
their  own  power  and  energies  must  be  preserved,  an 
earnest  endeavor  to  investigate  every  just  cause,  and 
remove  every  colorable  pretence,  of  complaint ;  if  an 
intention  to  pursue,  by  amicable  negociation,  a  repara 
tion  for  the  injuries,  that  have  been  committed  on 


W    I 

470  ^PRESIDENT  J.  ADAMS',  &c7 

the  commerce  of  our  fellow-citizens  by  whatever  na 
tion  ;  arid  if  success  cannot  be  obtained,  to  lay  the 
facts  before  the  legislature,  that  they  may  consider, 
what  further  measures  the  honor  and  interest  of  the 
government  and  its  constituents  demand;  if  a  resolu 
tion  to  do  justice,  as  far  as  may  depend  upon  me,  at 
all  times,  and  to  all  nations,  and  maintain  peace, 
friendship  and  benevolence  with  all  the  world ;  if  an 
unshaken  confidence  in  the  honor,  spirit,  and  resources 
of  the  American  people,  on  which  I  have  so  often  ha 
zarded  my  all,  and  never  been  deceived  ;  if  elevated 
ideas  of  the  high  destinies  of  this  country,  and  of  my  own 
duties  towards  it,  founded  on  a  knowledge  of  the  moral 
principles  and  intellectual  improvements  of  the  people, 
deeply  engraven  on  my  mind  in  early  life,  and  not  ob 
scured  but  exalted  by  experience  and  age,  and  with 
humble  reverence  I  feel  it  my  duty  to  add — if  a  venera 
tion  for  the  religion  of  a  people,  who  profess  and  call 
themselves  Christians,  and  a  fixed  resolution  to  consi 
der  a  decent  respect  for  Christianity  among  the  best 
recommendations  for  the  public  service,  can  enable  me, 
in  any  degree,  to  comply  with  your  wishes,  it  shall  be 
my  strenuous  endeavor,  that  this  sagacious  injunction 
of  the  two  Houses  shall  not  be  without  effect. 

With  this  great  example  before  me ;  with  the  sense 
and  spirit,  the  faith  and  honor,  the  duty  and  interest  of 
the  same  American  people,  pledged  to  support  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States,  I  entertain  no  doubt 
of  its  continuance  in  all  its  energy ;  and  my  mind  is 
prepared  without  hesitation,  to  lay  myself  under  the 
most  solemn  obligations  to  support  it,  to  the  utmost  of 
my  power. 

And  may  that  Being,  who  is  supreme  over  all,  the 
patron  of  order,  the  fountain  of  justice,  and  the  protec 
tor,  in  all  ages  of  the  world,  of  virtuous  liberty,  con 
tinue  his  blessing  upon  this  nation  and  its  government, 
and  give  it  all  possible  success  and  duration,  consistent 
with  the  ends  of  his  providence. 


SPEECH  OF  ROBERT  G.  HARPER, 

*> 

ON    THE 

NECESSITY  OF  RESISTING  THE  AGGRESSIONS  AND 
ENCROACHMENTS  OF  FRANCE, 

t 

DELIVERED    IN    THE    HOUSE  OF   REPRESENTATIVES    OP    THE 
UNITED    STATES,   MAY    29,  1797. 


In  1797,  the  French  Directory  refused  to  receive  Mr.  Pinckney, 
the  minister  of  the  United  States,  under  such  circumstances  that 
the  President  deemed  it  advisable  to  call  a  special  session  of  Con 
gress  to  take  the  subject  into  consideration.  He  accordingly  issu 
ed  a  proclamation  convoking  Congress  ;  and  in  his  message,  com 
municated  at  the  opening  of  the  session,  he  expressed,  in  strong 
terms  of  disapprobation,  his  sense  of  the  indignity  offered  to  the 
United  States  by  the  Directory.  An  address  was  moved  in 
the  House  of  Representatives,  responding  the  sentiments  of  the 
President.  An  amendment,  however,  was  proposed,  expressive 
of  an  opinion  that  the  House  viewed  the  conduct  of  the  Directory 
as  less  reprehensible  than  it  had  been  represented  by  the  Presi 
dent,  and  recommending  conciliatory  measures  as  the  basis  of  the 
negociations  about  to  be  entered  into  with  France. 

The  amendment  being  under  consideration  in  committee  of  the 
whole,  Mr.  Harper  delivered  the  following  speech  : 

MR.  CHAIRMAN, 

AT  the  time  the  interruption  took  place  on  Satur 
day,  by  the  unfortunate  indisposition  of  the  speaker,  I 
had  drawn  near  to  the  close  of  those  observations, 
with  which  at  that  time,  I  intended  to  trouble  the  com 
mittee.  I  shall  now  resume,  as  nearly  as  possible,  the 
same  train  of  remarks,  and  bring  them  to  a  conclusion 
as  speedily  as  possible.  As  more  time,  however,  is 
now  afforded  to  me,  I  will  take  a  range  somewhat 
more  extensive  than  I  had  prescribed  to  myself  on  the 


472         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

former  day,  endeavoring,  at  the  same  time,  to  avoid 
every  thing,  not  strictly  relative  to  the  question  on  the 
amendment,  now  under  consideration. 

[Mr.  Harper  here  observed,  that  he  should  go  a  lit 
tle  out  of  his  way,  in  order  to  notice  and  refute  some 
positions  laid  down  by  gentlemen  in  favor  of  the 
amendment,  which,  though  wholly  irrelevant  to  the 
present  question,  would  have  a  tendency,  if  allowed  to 
pass  uncontradicted,  to  render  the  people  discontent 
ed  with  the  government.  Having  concluded  his  re 
marks  upon  this  subject,  he  proceeded  thus  :] 

The  scope  and  object  of  this  amendment  is  to  re 
commend  it  to  the  President,  to  offer  certain  conces 
sions  to  France,  in  the  negociations  which  he  has  de 
clared  it  his  intention  to  commence.  These  conces 
sions,  are  understood  to  relate  to  the  list  of  contra 
band,  which  is  more  extensive,  as  stated  by  the  British 
treaty,  than  in  that  with  France ;  and  to  the  right  of 
taking  enemies'  goods  out  of  neutral  ships,  which  Bri 
tain  enjoys,  and  France  by  her  treaty  with  us  has  given 
up.  In  these  two  points  it  is  the  scope  and  object  of 
the  amendment  to  recommend,  that  the  two  nations 
should  be  placed  on  the  same  footing.  Hence  the 
amendment  is  to  be  considered  under  two  points  of 
view ;  first,  the  recommendation  itself;  and  secondly, 
the  thing  recommended. 

As  to  the  recommendation  itself,  I  ask,  is  it  consti 
tutional — is  it  useful — is  it  politic  ? 

With  respect  to  its  constitutionality,  every  body 
knows,  that  the  power  of  negociation  is  given  wholly 
to  the  President  by  the  constitution,  and  that  of  mak 
ing  treaties  to  the  President  and  senate.  Can  the 
House  of  Representatives  control  or  direct  that  pow 
er  ?  Can  it  instruct  the  President  in  matters,  which 
the  constitution  has  entrusted  solely  and  exclusively 
to  his  judgment  ?  Shall  it  undertake  to  instruct  him — 
will  he  be  bound  to  obey  those  instructions  ?  Should 
he  think  fit  to  pursue  a  different  course,  will  the  House 
be  justified  by  the  constitution  and  their  duty  in  with- 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  473 


holding  supplies,  and  in  leaving  the  country  without 
defence  ?  Do  gentlemen  foresee  the  dilemma,  which 
they  are  preparing  for  themselves  and  for  the  House ; 
a  dilemma  in  which  they  must  choose  between  pride 
and  duty,  between  supporting  the  executive  in  mea 
sures  adopted  against  their  advice,  and  leaving  the 
country  defenceless,  at  the  mercy  of  all  who  may 
choose  to  assail  it?  What  possible  effect  can  this 
interference  have,  but  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  schism 
between  the  different  departments  of  government  ? 

But  admitting  such  a  recommendation  to  be  con 
formable  to  the  constitution,  in  what  is  it  useful  ?  Is 
it  to  dispose  the  executive  to  treat  ?  If  so,  it  is  use 
less,  for  he  already  has  that  disposition,  and  has  strong 
ly  declared  it  in  his  speech  to  both  Houses.  He  has 
declared  it  as  his  resolution  "  to  institute  a  fresh  at 
tempt  at  negociatiori,  and  to  promote  and  accelerate 
an  accommodation,  provided  one  can  be  made  on 
terms  compatible  with  the  rights,  duties,  interests  and 
honor  of  the  nation."  He  has  declared,  that  if  we 
have  committed  "  errors,  and  these  can  be  demonstrat 
ed,  we  shall  be  willing  to  correct  them.  If  we  have 
done  injuries,  we  shall  be  willing,  on  conviction,  to  re 
dress  them."  Can  there  be  a  spirit  more  conciliato 
ry — or  would  gentlemen  wish  to  see  the  negociations 
conducted  on  other  principles  ? 

Is  it  to  give  information  to  the  executive,  to  point 
out  the  course  which  the  public  good  requires  to  be 
taken?  But  do  gentlemen  imagine  that  the  executive 
is  ignorant  of  the  public  interest,  or  less  acquainted 
with  it  than  the  House?  Is  it  not  notorious  that 
bodies  of  this  kind  are  always  unfit  for  negociation  ? 
Have  not  the  people  declared  it,  by  placing  that  pow 
er  in  the  hands  of  the  President  ?  Can  gentlemen 
suppose,  that  the  House  possesses,  or  can  possess,  all 
the  information  necessary,  in  forming  an  opinion  about 
what  ought  to  be  given,  and  what  ought  to  be  requir 
ed,  in  a  negociation  with  another  nation  ?  Can  the 
house  foresee  all  that  may  happen,  to  render  this  of- 

VOL.  i.  60 


474         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

fer  inexpedient,  or  useless,  or  unnecessary — to  justify 
other  offers,  or  to  make  demands  necessary,  instead 
of  offers  of  any  kind  ?  What  will  become  of  the  power 
of  negociation  in  the  executive,  if  the  House  is  first  to 
instruct  him,  and  afterwards  to  censure  him  ? 

Some  gentlemen  have  seemed  to  think,  that  this 
amendment  would  give  weight  to  the  negociation 
abroad ;  would  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  executive, 
and  place  him  on  higher  ground.  But  how  is  this  ef 
fect  to  be  produced  ?  By  showing,  it  is  answered, 
that,  in  making  this  offer,  all  the  branches  of  govern 
ment  are  united,  and  that  the  ground  thus  taken  will 
be  firmly  supported.  But  must  it  not  be  perfectly 
evident,  that  the  best  way  of  giving  this  impression  is, 
to  pursue  a  conduct  and  hold  a  language,  which  will 
evince  a  perfect  confidence  in  the  executive,  and  a 
determination  to  support  him  with  the  whole  force  and 
resources  of  the  country  ?  Then  it  is,  that  the  offers 
of  the  executive  will  come  with  weight,  when  they  come 
with  evidence  of  union  in  the  government,  and  of 
mutual  confidence  among  the  various  departments. 

Some  gentlemen  have  supported  this  amendment  on 
the  ground,  that  it  will  give  confidence  to  the  people  of 
this  country  in  the  executive;  arid  one  gentleman 
from  Virginia,  (Mr.  Nicholas,)  has  gone  so  far  as  to 
say,  that  the  people  of  this  country  will  not  support  the 
government,  unless  its  measures  are  right.  Admitting 
this  opinion  to  be  true,  (and  I  am  inclined  to  think  it 
may  be,)  still  it  will  remain  to  be  inquired,  by  what 
means  and  on  what  standard  the  people  would  form 
their  opinion  of  the  propriety  and  wisdom  of  the  mea 
sures,  pursued  by  their  government.  Not  certainly 
from  the  declarations  of  that  gentleman  or  his  friends; 
because  there  has  not  been  one  measure  adopted  by 
the  government,  since  its  formation,  which  they  have 
not  opposed  in  the  House  and  out  of  it,  on  which  they 
have  not  set  the  stamp  of  their  most  decided  censure ; 
and  yet,  sir,  we  have  seen  all  these  measures  support 
ed  and  approved  of  by  the  people.  We  have  seen  the 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  475 

late  President,  who  was  in  a  peculiar  manner  the  au 
thor  of  them,  under  whose  auspices  they  were  adopt 
ed  and  established,  in  spite  of  the  most  violent  and 
persevering  opposition  from  these  very  gentlemen — 
we  have  seen  him  surrounded  with  applauses,  with 
gratitude  and  with  thanks,  from  every  quarter  of  the 
union ;  we  have  seen  the  wisdom  and  firmness  of  his 
administration  made  one  very  principal  ground  of 
these  thanks  arid  applauses ;  and  even  in  a  former 
House  of  Representatives,  where  the  principles  of 
these  gentlemen  did  so  greatly  preponderate,  when 
they  moved  to  strike  out  of  an  address  to  this  great 
man  a  clause  expressly  approving  his  administration, 
as  wise,  firm  and  greatly  beneficial  to  his  country,  the 
motion  was  overruled  by  a  very  large  majority ;  and 
when  the  address  itself,  containing  this  obnoxious 
clause,  was  put  to  the  vote,  it  passed  with  only  twelve 
nays.  Yet  gentlemen  talk  to  us,  as  if  they  were  the 
standard,  by  which  the  people  would  measure  the  con 
duct  of  government !  Sir,  the  people  are  not  truly  es 
timated  by  those  gentlemen.  They  are  not  the  blind, 
ignorant  herd  which  those  gentlemen  take  them  to  be. 
They  will  do  in  future  what  they  have  always  done 
heretofore — they  will  judge  of  the  measures  of  govern 
ment  by  the  measures  themselves,  and  by  the  just  con 
fidence  which  they  have  long  placed  in  those  whom 
they  have  appointed  to  administer  it ;  not  by  the  opin 
ions  or  invectives  of  this  or  that  set  of  men,  either  on 
this  floor  or  out  of  doors.  Gentlemen  ought  to  be  ad 
monished,  by  the  frequent  and  always  unsuccessful  ap 
peals,  which  they  have  made  to  the  people,  to  give  up 
at  length  this  vain  chimera  of  being  able  to  rule  public 
opinion,  with  which  they  have  so  long  suffered  them 
selves  to  be  deluded. 

I  hold,  sir,  in  my  hand  a  paper,  from  that  very  quar 
ter  where  gentlemen  probably  suppose,  and  not  with 
out  appearance  of  reason,  that  their  labors  in  the  vine 
yard  of  opposition  have  been  crowned  with  most  suc 
cess.  It  is  an  add*9ss  from  Mecklenburg  county,  in 


476        MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH   ON   RESISTING 

Virginia,  to  their  representative  on  this  floor,  and  con 
tains  sentiments  so  just,  so  truly  patriotic,  and  so  ap 
plicable  to  the  point  of  confidence  in  government,  that 
I  cannot  help  reading  it  to  the  committee,  though  I  am 
sensible  it  must  have  already  attracted  the  notice  of 
every  individual.  [Mr.  Harper  then  read  the  address.] 

This  paper,  sir,  affords  a  most  consoling  and  hon 
orable  contrast  to  the  speeches,  which  have  lately 
been  heard  on  this  floor.  It  contains  sentiments, 
which  I  have  no  doubt  are  reverberated  from  the  hearts 
of  every  American  in  every  part  of  the  union,  and 
which  prove  how  far  the  people,  even  that  part  of 
them  on  which  these  gentlemen  have  most  particular 
ly  relied,  are  from  sharing  with  them  in  their  want  of 
affection  for  the  government,  and  of  confidence  in  its 
measures.  There  is  nothing  in  this  address  to  prove, 
that  the  people  in  that  part  of  the  union  will  refuse  to 
support  the  government,  unless  those  gentlemen  should 
inform  them  that  its  measures  were  right. 

I  also  consider  the  recommendation,  contained  in 
this  amendment,  as  extremely  impolitic.  Is  it  good 
policy  to  show  the  enemy  your  eagerness  to  treat, 
your  eagerness  to  make  concessions  ?  Is  it  good  po 
licy  to  show  to  France,  that  you  have  no  confidence  in 
the  executive,  in  his  wisdom,  his  information,  his  pa 
triotic  intentions ;  that  you  think  it  necessary  to  in 
struct  and  direct  him  ?  Is  it  good  policy  to  send 
the  executive  trammelled  to  France ;  to  send  him  in  a 
situation,  where  he  must  either  yield  to  a  part  of  her 
demands,  or  go  against  the  recommendations  of  this 
House  ?  Is  this  the  way  to  give  weight  to  his  nego- 
ciations,  or  to  lessen  her  demands  ?  Is  it  true,  thai 
there  is  in  this  House  a  majority,  who  do  not  confide 
in  the  executive  ?  I  repeat  the  question,  and  I  ad 
dress  it  not  to  those  gentlemen  whose  constant  em 
ployment  it  has  been,  for  eight  years  past,  in  the 
House  and  out  of  it,  to  oppose  the  executive  and  every 
measure  which  he  was  understood  to  favor,  to  declare 
their  distrust  of  him.  and  endeavpr  to  weaken  thai 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  477 

confidence  so  justly  reposed  in  him  by  the  people.  I 
address  not  myself  to  these :  I  address  myself  to  those 
gentlemen,  and  some  such  there  no  doubt  are,  who, 
entertaining  just  ideas  of  the  constitution,  and  repos 
ing  full  confidence  in  the  executive,  may  nevertheless 
be  inclined  to  favor  this  recommendation,  because 
they  think  it  a  harmless  thing.  I  could  ask  these  gen 
tlemen,  whether  there  is  a  majority  in  this  House,  who 
do  not  think  the  executive  worthy  of  confidence  in  the 
performance  of  his  constitutional  functions  ?  I  could 
ask  them  whether  they  are  willing  to  make  this  decla 
ration,  if  they  do  not  believe  it  ?  I  could  ask  them 
whether,  admitting  it  to  be  true,  it  would  be  prudent 
to  tell  France  so  ?  I  would  ask  them  what,  beside 
such  a  declaration,  France  can  see  in  this  amend 
ment  ?  I  answer,  and  they  must,  I  think,  join  me  in 
the  answer,  that  she  can  see  nothing  else.  She  will 
see  in  it  a  proof  and  confirmation  of  her  present  opin 
ion,  that  we  are  a  divided  people;  that  the  people  are 
divided  from  the  government,  and  the  government  di 
vided  within  itself  This  will  encourage  her  to  press 
and  heighten  her  demands  ;  for,  seeing  us.  as  she  will 
think,  divided,  she  will  remember  one  part  of  the 
scripture,  while  she  forgets  all  the  rest,  that  "  a  house 
divided  against  itself  cannot  stand." 

As  I  believe  this  recommendation  to  be  unconstitu 
tional,  useless  and  highly  impolitic,  I  can  never  give 
my  vote  in  its  favor. 

I  will  now  ask  gentlemen,  who  may  think  the  recom 
mendation  not  improper,  whether  the  measure  recom 
mended  is  entitled  to  their  support  ?  Why  should  it 
be  entitled  to  support  ?  Either  because  it  is  necessa 
ry,  or  because  it  is  useful ;  because  it  is  demanded  by 
justice,  or  recommended  by  good  policy. 

If  the  measure  were  really  necessary,  or  useful,  sure 
ly  the  executive  is  as  well  apprized  of  that  necessity 
and  utility,  as  well  qualified  to  judge  about  it,  as  the 
House  of  Representatives :  and  the  thing  will  be  as 
well  done  by  him  alone,  and  will  have  as  much  effect, 


478        MR.  HARPER'S    SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

as  if  the  House  were  to  join  in  it :  the  claims  of  justice 
can  be  as  completely  satisfied  in  one  case  as  in  the 
other;  the  ends  of  policy  as  completely  attained. 
Though  I  myself  have  very  little  reliance  on  the  use 
fulness  of  the  measure,  and  no  conviction  of  its  neces 
sity,  still  I,  for  one,  am  perfectly  willing  that  it  should 
be  tried  by  the  executive,  and  perfectly  willing  that  it 
should  be  effected,  if  the  executive  think  fit.  Neither 
have  I  any  doubt  that  it  will  be  tried.  The  very  de 
bate  in  this  House  will  inform  the  executive  of  the  pro 
priety  of  trying  it;  and  I  have  no  doubt,  moreover, 
that  the  executive  is  disposed  to  make  the  attempt,  to 
offer  these  advantages  to  France.  I  know  nothing  di 
rectly  of  the  opinion  of  the  executive,  but  I  know,  that 
those  who  are  about  the  executive  have  this  opinion, 
and  are  disposed  to  make  this  offer  to  France,  not  per 
haps  in  the  unqualified  and  unconditional  manner  re 
commended  by  some  gentlemen,  but  on  terms  con 
sistent  with  the  honor  and  interests  of  this  country, 
and  with  which  the  public,  when  it  comes  to  be  informed 
of  them,  will  be  satisfied.  I,  therefore,  even  if  I  thought 
this  measure  not  only  useful  but  necessary,  should 
still  leave  it  most  willingly  to  the  President.  But  as 
there  are  gentlemen  in  the  House,  who  may  be  inclin 
ed  to  favor  the  recommendation  from  an  opinion,  that 
the  measure  recommended  is  necessary  or  useful,  F 
will  address  some  considerations  to  them,  by  which 
they  may,  perhaps,  be  induced  to  doubt  whether  it  is 
either  the  one  or  the  other. 

First,  I  ask  them,  how  this  measure,  this  concession 
to  France,  can  be  necessary  ?  Do  gentlemen  contend. 
that  this  country  is  too  weak  to  defend  her  rights ; 
that  it  must  yield  to  the  demands  of  a  foreign  power, 
merely  because  those  demands  are  made  ?  I  have 
not  so  understood  them.  Supple  as  their  language 
has  been,  and  submissive  as  their  course  of  policy 
seems  calculated  to  become,  they  have  not  yet  bent 
thus  low.  But  they  have  contended,  that  this  conces 
sion  is  necessary,  because  it  is  right ;  because  justice 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.      479 

requires  it.  And  how  does  justice  require  it  ?  Be 
cause,  according  to  them,  having  yielded  these  rights 
to  England  by  our  treaty  with  her,  impartial  justice  re 
quires,  that  we  should  yield  them  also  to  France. 

This  argument  rests^on  the  ground  that  Britain  does 
not  possess  these  rights  by  the  law  of  nations,  which 
point   gentlemen  have   taken  much  pains,  and  made 
many  elaborate  dissertations,  to  establish.     I  shall  not 
follow  them  through  this  long  diplomatic  discussion, 
which  is  much  better  suited  to  the    department  of 
state,  and   has  there   been  handled  in  a  very  mas 
terly  and  satisfactory  manner.     I  believe,  that  when 
the  official   paper  on   this  subject,    lately   published 
from    the   department    of  state,  shall    be    read   and 
compared    with    the  speeches    of  gentlemen,    very 
little  doubt   will  remain  on  the  point.      I  have  an 
other  reason  too  for  avoiding  a  dispute  on  the  law 
of  nations.     Gentlemen   seem   disposed  to  treat  the 
law,  and  the  writers  on  it,  with  as  little  respect  as  the 
one   and   the   other  have  received    from   the  nation 
whose  cause  they  advocate.     One  minister  of  that  na 
tion,  in  this  country,  has  declared  those  writers  to  be 
no  better  than  worm-eaten  volumes,  whose  contents  he 
was  happy  to  have  forgotten.     Another,   at  Genoa, 
declared,  that  the  French  had  taken  up  arms  for  the 
express    purpose  of  subverting  the  law   of  nations. 
After  this  I  should  be  almost  afraid  to  cite  writers  on 
the  law  of  nations,  lest  I  should  be  told,  "  that  they  are 
worm-eaten  volumes."      There  is,  however,  one  au 
thority  on  this  point,  which  perhaps  may  be  acknow 
ledged,  and  which  I  will  therefore  adduce.     It  is  the 
marine   code  of  France  herself;   from  which  it  ap 
pears,  that  by  the  law  of  nations,  and  her  own  laws 
founded  upon  it,  enemies'  goods  are  liable  to  capture, 
in  neutral  ships. 

Sir,  it  appears  from  Valin,  vol.  ii.  page  250,  that,  on 
the  21st  of  October,  1744,  the  king  of  France  published 
&  regulation,  "  concerning  prizes  made  at  sea,  and  the 
navigation  of-  neutral  vessels  in  time  of  war." 


480         MR.   HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

first,  second,  third  and  fourth  articles  specify  all  the 
cases  in  which  neutral  ships  in  time  of  war  may  sail,  free 
from  molestation.  Then  comes  the  fifth  article,  which 
is  in  these  words  :  "  If  in  any  of  the  cases  specified  in 
the  first,  second,  third  and  fourth  articles  of  this  regu 
lation,  there  shall  be  found  on  board  of  the  said  neutral 
ships,  to  whatsoever  nation  they  may  belong,  merchan 
dizes  or  effects,  the  property  of  his  majesty's  enemies, 
such  merchandize  or  effects  shall  be  good  prize,  even 
though  they  be  not  the  production  of  the  enemies' 
country:  but  the  ships  shall  be  released."  This 
regulation  continued  in  force  till  the  26th  of  July,  1778, 
when  the  king  of  France,  having  engaged  in  the  Ameri 
can  war,  (for  the  treaty  of  alliance  was  early  in  Februa 
ry,  1778,)  found  it  his  interest  to  relax  from  the  princi 
ple  in  hopes  of  prevailing  on  England  to  do  so  too. 
Accordingly  on  that  day  he  published  a  regulation,  by 
the  first  article  of  which,  enemies'  property,  on  board  of 
neutral  ships,  is  declared  to  be  safe  from  capture  by 
French  armed  vessels.  The  article,  however,  contains 
the  following  clause :  "  But  his  majesty  retains  to  him 
self  a  right  to  revoke  the  permission  contained  in  the 
present  article,  should  the  enemy  powers  fail  to  grant  a 
similar  permission  within  six  months  from  the  date 
hereof." 

Hence  it  is  clear,  that  France  not  only  has  asserted 
and  long  exercised  this  right,  which  she  charges  us 
with  having  conceded  to  England,  but  even  possesses 
it  at  the  present  moment,  and  may  exercise  it,  if  she 
thinks  fit,  without  violating  the  law  of  nations;  she 
being  only  restrained  in  those  cases,  in  which,  as  in 
ours,  she  has  renounced  it  by  treaties.  All  this  ap 
pears  from  her  own  laws  and  public  acts;  for  her  re- 
linquishment  of  this  right  in  July,  1778,  having  been 
merely  conditional  and  dependent  on  a  similar  relin- 
quishment  by  England,  which  has  never  taken  place, 
may  be  at  any  moment  revoked,  and  indeed  has  been; 
for,  notwithstanding  all  her  clamors  against  the  Eng 
lish  for  exercising  this  right,  it  is  very  well  known,  that 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE. 

she  has  constantly  exercised  it  herself  from  the  begin 
ning  of  the  present  war. 

It  may  therefore  be  expected,  that  we  shall  not  here 
after  be  told  by  either  France  or  her  advocates,  that 
the  right  to  take  enemies'  goods  in  neutral  vessels,  is 
not  a  right  given  by  the  law  of  nations. 

It  has,  however,  been  contended,  that  the  law  of  na 
tions  in  this  respect  has  been  altered  by  the  conven 
tion  of  the  armed  neutrality.  I  will  not  stop  to  refute 
this  position,  which  has  been  so  often  and  so  complete 
ly  exposed ;  still  less  will  I  undertake  to  prove  what  is 
in  itself  so  perfectly  obvious,  that  the  convention  of 
the  armed  neutrality,  being  no  more  than  a  treaty,  is 
confined,  like  all  other  treaties,  to  the  parties  who 
agree  to  it,  and  can  in  no  manner  affect  the  general 
rights  of  other  states,  under  the  general  law  of  nations : 
but  I  will  remark,  that  this  objection  about  the  armed 
neutrality,  comes  with  a  very  bad  grace  from  France ; 
because  France,  when  requested  to  accede  to  this  con 
vention  of  the  armed  neutrality,  expressly  declined  it. 
She  declined  it  indeed  under  pretence,  that  its  principles 
were  already  established  by  her  regulation  of  July, 
1778.  This  regulation,  however,  as  has  been  seen, 
was  temporary  and  conditional,  and  left  France  at  full 
liberty  to  adhere  to  the  law  of  nations,  or  adopt  the 
principles  of  the  armed  neutrality,  as  she  might  after 
wards  find  convenient.  She  afterwards  did  refuse  to 
accede,  as  appears  by  the  authority  of  Mr.  Gibbon ; 
in  one  of  whose  letters  to  lord  Sheffield,  dated  Sep 
tember  llth,  1785,  and  published  in  the  first  volume  of 
his  miscellaneous  works,  page  06,  there  is  found  this 
passage :  "  The  other  day  the  French  ambassador 
mentioned,  that  the  empress  of  Russia  had  proposed  to 
ratify  the  principles  of  the  armed  neutrality  by  a  defini 
tive  treaty ;  but  that  the  French  had  declared,  that 
they  would  neither  propose  nor  accept  an  article,  so 
disagreeable  to  England." 

This,  sir,  is  a  good  comment  on  their  former  pro 
ceedings  with  respect  to  this  right ;  and  proves,  that 

VOL.  i;  61 


482         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON   RESISTING 

they  never  meant  to  renounce  it,  though  they  were 
willing,  for  a  short  time  and  for  a  particular  purpose, 
to  suspend  its  exercise.  It  is  true  that  France  after 
wards,  in  the  years  1786  and  1787,  made  a  treaty  with 
Russia,  in  which  this  right  was  finally  relinquished. 
The  same  thing  is  done  in  her  treaty  with  England 
in  1786.  But  her  having  so  long  retained  it,  and  her 
very  agreement  at  last  to  give  it  up,  proves  most  incon- 
testably  that  she  believes  herself  to  possess  it,  under 
the  general  law  of  nations. 

A  dispute  has  arisen,  whether  the  convention  of  the 
armed  neutrality  is  permanent  in  its  nature,  or  merely 
confined  to  the  duration  of  the  American  war.  I  have 
been  of  the  latter  opinion  myself,  on  the  construction 
of  the  instrument  itself,  and  of  the  acts  which  have 
grown  out  of  it ;  and  I  shall  not  enter  again  into  the 
discussion,  which  I  believe  to  be  wholly  immaterial. 
Because,  whether  this  convention  be  permanent  or 
temporary,  still  it  is  no  more  than  a  treaty,  and  can 
have  no  effect  on  the  general  law  of  nations.  I  will, 
however,  correct  a  mistake  into  which  a  gentleman 
from  Pennsylvania,  (Mr.  Gallatin,)  has  fallen  on  this 
subject.  In  order  to  prove  that  the  convention  of  the 
armed  neutrality  was  permanent  in  its  nature,  that  gen 
tleman  has  asserted  that  Portugal  acceded  to  it  after 
the  war.  But  the  gentleman  has  forgot  the  dates. 
The  accession  of  Portugal  was  signed  at  Petersburg. 
July,  1782,  and  ratified  at  Lisbon,  September,  1782. 
The  ratifications  were  exchanged  on  the  21st  of 
January,  1783.  Whereas  the  provisional  articles  of 
peace  were  not  signed  till  November  30th,  1782. 
The  armistice  for  suspending  hostilities  took  place  on 
the  20th  of  January,  1783,  and  the  definitive  treaty,  by 
which  the  war  was  really  ended,  was  not  signed  till 
September,  1783,  many  months  after  the  accession  of 
Portugal.  That  accession  even  preceded  the  provi 
sional  articles  by  some  months ;  and  yet  the  gentle 
man  from  Pennsylvania  has  told  the  committee  that 
Portugal  acceded  after  the  war. 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  483 

The  gentleman,  however,  has  given  up  the  point,  so 
strongly  contended  for  by  others  on  the  same  side  of 
the  House.  He  has  admitted  that  we  did  not,  by  the 
treaty  with  England,  concede  to  her  the  right  respect 
ing  neutral  bottoms ;  but  he  contends  that  we  should 
have  made  no  commercial  treaty  with  her,  till  she  had 
relinquished  that  right.  I  will,  however,  ask  that  gen 
tleman  and  the  committee,  whether  it  is  not  wise  to 
obtain  the  modification  of  a  right  which  operates  un 
favorably  to  us,  when  we  cannot  obtain  its  relinquish- 
ment?  Is  it  not  wise  and  lawful,  since  we  cannot 
prevent  this  operation,  to  render  it  as  little  injurious 
as  possible — to  lessen  its  inconveniencies  when  we 
cannot  quite  remove  them  ?  This  is  what  the  treaty 
has  done ;  and  surely  we  may  do  this  without  asking 
the  permission  of  France,  or  giving  her  cause  of  offence. 

From  all  this  it  must  evidently  appear,  that  we  have 
not  conceded  this  right  to  England,  since  she  possess 
ed  it  by  the  law  of  nations ;  and  that  we  have  done 
France  no  injury.  Consequently,  justice  does  not  re 
quire  us  to  concede  it  to  her.  The  argument  of  ne 
cessity,  of  course,  falls  to  the  ground. 

Will  the  argument  of  utility  avail  gentlemen  any  bet 
ter  ?  They  contend,  that  if  not  necessary,  it  would  at; 
least  be  useful  to  make  this  concession  to  France  : 
that  if  not  demanded  by  justice,  it  is  at  least  recom 
mended  by  policy.  If  so,  it  may  be  done  by  the  Pre 
sident  without  our  assistance  or  advice,  and  the  same 
good  effects  will  still  result  from  it.  But  why  will  it  be 
useful  ?  Will  it  be  valuable  to  France  ?  Does  she 
want  it  ?  Will  this  concession  satisfy  her  ?  These 
are  questions  which,  in  my  opinion,  deserve  particular 
and  serious  consideration. 

In  the  first  place,  I  would  ask  how  this  right  can  be 
valuable  to  France  ?  We  are  not  carriers  for  Britain. 
For  many  nations,  indeed,  we  are  carriers,  but  not  for 
Britain ;  which,  on  the  contrary,  is  very  considerably  a 
carrier  for  us.  Our  produce  is  often  found  in  her 
ships — her  goods  very  seldom  in  ours.  Consequently. 


484         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

the  right  to  take  British  property  on  board  of  our 
ships,  is  a  right  of  no  value  to  France.  Her  interest, 
and  a  very  powerful  one  it  is,  consists  not  in  using  the 
right  herself,  but  in  taking  it  away  from  England.  It 
is  not  to  seize  English  property  in  our  ships  that  she  is 
so  anxious,  but  to  make  French  property  safe  from 
being  seized  in  them  by  the  English.  Could  she  once 
accomplish  this  point,  her  commerce  would  float  safe 
ly  in  our  ships,  and  England,  being  prohibited  to  touch 
it,  would  become  infinitely  less  formidable  to  her. 
The  navy  of  England  would,  in  fact,  become  in  a  great 
degree  useless  to  her,  in  a  war  against  France ;  since 
it  could  not  touch  her  commerce  secured  under  our 
neutral  flag,  while  France,  having  her  commerce  thus 
carried  on  for  her,  would  be  able  to  employ  every 
ship  and  every  sailor  she  possessed,  in  attacking  and 
destroying  the  commerce  and  the  navy  of  England. 
Thus  that  naval  superiority  which  she  so  much  dreads, 
and  which  enables  England  to  counterbalance  her 
power  in  Europe,  would  be  stripped  of  all  its  effects  and 
all  its  terrors.  It  is  not,  therefore,  wonderful,  that 
France  should  be  so  extremely  anxious  to  deprive  Eng 
land  of  this  right,  or  so  ready  to  renounce  it  herself. 
It  is  of  no  use  to  her,  and  of  infinite  use,  perhaps  ne 
cessity,  to  England. 

Accordingly  it  has  been  seen,  that  France,  while 
perpetually  urging  us  to  resist  the  exercise  of  this  right 
by  England,  and  even  quarrelling  with  us  for  not  doing 
so,  has  never  hinted  the  least  desire  to  have  it  herself. 
She  has  not  been  slow  or  diffident,  every  body  knows, 
in  demanding  what  she  thinks  useful  to  herself;  and  it 
may,  therefore,  be  most  safely  concluded,  that  since 
she  has  not  demanded  this,  she  thinks  it  of  no  use  to 
her,  and  does  not  want  it.  To  show  us,  indeed,  how 
little  she  cares  about  it,  she  has  taken  it  lately  by  a  for 
mal  decree,  and  yet  still  continues  to  quarrel  with  us, 
and  plunder  us. 

What  reason,  then,  I  would  ask,  is  there  for  suppos 
ing,  that  France  will  be  satisfied  by  this  concession  ? 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.      485 

Does  she  limit  her  claims  to  this  ?  Some  gentlemen, 
particularly  one  from  Maryland,  (Mr.  S.  Smith,)  has 
said  so :  but  does  she  say  so  ?  Is  that  gentleman  in 
the  secret  of  her  councils,  or  authorized  to  explain  her 
pretensions  ?  If  so,  let  him  show  his  credentials.  If 
not,  the  House  must  take  the  liberty  of  judging,  not 
from  his  assertions,  but  from  the  acts  of  France  her 
self;  from  the  official  papers  presented  by  her  minis 
ters.  Let  the  gentleman  from  Maryland  read  these 
papers.  He  will  find  in  them  a  great  many  preten 
sions  to  which  he  will  never  submit,  but  not  one  word 
of  this.  That  gentleman  has  said,  that  her  decree  of 
March  2d,  wherein  she  takes  these  rights,  which  gen 
tlemen  are  so  anxious  to  have  conceded  to  her,  ought 
to  overrule  all  her  former  acts,  to  be  considered  as  her 
ultimatum,  as  the  final  declaration  of  her  wishes,  her 
claims,  and  her  pretensions.  If  so,  why  continue  to 
plunder  and  maltreat  us  since  that  decree?  Why 
send  away  our  minister  ?  Why  refuse  to  receive  an 
other,  unless  all  the  grievances  of  which  she  has  com 
plained,  and  to  the  redress  of  which  she  thinks  herself 
entitled,  shall  first  be  removed  ?  Gentlemen  have 
found  in  that  phrase,  "  to  the  redress  of  which  she  is 
entitled,"  a  wonderful  restriction  of  all  her  demands, 
and  a  very  conciliatory  disposition.  But  who  is  to  de 
clare  which  are  the  complaints,  to  the  redress  of  which 
she  is  entitled  ?  Certainly  she  herself.  And  where  is 
this  country  to  look  for  the  declaration  ?  Certainly  in 
the  official  acts  of  her  government  directed  to  ours, 
and  not  in  decrees  passed  long  after,  nor  in  the 
speeches  of  members  on  this  floor.  The  first  of  these 
acts  is  M.  de  la  Croix's  summary,  delivered  to  our 
ministers  at  Paris,  March  9th,  1796,  and  containing 
complaints  against  the  whole  British  treaty,  against 
the  interference  of  our  courts  with  French  prizes,  and 
against  the  construction,  put  by  our  government  on 
the  laws  of  neutrality,  and  on  some  articles  of  the  trea 
ty  with  France.  Next  comes  the  decree  of  July  4th, 
1796.  for  enforcing  these  complaints.  After  that  is 


486         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESIST!^, 

M.  Adet's  fifth  note  of  October  27th,  1796,  communi 
cating  this  decree ;  and  last  of  all  comes  his  manifesto, 
November  15th,  1796,  in  which  all  the  former  com 
plaints  made  by  himself,  his  predecessors  and  M.  de  la 
Croix,  are  enlarged  upon  and  enforced.  On  the  12th 
of  December  following,  the  directory  refused  to  re 
ceive  our  minister,  and  declared  that  they  would  in  fu 
ture,  receive  no  minister  plenipotentiary  from  us,  till 
all  the  injuries,  of  which  they  had  complained,  were 
redressed.  What  are  the  complaints  here  referred  to  ? 
Certainly  those  contained  in  the  manifesto  of  M.  Adet : 
for  as  the  directory  had  no  doubt  given  him  instruc 
tions,  as  to  the  manifesto  and  the  time  of  publishing 
it,  they  must  have  known  that  it  had  been  published, 
when  they  gave  this  answer  to  Gen.  Pinckney ;  and  to 
that  manifesto,  and  the  complaints  contained  in  it,  the 
answer  no  doubt  refers.  As  to  the  decree  of  March 
2d,  which  gentlemen  say,  ought  to  be  considered  as 
the  ultimatum  of  France,  it  did  not  take  place  till  two 
months  afterwards :  and  to  suppose  that  the  directory, 
in  refusing  to  receive  a  minister  on  account  of  griev 
ances  complained  of,  had  reference  to  a  complaint 
made  two  months  after,  would  certainly  be  to  charge 
them  with  a  very  singular  absurdity. 

I  cannot,  therefore,  be  persuaded  that  these  conces 
sions,  so  much  relied  on  by  gentlemen,  will  satisfy 
France,  since  it  is  certain  that  they  form  no  part  of 
her  present  demands,  that  she  never  has  asked  for 
them,  and  that  they  would  be  of  little  value  to  her,  if 
she  had  them.  This  conclusion  is  greatly  strengthen 
ed  by  the  consideration,  that  although  she  had  pos 
sessed  herself  of  these  rights  by  the  decree  of  July  4th, 
1796,  and  still  more  formally  and  expressly  by  that  of 
March  2d,  1797,  she  still  continued  to  pillage  and  mal 
treat  this  country,  under  the  pretext  of  other  com 
plaints  ;  whereas,  had  these  rights  now  proposed  to  be 
ceded  to  her,  been  the  sole  or  chief  object  of  her  de 
sires,  she  would  have  ceased  to  complain  and  plunder, 
as  soon  as  she  had  seized  themt 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  487 

I  should  be  glad  to  hear  what  use  is  to  be  made  of 
this  conclusion.  Is  it  to  dissuade  our  government 
from  making  the  offer  to  France  ?  No ;  I,  for  one, 
wish  the  offer  to  be  made,  and  I  have  no  doubt,  that 
it  will  be  made,  whether  recommended  by  the  House 
or  not :  but  to  dissuade  the  House  from  relying  too 
much  on  the  efficacy  of  this  offer ;  to  dissuade  them 
from  regarding  this  offer  as  in  any  degree  an  effectual 
mean  of  satisfying  the  demands  of  France,  of  checking 
her  insolence,  or  of  restraining  her  aggressions.  To 
prevent  them,  if  possible,  from  being  led,  by  confidence 
so  false,  into  a  neglect  of  these  decided  and  energetic 
measures  of  defence,  on  which  the  success  of  the  ne- 
gociation  must  entirely  depend.  This  idea,  I  believe, 
cannot  be  too  much  pressed  upon  the  House.  I  con 
ceive  it  to  be  of  infinite  importance  in  the  present  situa 
tion  of  our  affairs.  I  am  persuaded,  that  our  only 
hope  of  avoiding  war  or  disgrace,  lies  in  a  strict  and 
practical  attention  to  it.  In  order  to  enforce  the  more 
effectually  its  importance,  I  conceive,  that  it  will  be 
highly  useful  to  inquire  what  the  real  wishes  and  ob 
jects  of  France  are,  as  well  as  what  they  are  not.  In 
order  to  find  out  this,  it  will  be  proper  to  ask,  what  has 
been  the  scope  of  her  policy  in  this  country  ?  And 
what  is  the  ground  of  her  anger  at  the  British  treaty  ? 
For  my  part,  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  whole  scope  of 
the  French  policy  towards  this  country,  has  been  to 
draw  it  into  the  war  against  England,  and  the  tenden 
cy  of  the  British  treaty  to  defeat  this  project,  the  whole 
ground  of  their  animosity  against  that  instrument.  It 
is,  in  my  opinion,  a  vain  delusion,  to  suppose  that 
France  has  conceived  this  mighty  resentment,  and  is 
committing  these  unheard  of  outrages,  on  account  of 
this  or  that  article  of  a  treaty,  this  or  that  advantage 
given  to  another  nation,  and  withheld  from  her.  It  is 
the  treaty  itself,  which  has  given  her  offence ;  and  its 
tendency  to  preserve  peace  between  this  country  and 
Britain,  is  the  ground  of  that  offence.  If  it  should  be 
asked,  how  this  appears  to  have  been  the  drift  of 


488         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

France  ?  I  answer,  that  it  appears,  in  the  first  place, 
by  the  instructions  to  Genet.  These  instructions  have 
been  given  to  the  public  by  M.  Genet  himself,  in  order 
to  justify  his  conduct  in  this  country.  They  must  still 
be  fresh  in  the  recollection  of  most  persons ;  but  as 
there  may  be  some,  who  have  not  particularly  attend 
ed  to  them,  or  have  forgotten  their  tenor,  it  will  not  be 
improper  to  cite  some  of  the  most  remarkable  pas 
sages.  "  The  executive  council,  (says  M.  Genet,)  are 
disposed  to  set  on  foot  a  negociation  on  these  founda 
tions,  (the  overtures  made  by  general  Washington  and 
Mr.  Jefferson  for  a  new  treaty,)  and  they  do  not  know 
but  that  such  a  treaty  admits  a  latitude  still  more  ex 
tensive,  in  becoming  a  national  agreement,  in  which 
two  great  nations  shall  suspend"  (this,  sir,  should  have 
been  translated  unite,)  "  their  commercial  and  political 
interests,  and  establish  a  mutual  understanding,  to  be 
friend  the  empire  of  liberty  wherever  it  can  be  embrac 
ed,  and  punish  those  powers  who  still  keep  up  an  ex 
clusive  colonial  and  commercial  system,  by  declaring, 
that  their  vessels  shall  not  be  received  in  the  ports  of 
the  contracting  parties."  Thus  it  appears,  that  this 
treaty  is  not  only  to  be  a  commercial,  but  also  a  politi 
cal  union :  that  we  are  to  assist  in  extending  French 
principles  and  French  influence,  under  the  name  of 
guaranteeing  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  and  be 
friending  the  empire  of  liberty ;  and  that,  in  order  to 
accomplish  this  end,  we  are  to  shut  our  ports  against 
all  the  powers  who  maintain  an  exclusive  commercial 
and  colonial  system;  that  is,  against  the  English, 
Spaniards,  Danes  and  Dutch.  This  amounts  in  sub 
stance,  and  almost  in  name,  to  an  alliance  offensive 
and  defensive  with  France. 

Lest,  however,  her  views  should  be  misunderstood, 
she  has  gone  on,  in  the  instructions,  to  explain  them  in 
a  manner  still  more  clear  and  explicit.  "  As  it  is  pos 
sible,  however,  (continues  M.  Genet,)  that  the  false 
representations,  which  have  been  made  to  Congress 
of  the  state  of  our  internal  affairs,  of  the  situation  of 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE,  489 

our  maritime  force,  of  our  finances,  and  especially  of 
the  storms  with  which  we  are  threatened,  may  make 
her  ministers,  in  the  negociations  which  citizen  Genet 
is  instructed  to  open,  adopt  a  timid  and  wavering  con 
duct,  the  executive  council  charges  him,  in  expecta 
tion  that  the  American  government  will  finally  deter 
mine  to  make  a  common  cause  with  us,  to  take  such 
steps  as  it  will  appear  to  him  exigencies  may  require* 
to  serve  the  cause  of  liberty  and  the  freedom  of  the, 
people."  This  passage,  sir,  assuredly  can  require  no 
comment.  In  the  supplementary  instructions,  the  sys 
tem  is  more  fully  developed.  And  indeed,  the  passage 
relative  to  the  point  under  consideration  is  so  conclu 
sive,  that  I  will  cite  it  entire.  These  are  the  words  : 
"  The  reciprocal  guarantee  of  the  possessions  of  the 
two  nations,  stipulated  in  the  eleventh  article  of  the 
treaty  of  1778,  can  be  established  upon  generous  prin 
ciples,  which  have  been  already  pointed  out,  and  shall 
equally  be  an  essential  clause  in  the  new  treaty,  which 
is  to  be  proposed."  In  order  to  understand  this,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  recollect,  that  the  treaty  of  1778,  was 
purely  defensive ;  so  that  France  could  not  claim  the 
guarantee  in  a  war,  in  which  she  should  be  the  aggres 
sor.  As  she  was  then  preparing  to  attack  England, 
against  which  she  declared  war  within  less  than  a 
month  after  these  instructions  were  signed,  this  defen 
sive  guarantee  would  not  answer  her  purpose.  She 
therefore  evidently  wished  to  make  it  offensive  and  de 
fensive.  For  had  she  meant  to  remain  on  the  defen 
sive  herself,  the  defensive  guarantee  would  have  been 
sufficient,  and  she  would  have  wanted  no  other.  The 
instructions  then  proceed  thus :  "  The  executive  coun 
cil,  in  consequence,  recommend  it  especially  to  citi 
zen  Genet,  to  sound  early  the  disposition  of  the  Ame 
rican  government,  and  to  make  it,  (the  guarantee,)  a 
condition  sine  qua  non  of  their  commerce  with  the  West 
Indies,  so  essential  to  the  United  States.  It  nearly  con 
cerns  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  French  nation, 
that  a  people,  whose  resources  increase  beyond  all 
VOL.  i.  62 


490         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

calculation,  and  whom  nature  has  placed  so  near  our 
rich  colonies,  should  become  interested  by  their  own 
engagements,  in  the  preservation  of  these  islands. 
Citizen  Genet  will  find  the  less  difficulty  in  making  the 
proposition  relished  in  the  United  States,  as  the  great 
trade  which  will  be  the  reward  of  it  will  indemnify 
them  in  the  end  for  the  sacrifices  which  they  may 
make  in  the  outset ;  and  the  Americans  cannot  be  ig 
norant  of  the  great  disproportion  between  their  re 
sources  and  those  of  the  French  republic,  and  that  for 
a  long  period  the  guarantee  asked  from  them  will  be 
little  more  than  nominal  for  them,  while  on  our  part 
it  will  be  real,  and  we  shall  immediately  put  ourselves 
in  a  condition  to  fulfil  it,  by  sending  to  the  American 
ports  a  sufficient  force  to  put  them  beyond  insult,  and 
to  facilitate  their  communication  with  the  islands  and 
with  France."  Thus  it  manifestly  appears,  that  an 
alliance,  offensive  and  defensive  in  the  war,  which  she 
meditated  against  England,  was  to  be  formed  with 
France ;  that  the  object  of  this  alliance  was  to  be  the 
preservation  of  her  islands,  and  commercial  privileges 
its  reward ;  that  we  were  to  make  sacrifices  in  the 
outset,  and  be  reimbursed  by  these  privileges ;  and 
that  a  French  fleet  was  to  be  sent  to  our  coast,  for  our 
protection.  In  other  words,  we  were  to  become  the 
carriers  and  servants  of  France,  and  she  was  to  defend 
us  against  England. 

This  point  indeed  is  so  clear,  that  it  has  been  ad 
mitted  by  the  greater  part  of  those,  who  possess  any 
information  on  the  subject.  Many  gentlemen,  how 
ever,  are  of  opinion,  that  when  Genet  was  recalled,  this 
system  was  given  up  by  France.  But  I  ask  these  gen 
tlemen,  what  was  the  real  motive  of  Genet's  recal  ? 
Was  it  to  disavow  his  plans,  or  to  satisfy  our  com 
plaints  ?  Certainly  not.  His  violent  and  foolish  pro 
ceedings,  which  counteracted  the  plan  instead  of  pro 
moting  it,  were  no  doubt  intended  to  be  censured,  and 
there  probably  was  a  disposition  to  coax  and  flatter 
oiil  government*  by  the  recal  of  this  minister,  in  order 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE. 

to  prepare  it  better  for  that  insidious  policy,  which  was 
to  be  adopted  by  his  successors.  The  true  cause, 
however,  of  Genet's  removal  was  the  fall  of  the  Brisso- 
tine  party,  to  which  he  had  belonged;  and  every  person 
connected  with  or  employed  by  which,  Robespierre 
had  removed.  Hence  the  consuls  in  America,  against 
whom  we  never  had  complained,  were  removed,  as 
well  as  the  minister.  But  did  the  French  government 
disavow  the  instructions  or  the  proceedings  of  M.  Genet  ? 
Did  his  successors  relinquish  his  claims  and  preten 
sions  ?  Certainly  not.  On  the  contrary,  they  were 
all  renewed  and  perpetually  urged  by  those  gentlemen, 
who  never  ceased  to  talk  to  us  about  efficacious 
measures  against  England,  about  a  vigorous  reaction. 
And  in  the  manifesto  published  by  one  of  them  (M. 
Adet,)  the  whole  of  Genet's  measures  were  expressly 
revived,  and  all  his  complaints  renewed  and  enforced. 
Even  that  appeal  to  the  people,  which  he  was  dis 
graced  for  threatening,  was  actually  made  by  this 
manifesto. 

The  policy  of  France  to  draw  this  country  into  the 
war,  appears  also,  from  the  clamor,  raised  by  her  and 
her  partizans  against  the  proclamation  of  neutrality. 
This  clamor  is  fresh  in  the  recollection  of  us  all.  Genet 
cried  out  against  this  proclamation ;  Fouchet  indirect 
ly  complained  of  it,  and  Adet  stigmatized  it  as  insidi 
ous,  perfidious  and  "  a  cloak  under  which  this  country 
presented  England  with  a  poniard,  to  cut  the  throat 
of  our  ally."  Societies  passed  resolutions  against  it ; 
orators  declaimed,  and  newspapers  teemed  with  abuse. 
Whence  all  this,  if  the  object  had  not  been  to  engage 
us  in  the  war  ?  Had  France,  as  she  pretended,  been  de 
sirous  of  our  remaining  in  peace,  whence  all  this  rage 
at  the  measure,  the  only  possible  object  of  which  was  to 
preserve  peace  ?  That  such  was  her  object  is  more 
over  manifest  from  the  measures  themselves  which  she 
wished  us  to  adopt;  for  it  is  impossible  to  suppose  her 
government  ignorant  of  the  direct  and  necessary  ten 
dency  of  these  measures  to  bring  us  into  a  quarrel 
with  England. 


.192          MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

Tn  the  first  place,  she  wished  us  to  resist  and  repel 
the  right,  .claimed  and  exercised  by  the  British  govern 
ment  under  the  law  of  nations,  of  taking  the  property 
of  their  enemies,  on  board  of  our  ships.  She  constant 
ly  urged  us,  not  only  to  deny  this  right,  but  to  resist  its 
exercise  in  an  efficacious  manner.  But  could  she 
have  imagined  that  England  would  yield  this  right  to 
us  ?  She  knew  that  the  English,  when  France,  Spain, 
Holland  and  the  United  States,  were  in  arms  against 
them  alone,  had  refused  to  yield  it,  though  pressed  by 
the  formidable  combination  of  all  the  neutral  powers, 
with  the  empress  of  Russia  at  their  head:  a  combina 
tion,  supported  too  by  the  united  maritime  strength  of 
Prussia,  Sweden  and  Denmark.  She  knew  that  after 
the  American  war,  Russia,  whose  treaty  with  England 
expired  in  1786,  and  who,  as  a  power  desirous  of  ex 
tending  its  navigation,  was  extremely  desirous  of  this 
concession,  had  never  been  able  to  obtain  it  from  Eng 
land. 

Sir,  England  has  constantly  refused  it  to  the  formida 
ble  fleet,  the  immense  strength,  the  overbearing  influ 
ence,  and  the  wise  and  vigorous  government  of  the 
empress  of  Russia.  She  has  constantly  refused  it  to 
the  united  solicitations  of  Sweden  and  Denmark  and 
the  Hanse  towns ;  though  she  has  carried  on  a  very 
extensive  and  important  commerce  with  all  these  na 
tions.  She  has  constantly  refused  it,  in  time  of  peace, 
to  all  of  them.  To  France,  indeed,  she  conceded  it  in 
1780,  because  she  gained  great  equivalents,  and 
had  no  interest  in  withholding  it  from  her ;  as  she 
could  never  expect  to  be  engaged  in  a  war  without 
having  France  for  her  enemy ;  and  in  that  case  the 
stipulation  could  not  operate.  But  what  did  she  say 
to  those  nations  who  might  remain  at  peace,  while  she 
and  France  should  be  at  war — such  as  the  Russians, 
Swedes,  Danes,  and  Hanse  towns  ?  She  said,  "  I  will 
never J  relinquish  this  right  to  you ;  because  it  would 
enable  you  to  become  the  carriers  of  France,  whenever 
is  at  war  with  me;  and  she  will  thereby  be  ena- 


J  HE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  493 

bled,  in  her  turn,  to  employ  all  her  ships  and  sailors  in 
attacking  my  commerce,  while  hers  will  be  safe  under 
a  neutral  flag."  In  the  year  1793,  indeed,  when  Rus 
sia  entered  into  the  coalition  against  France,  Britain 
made  a  temporary  cession  to  her  of  this  right,  because 
the  reason,  for  which  it  had  been  withheld,  could  not 
operate,  while  Russia  as  well  as  England  was  at  war 
with  France :  but  even  then  she  would  not  entirely  re 
linquish  it.  All  this  France  perfectly  well  knew ;  and 
knowing  it,  could  she  suppose,  that  England,  would 
relinquish  this  right  to  us,  who  had  not  a  single  ship  of 
war,  when  she  had  refused  it  to  the  vast  force  of  the 
armed  neutrality — that  what  she  had  refused  to  so 
many  powerful  nations  she  would  yield  to  a  people, 
who,  though  possessing  vast  resources,  could  not  call 
them  into  action  without  great  injury  to  themselves,  and 
much  delay — that  what  she  had  refused  in  time  of  peace, 
she  wouLd  surrender  in  a  war,  where  not  only  her  suc 
cess,  but  her  very  existence,  depended  on  the  support 
of  her  naval  power ;  and  surrender  it  too  to  that  very  na 
tion,  which  possessing  the  greatest  number  of  ships  and 
sailors,  was  most  capable  of  exercising  the  right  to 
her  injury  and  destruction  ?  No,  France  expected  no 
such  thing.  She  knew,  that  England  would  not  sur 
render  the  right ;  and  when  she  so  warmly  and  pertina 
ciously  urged  us  to  resist  the  exercise  of  it,  she  could 
have  had  no  other  view  than  to  set  the  two  countries  to 
quarrelling.  England,  she  well  knew,  would  not  yield, 
Should  we  persist,  a  war  must  immediately  take  place. 
The  same,  sir,  will  apply  to  the  measures  she  wished 
us  to  adopt,  respecting  the  impressment  of  seamen  in 
our  ships.  It  is  well  known,  that  England  insists  on  a 
principle,  by  which  all  persons  once  her  subjects  al 
ways  remain  so,  unless  the  right  to  their  allegiance 
has  been  given  up  by  the  government  itself.  This  is 
the  case  with  all  persons  born  in  the  United  States,  or 
settled  in  them  at  the  treaty  of  peace.  From  these  she 
claims  no  allegiance.  But  such  as  have  come  here 
tsince  the  treaty,  she  still  considers  as  her  subjects,  and 


494          MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

claims  the  right  of  treating  them  as  such,  whenever  she 
finds  them  on  her  own  territory,  or  on  the  high  seas,  the 
common  territory  of  nations.  Of  this  description  there 
are  numbers  of  sailors  on  board  of  our  ships,  and  she 
claims  a  right  to  impress  them.  This  right  I  do  not 
mean  to  defend ;  I  know  that  in  its  exercise  it  is  liable 
to  great  abuse,  and  is  particularly  inconvenient  to  this 
country ;  but  it  is  claimed  and  exercised  by  France 
herself,  and  by  every  other  nation,  as  well  as  England. 
Yet  France  has  constantly  urged  us  to  resist  the  exer 
cise  of  it  by  England.  We  have  done  every  thing 
in  our  power  to  induce  England  to  renounce  it,  and 
not  succeeding  in  that,  we  have  taken  all  proper  steps 
to  remedy  and  prevent  its  abuse.  But  this  does  not 
satisfy  France ;  she  urges  us  to  resist  the  right  itself. 
Why  ? — Because  she  supposes  that  England  will  yield 
it?  No,  sir,  no  such  thing.  She  well  knows  that 
England  will  not  arid  cannot  yield  it  with  any  regard 
to  her  own  safety:  it  being  of  the  last  importance 
to  her  in  a  war  like  the  present,  where  she  has  every 
thing  staked  on  her  maritime  exertions,  to  prevent  her 
seamen  from  passing  from  hers  into  neutral  ships, 
where  they  get  better  wages,  lighter  duty,  and  are  free 
from  danger.  France  well  knows,  therefore,  that 
England  will  not  yield  this  right,  and  this  is  precisely 
the  reason  why  she  urges  us  to  resist  it :  because  such 
a  resistance  must  immediately  produce  a  quarrel  be 
tween  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 

The  same  spirit  is  visible  in  her  other  demands ;  all 
of  which  tend  to  the  same  point.  She  wished  us  to 
adopt  a  construction  of  the  treaty,  that  would  have 
given  her  complete  possession  of  our  ports,  and  shut 
them  to  England.  She  would  have  armed  vessels,  and 
enlisted  crews,  in  our  country ;  she  would  have  sold 
her  prizes  here ;  she  would  have  taken  the  merchant 
ships  of  England  on  our  shores,  and  in  our  very  rivers ; 
arid  our  courts  must  not  have  interfered.  No  English 
ship  of  war  could  have  entered  our  harbors,  which  she 
would  not  have  expelled,  by  simply  affirming,  that  it 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.      495 

had  made  prize  on  her  citizens,  no  matter  whether 
lately  or  four  years  ago,  whether  in  the  East  Indies, 
the  West  Indies,  Africa  or  Europe.  Could  she  have 
imagined,  that  England  would  see  all  this  partiality,  all 
these  favors  to  its  enemy,  without  anger  and  jealousy  ? 
Could  she  have  imagined,  that  bitter  complaints  or  ir 
ritating  remonstrances  on  the  part  of  that  country, 
would  not  take  place  ?  Certainly  she  could  not.  She 
knew,  that  anger,  jealousy  and  irritation  would  ne 
cessarily  be  excited  :  she  knew,  that  a  system,  which, 
under  the  name  of  neutrality,  would  have  all  the  effect 
of  an  alliance  with  her,  must  produce  resentment  and 
remonstrance  on  the  part  of  England,  and  that  these, 
added  to  the  ancient  animosities  not  yet  extinguished, 
but  heightened  on  the  contrary  by  recent  injuries,  must 
speedily  end  in  hostility. 

Sir,  the  plan  of  ambition  and  aggrandizement,  pur 
sued  by  France  in  Europe,  affords  additional  proofs  of 
her  policy  respecting  this  country.  I  have  no  doubt, 
that  any  gentleman,  who  will  carefully  examine  the 
subject,  will  be  convinced,  that  France  deliberately  at 
tacked  Austria  as  well  as  England,  and  of  her  own 
accord,  and,  in  pursuance  of  a  regular  system  of  poli 
cy,  lighted  up  the  flames  of  the  present  war.  I  shall 
not,  however,  stop  to  examine  that  question,  which 
would  require  a  minute  and  tedious  detail  of  facts, 
and  is  by  no  means,  essentially  necessary  in  the  pre 
sent  deliberation.  Whether  France  began  the  war 
from  projects  of  dominion,  or  was  driven  into  it  for 
the  defence  of  her  independence,  is,  in  some  degree, 
unimportant  at  present ;  since  it  is  perfectly  evident, 
and  has  indeed  been  admitted  on  all  sides,  that  with 
whatever  motives  the  war  began,  it  has  long  since 
been  a  mere  contest  for  power.  In  this  contest, 
France,  having  detached  Prussia  from  the  alliance, 
enslaved  Belgium,  subjugated  Holland,  and  obtained 
an  absolute  control  over  the  government  and  forces 
of  Spain,  found  her  progress  resisted  by  nothing  but 
the  firm  persevering  courage  of  Austria  on  one  side, 


496         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

and  the  vast  maritime  power  of  England  on  the  other. 
Accordingly,  she  bent  all  her  efforts  to  weaken  and 
destroy  these  two  powers,  and  left  nothing  un attempt 
ed  to  divide  them*  She  made  continual  efforts  to  in 
duce  the  Turks  to  fall  on  the  house  of  Austria  on  one 
side,  and  to  arm  Prussia  against  it  on  the  other.  She 
offered  to  divide  its  spoils  with  Prussia,  in  order  to 
engage  the  avarice  and  ambition  of  that  rival  power, 
by  whose  assistance  she  might  break  the  strength  of 
Austria,  arid  then  rule  both,  with  the  rest  of  Germany. 
As  the  fear  of  Russia  has  kept  the  king  of  Prussia  in 
awe,  and  restrained  his  enterprises,  she  has  left  no 
stone  unturned,  to  lull  the  new  emperor  of  Russia  into 
security,  and  obtain  his  acquiescence.  By  thus  rais 
ing  up  enemies  against  Austria  on  every  side,  and 
pressing  upon  it  at  the  same  time  with  her  whole  mili 
tary  force,  she  is  attempting  to  compel  it  to  relinquish 
a  large  part  of  its  territories,  and  make  a  peace  sepa 
rate  from  England.  But  she  constantly  refuses  either 
to  give  up  her  own  conquests,  or  to  make  a  peace  in 
which  both  England  and  Austria  should  be  included. 
The  policy  of  this  is  obvious  and  important.  Could 
she,  after  having  stripped  and  weakened  Austria,  suc 
ceed  in  detaching  it  from  England,  she  would  be  left 
free  to  turn  her  whole  undivided  force  against  that  ri 
val  nation,  so  long  the  great  object  of  her  jealousy  and 
hatred,  and  whose  maritime  superiority,  it  has  been 
her  policy,  for  a  century,  to  reduce.  In  the  meantime, 
she  leaves  nothing  unattempted  to  accomplish  this 
purpose ;  and  knowing  that  the  naval  strength  and  pe 
cuniary  resources  of  the  English  depend  on  their  trade, 
she  resolves  to  assail  their  trade  in  all  possible  ways. 
Hence  her  former  and  recent  attempts  to  exclude 
English  vessels  from  every  port.  Hence  her  instruc 
tions  to  Genet  to  draw  us  into  an  alliance,  one  condi 
tion  of  which  is  to  be  the  exclusion  of  English  vessels 
from  our  ports.  Hence  her  threats  to  Portugal  of  an 
invasion  by  Spain,  unless  English  vessels  are  excluded 
from  the  Portuguese  ports.  Hence  her  recent  at- 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  497 


tempts  of  the  same  kind  on  Denmark  and  the  Hanse 
towns. 

To  the  success  of  this  project  against  the  com 
merce  and  navy  of  England,  the  aid  of  the  United 
States  is  of  the  highest  importance,*  and  is  so  consi 
dered  by  France.  I  have  it  from  the  highest  authori 
ty,  that  the  plan  of  a  maritime  coalition  against  Eng 
land,  was  early  formed  by  France ;  that  to  the  comple 
tion  of  it  the  accession  of  the  United  States  was  alone 
wanting ;  and  that  that  accession  was  requested  and 
refused.  The  pretence  of  this  coalition,  was  to  reduce 
the  exorbitant  maritime  power  of  England,  and  pre 
vent  her  tyranny  over  the  other  commercial  states. 
The  object  of  it  was,  and  the  certain  effect  of  it  if  suc 
cessful  would  have  been,  to  break  down  England ;  by 
which  means  France,  who  came  next  to  her  in  naval 
power,  would  have  been  left  to  reign  unrivalled  and 
uncontrolled  in  her  stead.  The  United  States  would 
have  been  the  most  important  member  of  this  coali 
tion.  The  great  number  of  their  ships  and  sailors 
would  have  enabled  them  to  become  the  carriers  of 
France,  while  she  should  employ  all  her  maritime  re 
sources  in  attacking  England.  Their  privateers  also 
would  have  struck  a  deadly  blow  at  the  English  com 
merce  ;  and  the  use  of  their  resources  and  their  ports 
to  France  would  have  given  her  a  decided  superiority 
in  the  West  Indies,  and  obliged  the  English  to  send 
so  great  a  force  there,  as  greatly  to  weaken  their  ope 
rations  every  where  else.  Hence  it  is  evident  that 
France  could  have  no  ally  so  important  to  her,  in  the 
naval  war  against  England,  as  the  United  States.  In 
deed,  without  their  assistance,  she  could  have  no  hopes 
of  success  in  the  West  Indies.  Accordingly  she  took 
steps  to  secure  this  assistance,  as  soon  as  she  be 
gan  to  form  her  project  against  England,  and  has  pur 
sued  them  ever  since  with  the  most  unwearied  perse 
verance,  and  by  every  expedient  of  threats,  promise?, 
flatteries,  fraud  and  intrigue. 

VOL.  i.  63 


49,8         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

It  being,  as  I  conceive,  perfectly  manifest  from  all 
these  considerations,  that  the  plan  of  France  has  al 
ways  been  to  draw  us  into  the  war ;  the  house  is  fur 
nished  with  a  ready  solution  of  her  anger  against  the 
British  treaty,  and  a  clue  to  all  her  present  measures. 
It  is  evident,  that  her  anger  at  the  treaty  has  arisen 
entirely,  from  its  having  defeated  her  plan  of  drawing 
us  into  the  war ;  and  it  will  readily  appear,  that  the 
whole  aim  and  object  of  her  present  measures  are  to 
compel  us  to  renounce  it ;  to  drive  us  into  that  quarrel 
with  England,  into  which  she  has  failed  in  her  attempts 
to  entice  us.  She  must  either  mean  this,  or  she  must 
mean  seriously  to  attack  us,  and  drive  us  into  a  war 
against  herself.  To  discover  which  of  these  is  her 
real  object,  what  is  the  true  motive  of  her  present 
measures,  is  of  the  utmost  importance ;  because  till 
that  is  done,  it  will  be  difficult  to  determine,  in  what 
manner  those  measures  ought  to  be  counteracted, 
which  is  the  point  immediately  under  consideration. 
I  can  never  believe,  that  it  is  the  intention  of  France 
seriously  to  attack  this  country,  or  to  drive  it  into  a 
war  against  herself.  She  has  too  much  to  lose  and 
too  little  to  gain  by  such  a  contest,  to  have  seriously 
resolved  on  it,  or  even  to  wish  it.  In  her  counsels,  I 
have  observed  great  wickedness,  but  no  folly ;  and  it 
would  be  the  extreme  of  folly  in  her  to  compel  this 
country  to  become  her  enemy;  especially  in  the  pre 
sent  war,  when  we  can  throw  so  formidable  a  weight 
into  the  opposite  scale.  France  well  knows  our  pow 
er  in  that  respect,  and  will  not  compel  us  to  exert  it. 
She  well  knows,  that  we  possess  more  ships  and  more 
seamen  than  any  country  upon  earth  except  England 
alone.  She  well  knows,  that  our  sailors  are  the  most 
brave,  skilful  and  enterprizing  in  the  world,  and,  that  by 
arming  our  vessels,  our  commerce  would  soon  be  made 
to  float  safe  from  privateers;  while  her  fleets  and 
large  ships  would  be  kept  in  awe  by  those  of  England. 
She  knows  that  in  the  late  war,  the  state  of  Massa 
chusetts  alone,  with  its  privateers,  took  one  third  of  all 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  499 

the  merchant  ships  of  Great  Britain ;  and  that,  though 
she  had  no  commerce  to  be  attacked,  these  maritime 
materials,  greatly  increased  since  that  time,  would  ena 
ble  us,  if  driven  to  the  necessity,  to  create  speedily  a 
formidable  marine,  with  which  we  could,  not  only  de 
fend  ourselves,  but  attack  her  possessions.  She  knows, 
that  we  have  a  population  not  far  short  of  six  millions, 
and  that  the  martial  spirit,  which  conducted  us  glori 
ously  through  the  trying  scenes  of  the  late  war,  though 
dormant  indeed,  could  not  have  been  extinguished. 
She  knows,  that  by  co-operating  with  the  English,  (a 
co-operation  which  must  result  naturally  from  our  be 
ing  driven  into  the  war.)  by  opening  our  harbors  to 
their  ships,  permitting  them  to  arm,  refit  and  victual  in 
our  ports,  to  recruit  among  our  seamen,  and  to  em 
ploy  our  vessels  as  transports,  we  could  give  them  a 
most  decided  preponderance  in  the  American  seas, 
under  which  her  own  colonies,  and  those  of  Spain  arid 
Holland,  which  she  most  justly  considers  as  her  own, 
must  speedily  fall. 

She  knows,  that  in  case  of  a  war  with  us,  Spain  and 
Holland,  who  must  be  her  allies,  would  be  within  our 
grasp.  She  knows  that  the  Americans  could  and 
would  lay  hold  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  and 
that  they  are  well  acquainted  with  the  road  to  Mexico  ; 
and  she  would  dread  that  enterprizing  valor,  which 
formerly  led  them  through  barren  wilds  and  frozen 
mountains,  to  the  walls  of  Quebec.  She  knows,  in  fine, 
that  to  drive  this  country  into  a  war  with  her  at  the 
present  juncture,  would  bring  about  that  co-operation 
of  means,  and  that  union  of  interests  and  views  be 
tween  us  and  the  English,  which  it  has  been  the  great 
object  of  her  policy  to  prevent,  and  which  she  had  un 
dertaken  two  wars,  in  the  course  of  half  a  century,  for 
the  sole  and  express  purpose  of  breaking.  It  is,  there 
fore,  I  think,  impossible  to  conceive,  that  France 
means  to  drive  or  provoke  us  into  war.  Her  object, 
in  my  opinion,  must  be  altogether  different.  It  must 


500        MR.  HARPER'S   SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

be  to  compel  us  to  renounce  the  British  treaty,  and 
renew  all  our  differences  with  that  nation,  under  cir 
cumstances  of  irritation  which  must  speedily  end  in  a 
rupture.  What  has  led  her  to  form  this  project? 
From  whence  could  she  derive  hopes  of  success  ? 
She  has  been  led  to  form  it,  in  my  opinion,  from  a  per 
suasion,  erroneous  indeed,  but  favored  by  many  ap 
pearances,  that  we  are  a  weak,  pusillanimous  people, 
too  much  devoted  to  gain  to  regard  our  honor,  too 
careful  about  our  property  to  risk  it  in  support  of  our 
rights,  too  much  divided  to  exert  our  strength,  too  dis 
trustful  of  our  own  government  to  defend  it,  too  much 
devoted  to  her  to  repel  her  aggressions  at  the  risk  of 
a  quarrel,  too  much  exasperated  against  England  to 
consent  to  that  co-operation,  which  must  of  necessity 
grow  out  of  resistance  to  France.  Various  occur 
rences  have  combined  to  produce  and  confirm  this 
persuasion,  and  the  forbearance,  which  our  govern 
ment  has  exercised  towards  herself,  is  not  the  least  of 
them.  She  has  seen  us  submit,  with  patience,  to  the 
insults  and  outrages  of  three  successive  ministers,  for 
the  very  least  of  which,  she  would  have  sent  the  minis 
ter  of  any  nation  out  of  her  country,  if  not  to  the  guil 
lotine.  The  minister  of  the  grand  duke  of  Tuscany, 
with  whom  France  had  recently  concluded  a  treaty, 
learning  that  the  daughter  of  Louis  the  Sixteenth  was 
to  be  sent  out  of  the  country,  requested  permission 
to  pay  her  a  visit.  This  request  to  visit  an  unfortu 
nate  young  lady,  the  near  relation  of  his  sovereign, 
and  whose  tender  age  no  less  than  her  sex,  her  vir 
tues  and  her  calamities,  entitled  her  to  respect,  was 
answered  by  an  order  from  the  directory,  to  quit  the 
territories  of  the  republic.  His  expression  of  a  wish 
to  show  one  mark  of  regard  to  virtuous  misfortune 
and  suffering  innocence,  was  considered  as  an  affront 
by  the  government  of  France,  and  punished  by  the  in 
stant  dismissal  of  the  minister.  Accustomed  to  act 
thus  herself,  how  can  she  impute  our  long  suffering  and 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  501 

forbearance,  under  the  perpetual  insolence  and  insults 
of  her  ministers,  to  any  thing  but  weakness,  pusilla 
nimity,  or  a  blind  devotedness  to  herself?  The  con 
duct  of  gentlemen  on  this  floor  too  has  more  and  more 
confirmed  her  in  this  injurious  opinion  of  us  ;  has 
confirmed  her  in  the  erroneous  persuasion,  that  there 
is  a  party  in  the  very  bosom  of  the  government,  devot 
ed  to  her  interests.  I  do  not  mean  to  charge  gentle 
men  with  acting  under  French  influence.  I  am  per 
suaded  that,  in  the  course  they  have  taken,  they  be 
lieved  themselves  to  be  aiming  at  the  good  of  their 
country,  which  they  supposed  might  best  be  promoted 
in  the  manner  recommended  by  them.  But  I  would 
ask  those  gentlemen,  and  I  solemnly  call  on  them  to 
lay  their  hands  on  their  hearts  and  answer  me — I 
would  ask  them  whether  the  course  of  conduct,  which 
they  have  pursued,  is  not  calculated  to  impress  France 
with  a  belief,  that  they  are  devoted  to  her  interests  and 
not  to  those  of  their  own  country  ?  Whether  the  man 
ner,  in  which  they  have  always  connected  the  interests 
and  wishes  of  France  with  their  opposition  to  the 
measures  of  this  government,  does  not  necessarily 
tend  to  create  and  confirm  this  belief?  When  she 
saw  them  constantly  making  it  a  ground  of  opposi 
tion  to  measures,  that  they  would  be  hurtful  or  dis 
pleasing  to  her;  constantly  supporting  those  plans 
which  she  was  desirous  of  seeing  adopted;  constantly 
opposing  all  that  she  opposed ;  what  could  she  infer, 
but  that  they  were  a  party  devoted  to  her  views  ?  As 
she  knows  their  numbers  and  importance,  and  has 
these  apparently  strong  reasons  for  relying  on  their 
attachment,  what  can  she  conclude,  but  that  however 
unable  they  may  be  to  direct  the  government  accord 
ing  to  her  wishes,  they  will  be  ready  and  able  so  to 
clog  its  operations,  as  to  prevent  it  from  adopting  or 
pursuing  vigorous  measures  against  her?  She  no 
doubt  does  believe,  and  there  is  evidence  of  the  fact 
from  the  most  respectable  quarter,  our  minister  in 


o02        MR.  HARPER'S   SPEECH  ON  RESISTING 

that  country,  that  she  has  nothing  to  do  but  press 
hard  on  the  government,  in  order  to  lay  it,  bound  hand 
and  foot,  at  the  feet  of  this  party,  by  means  of  which, 
she  might  then  govern  the  country.  She  is  further 
confirmed  in  this  belief  by  the  conduct  of  the  people 
of  this  country,  by  their  warm  partiality  for  her  cause 
and  her  nation,  by  their  enthusiastic  exultation  in  her 
victories,  and  the  fond,  sympathizing  sorrow  with 
which  they  mourn  her  disasters.  Mistaking  the  source 
of  these  generous  emotions,  she  has  seen  in  them  no 
thing  but  the  proof  of  a  slavish  devotedness  to  herself, 
which  would  render  this  people  incapable  of  asserting 
their  own  rights,  when  it  must  be  done  at  the  risk  of 
her  displeasure.  She  does  not  know,  nor  can  she  be 
made  to  understand,  that  it  is  the  cause  of  liberty  in 
which  she  is  thought  to  be  struggling,  that  inspires  this 
enthusiasm,  and  that,  should  she  change  her  conduct, 
and  abandon  the  principles  which  she  professes,  these 
generous  well-wishers  would  be  found  among  the  firm 
est  of  her  opposers.  A  similar  mistake  she  commit 
ted  with  respect  to  England,  and  that  mistake  further 
confirmed  her  original  error.  She  saw  much  resent 
ment  excited  by  the  attacks  and  outrages  of  England, 
and  she  supposed  that  resentment  to  be  deep-rooted 
and  durable.  She  did  not  know,  and  could  not  con 
ceive,  that,  when  England  had  given  up  her  injurious 
pretensions  for  the  future,  and  agreed  to  make  a  fair 
and  just  compensation  for  the  past,  we  should  forget 
our  resentments,  and  cherish  sentiments  of  mutual 
and  friendly  intercourse.  She  supposed  these  resent 
ments  to  be  far  more  deeply  rooted,  more  universal, 
and  more  permanent,  than  they  really  are,  and  relies 
on  them  as  a  certain  means  of  preventing  any  union 
of  interests  and  operations  between  us  and  England, 
however  recommended  by  policy  or  even  required  by 
necessity. 

In  all  these  delusions  she  is  confirmed  by  the  con 
duct*  the  speeches,  and  the  writings,  of  persons  in  this 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.      503 

country,  both  our  own  citizens  and  hers ;  by  the  infor 
mation  and  opinions  of  some  of  her  citizens,  who,  hav 
ing  resided  here,  have  carried  home  with  them  those 
erroneous   opinions,  which  foreigners  generally  form 
about  countries  they  visit ;  and  it  is  to  be  feared  by 
the  behaviour  too  of  some  of  our  citizens  in  her  own 
country,  who,  forgetting  the  trust  reposed  in  them,  and 
the  situations  in  which  they  were  placed,  allowed  them 
selves  to  pursue  a  course  of  conduct  and  conversation, 
calculated  to  confirm  France  in  all  her  unfounded  and 
injurious  opinions,  respecting  this  country.     Suppos 
ing,  therefore,  that  the  people  of  this  country  are  un 
willing  to  oppose  her,  arid  the  government  unable; 
that  we  should  prefer  peace  with  submission,  to  the 
risk  of  war ;  that  a  strong  party  devoted  to  her  will 
hang  on  the  government,  and  impede  all  its  measures 
of  reaction ;  and  that,  if  she  should  place  us  by  her 
aggressions  in  a  situation,  where  the  choice  should 
seem  to  lie  between  a  war  with  England  and  a  war 
with  her,  our  hatred  to  England,  joined  to  those  other 
causes,  would  force  us  to  take  the  former  part  of  the 
alternative;  she  has  resolved  on  the  measures  which 
she  is  now  pursuing,  and  the  object  of  which  is  to 
make  us  renounce  the  treaty  with  England,  and  enter 
into  a  quarrel  with  that  nation :  in  fine,  to  effect  by 
force  and  aggressions,  that  which  she  had  attempted 
in  vain  by  four  years  of  intriguing  and  insidious  policy. 
If  such  are  her  objects,  how  was  she  to  be  induced 
to  renounce  them?     By  trifling  concessions  of  this, 
that,  or  the  other  article  of  a  treaty ;  this,  that  or  the 
other  advantage  in  trade  ? — No.     It  seems  to  me  a  de 
lusion  equally  fatal  and  unaccountable,  to   suppose 
that  she  is  to  be  thus  satisfied :  to  suppose  that,  by 
these  inconsiderable  favors  which  she  has  not  even 
asked  for,  she  is  to  be  bought  off  from  a  plan  so 
great  and  important.     It  seems  to  me  the  most  fatal 
and  unaccountable  delusion,  that  can  make  gentlemen 
shut  their  eyes  to  this  testimony  of  every  nation,  to 


504         MR.  HARPER'S  SPEECH  ON   RESISTING 

this  glare  of  light  bursting  in  from  every  side ;  that 
can  render  them  blind  to  the  projects  of  France,  to  the 
Herculean  strides  of  her  overtowering  ambition,  which 
so  evidently  aims  at  nothing  less  than  the  establish 
ment  of  universal  empire,  or  universal  influence,  and 
has  fixed  on  this  country  as  one  of  the  instruments  for 
accomplishing  her  plan. 

It  is  against  this  dangerous  delusion  that  I  wish  to 
warn  the  House  and  the  country.  I  wish  to  warn 
them  not  to  deceive  themselves  with  the  vain  and  fal 
lacious  expectation,  that  the  concessions  proposed  by 
this  amendment  will  satisfy  the  wishes  or  arrest  the 
measures  of  France.  Do  I  dissuade  you  from  these 
concessions  ?  Far  from  it,  I  wish  them  to  be  offered, 
and  in  the  way  the  most  likely  to  give  weight  to  the 
offer.  It  is  a  bridge  which  I  am  willing  to  build,  for 
the  pride  of  France  to  retreat  over ;  but  what  I  wish  to 
warn  the  House  against,  is  the  resting  satisfied  with 
building  the  bridge,  to  the  neglect  of  those  measures 
by  which  France  may  be  induced  to  march  over  it, 
after  it  shall  be  built.  I  wish  to  negociate,  and  I  even 
rely  much  on  success ;  but  the  success  of  the  negocia- 
tion  must  be  secured  on  this  floor.  It  must  be  secur 
ed  by  adopting  firm  language  and  energetic  measures ; 
measures  which  will  convince  France,  that  those  opin 
ions  respecting  this  country,  on  which  her  system  is 
founded,  are  wholly  erroneous  ;  that  we  are  neither  a 
weak,  a  pusillanimous  or  a  divided  people ;  that  we 
are  not  disposed  to  barter  honor  for  quiet,  nor  to  save 
our  money  at  the  expense  of  our  rights :  which  will 
convince  her,  that  we  understood  her  projects,  and  are 
determined  to  oppose  them,  with  all  our  resources,  and 
at  the  hazard  of  all  our  possessions.  This,  I  believe, 
is  the  way  to  insure  success  to  the  negociation ;  and 
without  this  I  shall  consider  it  as  a  measure  equally 
vain,  weak  and  delusive. 

When  France  shall  at  length  be  convinced,  that  we 
are  firmly  resolved  to  call  forth  all  our  resources,  and 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  505 

exert  all  our  strength  to  resist  her  encroachments  and 
aggressions,  she  will  soon  desist  from  them.  She 
need  not  be  told  what  these  resources  are;  she 
well  knows  their  greatness  and  extent ;  she  well 
knows  that  this  country,  if  driven  into  a  war, 
could  soon  become  invulnerable  to  her  attacks,  and 
could  throw  a  most  formidable  and  preponderating 
weight  into  the  scale  of  her  adversary.  She  will  not, 
therefore,  drive  us  to  this  extremity,  but  will  desist  as 
soon  as  she  finds  us  determined.  I  have  already  touch 
ed  on  our  means  of  injuring  France,  and  of  repelling 
her  attacks;  and  if  those  means  were  less  than  they 
are,  still  they  might  be  rendered  all-sufficient,  by  resolu 
tion  and  courage.  It  is  in  these  that  the  strength  of 
nations  consists,  and  not  in  fleets,  nor  armies,  nor  popu 
lation,  nor  money:  in  the  "unconquerable  will — the 
courage  never  to  submit  or  yield."  These  are  the  true 
sources  of  national  greatness ;  aud  to  use  the  words  of 
a  celebrated  writer,— "  where  these  means  are  not 
wanting,  all  others  will  be  found  or  created."  It  was 
by  these  means  that  Holland,  in  the  days  of  her  glory, 
triumphed  over  the  mighty  power  of  Spain.  It  is  by 
these,  that  in  latter  times,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
present  war,  the  Swiss,  a  people,  not  half  so  numerous 
as  we,  and  possessing  few  of  our  advantages,  have 
honorably  maintained  their  neutrality  amid  the  shock 
of  surrounding  states,  and  against  the  haughty  ag 
gressions  of  France  herself.  The  Swiss  have  not  been 
without  their  trials.  They  had  given  refuge  to  many 
French  emigrants,  whom  their  vengeful  and  implacable 
country  had  driven  and  pursued  from  state  to  state,  and 
whom  it  wished  to  deprive  of  their  last  asylum  in  the 
mountains  of  Switzerland.  The  Swiss  were  required 
to  drive  them  away,  under  the  pretence  that  to  afford 
them  a  retreat  was  contrary  to  the  laws  of  neutrality. 
They  at  first  temporized  and  evaded  the  demand: 
France  insisted ;  and  finding  at  length  that  evasion  was 
useless,  they  assumed  a  firm  attitude,  and  declared  that 
VOL.  i.  64 


506         Mfc.  HARPER'S  SPEECH   ON  RESISTING 

having  afforded  an  asylum  to  those  unfortunate  exiles, 
which  no  law  of  neutrality  forbade,  they  would  protect 
them  in  it  at  every  hazard.  France,  finding  them  thus  re 
solved,  gave  up  the  attempt.     This  was  effected  by 
that  determined  courage,  which  alone  can  make  a  na 
tion  great  or  respectable :  and  this  effect  has  invariably 
been  produced  by  the  same  cause,  in  every  age  and 
every  clime.     It  was  this  that  made  Rome  the  mistress 
of  the  world,  and  Athens  the  protectress  of  Greece. 
When  was  it  that  Rome  attracted  most  strongly  the 
admiration  of  mankind,  and  impressed  the  deepest 
sentiment  of  fear  on  the  hearts  of  her  enemies  ?     It 
was  when  seventy  thousand  of  her  sons  lay  bleeding  at 
Cannae,  and  Hannibal,  victorious  over  three  Roman 
armies   and  twenty  nations,  was  thundering  at  her 
gates.     It  was  then  that  the  young  and  heroic  Scipio, 
having  sworn  on  his  sword  in  the  presence  of  the  fathers 
of  the  country,  not  to  despair  of  the  republic,  marched 
forth  at  the  head  of  a  people,  firmly  resolved  to  con 
quer  or  die :  and  that  resolution  insured  them  the  victo 
ry.     When  did  Athens  appear  the   greatest  and  the 
most  formidable  ?    It  was  when  giving  up  their  houses 
and  possessions  to  the  flames  of  the  enemy,  and  having 
transferred  their  wives,  their  children,  their  aged  pa 
rents,  and  the  symbols  of  their  religion  on  board  of 
their  fleet,  they  resolved  to  consider  themselves  as  the 
republic,  and  their  ships  as  their  country.     It  was  then 
they  struck  that  terrible  blow,  under  which  the  great 
ness  of  Persia  sunk  and  expired. 

These  means,  sir,  and  many  others  are  in  our  power. 
Let  us  resolve  to  use  them,  and  act  so  as  to  convince 
France  that  we  have  taken  the  resolution,  and  there 
is  nothing  to  fear.  This  conviction  will  be  to  us  in 
stead  of  fleets  and  armies,  and  even  more  effectual. 
Seeing  us  thus  prepared  she  will  not  attack  us.  Then 
will  she  listen  to  our  peaceable  proposals ;  then  will 
she  accept  the  concessions  we  mean  to  offer.  But 
should  this  offer  not  be  thus  supported,  should  it  be  at- 


THE  AGGRESSIONS  OF  FRANCE.  507 

tended  by  any  circumstances  from  which  she  can  dis 
cover  weakness,  distrust  or  division,  then  will  she  re 
ject  it  with  derision  and  scorn.  I  view  in  the  proposed 
amendment  circumstances  of  this  kind;  and  for  that, 
among  other  reasons  shall  vote  against  it.  I  shall  vote 
against  it  not  because  I  am  for  war,  but  because  I  am 
for  peace ;  and  because  I  see  in  this  amendment  itself, 
and  more  especially  in  the  course  to  which  it  points, 
the  means  of  impeding,  instead  of  promoting  our  pacific 
endeavors.  And  let  it  be  remembered,  that  when  we 
give  this  vote,  we  vote  not  only  on  the  peace  of  our 
country,  but  on  what  is  far  more  important,  its  rights 
and  its  honor. 


END    OF   VOL.    I. 


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Iwilliston,   E.B. 

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